PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
Well, we now see how the peace agreement which ends the war in Bosnia (at least for now) is hashed out in Split Croatia. Problems arise (just as in OTL in Dayton) but unlike with Dayton, the Americans are not as well schooled in Balkan politics and Walter Mondale proves to be no Warren Christopher in the negotiating room. With the Croats now seen as an American ally and the Serbs now seen as a Russia ally, the Bosnians are almost looked at as a side note (with tragic consequences for the Bosnian nation). With Bosnia clearly screwed, this adds to the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, and gives birth to a new conspiracy theory that we will start to see emerge in places like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in later posts: that the American and Russians are secretly aligned to destroy the Muslim world together. Although few Arab and Muslim governments take this conspiracy theory seriously, it grows strong with terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and in madrassas throughout Pakistan (where UIS intervention is proving costly). But I am getting ahead of myself; first we have the much maligned Split Peace Treaty…
Some new names in this update…
Madeline Albright
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madeline_Albright
Alex Bessmertnykh
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bessmertnykh
The Croatian Defense Counsel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_Defence_Council
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alija_Izetbegovi%C4%87
The Lora Prison Camp in Split, Croatia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lora_prison_camp
The Jasenovac Concentration Camp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasenovac_concentration_camp
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the Split Peace Accord negotiations between Croatia, Yugoslavia, the United States, and the UIS from March 1 to March 13, 1993.
BBC: Critics of the UIS often point to the rather dismissive attitude many of the UIS leaders had during the negotiations in Croatia during the Spilt accord. You have repeatedly rejected this criticism and claimed in your book that the UIS was the driving force for a cessation of hostilities and in fact was determined to end the conflict at all costs.
Putin: Yes. We were determined to see the conflict end. We knew that if a peace deal wasn’t reached it would only be a matter of time before the Serbs and Croats started going after each other, and if that happened it would be the Korean War all over again. We would see UN troops fighting Serb and Russian forces, with high casualties all around and the world on the constant brink of nuclear war.
BBC: But what of Secretary of State Mondale’s assertion in 1997 that the “Russians had no interest in being there in Split?”
Putin: What about it? He is trying to cover face for the fact that he couldn’t control the Croats during the negotiations. He is trying to hide the fact that he couldn’t do what we were able to do. We kept Milošević, Karadžić and Mladic under our thumb. He was unable to do the same with Tudjman and Boban.
BBC: But many people point to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky was on vacation in the Crimea for nearly two weeks during the negotiations and never once even spoke publically on the progress of the peace negotiations as proof that the UIS was never really committed to peace.
Putin: That is absurd! The reason Zhirinovsky never arrived in Split is because General Lebed placed him under virtual house arrest during the negotiations! He knew Zhirinovsky would blow it if he opened his mouth so he sent him to the Crimea and prohibited the media from talking to him for the two weeks that we were in Split negotiating the peace agreement!
BBC: That seems very suspicious. You are saying that 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense put the President of Russia under house arrest?!
Putin: That is exactly what I am saying.
MSNBC interview with Robert Strauss, American ambassador to the UDR and UIS
December 10, 2001
MSNBC: You received a great deal of criticism, even from Republicans, over your response to the Split Peace Accord. Most notably when you said “based on the terms of this agreement, it is hard to understand why Secretary of State Mondale would consider this a victory. We could have gotten better terms had nobody shown up on our behalf.”
Strauss: Yes. I took quite the beating for that. But I was shocked at the terms of the agreement. It basically rewarded the Serbs and Croats for what they did in Bosnia. Bosnia was split down the middle, and the Bosnians were left with almost nothing in their own country.
MSNBC: You also famously predicted that war would break out again in Bosnia within ten years.
Strauss: Yes, and I prayed every day that I would be proven wrong on that. I for one was not happy that my warnings proved prophetic in 1997.
MSNBC: Many defenders of the Split Peace Accord point to that fact that it was the best that could be worked out under the circumstances. The Croatians refused to withdraw from central Bosnia unless the UIS agreed to withdraw from Krajina, and the Serbs refused to withdraw from Srebrenica unless the Bosnians agreed to the independence of the Republic Srpska. They argue that a cease fire was the best that could be worked out under those circumstances.
Strauss: Sometimes no peace is preferable to a bad peace.
MSNBC: So you are suggesting that the Americans should have walked away from the table?!
Strauss: No, but I do think that the United States could have taken a leadership role in the negotiations and not let it turn into a circus. First of all, Mondale should not have agreed to the negotiations being held in Split. Emotions were too raw to hold it in a Croatian city like Split. Having the peace negotiations there was a terrible, terrible idea. It put the Serbs and Bosnians on the defensive from the start. Second, we should have walked away from the table when it became clear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Russia was not part of the peace negotiations. We held firm that the UIS was not a nation, and that Russia was occupying central and eastern Croatia. Our refusal to hold firm on that one, critical principle badly weakened our credibility. We never capitulated to the North Koreans demand on unilateral peace talks; we should have shown similar backbone in regards to the Russians. Had we shown more resolve, had we walked away from the table, it may have changed how they approached the negotiations.
MSNBC: Or it could have encouraged the Russians and Serbs to attack Croatia and start World War III.
Strauss (long pause): Yes. It could have ended in disaster as well. But we needed to remain firm if we honestly expected a lasting peace.
Excerpts from the book: “Croatia: The Nation That Almost Was”
By Steven Martinovic
Published by University of California Press, © 2009.
Chapter Six: The Split Peace Accords
For Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian victory in Bosnia gave his administration a badly needed boost after the disaster of the brief war the previous year with the UIS. Tudjman’s offer to host peace negotiations in the costal city of Split was readily agreed upon by NATO and even the UIS, despite strong objections from both the Serb and Bosnian delegation. However, although the Americans hoped that Tudjman would not politicize the negotiations for domestic consumption, it soon became apparent that the he was doing just that.
