Looking forward to next update. It looks as though poor Bosnia really got the..uh...soiled end of the stick.
Zhirinovsky's Russian Empire
- Thread starter Pellegrino
- Start date
Incognito
Banned
I'm back
As for who’s pulling the strings, if you go back to page one or two of the thread, you’ll see Pellegrino Shots commenting that he intended to make it to be ambiguous whether or not Zhirinovsky is someone else’s puppet.
Didn’t Pellegrino Shots say he got the thing about Zhirinovsky commenting on his background from an OTL interview with a western journalist? Pellegrino even commented that he was surprised by how diplomatic Zhirinovsky could sound when the situation called for it.
As for who’s pulling the strings, if you go back to page one or two of the thread, you’ll see Pellegrino Shots commenting that he intended to make it to be ambiguous whether or not Zhirinovsky is someone else’s puppet.
All that newspaper article has is a reference to a map printed in another newspaper purportedly showing Zhirinovsky’s version of “ideal Europe”. It has nothing about Zhirinovsky suggesting this to European leaders or even thinking European politicians would agree with his daydreams. And if the map was attributed to anyone else, I would call it made-up tabloid baloney but since Zhirinovsky says a lot of crazy nonsense for domestic consumption, I wouldn’t be surprised if he did trot that map out during one of his rallies in Russia. But once again, I doubt he thinks Kohl would like to take chunks out of Poland and ethnically cleanse the area.
Than those must be some magic sanctions unparalleled in human history if they can bring down a nation the size of the Soviet Union to its knees & fermented revolution within weeks while similar measures OTL against a much smaller Yugoslavia (or more recently, Iran) failed to work in much longer timeframe.
I would love to see Rush Limbaugh or someone like him openly support "our brave Muslim brothers who fight against the savage Russian totalitarianism" when 9/11 attack is carried out in UIS... only to have al-Qaeda carry out an attack on America latter that day.
Why? I am no expert on the matter but from what I understand most opposition to admitting Turkey into E.U. has to do with Turkey's human rights record, the problems related to a large influx of Turks into Western Europe (similar to the wave of Eastern European immigrants that occurred predominantly in 1990s-2000s), the problems of admitting another "poor" nation into E.U. (see issues with Eastern Europe again) and probably some racist feelings. Non of that would go away in the scenario you propose.
True, but this is well before the Copenhagen criteria were formalized, and if you look at how some of the members of the EEC got in, much it was less on some of the stuff that the Copenhagen criteria would have flagged and more on politics and political considerations. For example, it was on political criteria that the UK's admission to the EEC was delayed considerably until the 1970s, or Greece's early admission in the early 1980s. Along those same lines, in the case of Greece and Turkey joining forces to combat Volodya's henchmen, on the basis of political criteria alone (i.e. we must shore up our defences in case the UIS decides to pull another Nazi Germany), Turkey getting a more-or-less expedited entry into the EEC/EU would be on the cards.
In the case of Greece, I'll bet you that Athens is shitting their pants in TTL and - even if Bulgaria doesn't go along with Volodya - there would probably be huge fears in Athens that they would, and along the same lines that I mentioned a couple of pages back. For Turkey, Ankara is already jittery not just because of Volodya's rhetoric, but also what he has done - Azerbaijan, the Polish embassy crisis, and now Bosnia. The big fear here would be Volodya going all out to dismembering Turkey and annexing Turkish territory to the UIS and/or to a "friendly" country. So, on those lines alone - plus both Greece and Turkey being members of NATO - both countries would probably start to heavily work together. That Greek military budget won't go down anytime soon in TTL.
Yes, I can admit that my line of Turkey joining the EU qualifies as hyperbole. But at the very least a more intense Greco-Turkish co-operation starting from common military threats that could turn in TTL to what "earthquake diplomacy" was OTL, and then some.
Incognito
Banned
I admit that this may not be my area of expertise, but would Greece see UIS as a bigger threat than Turkey in the Balkans? OTL, Greek volunteers fought for Serbia in 1990s (so at least some segment of the population was pro-Serbian) while Turkey supported Bosnia...
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
Well, we now see how the peace agreement which ends the war in Bosnia (at least for now) is hashed out in Split Croatia. Problems arise (just as in OTL in Dayton) but unlike with Dayton, the Americans are not as well schooled in Balkan politics and Walter Mondale proves to be no Warren Christopher in the negotiating room. With the Croats now seen as an American ally and the Serbs now seen as a Russia ally, the Bosnians are almost looked at as a side note (with tragic consequences for the Bosnian nation). With Bosnia clearly screwed, this adds to the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, and gives birth to a new conspiracy theory that we will start to see emerge in places like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in later posts: that the American and Russians are secretly aligned to destroy the Muslim world together. Although few Arab and Muslim governments take this conspiracy theory seriously, it grows strong with terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and in madrassas throughout Pakistan (where UIS intervention is proving costly). But I am getting ahead of myself; first we have the much maligned Split Peace Treaty…
Some new names in this update…
Madeline Albright
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madeline_Albright
Alex Bessmertnykh
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bessmertnykh
The Croatian Defense Counsel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_Defence_Council
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alija_Izetbegovi%C4%87
The Lora Prison Camp in Split, Croatia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lora_prison_camp
The Jasenovac Concentration Camp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasenovac_concentration_camp
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the Split Peace Accord negotiations between Croatia, Yugoslavia, the United States, and the UIS from March 1 to March 13, 1993.
BBC: Critics of the UIS often point to the rather dismissive attitude many of the UIS leaders had during the negotiations in Croatia during the Spilt accord. You have repeatedly rejected this criticism and claimed in your book that the UIS was the driving force for a cessation of hostilities and in fact was determined to end the conflict at all costs.
Putin: Yes. We were determined to see the conflict end. We knew that if a peace deal wasn’t reached it would only be a matter of time before the Serbs and Croats started going after each other, and if that happened it would be the Korean War all over again. We would see UN troops fighting Serb and Russian forces, with high casualties all around and the world on the constant brink of nuclear war.
BBC: But what of Secretary of State Mondale’s assertion in 1997 that the “Russians had no interest in being there in Split?”
Putin: What about it? He is trying to cover face for the fact that he couldn’t control the Croats during the negotiations. He is trying to hide the fact that he couldn’t do what we were able to do. We kept Milošević, Karadžić and Mladic under our thumb. He was unable to do the same with Tudjman and Boban.
BBC: But many people point to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky was on vacation in the Crimea for nearly two weeks during the negotiations and never once even spoke publically on the progress of the peace negotiations as proof that the UIS was never really committed to peace.
Putin: That is absurd! The reason Zhirinovsky never arrived in Split is because General Lebed placed him under virtual house arrest during the negotiations! He knew Zhirinovsky would blow it if he opened his mouth so he sent him to the Crimea and prohibited the media from talking to him for the two weeks that we were in Split negotiating the peace agreement!
BBC: That seems very suspicious. You are saying that 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense put the President of Russia under house arrest?!
Putin: That is exactly what I am saying.
MSNBC interview with Robert Strauss, American ambassador to the UDR and UIS
December 10, 2001
MSNBC: You received a great deal of criticism, even from Republicans, over your response to the Split Peace Accord. Most notably when you said “based on the terms of this agreement, it is hard to understand why Secretary of State Mondale would consider this a victory. We could have gotten better terms had nobody shown up on our behalf.”
Strauss: Yes. I took quite the beating for that. But I was shocked at the terms of the agreement. It basically rewarded the Serbs and Croats for what they did in Bosnia. Bosnia was split down the middle, and the Bosnians were left with almost nothing in their own country.
MSNBC: You also famously predicted that war would break out again in Bosnia within ten years.
Strauss: Yes, and I prayed every day that I would be proven wrong on that. I for one was not happy that my warnings proved prophetic in 1997.
MSNBC: Many defenders of the Split Peace Accord point to that fact that it was the best that could be worked out under the circumstances. The Croatians refused to withdraw from central Bosnia unless the UIS agreed to withdraw from Krajina, and the Serbs refused to withdraw from Srebrenica unless the Bosnians agreed to the independence of the Republic Srpska. They argue that a cease fire was the best that could be worked out under those circumstances.
Strauss: Sometimes no peace is preferable to a bad peace.
MSNBC: So you are suggesting that the Americans should have walked away from the table?!
Strauss: No, but I do think that the United States could have taken a leadership role in the negotiations and not let it turn into a circus. First of all, Mondale should not have agreed to the negotiations being held in Split. Emotions were too raw to hold it in a Croatian city like Split. Having the peace negotiations there was a terrible, terrible idea. It put the Serbs and Bosnians on the defensive from the start. Second, we should have walked away from the table when it became clear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Russia was not part of the peace negotiations. We held firm that the UIS was not a nation, and that Russia was occupying central and eastern Croatia. Our refusal to hold firm on that one, critical principle badly weakened our credibility. We never capitulated to the North Koreans demand on unilateral peace talks; we should have shown similar backbone in regards to the Russians. Had we shown more resolve, had we walked away from the table, it may have changed how they approached the negotiations.
MSNBC: Or it could have encouraged the Russians and Serbs to attack Croatia and start World War III.
Strauss (long pause): Yes. It could have ended in disaster as well. But we needed to remain firm if we honestly expected a lasting peace.
Excerpts from the book: “Croatia: The Nation That Almost Was”
By Steven Martinovic
Published by University of California Press, © 2009.
Chapter Six: The Split Peace Accords
For Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian victory in Bosnia gave his administration a badly needed boost after the disaster of the brief war the previous year with the UIS. Tudjman’s offer to host peace negotiations in the costal city of Split was readily agreed upon by NATO and even the UIS, despite strong objections from both the Serb and Bosnian delegation. However, although the Americans hoped that Tudjman would not politicize the negotiations for domestic consumption, it soon became apparent that the he was doing just that.
