PART SIXTY FOUR: ALL POLITICS ARE ETHNIC
PART SIXTY FOUR: ALL POLITICS ARE ETHNIC
PART SIXTY FOUR: ALL POLITICS ARE ETHNIC
Well, we now get our answers as to how the UIS regains control of Uzbekistan while also getting our first look into what is happening with the Crimean Tartars as well as the Koryo-saram in Uzbekistan. Some new names in this update:
Jumma Kasinov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juma_Namangani
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan
The Crimean Tartars:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Tatars
Islam Karimov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_Karimov
Koreans in Uzbekistan:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koreans_in_Uzbekistan
Excerpts from the book: “From Marx to Massoud: A Modern History of Tajikistan”
By Abu Rahmon
Published by University of California Press, © 2005
CHAPTER SIX: THE BLAME GAME
With three individuals (excluding UTO leader Davlat Khudonazarov) all claiming to be the new President of Tajikistan, the fragile coalition between the communists and Islamists appeared to finally break. The heir apparent, Emomalii Rahmon (who was still going by the name Rahmonov) seemed ill equipped to rally the various factions under his leadership and seemed to quickly be usurped by the more extreme Qahhor Mahkamov. However, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan leader Sayid Abdulloh Nuri made it abundantly clear that the emergence of Mahkamov as president would result in the IRPT leaving the coalition. The threat succeeded in preventing Mahkamov from taking control, but it fueled a deep-seated bitterness that soon hijacked the war effort. As UTO forces began to move on the capital Dushanbe, Mahkamov would often take steps to ensure that Nuri’s forces would be forced to engage the UTO. Some UTO defectors even indicated that Mahkamov had in fact been in communication with UTO forces, revealing troop positions to the enemy in an attempt to liquidate his chief rival in the government coalition. The bickering between forces loyal to Mahkamov and forces loyal to Nuri soon exploded when UTO forces captured Dushanbe and arrested acting President Emomalii Rahmon. The loss of Rahmon created a brutal power struggle between Nuri and Mahkamov which, coupled with the UTO’s apparent policy of ethnic targeting and retribution, resulted in a massive human rights catastrophe that rocked neighboring Uzbekistan.
As nearly half a million Tajiks fled the growing lawlessness into Tashkent and Uzbekistan, Mahkamov soon solidified his close alliance with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, seemingly eliminating Nuri as a leading force in the now exiled Tajik government. Troops loyal to Nuri were arrested and rounded up in Uzbekistan in an attempt to further disenfranchise the growing Islamic movement across Central Asia. However Nuri still retained a close ally in Pakistan. Although the former communists Karimov and Mahkamov seemed to have control of the situation at first, The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan soon joined forces with their Uzbek counterpart and shocked the world with a show of force that frightened governments from Morocco to China. Few realized on September 11th, 1995 that the peaceful state-sanctioned protests would give the Islamic fundamentalists the opportunity not only to show just how powerful a faction they had become, but to also expose the fragile state of Uzbekistan’s central government.
Rioting erupts across Uzbekistan as refugees from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan target ethnic Russians in Tashkent
The Times of London
September 12, 1995
(TASHKENT, UIS) – In a sign of just how precarious the situation in the quasi-breakaway UIS republic of Uzbekistan has become, thousands of Kazak and Tajik refugees have begun rioting in the capital city of Tashkent to protest Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s apparent secret negotiations with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. The riots have revealed just how precarious Karimov’s grip over the country has become, and highlighted just how raw emotions have become not only with the native Uzbek population, but also with the refugees who are streaming in from all over central Asia. Nearly 100 ethnic Russians are believed to have been killed since the peaceful protests spiraled into violence on September 11th. They were triggered by the massive influx of thousands of Tajik refugees from the Leninabad district of Tajikistan.
“We condemn any agreement with the Russians,” a protester told this reporter, “we don’t care if it is the communists, the fascists, or the democrats. To us they are all enemies of the Muslim people.”
Karimov had initially tried to ensure the safety of the Russians who remained in Uzbekistan after declaring independence in 1991. Making up over 10% of the population, most were highly skilled and were seen as critical to keeping the economy afloat. But decades of economic mismanagement in the cotton industry, as well as the massive environmental destruction of the Uzbek cotton fields, have left the economy in shambles since 1991. Many Russians elected to leave the Republic, and those who remained often did so because of fear of persecution back in Russia.