“There was a severe lack of understanding on the part of the American delegation in regards to the significance of holding the negotiations in Split,” commented Gilbert Cohen, an aid to Secretary of State Mondale, “and with the exception of Deputy Secretary of State Madeline Albright, nobody saw the red flags that, in hindsight, should have been obvious.”
As soon as the American delegation arrived in Split, problems emerged when the Croatian President visited the Lora Prison Camp in Split. The camp, which was used as a Croatian prisoner of war camp, had been slated to be decommissioned as part of the initial ceasefire with the UIS and the Republic of Krajina in 1992. However, with the exception of the release of a small number of Ukrainian and Serb prisoners, no steps had been taken to decommission the camp. Although the UIS and the Serb delegation had been willing initially to overlook the presence of Serb and Russian POW’s just a few kilometers away, the image of President Tudjman on the local news visiting with guards and prisoners (including several Russian POWs) enraged both the Serb and UIS delegates to the point that Secretary of State Mondale had to beg his Russian counterpart, Alexander Bessmertnykh, not to return to Moscow that afternoon. The Bosnian delegation was also badly shaken when Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban arrived in town with over 3,500 troops. Treated to a heroes welcome, the arrival of Boban and the Croatian Defense Council caused a stir locally, with residents greeting them as liberators, much to the chagrin of the Bosnians.
“Split had been flooded with refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina,” Cohen added, “for many of them Boban was seen as a hero. But there were also over 50,000 Bosniak refugees in Split too. They fled to Split before relations between the Bosnian federal government and the Bosnian Croats collapsed. In fact, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović was meeting with some of these refugees when word of Boban’s arrival reached him, and needless to say, he was not at all pleased.”
The parade through the center of town prompted Izetbegović to announce that the Bosnian delegation would be returning to Bosnia immediately, and that they would not return to the table until the Croatian government apologized for the perceived slight. American Secretary of State Mondale was again forced to do damage control, calling President Izetbegović and begging him to remain at the table, despite the fact that both Boban and Tudjman made it abundantly clear that no apology would be forthcoming.
The arrival of Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and the Croatian Defense Counsel (HVO) electrified the residence of Split, Croatia (photo courtesy of the University of California Press)
A Split Decision: An American diplomat remembers the peace negotiation that ended the Bosnian Civil War
Foreign Affairs (07/01/2010)
By Timothy Welch
Walter Mondale during negotiations in Split, Croatia. (March 1993)
Madeline Albright still remembers how worn out Secretary of State Walter Mondale appeared as he proudly announced that the Split Peace Accords were now underway. The 65-year old former vice president had been up for most of the night trying to mend fences with both the UIS and Bosnian delegation over a series of perceived slights from their Croatian hosts, and as the room stood and applauded the announcement that peace negotiations were now underway, there still was a sense of gloom from the Deputy Secretary of State.
“I knew that this was going to be a long, drawn out affair,” Albright recalled, “and that we were now going into things at a disadvantage. I told Secretary Mondale that we would be better served to reschedule the accord for later in the month. The Italians had offered the city of Trieste as a location to host the negotiations. I thought that would be preferable to hosting them in Split.”
Mondale, however, elected to push ahead, concerned that a delay could threaten the entire peace process.
“I hate to say this,” Commented Albright, “but I don’t think Secretary Mondale realized what he was in for. I really think that he was going into the negotiations thinking that he, a former vice president and former presidential candidate, would just awe everyone into submission. I think he assumed that he’d be able to take control of the proceedings on the power of his personality and based on his impressive resume.”
However, as soon as those in attendance took their seats, the fireworks began, giving Mondale little opportunity to ease into negotiations on a positive note. Almost immediately, the Serbian delegation began by protesting the role of the Ustaše in World War II and the prominent role that Split held during the reign of the Croatian fascist state during that conflict.
“I warned him that he had no idea the can of worms that had just been opened in Bosnia,” Albright said angrily, “and I warned him not to let the Serbs hijack the proceedings and bring up the Ustaše. But he just sat there looking like a guy who had just been blindsided.”
The Serb delegation, led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, began to speak with even more emotion when they complained about Croatian President Tudjman’s recent visit to the Lora prison camp, an event that had not only made the local Croatian news, but had stirred emotions across Yugoslavia and even inside of Russia itself.
“Once Milosevic started ranting and raving about Lora, I knew we had to get control of the situation immediately,” Albright recalled, “and when UIS delegate Alexander Bessmertnykh told Milosevic to sit down, I recognized immediately what he was really saying. I saw Mondale smile and nod his head to Bessmertnykh, but I knew that Bessmertnykh had just made a vicious accusation against Tudjman and the Croats and made Mondale look like a fool at the same time.”
Bessmertnykh, a former Soviet ambassador to the United States, gently put his hand on the shoulder of Milosevic as he addressed Mondale. He smiled and said that he hoped that the United States would recognize that Tudjman’s visit to the Jasenovac camp was somewhat upsetting for those in the UIS, but that the UIS was committed to working with the Americans and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
“The Ustaše run Jasenovac concentration camp was one of the most horrific concentration camps in Europe during World War II,” added Albright, “and although most Americans wouldn’t have caught the significance of the statement, I immediately recognized what Bessmertnykh was really saying when he switched the word Lora with Jasenovac. I knew we had to condemn that horrible accusation against the Croats before they walked out themselves.”
Albright stood up and began to argue with Bessmertnykh before Mondale angrily told her to take her seat.
“He really thought he was the star and we were all bit players in the Walter Mondale show,” Albright said angrily, “but in that instance Mondale, and in turn the United States, lost all credibility with the Croats. After that it became next to impossible to get the Croats to agree to compromise.”