“There was a severe lack of understanding on the part of the American delegation in regards to the significance of holding the negotiations in Split,” commented Gilbert Cohen, an aid to Secretary of State Mondale, “and with the exception of Deputy Secretary of State Madeline Albright, nobody saw the red flags that, in hindsight, should have been obvious.”
As soon as the American delegation arrived in Split, problems emerged when the Croatian President visited the Lora Prison Camp in Split. The camp, which was used as a Croatian prisoner of war camp, had been slated to be decommissioned as part of the initial ceasefire with the UIS and the Republic of Krajina in 1992. However, with the exception of the release of a small number of Ukrainian and Serb prisoners, no steps had been taken to decommission the camp. Although the UIS and the Serb delegation had been willing initially to overlook the presence of Serb and Russian POW’s just a few kilometers away, the image of President Tudjman on the local news visiting with guards and prisoners (including several Russian POWs) enraged both the Serb and UIS delegates to the point that Secretary of State Mondale had to beg his Russian counterpart, Alexander Bessmertnykh, not to return to Moscow that afternoon. The Bosnian delegation was also badly shaken when Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban arrived in town with over 3,500 troops. Treated to a heroes welcome, the arrival of Boban and the Croatian Defense Council caused a stir locally, with residents greeting them as liberators, much to the chagrin of the Bosnians.
“Split had been flooded with refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina,” Cohen added, “for many of them Boban was seen as a hero. But there were also over 50,000 Bosniak refugees in Split too. They fled to Split before relations between the Bosnian federal government and the Bosnian Croats collapsed. In fact, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović was meeting with some of these refugees when word of Boban’s arrival reached him, and needless to say, he was not at all pleased.”
The parade through the center of town prompted Izetbegović to announce that the Bosnian delegation would be returning to Bosnia immediately, and that they would not return to the table until the Croatian government apologized for the perceived slight. American Secretary of State Mondale was again forced to do damage control, calling President Izetbegović and begging him to remain at the table, despite the fact that both Boban and Tudjman made it abundantly clear that no apology would be forthcoming.
The arrival of Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and the Croatian Defense Counsel (HVO) electrified the residence of Split, Croatia (photo courtesy of the University of California Press)
A Split Decision: An American diplomat remembers the peace negotiation that ended the Bosnian Civil War
Foreign Affairs (07/01/2010)
By Timothy Welch
Walter Mondale during negotiations in Split, Croatia. (March 1993)
Madeline Albright still remembers how worn out Secretary of State Walter Mondale appeared as he proudly announced that the Split Peace Accords were now underway. The 65-year old former vice president had been up for most of the night trying to mend fences with both the UIS and Bosnian delegation over a series of perceived slights from their Croatian hosts, and as the room stood and applauded the announcement that peace negotiations were now underway, there still was a sense of gloom from the Deputy Secretary of State.
“I knew that this was going to be a long, drawn out affair,” Albright recalled, “and that we were now going into things at a disadvantage. I told Secretary Mondale that we would be better served to reschedule the accord for later in the month. The Italians had offered the city of Trieste as a location to host the negotiations. I thought that would be preferable to hosting them in Split.”
Mondale, however, elected to push ahead, concerned that a delay could threaten the entire peace process.
“I hate to say this,” Commented Albright, “but I don’t think Secretary Mondale realized what he was in for. I really think that he was going into the negotiations thinking that he, a former vice president and former presidential candidate, would just awe everyone into submission. I think he assumed that he’d be able to take control of the proceedings on the power of his personality and based on his impressive resume.”
However, as soon as those in attendance took their seats, the fireworks began, giving Mondale little opportunity to ease into negotiations on a positive note. Almost immediately, the Serbian delegation began by protesting the role of the Ustaše in World War II and the prominent role that Split held during the reign of the Croatian fascist state during that conflict.
“I warned him that he had no idea the can of worms that had just been opened in Bosnia,” Albright said angrily, “and I warned him not to let the Serbs hijack the proceedings and bring up the Ustaše. But he just sat there looking like a guy who had just been blindsided.”
The Serb delegation, led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, began to speak with even more emotion when they complained about Croatian President Tudjman’s recent visit to the Lora prison camp, an event that had not only made the local Croatian news, but had stirred emotions across Yugoslavia and even inside of Russia itself.
“Once Milosevic started ranting and raving about Lora, I knew we had to get control of the situation immediately,” Albright recalled, “and when UIS delegate Alexander Bessmertnykh told Milosevic to sit down, I recognized immediately what he was really saying. I saw Mondale smile and nod his head to Bessmertnykh, but I knew that Bessmertnykh had just made a vicious accusation against Tudjman and the Croats and made Mondale look like a fool at the same time.”
Bessmertnykh, a former Soviet ambassador to the United States, gently put his hand on the shoulder of Milosevic as he addressed Mondale. He smiled and said that he hoped that the United States would recognize that Tudjman’s visit to the Jasenovac camp was somewhat upsetting for those in the UIS, but that the UIS was committed to working with the Americans and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
“The Ustaše run Jasenovac concentration camp was one of the most horrific concentration camps in Europe during World War II,” added Albright, “and although most Americans wouldn’t have caught the significance of the statement, I immediately recognized what Bessmertnykh was really saying when he switched the word Lora with Jasenovac. I knew we had to condemn that horrible accusation against the Croats before they walked out themselves.”
Albright stood up and began to argue with Bessmertnykh before Mondale angrily told her to take her seat.
“He really thought he was the star and we were all bit players in the Walter Mondale show,” Albright said angrily, “but in that instance Mondale, and in turn the United States, lost all credibility with the Croats. After that it became next to impossible to get the Croats to agree to compromise.”
As soon as Milosevic sat down, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman launched his attack on the former Soviet Union. Tudjman proceeded to stand up and say that the Croats were leaving the negotiating table. He claimed that they (like NATO) didn’t recognize the UIS as a legal entity and that they would only negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The demand caught both Bessmertnykh and Mondale off guard.
“As Tudjman began to storm out of the conference room dozens of Croatians at the table, including Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, stood up and applauded,” Albright recalled, “nobody was expecting the Croats to take that position, especially considering they were the ones who agreed to host the event.”
Mondale quickly jumped to his feet in an attempt to intercept the Croatian delegation, but as the Serb delegation began to gather their belongings, it appeared that the entire peace process would collapse before it even began.
“Mondale turned to Bessmertnykh with a desperate look,” Albright recalled, “but in that moment I realized that, for all his bluster and bravado, Bessmertnykh was as desperate as we were to come to a resolution to the conflict. He looked like a deer caught in the headlights.”
The former Soviet ambassador jumped to his feet to reassure the Serb delegates while Mondale pulled Tudjman aside to consult with him in a separate room.
“I walked over and joined the conversation,” Albright added, “I wish I had the chance to talk to Mondale before he did because he was completely blindsided by what was said next.”
The angry Croatian President proceeded to scold the American Secretary of State for his failure to condemn the Lora prison camp comment, as well as his refusal to stand in unison with the Croats and demand the presence of the Russian president. Mondale tried to reassure Tudjman, but his arguments were falling on deaf ears.
“Tudjman kept saying that these were supposed to be multi-party talks between all belligerents involved in the conflict,” Albright recalled, “and that there was no point in negotiating since there was nobody present to represent the Russians.”
It was at this time that Albright heard a soft knock on the door. As she stepped aside and opened it, she was shocked to see Ambassador Bessmertnykh.
“He told me that by coincidence Russian Secretary of State Gennady Burbulis was scheduled to come and visit with the UIS delegation the following day,” Albright said, “I knew he called Burbulis in desperation during the break and Burbulis agreed to come out. It was a very positive sign, and one I was happy about. It showed me the Russians wanted to deal…badly. And Burbulis was one of the few remaining Yeltsinites left in the Russian government. He was a man that could be reasoned with.”
Albright relayed the message to Secretary Mondale and President Tudjman, but to their dismay, it appeared to have little impact on the Croatian leader.
“He demanded that President Zhirinovsky himself come,” Albright recalled, “he felt that since Russia was a dictatorship that there was no use speaking to the ‘peons’ who controlled nothing.”
The demands made by Tudjman aggravated both Mondale and Albright, who recognized that the Russians would not be dictated to in such a way, especially considering the concession that they had just made.
“At best they could demand that President Kerrey be present for the negotiations as well,” Albright added, “but more likely they would have stormed off. That would have given them just enough to leave the table and argue that they gave it their best effort.”
After nearly thirty minutes of discussions, Tudjman agreed to continue under one condition: unless there was a unilateral withdrawal of UIS recognition of Serbian Krajina as independent from Croatia, there would be no discussions in regards to the UIS Republic of Krajina. They simply would not entertain any discussions over the fate of the Krajina unless the UIS withdrew and recognized that Krajina was part of Croatia. Albright knew that the ultimatum effectively killed any hope of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.
“I just wanted to sink down in my chair when I heard that,” Albright admitted, “the hope was we would reach a tentative agreement where the Krajina would reject UIS membership and agree to a loose federation with Croatia with a possible option on a future referendum on independence. But the Tudjman ultimatum effectively killed that possibility. We were hoping to use the Krajina as a wedge between the Serbs and the Russians, but instead their bond would end up being even stronger. Ultimately Tudjman knew that the Russians would never agree to that, and by making the ultimatum he removed the politically untenable possibility that he might be forced to make any concessions on the status of the Krajina. For him, UIS occupation of the Krajina was better than a compromise that could have led to independence.”
It was not until the second day of negotiations, and the arrival of Russian Secretary of State Burbulis, that the discussion finally reached the issue of Bosnia itself.
“Initially the discussions were over the removal of all foreign troops and the establishment of a collection of cantons, which would have been either Muslim, Croat, or Serb,” Albright recalled, “but this proposal, authored by Cyrus Vance, gained no traction. It quickly became clear that neither the Croats nor the Serbs were willing to withdraw from the territory they had occupied.”
For the Serbs, the fear was that the surrendering of the Srebrenica enclave would destroy any possibility of a separate state, a prospect that was unacceptable to them.