“The strange thing is that many of the Russians who elected to remain in Tashkent did so because of their strong ties to the Communist Party,” commented William Tubman, a professor of Central Asian history in Edinburgh, “they opposed the UIS government and were some of the most loyal supporters of President Karimov, an unapologetic communist. These riots will almost certainly hurt Uzbekistan economically, but they also seem to have the unintended consequence of weakening the growing opposition within the UIS to the Liberal Democratic Party.”
The riots began peacefully on September 3rd, when Russian State media reported that Karimov, leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (an offshoot of the old Communist Party of Uzbekistan) and Belarusian President Lukashenko (who is head of the Belarusian Communist Party) had entered into preliminary negotiations to form a coalition that would compete in the 1996 UIS Presidential and legislative elections. The move was seen as little more than a formality, and few considered it particularly controversial. However, as tensions rose across the country, many Uzbeks felt betrayed by the apparent concession since it hinted that “independence was off the table.”
“With the breakdown of the Communist-Islamist faction in Tajikistan coupled with the growing instability in the western Karakalpakstan region, Karimov can ill afford this sort of breakdown of central authority,” Tubman added, “keep in mind, his predecessor was ousted because of his inability to quell ethnic riots in 1990.”
“The Politics of Islam: The Changing Face of Central Asia”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)
By Timothy Burnside
Routledge Press, (2010)
CHAPTER THREE: FROM COTTON TO CRUDE OIL
Once it became clear that the central government was losing control of the situation in Tashkent, the UIS soon made its move to further isolate the hostile government of Islam Karimov. Although many Uzbeks did not initially take part in the anti-Russian pogroms, their entry into the fray not only tipped the balance in favor of the Islamists, but also frightened minorities all across the Republic.
“The Korean population was terrified,” commented Alisher Aslanov, a former journalist from Tashkent, “as were the Crimean Tartars. You have to realize that Uzbekistan had always been a dumping ground for the Soviets for various minorities who were seen as disloyal or dangerous. But they were never particularly welcome by the Uzbeks and were sometimes victims themselves of discrimination by the local Uzbek population.”
The realization that the central government was unable to protect the Russian population exposed the myth of an independent Uzbekistan to many of the minorities. Recognizing that the remaining Russian population had been some of the most loyal supporters of Islam Karimov, many realized that they were in grave danger as well. Complicating matters was the recognition in the western region of the country that the Uzbek government was little more than a paper tiger. On September 15th, 1995, the breakaway region of Karakalpakstan announced its independence from Uzbekistan and its membership into the UIS as a separate Republic. What followed was a campaign of ethnic cleansing of the remaining Uzbek population in Karakalpakstan that ultimately terrified the remaining Crimean Tartars and Koreans in the east.
“They saw that this no longer had to do with political allegiances but with race,” added Aslanov, “as soon as that happened many of them began to flee Tashkent for either Kyrgyzstan or to the newly proclaimed Karakalpakstan Republic.”
Although Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko offered moral support to the fragile government of Islam Karimov, he was not able to offer any military support. Coupled with the deteriorating situation in Uzbekistan were long dormant territorial claims by neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, both loyal UIS Republics who now saw the opportunity to expand their borders.
“Keep in mind that Uzbekistan was the strongest and most populous country in Central Asia,” added Aslanov, “so there was some fear from the Turkmen and the Kyrgyzstanis in regards to a strong Uzbekistan. They all felt confident that independence would soon be realized and as a result they started becoming more threatened by Uzbekistan than by the UIS. They didn’t realize that we were all in this boat together.”
As the situation in Tashkent continued to deteriorate, Karimov now realized that he was backed into a corner. With the Islamists now firmly in control in Tashkent and with no allies remaining, Karimov realized that he had been flanked in the politics battlefield as well.
“The problem for President Karimov was he was playing politics under the old rule book,” said Aslanov, “the Soviet rule book. But that book was outdated as soon as Vladimir Zhirinovsky took power in Russia. We were now playing by Zhirinovsky’s rules, and rule number one was that ‘all politics are ethnic.’ As former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev famously said in 2002, Vladimir Zhirinovsky was a master of creating ethnic strife.”