As soon as Milosevic sat down, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman launched his attack on the former Soviet Union. Tudjman proceeded to stand up and say that the Croats were leaving the negotiating table. He claimed that they (like NATO) didn’t recognize the UIS as a legal entity and that they would only negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The demand caught both Bessmertnykh and Mondale off guard.
“As Tudjman began to storm out of the conference room dozens of Croatians at the table, including Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, stood up and applauded,” Albright recalled, “nobody was expecting the Croats to take that position, especially considering they were the ones who agreed to host the event.”
Mondale quickly jumped to his feet in an attempt to intercept the Croatian delegation, but as the Serb delegation began to gather their belongings, it appeared that the entire peace process would collapse before it even began.
“Mondale turned to Bessmertnykh with a desperate look,” Albright recalled, “but in that moment I realized that, for all his bluster and bravado, Bessmertnykh was as desperate as we were to come to a resolution to the conflict. He looked like a deer caught in the headlights.”
The former Soviet ambassador jumped to his feet to reassure the Serb delegates while Mondale pulled Tudjman aside to consult with him in a separate room.
“I walked over and joined the conversation,” Albright added, “I wish I had the chance to talk to Mondale before he did because he was completely blindsided by what was said next.”
The angry Croatian President proceeded to scold the American Secretary of State for his failure to condemn the Lora prison camp comment, as well as his refusal to stand in unison with the Croats and demand the presence of the Russian president. Mondale tried to reassure Tudjman, but his arguments were falling on deaf ears.
“Tudjman kept saying that these were supposed to be multi-party talks between all belligerents involved in the conflict,” Albright recalled, “and that there was no point in negotiating since there was nobody present to represent the Russians.”
It was at this time that Albright heard a soft knock on the door. As she stepped aside and opened it, she was shocked to see Ambassador Bessmertnykh.
“He told me that by coincidence Russian Secretary of State Gennady Burbulis was scheduled to come and visit with the UIS delegation the following day,” Albright said, “I knew he called Burbulis in desperation during the break and Burbulis agreed to come out. It was a very positive sign, and one I was happy about. It showed me the Russians wanted to deal…badly. And Burbulis was one of the few remaining Yeltsinites left in the Russian government. He was a man that could be reasoned with.”
Albright relayed the message to Secretary Mondale and President Tudjman, but to their dismay, it appeared to have little impact on the Croatian leader.
“He demanded that President Zhirinovsky himself come,” Albright recalled, “he felt that since Russia was a dictatorship that there was no use speaking to the ‘peons’ who controlled nothing.”
The demands made by Tudjman aggravated both Mondale and Albright, who recognized that the Russians would not be dictated to in such a way, especially considering the concession that they had just made.
“At best they could demand that President Kerrey be present for the negotiations as well,” Albright added, “but more likely they would have stormed off. That would have given them just enough to leave the table and argue that they gave it their best effort.”
After nearly thirty minutes of discussions, Tudjman agreed to continue under one condition: unless there was a unilateral withdrawal of UIS recognition of Serbian Krajina as independent from Croatia, there would be no discussions in regards to the UIS Republic of Krajina. They simply would not entertain any discussions over the fate of the Krajina unless the UIS withdrew and recognized that Krajina was part of Croatia. Albright knew that the ultimatum effectively killed any hope of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.
“I just wanted to sink down in my chair when I heard that,” Albright admitted, “the hope was we would reach a tentative agreement where the Krajina would reject UIS membership and agree to a loose federation with Croatia with a possible option on a future referendum on independence. But the Tudjman ultimatum effectively killed that possibility. We were hoping to use the Krajina as a wedge between the Serbs and the Russians, but instead their bond would end up being even stronger. Ultimately Tudjman knew that the Russians would never agree to that, and by making the ultimatum he removed the politically untenable possibility that he might be forced to make any concessions on the status of the Krajina. For him, UIS occupation of the Krajina was better than a compromise that could have led to independence.”
It was not until the second day of negotiations, and the arrival of Russian Secretary of State Burbulis, that the discussion finally reached the issue of Bosnia itself.
“Initially the discussions were over the removal of all foreign troops and the establishment of a collection of cantons, which would have been either Muslim, Croat, or Serb,” Albright recalled, “but this proposal, authored by Cyrus Vance, gained no traction. It quickly became clear that neither the Croats nor the Serbs were willing to withdraw from the territory they had occupied.”
For the Serbs, the fear was that the surrendering of the Srebrenica enclave would destroy any possibility of a separate state, a prospect that was unacceptable to them.
“Under the Owen-Mondale proposal they would have become a patchwork of cantons without a unified common border with Serbia itself or even with each other,” Albright recalled, “Even though they were not promised independence, for the Serbs the cantons would have ensured that independence would never happen. As a result the cantons were a deal killer for them.”
But Albright and Mondale soon realized that they had equal opposition from their Croatian allies.
“The Croats occupied about the same amount of territory in Bosnia that the UIS occupied in central and eastern Croatia,” Albright said, “for them they would not surrender so much as one inch unless the Russians agreed to turn over an equal amount of land in Croatia. But with the Tudjman ultimatum now on the table the Russians were unwilling to discuss anything over the status of the Krajina. They regarded that as outside the scope of the discussions.”
The negotiations reached a standstill as both Croats and Serbs stood in firm opposition to the Vance-Mondale plan. Sadly, Secretary of State Mondale was ill-prepared for a rejection of his plan.
“He really thought it was going to be an acceptable solution,” Albright recalled, “and understandably so. But he failed to recognize that there were so many other factors at play. Once the Vance-Mondale plan fell through the negotiations changed from finding a permanent peace to just finding a workable ceasefire.”
As discussions broke down over the terms of the peace agreement, both Mondale and Burbulis began to focus almost exclusively on a solution that would at least ease the threat of a global war in Bosnia from breaking out. However, Bosnian President Izetbegović now found himself in an untenable position as well: a ceasefire with the current front lines acting as a permanent border was simply unacceptable.