“Under the Owen-Mondale proposal they would have become a patchwork of cantons without a unified common border with Serbia itself or even with each other,” Albright recalled, “Even though they were not promised independence, for the Serbs the cantons would have ensured that independence would never happen. As a result the cantons were a deal killer for them.”
But Albright and Mondale soon realized that they had equal opposition from their Croatian allies.
“The Croats occupied about the same amount of territory in Bosnia that the UIS occupied in central and eastern Croatia,” Albright said, “for them they would not surrender so much as one inch unless the Russians agreed to turn over an equal amount of land in Croatia. But with the Tudjman ultimatum now on the table the Russians were unwilling to discuss anything over the status of the Krajina. They regarded that as outside the scope of the discussions.”
The negotiations reached a standstill as both Croats and Serbs stood in firm opposition to the Vance-Mondale plan. Sadly, Secretary of State Mondale was ill-prepared for a rejection of his plan.
“He really thought it was going to be an acceptable solution,” Albright recalled, “and understandably so. But he failed to recognize that there were so many other factors at play. Once the Vance-Mondale plan fell through the negotiations changed from finding a permanent peace to just finding a workable ceasefire.”
As discussions broke down over the terms of the peace agreement, both Mondale and Burbulis began to focus almost exclusively on a solution that would at least ease the threat of a global war in Bosnia from breaking out. However, Bosnian President Izetbegović now found himself in an untenable position as well: a ceasefire with the current front lines acting as a permanent border was simply unacceptable.
“Over 80% of Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by either the Croats or Serbs,” Albright said, “there was no way he could agree to anything that saw that much of his country outside central government control, even with an agreement to turn over the Bihac pocket to the Bosnian government. He insisted that Bosnia not be turned into a European Transkei (after the apartheid proclaimed black republic in South Africa), but by then it became clear that Bosnia was going to be a casualty of the new Cold War.”
Concerned over the prospect of a major conflict, both Burbulis and Mondale agreed in principle to the recognition of three regions inside of Bosnia: The Republic of Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, and The Republic of Bosnia. The Croatian occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina were declared to be part of the Republic of Herzegovina, despite the fact that the historic borders of Herzegovina didn’t even remotely resemble the newly created republic. The Republic of Srpska would encompass all of the areas that were controlled by the Serbs, even those that had a large Bosniak population, and the remaining areas would be part of the Republic of Bosnia. However, as a concession to Bosnian president Izetbegović, all three of the republics were, in theory, suppose to make up part of a “confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” with no option of secession possible for any entity.
“On paper it preserved the integrity of the Bosnian nation,” Albright said, “but what it really did was destroy the country.”
The Bosnian President initially refused to sign the agreement, announcing that “war was preferable to this.” However, to the shock of Albright and the Americans, the Russians sweetened the pot with several major concessions, even as the Croats refused to make any concessions on their end other than the release of the POWs held at the Lora prison camp.
“Burbulis immediately agreed to surrender both the Bihac pocket and a small amount of territory around Sarajevo to the Bosnian Republic so that the city could be connected to the Bosnian Republic…as long as both were declared United Nations administered regions,” Albright recalled, “and he also agreed to withdraw any Serbian claims to Gorazde as long as it was also administered by the United Nations for a period of ten years.”
The offer of a link to Sarajevo to Bosnia and the demilitarization of the capital city were both significant concessions that initially were met with loud opposition from the Serbian delegation. Although the Serbian controlled areas of south central Sarajevo would still technically remain under Serbian administration, it did little to placate Milosevic and the other Serbian delegates.
“At first Milosevic demanded that the Serb-controlled areas of the proposed UN administered Sarajevo be expanded to include location of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.” Albright recalled, “He called the plaque located at the assassination site a ‘place of tremendous significance for the Serbian people’ and insisted that it be placed under Serbian administration.”
The demand led to a sharp rebuke from the Russian Secretary of State.
“Burbulis slammed his fist on the table and jumped out of his seat,” Albright recalled with a chuckle, “he then screamed ‘I am not wasting any more time over a stupid plaque! I don’t care if it is one of the tablets Moses carried down from Mount Sinai, this issue is settled! I will not waste my time arguing over a plaque just so you Serbs can have a giant wank in front of it!”
The sharp rebuttal from Burbulis stunned Milosevic into silence; however, the issue over the status of Sarajevo would tragically come into play before long.
“The idea of a UN administered city seemed workable at first,” Albright recalled. “The city would still remain technically undivided and was still considered the capital of a unified Bosnia. But deep down we knew that the unresolved status of Sarajevo would come back to haunt us.”
Despite protests from some Bosnian delegates, Izetbegović reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Split Peace Accord, hoping that the status of Bosnia as a unified country would remain as firmly enforced in reality as it was proclaimed in the language of the paperwork. The promise of a return of refugees also motivated him to agree to the terms, hoping that a return to a multi ethnic Bosnia could reestablish federal control over the other so-called ‘republics’ within the country. However, what was clear to many at the table were that battle lines in the new cold war had just been drawn, and Bosnia had just been split down the middle between the United States and the UIS, with little regard for the Bosnians themselves. A little considered provision would prove fatal as all sides agreed to international peacekeepers in the event of a failure of any party to honor the terms of the peace agreement.
“The Republic of Srpska would only allow UIS peacekeepers; while the Republic of Herzegovina would only allow Croatian peace keepers,” Albright said, “within a week of the treaty being signed it was apparent that both the Croats and the Serbs were not done shooting. So the UIS and Croatia both moved into the respective republics, and tore the country apart.”
Neither the Republic of Herzegovina nor the Republic of Srpska took any steps to allow Bosniak refugees to return to their homes, and within ten months the Republic of Herzegovina declared independence from the Confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite Albright’s strong protest, Secretary of State Mondale, who was being badly ridiculed in the media over what was becoming an undeniable failure over Bosnia, refused to take firm action in condemning the move.
“That was when Rush Limbaugh first became a household name,” Albright recalled, “and every day on his radio program he would call the Secretary of State ‘Walter Chamberlain.’ I think it shook him up a lot more than it should have. But by not taking a hard line against the Herzegovinians, we allowed the Russians to solidify their control over the Republic of Srpska.”
By 1997 the breakaway Serbian Republic would become a member of the Union of Independent States.
“In the end, Izetbegović didn’t have a very good hand,” Albright recalled, “but I really don’t think he expected things to go the way they did. He was just hoping to buy some time until the Cold War passed Bosnia over. But tragically for him and the Bosnian people, it never did. I pray that there will never be a World War III, and I pray that there will never be a nuclear war between the United States and the UIS. But if there is it will be because of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. It will be because of some damned silly thing in Bosnia.”
The front lines of Sarajevo prior to the Graz Offensive which saw Serbs capture the Airport and surround the city. As part of the Split Peace Treaty, much of the area norht of Sarajevo was turned over the the Bosnian government.
________________________________________________________________________
The Owen-Mondale plan, which was rejected by both the Croatian and Serbian delegates during the Split Peace Accord. Serbian cantons in RED. Croatian cantons in BLUE.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
The former Yugoslavia after the Split Peace Treaty
PART THIRTY EIGHT: SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE
Well, we now see how the peace agreement which ends the war in Bosnia (at least for now) is hashed out in Split Croatia. Problems arise (just as in OTL in Dayton) but unlike with Dayton, the Americans are not as well schooled in Balkan politics and Walter Mondale proves to be no Warren Christopher in the negotiating room. With the Croats now seen as an American ally and the Serbs now seen as a Russia ally, the Bosnians are almost looked at as a side note (with tragic consequences for the Bosnian nation). With Bosnia clearly screwed, this adds to the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world, and gives birth to a new conspiracy theory that we will start to see emerge in places like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia in later posts: that the American and Russians are secretly aligned to destroy the Muslim world together. Although few Arab and Muslim governments take this conspiracy theory seriously, it grows strong with terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and in madrassas throughout Pakistan (where UIS intervention is proving costly). But I am getting ahead of myself; first we have the much maligned Split Peace Treaty…
Some new names in this update…
Madeline Albright
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madeline_Albright
Alex Bessmertnykh
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bessmertnykh
The Croatian Defense Counsel:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Croatian_Defence_Council
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alija_Izetbegovi%C4%87
The Lora Prison Camp in Split, Croatia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lora_prison_camp
The Jasenovac Concentration Camp
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jasenovac_concentration_camp
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the Split Peace Accord negotiations between Croatia, Yugoslavia, the United States, and the UIS from March 1 to March 13, 1993.
BBC: Critics of the UIS often point to the rather dismissive attitude many of the UIS leaders had during the negotiations in Croatia during the Spilt accord. You have repeatedly rejected this criticism and claimed in your book that the UIS was the driving force for a cessation of hostilities and in fact was determined to end the conflict at all costs.
Putin: Yes. We were determined to see the conflict end. We knew that if a peace deal wasn’t reached it would only be a matter of time before the Serbs and Croats started going after each other, and if that happened it would be the Korean War all over again. We would see UN troops fighting Serb and Russian forces, with high casualties all around and the world on the constant brink of nuclear war.
BBC: But what of Secretary of State Mondale’s assertion in 1997 that the “Russians had no interest in being there in Split?”
Putin: What about it? He is trying to cover face for the fact that he couldn’t control the Croats during the negotiations. He is trying to hide the fact that he couldn’t do what we were able to do. We kept Milošević, Karadžić and Mladic under our thumb. He was unable to do the same with Tudjman and Boban.
BBC: But many people point to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky was on vacation in the Crimea for nearly two weeks during the negotiations and never once even spoke publically on the progress of the peace negotiations as proof that the UIS was never really committed to peace.
Putin: That is absurd! The reason Zhirinovsky never arrived in Split is because General Lebed placed him under virtual house arrest during the negotiations! He knew Zhirinovsky would blow it if he opened his mouth so he sent him to the Crimea and prohibited the media from talking to him for the two weeks that we were in Split negotiating the peace agreement!