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER SIXTY
As I hung up the phone I couldn’t help but shake my head. The madman had pulled it off. Zhirinovsky’s insane plan to foster ethnic strife in Uzbekistan had actually worked.
“Well,” General Sergei Stepashin asked as he looked at me, “what did he say?”
“He wants our help,” I replied, still not believing what I was saying, “he wants us to send troops.”
General Stepashin began laughing as he slapped his knee.
“Wait until we tell President Luzhkov and General Lebed,” he said joyfully, “that the President of Uzbekistan just called and asked us to invade his country.”
Uzbek President agrees to abandon independence as UIS peacekeepers enter Tashkent
By Jack Horn
Denver Post – October 13, 1995
(TASHKENT, UIS) In a move that stunned international observers, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov has agreed to withdraw his nations declaration of independence and has asked the UIS federal government to assist Uzbek government forces in quashing the rising Islamic fundamentalist movement in Uzbekistan. The move was widely seen as an attempt to regain control of his country after rioters drove Karimov out of the Uzbek capital of Tashkent.
“This is only a temporary measure,” Karimov told reporters, “we have received concessions from UIS President Luzhkov not to interfere with free and fair elections on the issue of independence, just as they have agreed to do in Turkmenistan.”
No date on a referendum has been announced, although it was reported that a vote on independence would be delayed until the “UIS federal government is confident that the central authority of the Uzbek government is strong enough to repel another attempt by radical Islamic fundamentalist from seizing control of the country.”
After riots in Tashkent spiraled out of control, numerous factions soon emerged claiming to be in charge. Perhaps most troubling was the emergence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by radical Islamic fundamentalist Jumma Kasimov. Although the IMU only controlled a few blocks of territory in Tashkent, and did not appear to have much appeal with the Uzbek population, Russian state television had devoted much of its coverage to the group. Calling Kasimov a “dangerous Muslim terrorist”, the Russian media also claimed that he would turn Uzbekistan into “Chechnya with nuclear weapons.”
UPDATE: As of 11:00 local time, federal UIS troops have regained control of nearly 75% of the city of Tashkent. It is believed that Kasimov has fled into neighboring Afghanistan.
Protesters wave the old flag of the USSR as UIS troops enter Tashkent to help the government restore order
PART SIXTY FOUR: ALL POLITICS ARE ETHNIC
Well, we now get our answers as to how the UIS regains control of Uzbekistan while also getting our first look into what is happening with the Crimean Tartars as well as the Koryo-saram in Uzbekistan. Some new names in this update:
Jumma Kasinov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juma_Namangani
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Movement_of_Uzbekistan
The Crimean Tartars:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimean_Tatars
Islam Karimov:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_Karimov
Koreans in Uzbekistan:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koreans_in_Uzbekistan
Excerpts from the book: “From Marx to Massoud: A Modern History of Tajikistan”
By Abu Rahmon
Published by University of California Press, © 2005
CHAPTER SIX: THE BLAME GAME
With three individuals (excluding UTO leader Davlat Khudonazarov) all claiming to be the new President of Tajikistan, the fragile coalition between the communists and Islamists appeared to finally break. The heir apparent, Emomalii Rahmon (who was still going by the name Rahmonov) seemed ill equipped to rally the various factions under his leadership and seemed to quickly be usurped by the more extreme Qahhor Mahkamov. However, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan leader Sayid Abdulloh Nuri made it abundantly clear that the emergence of Mahkamov as president would result in the IRPT leaving the coalition. The threat succeeded in preventing Mahkamov from taking control, but it fueled a deep-seated bitterness that soon hijacked the war effort. As UTO forces began to move on the capital Dushanbe, Mahkamov would often take steps to ensure that Nuri’s forces would be forced to engage the UTO. Some UTO defectors even indicated that Mahkamov had in fact been in communication with UTO forces, revealing troop positions to the enemy in an attempt to liquidate his chief rival in the government coalition. The bickering between forces loyal to Mahkamov and forces loyal to Nuri soon exploded when UTO forces captured Dushanbe and arrested acting President Emomalii Rahmon. The loss of Rahmon created a brutal power struggle between Nuri and Mahkamov which, coupled with the UTO’s apparent policy of ethnic targeting and retribution, resulted in a massive human rights catastrophe that rocked neighboring Uzbekistan.