“Over 80% of Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by either the Croats or Serbs,” Albright said, “there was no way he could agree to anything that saw that much of his country outside central government control, even with an agreement to turn over the Bihac pocket to the Bosnian government. He insisted that Bosnia not be turned into a European Transkei (after the apartheid proclaimed black republic in South Africa), but by then it became clear that Bosnia was going to be a casualty of the new Cold War.”
Concerned over the prospect of a major conflict, both Burbulis and Mondale agreed in principle to the recognition of three regions inside of Bosnia: The Republic of Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, and The Republic of Bosnia. The Croatian occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina were declared to be part of the Republic of Herzegovina, despite the fact that the historic borders of Herzegovina didn’t even remotely resemble the newly created republic. The Republic of Srpska would encompass all of the areas that were controlled by the Serbs, even those that had a large Bosniak population, and the remaining areas would be part of the Republic of Bosnia. However, as a concession to Bosnian president Izetbegović, all three of the republics were, in theory, suppose to make up part of a “confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” with no option of secession possible for any entity.
“On paper it preserved the integrity of the Bosnian nation,” Albright said, “but what it really did was destroy the country.”
The Bosnian President initially refused to sign the agreement, announcing that “war was preferable to this.” However, to the shock of Albright and the Americans, the Russians sweetened the pot with several major concessions, even as the Croats refused to make any concessions on their end other than the release of the POWs held at the Lora prison camp.
“Burbulis immediately agreed to surrender both the Bihac pocket and a small amount of territory around Sarajevo to the Bosnian Republic so that the city could be connected to the Bosnian Republic…as long as both were declared United Nations administered regions,” Albright recalled, “and he also agreed to withdraw any Serbian claims to Gorazde as long as it was also administered by the United Nations for a period of ten years.”
The offer of a link to Sarajevo to Bosnia and the demilitarization of the capital city were both significant concessions that initially were met with loud opposition from the Serbian delegation. Although the Serbian controlled areas of south central Sarajevo would still technically remain under Serbian administration, it did little to placate Milosevic and the other Serbian delegates.
“At first Milosevic demanded that the Serb-controlled areas of the proposed UN administered Sarajevo be expanded to include location of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.” Albright recalled, “He called the plaque located at the assassination site a ‘place of tremendous significance for the Serbian people’ and insisted that it be placed under Serbian administration.”
The demand led to a sharp rebuke from the Russian Secretary of State.
“Burbulis slammed his fist on the table and jumped out of his seat,” Albright recalled with a chuckle, “he then screamed ‘I am not wasting any more time over a stupid plaque! I don’t care if it is one of the tablets Moses carried down from Mount Sinai, this issue is settled! I will not waste my time arguing over a plaque just so you Serbs can have a giant wank in front of it!”
The sharp rebuttal from Burbulis stunned Milosevic into silence; however, the issue over the status of Sarajevo would tragically come into play before long.
“The idea of a UN administered city seemed workable at first,” Albright recalled. “The city would still remain technically undivided and was still considered the capital of a unified Bosnia. But deep down we knew that the unresolved status of Sarajevo would come back to haunt us.”
Despite protests from some Bosnian delegates, Izetbegović reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Split Peace Accord, hoping that the status of Bosnia as a unified country would remain as firmly enforced in reality as it was proclaimed in the language of the paperwork. The promise of a return of refugees also motivated him to agree to the terms, hoping that a return to a multi ethnic Bosnia could reestablish federal control over the other so-called ‘republics’ within the country. However, what was clear to many at the table were that battle lines in the new cold war had just been drawn, and Bosnia had just been split down the middle between the United States and the UIS, with little regard for the Bosnians themselves. A little considered provision would prove fatal as all sides agreed to international peacekeepers in the event of a failure of any party to honor the terms of the peace agreement.
“The Republic of Srpska would only allow UIS peacekeepers; while the Republic of Herzegovina would only allow Croatian peace keepers,” Albright said, “within a week of the treaty being signed it was apparent that both the Croats and the Serbs were not done shooting. So the UIS and Croatia both moved into the respective republics, and tore the country apart.”
Neither the Republic of Herzegovina nor the Republic of Srpska took any steps to allow Bosniak refugees to return to their homes, and within ten months the Republic of Herzegovina declared independence from the Confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite Albright’s strong protest, Secretary of State Mondale, who was being badly ridiculed in the media over what was becoming an undeniable failure over Bosnia, refused to take firm action in condemning the move.
“That was when Rush Limbaugh first became a household name,” Albright recalled, “and every day on his radio program he would call the Secretary of State ‘Walter Chamberlain.’ I think it shook him up a lot more than it should have. But by not taking a hard line against the Herzegovinians, we allowed the Russians to solidify their control over the Republic of Srpska.”
By 1997 the breakaway Serbian Republic would become a member of the Union of Independent States.
“In the end, Izetbegović didn’t have a very good hand,” Albright recalled, “but I really don’t think he expected things to go the way they did. He was just hoping to buy some time until the Cold War passed Bosnia over. But tragically for him and the Bosnian people, it never did. I pray that there will never be a World War III, and I pray that there will never be a nuclear war between the United States and the UIS. But if there is it will be because of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. It will be because of some damned silly thing in Bosnia.”
The front lines of Sarajevo prior to the Graz Offensive which saw Serbs capture the Airport and surround the city. As part of the Split Peace Treaty, much of the area norht of Sarajevo was turned over the the Bosnian government.