BBC: That seems very suspicious. You are saying that 16-man Committee for State Security and Defense put the President of Russia under house arrest?!
Putin: That is exactly what I am saying.
MSNBC interview with Robert Strauss, American ambassador to the UDR and UIS
December 10, 2001
MSNBC: You received a great deal of criticism, even from Republicans, over your response to the Split Peace Accord. Most notably when you said “based on the terms of this agreement, it is hard to understand why Secretary of State Mondale would consider this a victory. We could have gotten better terms had nobody shown up on our behalf.”
Strauss: Yes. I took quite the beating for that. But I was shocked at the terms of the agreement. It basically rewarded the Serbs and Croats for what they did in Bosnia. Bosnia was split down the middle, and the Bosnians were left with almost nothing in their own country.
MSNBC: You also famously predicted that war would break out again in Bosnia within ten years.
Strauss: Yes, and I prayed every day that I would be proven wrong on that. I for one was not happy that my warnings proved prophetic in 1997.
MSNBC: Many defenders of the Split Peace Accord point to that fact that it was the best that could be worked out under the circumstances. The Croatians refused to withdraw from central Bosnia unless the UIS agreed to withdraw from Krajina, and the Serbs refused to withdraw from Srebrenica unless the Bosnians agreed to the independence of the Republic Srpska. They argue that a cease fire was the best that could be worked out under those circumstances.
Strauss: Sometimes no peace is preferable to a bad peace.
MSNBC: So you are suggesting that the Americans should have walked away from the table?!
Strauss: No, but I do think that the United States could have taken a leadership role in the negotiations and not let it turn into a circus. First of all, Mondale should not have agreed to the negotiations being held in Split. Emotions were too raw to hold it in a Croatian city like Split. Having the peace negotiations there was a terrible, terrible idea. It put the Serbs and Bosnians on the defensive from the start. Second, we should have walked away from the table when it became clear that Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Russia was not part of the peace negotiations. We held firm that the UIS was not a nation, and that Russia was occupying central and eastern Croatia. Our refusal to hold firm on that one, critical principle badly weakened our credibility. We never capitulated to the North Koreans demand on unilateral peace talks; we should have shown similar backbone in regards to the Russians. Had we shown more resolve, had we walked away from the table, it may have changed how they approached the negotiations.
MSNBC: Or it could have encouraged the Russians and Serbs to attack Croatia and start World War III.
Strauss (long pause): Yes. It could have ended in disaster as well. But we needed to remain firm if we honestly expected a lasting peace.
Excerpts from the book: “Croatia: The Nation That Almost Was”
By Steven Martinovic
Published by University of California Press, © 2009.
Chapter Six: The Split Peace Accords
For Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian victory in Bosnia gave his administration a badly needed boost after the disaster of the brief war the previous year with the UIS. Tudjman’s offer to host peace negotiations in the costal city of Split was readily agreed upon by NATO and even the UIS, despite strong objections from both the Serb and Bosnian delegation. However, although the Americans hoped that Tudjman would not politicize the negotiations for domestic consumption, it soon became apparent that the he was doing just that.
“There was a severe lack of understanding on the part of the American delegation in regards to the significance of holding the negotiations in Split,” commented Gilbert Cohen, an aid to Secretary of State Mondale, “and with the exception of Deputy Secretary of State Madeline Albright, nobody saw the red flags that, in hindsight, should have been obvious.”
As soon as the American delegation arrived in Split, problems emerged when the Croatian President visited the Lora Prison Camp in Split. The camp, which was used as a Croatian prisoner of war camp, had been slated to be decommissioned as part of the initial ceasefire with the UIS and the Republic of Krajina in 1992. However, with the exception of the release of a small number of Ukrainian and Serb prisoners, no steps had been taken to decommission the camp. Although the UIS and the Serb delegation had been willing initially to overlook the presence of Serb and Russian POW’s just a few kilometers away, the image of President Tudjman on the local news visiting with guards and prisoners (including several Russian POWs) enraged both the Serb and UIS delegates to the point that Secretary of State Mondale had to beg his Russian counterpart, Alexander Bessmertnykh, not to return to Moscow that afternoon. The Bosnian delegation was also badly shaken when Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban arrived in town with over 3,500 troops. Treated to a heroes welcome, the arrival of Boban and the Croatian Defense Council caused a stir locally, with residents greeting them as liberators, much to the chagrin of the Bosnians.
“Split had been flooded with refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina,” Cohen added, “for many of them Boban was seen as a hero. But there were also over 50,000 Bosniak refugees in Split too. They fled to Split before relations between the Bosnian federal government and the Bosnian Croats collapsed. In fact, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović was meeting with some of these refugees when word of Boban’s arrival reached him, and needless to say, he was not at all pleased.”
The parade through the center of town prompted Izetbegović to announce that the Bosnian delegation would be returning to Bosnia immediately, and that they would not return to the table until the Croatian government apologized for the perceived slight. American Secretary of State Mondale was again forced to do damage control, calling President Izetbegović and begging him to remain at the table, despite the fact that both Boban and Tudjman made it abundantly clear that no apology would be forthcoming.
The arrival of Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban and the Croatian Defense Counsel (HVO) electrified the residence of Split, Croatia (photo courtesy of the University of California Press)
A Split Decision: An American diplomat remembers the peace negotiation that ended the Bosnian Civil War
Foreign Affairs (07/01/2010)
By Timothy Welch
Walter Mondale during negotiations in Split, Croatia. (March 1993)
Madeline Albright still remembers how worn out Secretary of State Walter Mondale appeared as he proudly announced that the Split Peace Accords were now underway. The 65-year old former vice president had been up for most of the night trying to mend fences with both the UIS and Bosnian delegation over a series of perceived slights from their Croatian hosts, and as the room stood and applauded the announcement that peace negotiations were now underway, there still was a sense of gloom from the Deputy Secretary of State.
“I knew that this was going to be a long, drawn out affair,” Albright recalled, “and that we were now going into things at a disadvantage. I told Secretary Mondale that we would be better served to reschedule the accord for later in the month. The Italians had offered the city of Trieste as a location to host the negotiations. I thought that would be preferable to hosting them in Split.”
Mondale, however, elected to push ahead, concerned that a delay could threaten the entire peace process.
“I hate to say this,” Commented Albright, “but I don’t think Secretary Mondale realized what he was in for. I really think that he was going into the negotiations thinking that he, a former vice president and former presidential candidate, would just awe everyone into submission. I think he assumed that he’d be able to take control of the proceedings on the power of his personality and based on his impressive resume.”
However, as soon as those in attendance took their seats, the fireworks began, giving Mondale little opportunity to ease into negotiations on a positive note. Almost immediately, the Serbian delegation began by protesting the role of the Ustaše in World War II and the prominent role that Split held during the reign of the Croatian fascist state during that conflict.
“I warned him that he had no idea the can of worms that had just been opened in Bosnia,” Albright said angrily, “and I warned him not to let the Serbs hijack the proceedings and bring up the Ustaše. But he just sat there looking like a guy who had just been blindsided.”
The Serb delegation, led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, began to speak with even more emotion when they complained about Croatian President Tudjman’s recent visit to the Lora prison camp, an event that had not only made the local Croatian news, but had stirred emotions across Yugoslavia and even inside of Russia itself.
“Once Milosevic started ranting and raving about Lora, I knew we had to get control of the situation immediately,” Albright recalled, “and when UIS delegate Alexander Bessmertnykh told Milosevic to sit down, I recognized immediately what he was really saying. I saw Mondale smile and nod his head to Bessmertnykh, but I knew that Bessmertnykh had just made a vicious accusation against Tudjman and the Croats and made Mondale look like a fool at the same time.”
Bessmertnykh, a former Soviet ambassador to the United States, gently put his hand on the shoulder of Milosevic as he addressed Mondale. He smiled and said that he hoped that the United States would recognize that Tudjman’s visit to the Jasenovac camp was somewhat upsetting for those in the UIS, but that the UIS was committed to working with the Americans and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
“The Ustaše run Jasenovac concentration camp was one of the most horrific concentration camps in Europe during World War II,” added Albright, “and although most Americans wouldn’t have caught the significance of the statement, I immediately recognized what Bessmertnykh was really saying when he switched the word Lora with Jasenovac. I knew we had to condemn that horrible accusation against the Croats before they walked out themselves.”
Albright stood up and began to argue with Bessmertnykh before Mondale angrily told her to take her seat.
“He really thought he was the star and we were all bit players in the Walter Mondale show,” Albright said angrily, “but in that instance Mondale, and in turn the United States, lost all credibility with the Croats. After that it became next to impossible to get the Croats to agree to compromise.”
As soon as Milosevic sat down, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman launched his attack on the former Soviet Union. Tudjman proceeded to stand up and say that the Croats were leaving the negotiating table. He claimed that they (like NATO) didn’t recognize the UIS as a legal entity and that they would only negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The demand caught both Bessmertnykh and Mondale off guard.
“As Tudjman began to storm out of the conference room dozens of Croatians at the table, including Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, stood up and applauded,” Albright recalled, “nobody was expecting the Croats to take that position, especially considering they were the ones who agreed to host the event.”
Mondale quickly jumped to his feet in an attempt to intercept the Croatian delegation, but as the Serb delegation began to gather their belongings, it appeared that the entire peace process would collapse before it even began.
“Mondale turned to Bessmertnykh with a desperate look,” Albright recalled, “but in that moment I realized that, for all his bluster and bravado, Bessmertnykh was as desperate as we were to come to a resolution to the conflict. He looked like a deer caught in the headlights.”
The former Soviet ambassador jumped to his feet to reassure the Serb delegates while Mondale pulled Tudjman aside to consult with him in a separate room.
“I walked over and joined the conversation,” Albright added, “I wish I had the chance to talk to Mondale before he did because he was completely blindsided by what was said next.”
The angry Croatian President proceeded to scold the American Secretary of State for his failure to condemn the Lora prison camp comment, as well as his refusal to stand in unison with the Croats and demand the presence of the Russian president. Mondale tried to reassure Tudjman, but his arguments were falling on deaf ears.