As nearly half a million Tajiks fled the growing lawlessness into Tashkent and Uzbekistan, Mahkamov soon solidified his close alliance with Uzbek President Islam Karimov, seemingly eliminating Nuri as a leading force in the now exiled Tajik government. Troops loyal to Nuri were arrested and rounded up in Uzbekistan in an attempt to further disenfranchise the growing Islamic movement across Central Asia. However Nuri still retained a close ally in Pakistan. Although the former communists Karimov and Mahkamov seemed to have control of the situation at first, The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan soon joined forces with their Uzbek counterpart and shocked the world with a show of force that frightened governments from Morocco to China. Few realized on September 11th, 1995 that the peaceful state-sanctioned protests would give the Islamic fundamentalists the opportunity not only to show just how powerful a faction they had become, but to also expose the fragile state of Uzbekistan’s central government.
Rioting erupts across Uzbekistan as refugees from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan target ethnic Russians in Tashkent
The Times of London
September 12, 1995
(TASHKENT, UIS) – In a sign of just how precarious the situation in the quasi-breakaway UIS republic of Uzbekistan has become, thousands of Kazak and Tajik refugees have begun rioting in the capital city of Tashkent to protest Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s apparent secret negotiations with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. The riots have revealed just how precarious Karimov’s grip over the country has become, and highlighted just how raw emotions have become not only with the native Uzbek population, but also with the refugees who are streaming in from all over central Asia. Nearly 100 ethnic Russians are believed to have been killed since the peaceful protests spiraled into violence on September 11th. They were triggered by the massive influx of thousands of Tajik refugees from the Leninabad district of Tajikistan.
“We condemn any agreement with the Russians,” a protester told this reporter, “we don’t care if it is the communists, the fascists, or the democrats. To us they are all enemies of the Muslim people.”
Karimov had initially tried to ensure the safety of the Russians who remained in Uzbekistan after declaring independence in 1991. Making up over 10% of the population, most were highly skilled and were seen as critical to keeping the economy afloat. But decades of economic mismanagement in the cotton industry, as well as the massive environmental destruction of the Uzbek cotton fields, have left the economy in shambles since 1991. Many Russians elected to leave the Republic, and those who remained often did so because of fear of persecution back in Russia.
“The strange thing is that many of the Russians who elected to remain in Tashkent did so because of their strong ties to the Communist Party,” commented William Tubman, a professor of Central Asian history in Edinburgh, “they opposed the UIS government and were some of the most loyal supporters of President Karimov, an unapologetic communist. These riots will almost certainly hurt Uzbekistan economically, but they also seem to have the unintended consequence of weakening the growing opposition within the UIS to the Liberal Democratic Party.”
The riots began peacefully on September 3rd, when Russian State media reported that Karimov, leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (an offshoot of the old Communist Party of Uzbekistan) and Belarusian President Lukashenko (who is head of the Belarusian Communist Party) had entered into preliminary negotiations to form a coalition that would compete in the 1996 UIS Presidential and legislative elections. The move was seen as little more than a formality, and few considered it particularly controversial. However, as tensions rose across the country, many Uzbeks felt betrayed by the apparent concession since it hinted that “independence was off the table.”
“With the breakdown of the Communist-Islamist faction in Tajikistan coupled with the growing instability in the western Karakalpakstan region, Karimov can ill afford this sort of breakdown of central authority,” Tubman added, “keep in mind, his predecessor was ousted because of his inability to quell ethnic riots in 1990.”
“The Politics of Islam: The Changing Face of Central Asia”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)
By Timothy Burnside
Routledge Press, (2010)
CHAPTER THREE: FROM COTTON TO CRUDE OIL
Once it became clear that the central government was losing control of the situation in Tashkent, the UIS soon made its move to further isolate the hostile government of Islam Karimov. Although many Uzbeks did not initially take part in the anti-Russian pogroms, their entry into the fray not only tipped the balance in favor of the Islamists, but also frightened minorities all across the Republic.
“The Korean population was terrified,” commented Alisher Aslanov, a former journalist from Tashkent, “as were the Crimean Tartars. You have to realize that Uzbekistan had always been a dumping ground for the Soviets for various minorities who were seen as disloyal or dangerous. But they were never particularly welcome by the Uzbeks and were sometimes victims themselves of discrimination by the local Uzbek population.”