________________________________________________________________________
The Owen-Mondale plan, which was rejected by both the Croatian and Serbian delegates during the Split Peace Accord. Serbian cantons in RED. Croatian cantons in BLUE.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
The former Yugoslavia after the Split Peace Treaty
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
Well, we now see how the peace agreement which ends the war in Bosnia (at least for now) is hashed out in Split Croatia. Problems arise (just as in OTL in Dayton) but unlike with Dayton, the Americans are not as well schooled in Balkan politics and Walter Mondale proves to be no Warren Christopher in the negotiating room. With the Croats now seen as an American ally and the Serbs now seen as a Russia ally, the Bosnians are almost looked at as a side note (with tragic consequences for the Bosnian nation). With Bosnia clearly screwed, this adds to the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, and gives birth to a new conspiracy theory that we will start to see emerge in places like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in later posts: that the American and Russians are secretly aligned to destroy the Muslim world together. Although few Arab and Muslim governments take this conspiracy theory seriously, it grows strong with terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and in madrassas throughout Pakistan (where UIS intervention is proving costly). But I am getting ahead of myself; first we have the much maligned Split Peace Treaty…
Some new names in this update…
Madeline Albright
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madeline_Albright
Alex Bessmertnykh
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bessmertnykh
The Croatian Defense Counsel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_Defence_Council
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alija_Izetbegovi%C4%87
The Lora Prison Camp in Split, Croatia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lora_prison_camp
The Jasenovac Concentration Camp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasenovac_concentration_camp
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the Split Peace Accord negotiations between Croatia, Yugoslavia, the United States, and the UIS from March 1 to March 13, 1993.
BBC: Critics of the UIS often point to the rather dismissive attitude many of the UIS leaders had during the negotiations in Croatia during the Spilt accord. You have repeatedly rejected this criticism and claimed in your book that the UIS was the driving force for a cessation of hostilities and in fact was determined to end the conflict at all costs.
Putin: Yes. We were determined to see the conflict end. We knew that if a peace deal wasn’t reached it would only be a matter of time before the Serbs and Croats started going after each other, and if that happened it would be the Korean War all over again. We would see UN troops fighting Serb and Russian forces, with high casualties all around and the world on the constant brink of nuclear war.
BBC: But what of Secretary of State Mondale’s assertion in 1997 that the “Russians had no interest in being there in Split?”
Putin: What about it? He is trying to cover face for the fact that he couldn’t control the Croats during the negotiations. He is trying to hide the fact that he couldn’t do what we were able to do. We kept Milošević, Karadžić and Mladic under our thumb. He was unable to do the same with Tudjman and Boban.
BBC: But many people point to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky was on vacation in the Crimea for nearly two weeks during the negotiations and never once even spoke publically on the progress of the peace negotiations as proof that the UIS was never really committed to peace.
Putin: That is absurd! The reason Zhirinovsky never arrived in Split is because General Lebed placed him under virtual house arrest during the negotiations! He knew Zhirinovsky would blow it if he opened his mouth so he sent him to the Crimea and prohibited the media from talking to him for the two weeks that we were in Split negotiating the peace agreement!
BBC: That seems very suspicious. You are saying that 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense put the President of Russia under house arrest?!
Putin: That is exactly what I am saying.
MSNBC interview with Robert Strauss, American ambassador to the UDR and UIS
December 10, 2001
MSNBC: You received a great deal of criticism, even from Republicans, over your response to the Split Peace Accord. Most notably when you said “based on the terms of this agreement, it is hard to understand why Secretary of State Mondale would consider this a victory. We could have gotten better terms had nobody shown up on our behalf.”
Strauss: Yes. I took quite the beating for that. But I was shocked at the terms of the agreement. It basically rewarded the Serbs and Croats for what they did in Bosnia. Bosnia was split down the middle, and the Bosnians were left with almost nothing in their own country.
MSNBC: You also famously predicted that war would break out again in Bosnia within ten years.
Strauss: Yes, and I prayed every day that I would be proven wrong on that. I for one was not happy that my warnings proved prophetic in 1997.
MSNBC: Many defenders of the Split Peace Accord point to that fact that it was the best that could be worked out under the circumstances. The Croatians refused to withdraw from central Bosnia unless the UIS agreed to withdraw from Krajina, and the Serbs refused to withdraw from Srebrenica unless the Bosnians agreed to the independence of the Republic Srpska. They argue that a cease fire was the best that could be worked out under those circumstances.
Strauss: Sometimes no peace is preferable to a bad peace.
MSNBC: So you are suggesting that the Americans should have walked away from the table?!
Strauss: No, but I do think that the United States could have taken a leadership role in the negotiations and not let it turn into a circus. First of all, Mondale should not have agreed to the negotiations being held in Split. Emotions were too raw to hold it in a Croatian city like Split. Having the peace negotiations there was a terrible, terrible idea. It put the Serbs and Bosnians on the defensive from the start. Second, we should have walked away from the table when it became clear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Russia was not part of the peace negotiations. We held firm that the UIS was not a nation, and that Russia was occupying central and eastern Croatia. Our refusal to hold firm on that one, critical principle badly weakened our credibility. We never capitulated to the North Koreans demand on unilateral peace talks; we should have shown similar backbone in regards to the Russians. Had we shown more resolve, had we walked away from the table, it may have changed how they approached the negotiations.
MSNBC: Or it could have encouraged the Russians and Serbs to attack Croatia and start World War III.
Strauss (long pause): Yes. It could have ended in disaster as well. But we needed to remain firm if we honestly expected a lasting peace.
Excerpts from the book: “Croatia: The Nation That Almost Was”
By Steven Martinovic
Published by University of California Press, © 2009.
Chapter Six: The Split Peace Accords
For Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian victory in Bosnia gave his administration a badly needed boost after the disaster of the brief war the previous year with the UIS. Tudjman’s offer to host peace negotiations in the costal city of Split was readily agreed upon by NATO and even the UIS, despite strong objections from both the Serb and Bosnian delegation. However, although the Americans hoped that Tudjman would not politicize the negotiations for domestic consumption, it soon became apparent that the he was doing just that.