“Tudjman kept saying that these were supposed to be multi-party talks between all belligerents involved in the conflict,” Albright recalled, “and that there was no point in negotiating since there was nobody present to represent the Russians.”
It was at this time that Albright heard a soft knock on the door. As she stepped aside and opened it, she was shocked to see Ambassador Bessmertnykh.
“He told me that by coincidence Russian Secretary of State Gennady Burbulis was scheduled to come and visit with the UIS delegation the following day,” Albright said, “I knew he called Burbulis in desperation during the break and Burbulis agreed to come out. It was a very positive sign, and one I was happy about. It showed me the Russians wanted to deal…badly. And Burbulis was one of the few remaining Yeltsinites left in the Russian government. He was a man that could be reasoned with.”
Albright relayed the message to Secretary Mondale and President Tudjman, but to their dismay, it appeared to have little impact on the Croatian leader.
“He demanded that President Zhirinovsky himself come,” Albright recalled, “he felt that since Russia was a dictatorship that there was no use speaking to the ‘peons’ who controlled nothing.”
The demands made by Tudjman aggravated both Mondale and Albright, who recognized that the Russians would not be dictated to in such a way, especially considering the concession that they had just made.
“At best they could demand that President Kerrey be present for the negotiations as well,” Albright added, “but more likely they would have stormed off. That would have given them just enough to leave the table and argue that they gave it their best effort.”
After nearly thirty minutes of discussions, Tudjman agreed to continue under one condition: unless there was a unilateral withdrawal of UIS recognition of Serbian Krajina as independent from Croatia, there would be no discussions in regards to the UIS Republic of Krajina. They simply would not entertain any discussions over the fate of the Krajina unless the UIS withdrew and recognized that Krajina was part of Croatia. Albright knew that the ultimatum effectively killed any hope of reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.
“I just wanted to sink down in my chair when I heard that,” Albright admitted, “the hope was we would reach a tentative agreement where the Krajina would reject UIS membership and agree to a loose federation with Croatia with a possible option on a future referendum on independence. But the Tudjman ultimatum effectively killed that possibility. We were hoping to use the Krajina as a wedge between the Serbs and the Russians, but instead their bond would end up being even stronger. Ultimately Tudjman knew that the Russians would never agree to that, and by making the ultimatum he removed the politically untenable possibility that he might be forced to make any concessions on the status of the Krajina. For him, UIS occupation of the Krajina was better than a compromise that could have led to independence.”
It was not until the second day of negotiations, and the arrival of Russian Secretary of State Burbulis, that the discussion finally reached the issue of Bosnia itself.
“Initially the discussions were over the removal of all foreign troops and the establishment of a collection of cantons, which would have been either Muslim, Croat, or Serb,” Albright recalled, “but this proposal, authored by Cyrus Vance, gained no traction. It quickly became clear that neither the Croats nor the Serbs were willing to withdraw from the territory they had occupied.”
For the Serbs, the fear was that the surrendering of the Srebrenica enclave would destroy any possibility of a separate state, a prospect that was unacceptable to them.
“Under the Owen-Mondale proposal they would have become a patchwork of cantons without a unified common border with Serbia itself or even with each other,” Albright recalled, “Even though they were not promised independence, for the Serbs the cantons would have ensured that independence would never happen. As a result the cantons were a deal killer for them.”
But Albright and Mondale soon realized that they had equal opposition from their Croatian allies.
“The Croats occupied about the same amount of territory in Bosnia that the UIS occupied in central and eastern Croatia,” Albright said, “for them they would not surrender so much as one inch unless the Russians agreed to turn over an equal amount of land in Croatia. But with the Tudjman ultimatum now on the table the Russians were unwilling to discuss anything over the status of the Krajina. They regarded that as outside the scope of the discussions.”
The negotiations reached a standstill as both Croats and Serbs stood in firm opposition to the Vance-Mondale plan. Sadly, Secretary of State Mondale was ill-prepared for a rejection of his plan.
“He really thought it was going to be an acceptable solution,” Albright recalled, “and understandably so. But he failed to recognize that there were so many other factors at play. Once the Vance-Mondale plan fell through the negotiations changed from finding a permanent peace to just finding a workable ceasefire.”
As discussions broke down over the terms of the peace agreement, both Mondale and Burbulis began to focus almost exclusively on a solution that would at least ease the threat of a global war in Bosnia from breaking out. However, Bosnian President Izetbegović now found himself in an untenable position as well: a ceasefire with the current front lines acting as a permanent border was simply unacceptable.
“Over 80% of Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by either the Croats or Serbs,” Albright said, “there was no way he could agree to anything that saw that much of his country outside central government control, even with an agreement to turn over the Bihac pocket to the Bosnian government. He insisted that Bosnia not be turned into a European Transkei (after the apartheid proclaimed black republic in South Africa), but by then it became clear that Bosnia was going to be a casualty of the new Cold War.”
Concerned over the prospect of a major conflict, both Burbulis and Mondale agreed in principle to the recognition of three regions inside of Bosnia: The Republic of Herzegovina, the Republic of Srpska, and The Republic of Bosnia. The Croatian occupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina were declared to be part of the Republic of Herzegovina, despite the fact that the historic borders of Herzegovina didn’t even remotely resemble the newly created republic. The Republic of Srpska would encompass all of the areas that were controlled by the Serbs, even those that had a large Bosniak population, and the remaining areas would be part of the Republic of Bosnia. However, as a concession to Bosnian president Izetbegović, all three of the republics were, in theory, suppose to make up part of a “confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina” with no option of secession possible for any entity.
“On paper it preserved the integrity of the Bosnian nation,” Albright said, “but what it really did was destroy the country.”
The Bosnian President initially refused to sign the agreement, announcing that “war was preferable to this.” However, to the shock of Albright and the Americans, the Russians sweetened the pot with several major concessions, even as the Croats refused to make any concessions on their end other than the release of the POWs held at the Lora prison camp.
“Burbulis immediately agreed to surrender both the Bihac pocket and a small amount of territory around Sarajevo to the Bosnian Republic so that the city could be connected to the Bosnian Republic…as long as both were declared United Nations administered regions,” Albright recalled, “and he also agreed to withdraw any Serbian claims to Gorazde as long as it was also administered by the United Nations for a period of ten years.”
The offer of a link to Sarajevo to Bosnia and the demilitarization of the capital city were both significant concessions that initially were met with loud opposition from the Serbian delegation. Although the Serbian controlled areas of south central Sarajevo would still technically remain under Serbian administration, it did little to placate Milosevic and the other Serbian delegates.
“At first Milosevic demanded that the Serb-controlled areas of the proposed UN administered Sarajevo be expanded to include location of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.” Albright recalled, “He called the plaque located at the assassination site a ‘place of tremendous significance for the Serbian people’ and insisted that it be placed under Serbian administration.”
The demand led to a sharp rebuke from the Russian Secretary of State.
“Burbulis slammed his fist on the table and jumped out of his seat,” Albright recalled with a chuckle, “he then screamed ‘I am not wasting any more time over a stupid plaque! I don’t care if it is one of the tablets Moses carried down from Mount Sinai, this issue is settled! I will not waste my time arguing over a plaque just so you Serbs can have a giant wank in front of it!”
The sharp rebuttal from Burbulis stunned Milosevic into silence; however, the issue over the status of Sarajevo would tragically come into play before long.
“The idea of a UN administered city seemed workable at first,” Albright recalled. “The city would still remain technically undivided and was still considered the capital of a unified Bosnia. But deep down we knew that the unresolved status of Sarajevo would come back to haunt us.”
Despite protests from some Bosnian delegates, Izetbegović reluctantly agreed to the terms of the Split Peace Accord, hoping that the status of Bosnia as a unified country would remain as firmly enforced in reality as it was proclaimed in the language of the paperwork. The promise of a return of refugees also motivated him to agree to the terms, hoping that a return to a multi ethnic Bosnia could reestablish federal control over the other so-called ‘republics’ within the country. However, what was clear to many at the table were that battle lines in the new cold war had just been drawn, and Bosnia had just been split down the middle between the United States and the UIS, with little regard for the Bosnians themselves. A little considered provision would prove fatal as all sides agreed to international peacekeepers in the event of a failure of any party to honor the terms of the peace agreement.
“The Republic of Srpska would only allow UIS peacekeepers; while the Republic of Herzegovina would only allow Croatian peace keepers,” Albright said, “within a week of the treaty being signed it was apparent that both the Croats and the Serbs were not done shooting. So the UIS and Croatia both moved into the respective republics, and tore the country apart.”
Neither the Republic of Herzegovina nor the Republic of Srpska took any steps to allow Bosniak refugees to return to their homes, and within ten months the Republic of Herzegovina declared independence from the Confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite Albright’s strong protest, Secretary of State Mondale, who was being badly ridiculed in the media over what was becoming an undeniable failure over Bosnia, refused to take firm action in condemning the move.
“That was when Rush Limbaugh first became a household name,” Albright recalled, “and every day on his radio program he would call the Secretary of State ‘Walter Chamberlain.’ I think it shook him up a lot more than it should have. But by not taking a hard line against the Herzegovinians, we allowed the Russians to solidify their control over the Republic of Srpska.”
By 1997 the breakaway Serbian Republic would become a member of the Union of Independent States.
“In the end, Izetbegović didn’t have a very good hand,” Albright recalled, “but I really don’t think he expected things to go the way they did. He was just hoping to buy some time until the Cold War passed Bosnia over. But tragically for him and the Bosnian people, it never did. I pray that there will never be a World War III, and I pray that there will never be a nuclear war between the United States and the UIS. But if there is it will be because of some damned silly thing in the Balkans. It will be because of some damned silly thing in Bosnia.”
The front lines of Sarajevo prior to the Graz Offensive which saw Serbs capture the Airport and surround the city. As part of the Split Peace Treaty, much of the area norht of Sarajevo was turned over the the Bosnian government.