The realization that the central government was unable to protect the Russian population exposed the myth of an independent Uzbekistan to many of the minorities. Recognizing that the remaining Russian population had been some of the most loyal supporters of Islam Karimov, many realized that they were in grave danger as well. Complicating matters was the recognition in the western region of the country that the Uzbek government was little more than a paper tiger. On September 15th, 1995, the breakaway region of Karakalpakstan announced its independence from Uzbekistan and its membership into the UIS as a separate Republic. What followed was a campaign of ethnic cleansing of the remaining Uzbek population in Karakalpakstan that ultimately terrified the remaining Crimean Tartars and Koreans in the east.
“They saw that this no longer had to do with political allegiances but with race,” added Aslanov, “as soon as that happened many of them began to flee Tashkent for either Kyrgyzstan or to the newly proclaimed Karakalpakstan Republic.”
Although Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko offered moral support to the fragile government of Islam Karimov, he was not able to offer any military support. Coupled with the deteriorating situation in Uzbekistan were long dormant territorial claims by neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, both loyal UIS Republics who now saw the opportunity to expand their borders.
“Keep in mind that Uzbekistan was the strongest and most populous country in Central Asia,” added Aslanov, “so there was some fear from the Turkmen and the Kyrgyzstanis in regards to a strong Uzbekistan. They all felt confident that independence would soon be realized and as a result they started becoming more threatened by Uzbekistan than by the UIS. They didn’t realize that we were all in this boat together.”
As the situation in Tashkent continued to deteriorate, Karimov now realized that he was backed into a corner. With the Islamists now firmly in control in Tashkent and with no allies remaining, Karimov realized that he had been flanked in the politics battlefield as well.
“The problem for President Karimov was he was playing politics under the old rule book,” said Aslanov, “the Soviet rule book. But that book was outdated as soon as Vladimir Zhirinovsky took power in Russia. We were now playing by Zhirinovsky’s rules, and rule number one was that ‘all politics are ethnic.’ As former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev famously said in 2002, Vladimir Zhirinovsky was a master of creating ethnic strife.”
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER SIXTY
As I hung up the phone I couldn’t help but shake my head. The madman had pulled it off. Zhirinovsky’s insane plan to foster ethnic strife in Uzbekistan had actually worked.
“Well,” General Sergei Stepashin asked as he looked at me, “what did he say?”
“He wants our help,” I replied, still not believing what I was saying, “he wants us to send troops.”
General Stepashin began laughing as he slapped his knee.
“Wait until we tell President Luzhkov and General Lebed,” he said joyfully, “that the President of Uzbekistan just called and asked us to invade his country.”
Uzbek President agrees to abandon independence as UIS peacekeepers enter Tashkent
By Jack Horn
Denver Post – October 13, 1995
(TASHKENT, UIS) In a move that stunned international observers, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov has agreed to withdraw his nations declaration of independence and has asked the UIS federal government to assist Uzbek government forces in quashing the rising Islamic fundamentalist movement in Uzbekistan. The move was widely seen as an attempt to regain control of his country after rioters drove Karimov out of the Uzbek capital of Tashkent.
“This is only a temporary measure,” Karimov told reporters, “we have received concessions from UIS President Luzhkov not to interfere with free and fair elections on the issue of independence, just as they have agreed to do in Turkmenistan.”
No date on a referendum has been announced, although it was reported that a vote on independence would be delayed until the “UIS federal government is confident that the central authority of the Uzbek government is strong enough to repel another attempt by radical Islamic fundamentalist from seizing control of the country.”
After riots in Tashkent spiraled out of control, numerous factions soon emerged claiming to be in charge. Perhaps most troubling was the emergence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by radical Islamic fundamentalist Jumma Kasimov. Although the IMU only controlled a few blocks of territory in Tashkent, and did not appear to have much appeal with the Uzbek population, Russian state television had devoted much of its coverage to the group. Calling Kasimov a “dangerous Muslim terrorist”, the Russian media also claimed that he would turn Uzbekistan into “Chechnya with nuclear weapons.”
UPDATE: As of 11:00 local time, federal UIS troops have regained control of nearly 75% of the city of Tashkent. It is believed that Kasimov has fled into neighboring Afghanistan.
Protesters wave the old flag of the USSR as UIS troops enter Tashkent to help the government restore order
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Another great update, Pellegrino!