“There was a severe lack of understanding on the part of the American delegation in regards to the significance of holding the negotiations in Split,” commented Gilbert Cohen, an aid to Secretary of State Mondale, “and with the exception of Deputy Secretary of State Madeline Albright, nobody saw the red flags that, in hindsight, should have been obvious.”
As soon as the American delegation arrived in Split, problems emerged when the Croatian President visited the Lora Prison Camp in Split. The camp, which was used as a Croatian prisoner of war camp, had been slated to be decommissioned as part of the initial ceasefire with the UIS and the Republic of Krajina in 1992. However, with the exception of the release of a small number of Ukrainian and Serb prisoners, no steps had been taken to decommission the camp. Although the UIS and the Serb delegation had been willing initially to overlook the presence of Serb and Russian POW’s just a few kilometers away, the image of President Tudjman on the local news visiting with guards and prisoners (including several Russian POWs) enraged both the Serb and UIS delegates to the point that Secretary of State Mondale had to beg his Russian counterpart, Alexander Bessmertnykh, not to return to Moscow that afternoon. The Bosnian delegation was also badly shaken when Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban arrived in town with over 3,500 troops. Treated to a heroes welcome, the arrival of Boban and the Croatian Defense Council caused a stir locally, with residents greeting them as liberators, much to the chagrin of the Bosnians.
“Split had been flooded with refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina,” Cohen added, “for many of them Boban was seen as a hero. But there were also over 50,000 Bosniak refugees in Split too. They fled to Split before relations between the Bosnian federal government and the Bosnian Croats collapsed. In fact, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović was meeting with some of these refugees when word of Boban’s arrival reached him, and needless to say, he was not at all pleased.”
The parade through the center of town prompted Izetbegović to announce that the Bosnian delegation would be returning to Bosnia immediately, and that they would not return to the table until the Croatian government apologized for the perceived slight. American Secretary of State Mondale was again forced to do damage control, calling President Izetbegović and begging him to remain at the table, despite the fact that both Boban and Tudjman made it abundantly clear that no apology would be forthcoming.
The arrival of Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and the Croatian Defense Counsel (HVO) electrified the residence of Split, Croatia (photo courtesy of the University of California Press)
A Split Decision: An American diplomat remembers the peace negotiation that ended the Bosnian Civil War
Foreign Affairs (07/01/2010)
By Timothy Welch
Walter Mondale during negotiations in Split, Croatia. (March 1993)
Madeline Albright still remembers how worn out Secretary of State Walter Mondale appeared as he proudly announced that the Split Peace Accords were now underway. The 65-year old former vice president had been up for most of the night trying to mend fences with both the UIS and Bosnian delegation over a series of perceived slights from their Croatian hosts, and as the room stood and applauded the announcement that peace negotiations were now underway, there still was a sense of gloom from the Deputy Secretary of State.
“I knew that this was going to be a long, drawn out affair,” Albright recalled, “and that we were now going into things at a disadvantage. I told Secretary Mondale that we would be better served to reschedule the accord for later in the month. The Italians had offered the city of Trieste as a location to host the negotiations. I thought that would be preferable to hosting them in Split.”
Mondale, however, elected to push ahead, concerned that a delay could threaten the entire peace process.
“I hate to say this,” Commented Albright, “but I don’t think Secretary Mondale realized what he was in for. I really think that he was going into the negotiations thinking that he, a former vice president and former presidential candidate, would just awe everyone into submission. I think he assumed that he’d be able to take control of the proceedings on the power of his personality and based on his impressive resume.”
However, as soon as those in attendance took their seats, the fireworks began, giving Mondale little opportunity to ease into negotiations on a positive note. Almost immediately, the Serbian delegation began by protesting the role of the Ustaše in World War II and the prominent role that Split held during the reign of the Croatian fascist state during that conflict.
“I warned him that he had no idea the can of worms that had just been opened in Bosnia,” Albright said angrily, “and I warned him not to let the Serbs hijack the proceedings and bring up the Ustaše. But he just sat there looking like a guy who had just been blindsided.”
The Serb delegation, led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, began to speak with even more emotion when they complained about Croatian President Tudjman’s recent visit to the Lora prison camp, an event that had not only made the local Croatian news, but had stirred emotions across Yugoslavia and even inside of Russia itself.
“Once Milosevic started ranting and raving about Lora, I knew we had to get control of the situation immediately,” Albright recalled, “and when UIS delegate Alexander Bessmertnykh told Milosevic to sit down, I recognized immediately what he was really saying. I saw Mondale smile and nod his head to Bessmertnykh, but I knew that Bessmertnykh had just made a vicious accusation against Tudjman and the Croats and made Mondale look like a fool at the same time.”
Bessmertnykh, a former Soviet ambassador to the United States, gently put his hand on the shoulder of Milosevic as he addressed Mondale. He smiled and said that he hoped that the United States would recognize that Tudjman’s visit to the Jasenovac camp was somewhat upsetting for those in the UIS, but that the UIS was committed to working with the Americans and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
“The Ustaše run Jasenovac concentration camp was one of the most horrific concentration camps in Europe during World War II,” added Albright, “and although most Americans wouldn’t have caught the significance of the statement, I immediately recognized what Bessmertnykh was really saying when he switched the word Lora with Jasenovac. I knew we had to condemn that horrible accusation against the Croats before they walked out themselves.”
Albright stood up and began to argue with Bessmertnykh before Mondale angrily told her to take her seat.
“He really thought he was the star and we were all bit players in the Walter Mondale show,” Albright said angrily, “but in that instance Mondale, and in turn the United States, lost all credibility with the Croats. After that it became next to impossible to get the Croats to agree to compromise.”