________________________________________________________________________
The Owen-Mondale plan, which was rejected by both the Croatian and Serbian delegates during the Split Peace Accord. Serbian cantons in RED. Croatian cantons in BLUE.
_______________________________________________________________________________________
The former Yugoslavia after the Split Peace Treaty
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Hmmm, very good questions, to best sum things up:
1. The UIS right now is sort of a mix between the old USSR and the old Warsaw pact. What I would compare it to right now is probably the old Yugoslavia under Tito, just a lot less centralized. basically a loose confederation held together by a storng man at the top (but is the strong man Zhirinovsky or Lebed). It also depends where in the UIS you are to see how it is run. Armenia is given total autonomy. Krajina much less. Azerbaijan is given none. But over the next few years the UIS will turn into a much more centralized nation with much stornger control from Moscow. Although the UIS shares a common military technically, right now it is not strongly enforced. But you are right, I have a hard time seeing Bulgaria giving up that much to join the UIS and I am strongly leaning against having them join right now. It seems like doing that would simply be highly unlikely, especially since it is becoming clear in Bosnia that membership comes at steep price. The Bosnians and Krajinan Serbs are willing to pay it becuase it actually gives them more independence (the UN and no country in the world recognizes their independence, so being part of the UIS give them a stronger claim to indpeendence) but the Bulgarians are not in the same boat. They don't stand to gain much of anything by joining.
2. Afghanistan is going to come into play before long, and yes, it too will be a front line in the new cold war. The Americans are almost certainly going ot back the Pastuns (who have Pakistans support) while the Russians and the UIS will probably support the Tajiks and Massoud in the Northern alliance. Massoud keeps them at arms distance, but after 9/11 it becomes clear that the US backed the wrong side in that particular front of the new cold war.
3. Mainly because they don't want the war in Estonia and Latvia to end. In Bosnia they are sending peace keepers because they are legitimatly frightened that the war will turn into another Korean war, but in Estonia and Latvia they don't share that same fear, and they want the Russian militias to capture more of the country before the fighting stops. They don't intervine until it becomes clear that the war is at a stalemate.
And yes, I will be updating Romania again shortly
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
At least Lebed is the one playing smart, by keeping Zhirinovsky isolated, he won't have to make any mistakes at all. On the other hand, you did foreshadow that Lebed would succeed Zhirinovsky as president of the UIS, right? As for Afghanistan, aren't the Hazaras a part of the Northern Alliance?
Angel Heart
Banned
I'm sorry if I'm a bit late to the party but here is a little summary of Petrušić.
Jugoslav Petrušić was once a devouted communist before he emmigrated to France and worked for the French secret service. During the Yugoslav Wars Petrušić was very active in this region working for France and occasionally leaking info to Serbia.
Dražen Erdemović, who is treated as the crown witness against Mladić and others that have been allegedly involved in the Srebrenica massacre, claims that Petrušić too participated in the massacre, which is interesting given that Petrušić wasn't even present during the killings. He also claims to have leaked some NATO documents like one he dubbed "Operation Storm 2" which was an eventual NATO-Croatian-Bosnian joint operation to ethnically cleanse the Serbs from Bosnia or plans where NATO is going to strike during the aggression in 1999.
His operation in Zaire was under the banner of France to stabilize the region. According to Petrušić it was a joint operation between France, the US and Serbia. Serbia's part in this was to send volunteers for which Serbia even got paid in millions.
In the end he ceased his work and went to the public to tell everything that is going on "backstage". He's pretty muich like Assange. The atrocities he allegedly commited are most likely fictional as he made himself a lot of enemies who try to discredit him. As a matter of fact there is IIRC not a single indictment against him by any court, neither in former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ICTY or anywhere else. He even appeared in the Bosnian court as a witness. For those who speak Serbo-Croatian you can watch his videos here. At his worst he's a Baron Münchausen who is telling stories even the wildest conspiracy theorists couldn't come up with even if they were on crack.
One more thing if it helps you for your story: According to Petrušić at least a third of the military leadership of Serbia during the 90s were traitors that worked for the Americans (which was also the reason they were sent to the ICTY). Jovica Stanišić and Momčilo Perišić are the most prominent examples. These two are also very interesting figures on their own.
Jugoslav Petrušić was once a devouted communist before he emmigrated to France and worked for the French secret service. During the Yugoslav Wars Petrušić was very active in this region working for France and occasionally leaking info to Serbia.
Dražen Erdemović, who is treated as the crown witness against Mladić and others that have been allegedly involved in the Srebrenica massacre, claims that Petrušić too participated in the massacre, which is interesting given that Petrušić wasn't even present during the killings. He also claims to have leaked some NATO documents like one he dubbed "Operation Storm 2" which was an eventual NATO-Croatian-Bosnian joint operation to ethnically cleanse the Serbs from Bosnia or plans where NATO is going to strike during the aggression in 1999.
His operation in Zaire was under the banner of France to stabilize the region. According to Petrušić it was a joint operation between France, the US and Serbia. Serbia's part in this was to send volunteers for which Serbia even got paid in millions.
In the end he ceased his work and went to the public to tell everything that is going on "backstage". He's pretty muich like Assange. The atrocities he allegedly commited are most likely fictional as he made himself a lot of enemies who try to discredit him. As a matter of fact there is IIRC not a single indictment against him by any court, neither in former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ICTY or anywhere else. He even appeared in the Bosnian court as a witness. For those who speak Serbo-Croatian you can watch his videos here. At his worst he's a Baron Münchausen who is telling stories even the wildest conspiracy theorists couldn't come up with even if they were on crack.
One more thing if it helps you for your story: According to Petrušić at least a third of the military leadership of Serbia during the 90s were traitors that worked for the Americans (which was also the reason they were sent to the ICTY). Jovica Stanišić and Momčilo Perišić are the most prominent examples. These two are also very interesting figures on their own.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
There's also the question of how the UIS can deal with Ibrahim Rugova, though I'm sure this may already have been answered. In any case, Zhirinovsky can't send a billion AKs around the world to every single troubled hotspot, right? I can even shudder at the thought of the UIS sending guns to East Timorese separatists, the Kurds in Turkey and the Kashmiris.
Not yet, but what we will start seeing in the next few years in TTL is that Serbia becomes a target of American and NATO proxy intervention, and a growing anti-Milosevic movement (just like we saw in OTL). If the Serbs suddenly can't control Kosovo and Milosevic looks like he is about to be ousted by a pro western leader there is no way in TTL that the UIS can let is happen. Not with two Serb Republics now in the UIS. Look for the UIS to prop up Milosevic and possibly Milosevic "asking" for membership to ensure he is not overthrown in the future
Yes, eventually he will succeed Zhirinovsky, but we don't yet know when he puts up the uniform for the suit, and what will happen to this "junta" (if there really is one) once that happens.
As for the Northern Aliance, the Hazaras were supporters of the NA, which probably puts them firmly in the UIS camp as the Afghan war starts to heat up...
Kosovo will come I to play later in the decade, around 1996-7, but in the short term the question is does the US support him, or does he try to go the neutral route?
And the thought of UIS support for every rebel group is a frightening thought indeed, this dystopian world in TTL isn't going to get a breather anytime soon.
The thing is he is so unpredictable nobody knows what he would say. He might be charming and agreeable to a fair peace accord, or he might be bombastic and say that he'd nuke Zagreb. But considering that the UIS desperately wants peace, they can't afford to take the chance of him saying something crazy...
This is from the New York Times on his Polish border claims:
During the holidays he made remarks calling into question the existing borders between Poland and Germany, allowing for negotiations with the Germans over the Russian district of Kaliningrad, formerly part of East Prussia, and asserting that the Russian military had some new weapon of mass destruction called the "elipton bomb."
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/30/w...imes Topics/People/Z/Zhirinovsky, Vladimir V.
He is very, very unpredictable. In an interview with a Israeli newspaper he was absolute gushing about his Jewish heritage, and then a few months later he is bunking up with an Austrian Rght Wing politician who served in the SS. He was also kicked out of Bulgaria when he told Bulgarians to "replace" the current president. The controversy was if he was suggesting they vote him out (poor taste, but not particularly earth shattering) or if (as many have claimed) he suggested they overthrow him.
And in regards to the sanctions, there is a key difference. Iran and Iraq were both dictatorships that had an interest is quelling opposition and toughing out the sanctions. Even Yugoslavia had a strong central government with enough central control to quash opposition if it arose. But here we have a very, very fragile government with various factions looking to exploit any shake up to seize control. And we may have a shadow government in the military that hates there reformers and wants to be rid of them. Remember in Lebanon in 2005 when we had anti government protest that we're quickly countered by
Pro government/pro Syria protest that had between 200,000-500,000 pro Syrian protesters? What's to say that the real power in Russia is not doing the same thing that the real power in Lebanon did in 2005? Maybe they arranged the overthrow of those pesky reformers? Remember, this "revolution" was accompanied by purges of those opposed to the military.
I'm sorry if I'm a bit late to the party but here is a little summary of Petrušić.
Jugoslav Petrušić was once a devouted communist before he emmigrated to France and worked for the French secret service. During the Yugoslav Wars Petrušić was very active in this region working for France and occasionally leaking info to Serbia.
Dražen Erdemović, who is treated as the crown witness against Mladić and others that have been allegedly involved in the Srebrenica massacre, claims that Petrušić too participated in the massacre, which is interesting given that Petrušić wasn't even present during the killings. He also claims to have leaked some NATO documents like one he dubbed "Operation Storm 2" which was an eventual NATO-Croatian-Bosnian joint operation to ethnically cleanse the Serbs from Bosnia or plans where NATO is going to strike during the aggression in 1999.
His operation in Zaire was under the banner of France to stabilize the region. According to Petrušić it was a joint operation between France, the US and Serbia. Serbia's part in this was to send volunteers for which Serbia even got paid in millions.
In the end he ceased his work and went to the public to tell everything that is going on "backstage". He's pretty muich like Assange. The atrocities he allegedly commited are most likely fictional as he made himself a lot of enemies who try to discredit him. As a matter of fact there is IIRC not a single indictment against him by any court, neither in former Yugoslavia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ICTY or anywhere else. He even appeared in the Bosnian court as a witness. For those who speak Serbo-Croatian you can watch his videos here. At his worst he's a Baron Münchausen who is telling stories even the wildest conspiracy theorists couldn't come up with even if they were on crack.
One more thing if it helps you for your story: According to Petrušić at least a third of the military leadership of Serbia during the 90s were traitors that worked for the Americans (which was also the reason they were sent to the ICTY). Jovica Stanišić and Momčilo Perišić are the most prominent examples. These two are also very interesting figures on their own.
I always found him to be a fascinating character, and wished there was more online about him. Thanks for that update, it has given me some ideas!
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
And to think that Zhirinovsky would have done something to support the defense industry for his plans of mass producing a ton of AKs. I mean, if he's not selling them to rebel groups, he could easily sell Russian made weapons to literally any country that wants to modernize their military but can't buy US made weapons since they're too expensive. On the other hand, given the fact that IOTL Canada and Ukraine had very good relations, what would Canada's stance be like against the UIS? I can imagine Zhirinovsky calling for Quebec to become independent if the Canadian Prime Minister at that time called for Ukraine to be free from the UIS, and there's also Canada's recognition of the Holodomor.
PART THIRTY NINE: A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH
PART THIRTY NINE: A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH
PART THIRTY NINE: A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH
Well, in OTL we have a referendum in Russia in April of 1993 which gives Yeltsin and the liberals a boost while also planting the seeds of the upcoming Constitutional Crisis later that year. But why would a unapologetic dictator like Zhirinovsky ever agree to a referendum? Well, maybe those pesky sanctions are taking their toll on the UIS...
And in Bosnia we see that, in TTL the goal of a multi ethnic state is all but dead as the Serbs form their own assembly (just as in OTL). A big difference, however, is a rump Bosnia is overwhelmingly Bosniak, which leaves Serb (and Croat) loyalist to the Federal government out in the cold. What is interesting is what was well known in the war was the split between Croat and Serb and Bosnians during the war. But there was also a split between the those from the city and those people from the countryside who tended to be looked down upon by Sarajevans of all races. With a city that is now overwhelmingly full of refugees from other parts of the country, the coalition of Bosnians-Croats-and Serbs who defended the federal government in Sarajevo (in OTL over 80,000 Serbs remained loyal to the federal government, and almost all of them were from Sarajevo) is shattered. This coalition, which stood firm during the war, finds itself threatened as the cultural makeup of the city changes radically overnight.
Bosnian President condemns UIS as refugees refused entry into “Serbian occupied territory”
NEW YORK TIMES
By JIM ZIMMERMAN
April 02, 1993
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović looks stunned as Serbs walk out during his speech to the Bosnian Parliament
In front of an angry Bosnian Parliamentary assembly, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemned the UIS and the Republic of Srpska (one of the three entities that currently make up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina), prompting nearly all of the remaining Serbian delegates to the Bosnian federal assembly to walk out in protest. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović demanded the UIS to permit refugees to return to their homes in the Republic Srpska and demanded that the UIS adhere to all of the terms of the Split Peace Accord, calling the Republic of Srpska “Serb occupied territory.” However, his failure to address the growing lawlessness in Sarajevo may have lost him the valuable support of the Serbian coalition in his government.
“We stood with President Izetbegović during the war,” commented Serbian politician Milanko Renovica, a former President of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, “but those of us who have stood with him are finding ourselves increasingly targeted by some of these refugees who cannot seem to understand that we had nothing to do with those Serbs who drove them from their homes. We still have many friends in Sarajevo, and we still have a great deal of support from many of our Bosniak allies here. But the President seems unwilling or unable to control these barely literate refugees from the countryside who seem determined to drive us out. We cannot help but wonder, is it the refugees that he wants to send to the Republic Srpska, or is it us?”
Many Bosnian Serbs feel that the Bosnian government has failed to protect the nearly 80,000 Serbs who remained loyal to the federal government but now find themselves targeted by angry refugees. It prompted Republic of Srpska Vice President Biljana Plavšić to call on any Serb member of the federal parliamentary assembly who feared for his or her family to “defect”.
“Our Serbian brothers and sisters in Sarajevo are being targeted every day,” Plavšić said on Russian television, “and this proves once and for all that the war was never really about independence. It was always about the extermination of the Serbian race at the hands of the Turkish horde.”
However, thus far UIS peacekeepers have refused to allow anyone, Serb or Bosniak, to enter the Republic of Srpska. Moscow has taken an increasingly hard stance in regards to Bosnia, demanding that Sarajevo “disassociate itself from international sanctions imposed on the UIS” before it will allow a return of refugees into the Serb Republic.
However, with Sarajevo now host to over half a million refugees, many who make little distinction between Serbs loyal to Banja Luka and those loyal to the federal government, many Serbs are wondering if relocation is the only answer. With over 300 Serbs living in Sarajevo having been killed since March, many Serb loyalists have decided that they will take their chances in the Republic Srpska if the border opens up.
“I have tried desperately to keep the Serbian coalition in Sarajevo together,” commented Mirko Pejanović, the highest ranking member of the Federal Government, “but most wanted to be part of a multi ethnic Bosnia. After the Split Peace Accord that was no longer a possibility. What is left is a rump Bosniak state that simply doesn’t have room for Serbs who remained loyal to Bosnia. If the Republic of Srpska is offering amnesty, I can’t imagine many of my colleagues would elect to stay here.”
Despite fears that those Serbs who failed to profess loyalty to the Serbian Liberal Democratic Party could suffer the same fate as political opponents in Russia and the Serbian Krajina, the olive branch offered by the Serbian Vice President has given many Serbs in Sarajevo reason to consider the offer as the city grows more violent. The fear across Europe is that the 13 members of the Bosnian Parliament who walked out on Izetbegović were not just walking out on the President. They may have walked out on the concept of federalism in Bosnia.
French President Refuses to abandon sanctions on UIS, calls for Russian President Zhirinovsky’s resignation
The Scotsman
April 2, 1992
French President Mitterrand speaking to the press after refusing to meet a Russian delegation
(PARIS) In a stunning defeat for the Union of Independent States, French President François Mitterrand rejected calls from Moscow to lift sanctions on the UIS, the successor state to the Soviet Union. Mitterrand stunned a Russian delegation that came to Paris when, after refusing to meet them, he called the UIS “a reprehensible dictatorship that offends the conscience of free people across the globe.” He then went on to call for democratic elections to be held in Moscow and for Russian president Vladimir Zhirinovsky to resign. The forceful language stunned many international observers, as well as Moscow, which saw France as the weakest link in NATO in regards to sanctions against the former Soviet Union.
“Moscow had spent the last month heavily courting France and Hungary,” commented an American diplomat who wished to remain anonymous, “they truly believed that France would relent on sanctions based on the Russian role in ending the war in Bosnia. And with Hungary, the assumption was that the Union’s support of Hungarian rebels in Romania would garner them some support.”
Although few international observers outside of Moscow expected Paris or Budapest to break with the UN in regards to the sanctions, the forcefulness of the rebuke did come as a surprise. France had long been seen as the “voice of moderation” in NATO, a sharp contrast to the hard line taken by Washington and Berlin in regards to the UIS.
“There was no way Mitterrand would forget what the Russians did at their embassy last year,” added the American diplomat, “but the Russians honestly believed they had made headway. They really believed after Split that the sanctions would collapse.”
The speech, which some conservatives in France have called “Mitterrand’s De Gaul speech”, has proved immensely popular domestically as well. Nearly 69% of those polled after the statements were made supported the position of Mitterrand, and nearly 73% of French citizens polled stated that they believed that “the UIS was a fascist dictatorship.”
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Addressing the failure of the UIS to break sanctions after the Split Peace Treaty was signed.
BBC: You indicated that General Lebed and the junta were legitimately shocked that sanctions had not been lifted in March of 1993.
Putin: Correct. To be honest, I was shocked too. After our role in bringing peace to Bosnia, and our role in supporting Hungarian freedom fighters in Romania, we all thought that there was a crack in the sanctions. And once one nation broke from the sanctions, we knew we could get more to follow suit. All we needed was to get one western nation to open the door, then we assumed there would be a flood of nations who realized that there was a huge benefit to doing business with the UIS.
BBC: That seems somewhat naïve, particularly when you consider what happened just a year ago at the French embassy in Moscow.
Putin: In hindsight, yes it was. General Lebed had promised to prosecute those responsible for the massacre, but the French were not buying it. And when French President Mitterrand humiliated us, when he berated the UIS after all we had done to mend fences…we knew we couldn’t count on them to ever stand up to the Americans and Germans! After that we knew we had to take a radically different approach.
BBC: What was this radically different approach?
Putin: We had to go through the United Nations.
United Nations vote to extend sanctions on UIS, call for democratic elections in Russia
By Richard Roundtree
Economist
April 05, 1993
In a shocking move, Russia, broke from its position of refusing to take its seat on the United Nations Security Council yesterday…only to do nothing. Russia, which had claimed that the Security Council seat belonged to the UIS and not the Russian Republic, broke from this position and took its seat, only to abstain from voting on United Nations Resolution 821. The abstention on Resolution 821 yesterday, which extended sanctions on the UIS, passed 13-0-2 (with Hungary also abstaining) and has left international observers dumbfounded.
“I never expected the Russians to break this pledge not to take the seat on the Security Council,” commented Canadian ambassador to the United Nations Louise Fréchette, “and when we realized they were about to break their pledge, our natural assumption was that they would vote to lift sanctions.”
Most international observers felt that such a move would have been a tremendous victory for the United States and NATO.