As soon as Milosevic sat down, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman launched his attack on the former Soviet Union. Tudjman proceeded to stand up and say that the Croats were leaving the negotiating table. He claimed that they (like NATO) didn’t recognize the UIS as a legal entity and that they would only negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The demand caught both Bessmertnykh and Mondale off guard.
“As Tudjman began to storm out of the conference room dozens of Croatians at the table, including Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, stood up and applauded,” Albright recalled, “nobody was expecting the Croats to take that position, especially considering they were the ones who agreed to host the event.”
Mondale quickly jumped to his feet in an attempt to intercept the Croatian delegation, but as the Serb delegation began to gather their belongings, it appeared that the entire peace process would collapse before it even began.
“Mondale turned to Bessmertnykh with a desperate look,” Albright recalled, “but in that moment I realized that, for all his bluster and bravado, Bessmertnykh was as desperate as we were to come to a resolution to the conflict. He looked like a deer caught in the headlights.”
The former Soviet ambassador jumped to his feet to reassure the Serb delegates while Mondale pulled Tudjman aside to consult with him in a separate room.
“I walked over and joined the conversation,” Albright added, “I wish I had the chance to talk to Mondale before he did because he was completely blindsided by what was said next.”
The angry Croatian President proceeded to scold the American Secretary of State for his failure to condemn the Lora prison camp comment, as well as his refusal to stand in unison with the Croats and demand the presence of the Russian president. Mondale tried to reassure Tudjman, but his arguments were falling on deaf ears.
“Tudjman kept saying that these were supposed to be multi-party talks between all belligerents involved in the conflict,” Albright recalled, “and that there was no point in negotiating since there was nobody present to represent the Russians.”
It was at this time that Albright heard a soft knock on the door. As she stepped aside and opened it, she was shocked to see Ambassador Bessmertnykh.
“He told me that by coincidence Russian Secretary of State Gennady Burbulis was scheduled to come and visit with the UIS delegation the following day,” Albright said, “I knew he called Burbulis in desperation during the break and Burbulis agreed to come out. It was a very positive sign, and one I was happy about. It showed me the Russians wanted to deal…badly. And Burbulis was one of the few remaining Yeltsinites left in the Russian government. He was a man that could be reasoned with.”
Albright relayed the message to Secretary Mondale and President Tudjman, but to their dismay, it appeared to have little impact on the Croatian leader.
“He demanded that President Zhirinovsky himself come,” Albright recalled, “he felt that since Russia was a dictatorship that there was no use speaking to the ‘peons’ who controlled nothing.”
The demands made by Tudjman aggravated both Mondale and Albright, who recognized that the Russians would not be dictated to in such a way, especially considering the concession that they had just made.
“At best they could demand that President Kerrey be present for the negotiations as well,” Albright added, “but more likely they would have stormed off. That would have given them just enough to leave the table and argue that they gave it their best effort.”
After nearly thirty minutes of discussions, Tudjman agreed to continue under one condition: unless there was a unilateral withdrawal of UIS recognition of Serbian Krajina as independent from Croatia, there would be no discussions in regards to the UIS Republic of Krajina. They simply would not entertain any discussions over the fate of the Krajina unless the UIS withdrew and recognized that Krajina was part of Croatia. Albright knew that the ultimatum effectively killed any hope of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.
“I just wanted to sink down in my chair when I heard that,” Albright admitted, “the hope was we would reach a tentative agreement where the Krajina would reject UIS membership and agree to a loose federation with Croatia with a possible option on a future referendum on independence. But the Tudjman ultimatum effectively killed that possibility. We were hoping to use the Krajina as a wedge between the Serbs and the Russians, but instead their bond would end up being even stronger. Ultimately Tudjman knew that the Russians would never agree to that, and by making the ultimatum he removed the politically untenable possibility that he might be forced to make any concessions on the status of the Krajina. For him, UIS occupation of the Krajina was better than a compromise that could have led to independence.”
It was not until the second day of negotiations, and the arrival of Russian Secretary of State Burbulis, that the discussion finally reached the issue of Bosnia itself.
“Initially the discussions were over the removal of all foreign troops and the establishment of a collection of cantons, which would have been either Muslim, Croat, or Serb,” Albright recalled, “but this proposal, authored by Cyrus Vance, gained no traction. It quickly became clear that neither the Croats nor the Serbs were willing to withdraw from the territory they had occupied.”
For the Serbs, the fear was that the surrendering of the Srebrenica enclave would destroy any possibility of a separate state, a prospect that was unacceptable to them.
“Under the Owen-Mondale proposal they would have become a patchwork of cantons without a unified common border with Serbia itself or even with each other,” Albright recalled, “Even though they were not promised independence, for the Serbs the cantons would have ensured that independence would never happen. As a result the cantons were a deal killer for them.”
But Albright and Mondale soon realized that they had equal opposition from their Croatian allies.
“The Croats occupied about the same amount of territory in Bosnia that the UIS occupied in central and eastern Croatia,” Albright said, “for them they would not surrender so much as one inch unless the Russians agreed to turn over an equal amount of land in Croatia. But with the Tudjman ultimatum now on the table the Russians were unwilling to discuss anything over the status of the Krajina. They regarded that as outside the scope of the discussions.”
The negotiations reached a standstill as both Croats and Serbs stood in firm opposition to the Vance-Mondale plan. Sadly, Secretary of State Mondale was ill-prepared for a rejection of his plan.
“He really thought it was going to be an acceptable solution,” Albright recalled, “and understandably so. But he failed to recognize that there were so many other factors at play. Once the Vance-Mondale plan fell through the negotiations changed from finding a permanent peace to just finding a workable ceasefire.”
As discussions broke down over the terms of the peace agreement, both Mondale and Burbulis began to focus almost exclusively on a solution that would at least ease the threat of a global war in Bosnia from breaking out. However, Bosnian President Izetbegović now found himself in an untenable position as well: a ceasefire with the current front lines acting as a permanent border was simply unacceptable.
“Over 80% of Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by either the Croats or Serbs,” Albright said, “there was no way he could agree to anything that saw that much of his country outside central government control, even with an agreement to turn over the Bihac pocket to the Bosnian government. He insisted that Bosnia not be turned into a European Transkei (after the apartheid proclaimed black republic in South Africa), but by then it became clear that Bosnia was going to be a casualty of the new Cold War.”
Concerned over the prospect of a major conflict, both Burbulis and Mondale agreed in principle to the recognition of three regions inside of Bosnia: The Republic of Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, and The Republic of Bosnia. The Croatian occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina were declared to be part of the Republic of Herzegovina, despite the fact that the historic borders of Herzegovina didn’t even remotely resemble the newly created republic. The Republic of Srpska would encompass all of the areas that were controlled by the Serbs, even those that had a large Bosniak population, and the remaining areas would be part of the Republic of Bosnia. However, as a concession to Bosnian president Izetbegović, all three of the republics were, in theory, suppose to make up part of a “confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” with no option of secession possible for any entity.
“On paper it preserved the integrity of the Bosnian nation,” Albright said, “but what it really did was destroy the country.”
The Bosnian President initially refused to sign the agreement, announcing that “war was preferable to this.” However, to the shock of Albright and the Americans, the Russians sweetened the pot with several major concessions, even as the Croats refused to make any concessions on their end other than the release of the POWs held at the Lora prison camp.
“Burbulis immediately agreed to surrender both the Bihac pocket and a small amount of territory around Sarajevo to the Bosnian Republic so that the city could be connected to the Bosnian Republic…as long as both were declared United Nations administered regions,” Albright recalled, “and he also agreed to withdraw any Serbian claims to Gorazde as long as it was also administered by the United Nations for a period of ten years.”
The offer of a link to Sarajevo to Bosnia and the demilitarization of the capital city were both significant concessions that initially were met with loud opposition from the Serbian delegation. Although the Serbian controlled areas of south central Sarajevo would still technically remain under Serbian administration, it did little to placate Milosevic and the other Serbian delegates.
“At first Milosevic demanded that the Serb-controlled areas of the proposed UN administered Sarajevo be expanded to include location of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.” Albright recalled, “He called the plaque located at the assassination site a ‘place of tremendous significance for the Serbian people’ and insisted that it be placed under Serbian administration.”
The demand led to a sharp rebuke from the Russian Secretary of State.
“Burbulis slammed his fist on the table and jumped out of his seat,” Albright recalled with a chuckle, “he then screamed ‘I am not wasting any more time over a stupid plaque! I don’t care if it is one of the tablets Moses carried down from Mount Sinai, this issue is settled! I will not waste my time arguing over a plaque just so you Serbs can have a giant wank in front of it!”
The sharp rebuttal from Burbulis stunned Milosevic into silence; however, the issue over the status of Sarajevo would tragically come into play before long.
“The idea of a UN administered city seemed workable at first,” Albright recalled. “The city would still remain technically undivided and was still considered the capital of a unified Bosnia. But deep down we knew that the unresolved status of Sarajevo would come back to haunt us.”
Despite protests from some Bosnian delegates, Izetbegović reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Split Peace Accord, hoping that the status of Bosnia as a unified country would remain as firmly enforced in reality as it was proclaimed in the language of the paperwork. The promise of a return of refugees also motivated him to agree to the terms, hoping that a return to a multi ethnic Bosnia could reestablish federal control over the other so-called ‘republics’ within the country. However, what was clear to many at the table were that battle lines in the new cold war had just been drawn, and Bosnia had just been split down the middle between the United States and the UIS, with little regard for the Bosnians themselves. A little considered provision would prove fatal as all sides agreed to international peacekeepers in the event of a failure of any party to honor the terms of the peace agreement.
“The Republic of Srpska would only allow UIS peacekeepers; while the Republic of Herzegovina would only allow Croatian peace keepers,” Albright said, “within a week of the treaty being signed it was apparent that both the Croats and the Serbs were not done shooting. So the UIS and Croatia both moved into the respective republics, and tore the country apart.”
Neither the Republic of Herzegovina nor the Republic of Srpska took any steps to allow Bosniak refugees to return to their homes, and within ten months the Republic of Herzegovina declared independence from the Confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite Albright’s strong protest, Secretary of State Mondale, who was being badly ridiculed in the media over what was becoming an undeniable failure over Bosnia, refused to take firm action in condemning the move.
“That was when Rush Limbaugh first became a household name,” Albright recalled, “and every day on his radio program he would call the Secretary of State ‘Walter Chamberlain.’ I think it shook him up a lot more than it should have. But by not taking a hard line against the Herzegovinians, we allowed the Russians to solidify their control over the Republic of Srpska.”
By 1997 the breakaway Serbian Republic would become a member of the Union of Independent States.
“In the end, Izetbegović didn’t have a very good hand,” Albright recalled, “but I really don’t think he expected things to go the way they did. He was just hoping to buy some time until the Cold War passed Bosnia over. But tragically for him and the Bosnian people, it never did. I pray that there will never be a World War III, and I pray that there will never be a nuclear war between the United States and the UIS. But if there is it will be because of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. It will be because of some damned silly thing in Bosnia.”
The front lines of Sarajevo prior to the Graz Offensive which saw Serbs capture the Airport and surround the city. As part of the Split Peace Treaty, much of the area norht of Sarajevo was turned over the the Bosnian government.
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The Owen-Mondale plan, which was rejected by both the Croatian and Serbian delegates during the Split Peace Accord. Serbian cantons in RED. Croatian cantons in BLUE.
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The former Yugoslavia after the Split Peace Treaty
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