“Had Russia taken its seat and voted to quash the sanctions it would have been seen as an act of desperation,” Fréchette added, “and to be honest, even though they are a member of the Security Council, I really think that it would have only strengthened the sanctions. But to take a seat and abstain from voting on sanctions makes no sense whatsoever.”
Some observers disagree however. Noting that Russian ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov indicated that Russia was about to hold snap elections in 30 days, many saw the Russians as taking a calculated risk.
“Much of the language of Resolution 821 indicates that sanctions would not be lifted until there were free and democratic elections in Russia and after Russia ended its occupation of central and eastern Croatia,” commented an American diplomat who wished to remain anonymous, “as crazy as this was, it really is a calculated gamble. If Russia does hold snap elections next month and they are deemed ‘fair’ by the UN, the sanctions could conceivably collapse.”
PART THIRTY NINE: A RADICALLY DIFFERENT APPROACH
Well, in OTL we have a referendum in Russia in April of 1993 which gives Yeltsin and the liberals a boost while also planting the seeds of the upcoming Constitutional Crisis later that year. But why would a unapologetic dictator like Zhirinovsky ever agree to a referendum? Well, maybe those pesky sanctions are taking their toll on the UIS...
And in Bosnia we see that, in TTL the goal of a multi ethnic state is all but dead as the Serbs form their own assembly (just as in OTL). A big difference, however, is a rump Bosnia is overwhelmingly Bosniak, which leaves Serb (and Croat) loyalist to the Federal government out in the cold. What is interesting is what was well known in the war was the split between Croat and Serb and Bosnians during the war. But there was also a split between the those from the city and those people from the countryside who tended to be looked down upon by Sarajevans of all races. With a city that is now overwhelmingly full of refugees from other parts of the country, the coalition of Bosnians-Croats-and Serbs who defended the federal government in Sarajevo (in OTL over 80,000 Serbs remained loyal to the federal government, and almost all of them were from Sarajevo) is shattered. This coalition, which stood firm during the war, finds itself threatened as the cultural makeup of the city changes radically overnight.
Bosnian President condemns UIS as refugees refused entry into “Serbian occupied territory”
NEW YORK TIMES
By JIM ZIMMERMAN
April 02, 1993
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović looks stunned as Serbs walk out during his speech to the Bosnian Parliament
In front of an angry Bosnian Parliamentary assembly, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemned the UIS and the Republic of Srpska (one of the three entities that currently make up the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina), prompting nearly all of the remaining Serbian delegates to the Bosnian federal assembly to walk out in protest. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović demanded the UIS to permit refugees to return to their homes in the Republic Srpska and demanded that the UIS adhere to all of the terms of the Split Peace Accord, calling the Republic of Srpska “Serb occupied territory.” However, his failure to address the growing lawlessness in Sarajevo may have lost him the valuable support of the Serbian coalition in his government.
“We stood with President Izetbegović during the war,” commented Serbian politician Milanko Renovica, a former President of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia, “but those of us who have stood with him are finding ourselves increasingly targeted by some of these refugees who cannot seem to understand that we had nothing to do with those Serbs who drove them from their homes. We still have many friends in Sarajevo, and we still have a great deal of support from many of our Bosniak allies here. But the President seems unwilling or unable to control these barely literate refugees from the countryside who seem determined to drive us out. We cannot help but wonder, is it the refugees that he wants to send to the Republic Srpska, or is it us?”
Many Bosnian Serbs feel that the Bosnian government has failed to protect the nearly 80,000 Serbs who remained loyal to the federal government but now find themselves targeted by angry refugees. It prompted Republic of Srpska Vice President Biljana Plavšić to call on any Serb member of the federal parliamentary assembly who feared for his or her family to “defect”.
“Our Serbian brothers and sisters in Sarajevo are being targeted every day,” Plavšić said on Russian television, “and this proves once and for all that the war was never really about independence. It was always about the extermination of the Serbian race at the hands of the Turkish horde.”
However, thus far UIS peacekeepers have refused to allow anyone, Serb or Bosniak, to enter the Republic of Srpska. Moscow has taken an increasingly hard stance in regards to Bosnia, demanding that Sarajevo “disassociate itself from international sanctions imposed on the UIS” before it will allow a return of refugees into the Serb Republic.
However, with Sarajevo now host to over half a million refugees, many who make little distinction between Serbs loyal to Banja Luka and those loyal to the federal government, many Serbs are wondering if relocation is the only answer. With over 300 Serbs living in Sarajevo having been killed since March, many Serb loyalists have decided that they will take their chances in the Republic Srpska if the border opens up.
“I have tried desperately to keep the Serbian coalition in Sarajevo together,” commented Mirko Pejanović, the highest ranking member of the Federal Government, “but most wanted to be part of a multi ethnic Bosnia. After the Split Peace Accord that was no longer a possibility. What is left is a rump Bosniak state that simply doesn’t have room for Serbs who remained loyal to Bosnia. If the Republic of Srpska is offering amnesty, I can’t imagine many of my colleagues would elect to stay here.”
Despite fears that those Serbs who failed to profess loyalty to the Serbian Liberal Democratic Party could suffer the same fate as political opponents in Russia and the Serbian Krajina, the olive branch offered by the Serbian Vice President has given many Serbs in Sarajevo reason to consider the offer as the city grows more violent. The fear across Europe is that the 13 members of the Bosnian Parliament who walked out on Izetbegović were not just walking out on the President. They may have walked out on the concept of federalism in Bosnia.
French President Refuses to abandon sanctions on UIS, calls for Russian President Zhirinovsky’s resignation
The Scotsman
April 2, 1992
French President Mitterrand speaking to the press after refusing to meet a Russian delegation
(PARIS) In a stunning defeat for the Union of Independent States, French President François Mitterrand rejected calls from Moscow to lift sanctions on the UIS, the successor state to the Soviet Union. Mitterrand stunned a Russian delegation that came to Paris when, after refusing to meet them, he called the UIS “a reprehensible dictatorship that offends the conscience of free people across the globe.” He then went on to call for democratic elections to be held in Moscow and for Russian president Vladimir Zhirinovsky to resign. The forceful language stunned many international observers, as well as Moscow, which saw France as the weakest link in NATO in regards to sanctions against the former Soviet Union.
“Moscow had spent the last month heavily courting France and Hungary,” commented an American diplomat who wished to remain anonymous, “they truly believed that France would relent on sanctions based on the Russian role in ending the war in Bosnia. And with Hungary, the assumption was that the Union’s support of Hungarian rebels in Romania would garner them some support.”
Although few international observers outside of Moscow expected Paris or Budapest to break with the UN in regards to the sanctions, the forcefulness of the rebuke did come as a surprise. France had long been seen as the “voice of moderation” in NATO, a sharp contrast to the hard line taken by Washington and Berlin in regards to the UIS.
“There was no way Mitterrand would forget what the Russians did at their embassy last year,” added the American diplomat, “but the Russians honestly believed they had made headway. They really believed after Split that the sanctions would collapse.”
The speech, which some conservatives in France have called “Mitterrand’s De Gaul speech”, has proved immensely popular domestically as well. Nearly 69% of those polled after the statements were made supported the position of Mitterrand, and nearly 73% of French citizens polled stated that they believed that “the UIS was a fascist dictatorship.”
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Addressing the failure of the UIS to break sanctions after the Split Peace Treaty was signed.
BBC: You indicated that General Lebed and the junta were legitimately shocked that sanctions had not been lifted in March of 1993.
Putin: Correct. To be honest, I was shocked too. After our role in bringing peace to Bosnia, and our role in supporting Hungarian freedom fighters in Romania, we all thought that there was a crack in the sanctions. And once one nation broke from the sanctions, we knew we could get more to follow suit. All we needed was to get one western nation to open the door, then we assumed there would be a flood of nations who realized that there was a huge benefit to doing business with the UIS.
BBC: That seems somewhat naïve, particularly when you consider what happened just a year ago at the French embassy in Moscow.
Putin: In hindsight, yes it was. General Lebed had promised to prosecute those responsible for the massacre, but the French were not buying it. And when French President Mitterrand humiliated us, when he berated the UIS after all we had done to mend fences…we knew we couldn’t count on them to ever stand up to the Americans and Germans! After that we knew we had to take a radically different approach.
BBC: What was this radically different approach?
Putin: We had to go through the United Nations.
United Nations vote to extend sanctions on UIS, call for democratic elections in Russia
By Richard Roundtree
Economist
April 05, 1993
In a shocking move, Russia, broke from its position of refusing to take its seat on the United Nations Security Council yesterday…only to do nothing. Russia, which had claimed that the Security Council seat belonged to the UIS and not the Russian Republic, broke from this position and took its seat, only to abstain from voting on United Nations Resolution 821. The abstention on Resolution 821 yesterday, which extended sanctions on the UIS, passed 13-0-2 (with Hungary also abstaining) and has left international observers dumbfounded.
“I never expected the Russians to break this pledge not to take the seat on the Security Council,” commented Canadian ambassador to the United Nations Louise Fréchette, “and when we realized they were about to break their pledge, our natural assumption was that they would vote to lift sanctions.”
Most international observers felt that such a move would have been a tremendous victory for the United States and NATO.
“Had Russia taken its seat and voted to quash the sanctions it would have been seen as an act of desperation,” Fréchette added, “and to be honest, even though they are a member of the Security Council, I really think that it would have only strengthened the sanctions. But to take a seat and abstain from voting on sanctions makes no sense whatsoever.”
Some observers disagree however. Noting that Russian ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov indicated that Russia was about to hold snap elections in 30 days, many saw the Russians as taking a calculated risk.
“Much of the language of Resolution 821 indicates that sanctions would not be lifted until there were free and democratic elections in Russia and after Russia ended its occupation of central and eastern Croatia,” commented an American diplomat who wished to remain anonymous, “as crazy as this was, it really is a calculated gamble. If Russia does hold snap elections next month and they are deemed ‘fair’ by the UN, the sanctions could conceivably collapse.”
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