MarshalBraginsky
Banned
I guess this is what Zbigniew Brzezinski meant by the 'Eurasian Balkans': massive ethnic strife from the Balkans, the Caucasus to Central Asia.
Zhirinovsky's Russian Empire
- Thread starter Pellegrino
- Start date
Tragically, OTL's Tajik civil war was just as bloody as the one in this TL
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
Though what ethnic group would suffer the most in Afghanistan come around the War on Terror? There's the Nuristani group which converted to Islam in 1896, which makes them the last pagan group to convert into an Abrahamic faith.
The Pashto. As we see in this TL, the UIS is starting to find its bearings on how to get what it wants in regards to foreign policy. Rather than go into Afghanistan treating it as a united Muslim country in 2001 and trying to impose a government on them like they did in the 1980s, the UIS rather decides that the "divide and conquer" approach that works so well in Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan is the way to go. The Afghans have already shown that when invaded they fight back with a vengeance. So how do you get around that? By turning Afghanistan into three (or more) countries and turning those countries against each other. And the best way to see that happen is to disenfranchise the single largest (and strongest) ethnic group in Afghanistan. It doesn't help that the Pashto are closely linked to Pakistan and Al Qaeda.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
Sounds like what happened in Bosnia, only this time it's really personal for Zhirinovsky. The Hazaras may get an independent Hazarajat, and we know that the Uzbeks get their own state there.
Interesting switch-up you've got going with the Civil War, especially that the UTO* and the UIS are now bedfellows.
I would only make two comments based on what you have thus far:
1) Rahmonov (he doesn't become Rahmon until the 2000s IOTL, when he makes a decree the -ov suffix isn't properly Tajik) is a poor choice for leader of "Tajikistan" at this point. IOTL, he basically got the job because he was a weak candidate between the population centers in Leninabad/Khatlon and Kulob, and no one expected him to run with it. If the Communists are in a weaker position ITTL, they'll want someone much stronger, and they might even rally behind someone like Nuri (Hizb-e Nazahat-i Islami), just because he can inspire people.
2) Likewise, the UIS will not back a Pamiri. If anything, given Pamiri demands IOTL, and given Zhirinovsky's track-records with autonomous regions, he'll either give 'Gorno/Kuhistoni Badakhshan" independence, or he'll turn into a part of the Russian UIS (this is concerned popular IOTL).
Other than that, great work! I've done research on the Civil War, and it's not an easy conflict to understand, even as far as post-Soviet wars go.
I would only make two comments based on what you have thus far:
1) Rahmonov (he doesn't become Rahmon until the 2000s IOTL, when he makes a decree the -ov suffix isn't properly Tajik) is a poor choice for leader of "Tajikistan" at this point. IOTL, he basically got the job because he was a weak candidate between the population centers in Leninabad/Khatlon and Kulob, and no one expected him to run with it. If the Communists are in a weaker position ITTL, they'll want someone much stronger, and they might even rally behind someone like Nuri (Hizb-e Nazahat-i Islami), just because he can inspire people.
2) Likewise, the UIS will not back a Pamiri. If anything, given Pamiri demands IOTL, and given Zhirinovsky's track-records with autonomous regions, he'll either give 'Gorno/Kuhistoni Badakhshan" independence, or he'll turn into a part of the Russian UIS (this is concerned popular IOTL).
Other than that, great work! I've done research on the Civil War, and it's not an easy conflict to understand, even as far as post-Soviet wars go.
I have followed this timeline pretty closely in the last couple of weeks and I love it. I read from the beginning to the end and it is awesome.
If I may inject on the Bulgaria part, in the 1990s and 1991s the Bulgarian government was especially unstable. At first the UDF (a loose coalition of democratic parties) faced off against the now renamed communists and won, but then in 1991 the renamed communists held a vote of no confidence and seized power again. People begun to protest and riot but the old communist guard moved quickly to try to consolidate their power and transfer their political power into economic such, which in turn caused a massive hyperinflation and political unrest. Now, there are several ways to play the 'wildcard' idea.
First of all, the massive crisis coupled with events around the country, could lead to parties brandishing anti-communist slogans to sweep to power, but what is most likely is a combined front of democrats, nationalists and everyone who is not Communist to take the government down (like it happened in 1997). If somehow in those riots you manage to get the Nationalists (nominally IMRO or a gathering of parties such as the Bulgarian National-Radical Party) to come into the central spotlight (Perhaps via opposition to the Romanian avocation of Greater Romania which includes Southern Dobruja) you can have them win some gains.
The Second idea I had is, following the first idea, with riots similar to those in 1997 and people not being able to consolidate, growing radicalism and American pressure to scrap Bulgaria's significant missile arsenal, (including 67 SCUD-B, 50 FROG-7 and 24 SS-23 ballistic missiles) (In 2002, Bulgaria disbanded the Rocket Forces despite nationwide protests, but the US was advocating for that ever since Bulgaria's transition started.) we can see the army, having had enough of it all, returning to prominence as they organize a coup. This could lead to a renewed Bulgarian drive for rearmament and Balkan hegemony.
The third idea I had, is with the conflicts starting and everything going to hell, the Tsar (Simeon II) returns early and instead of advocating for becoming a prime minister, he advocates for the restoration of the monarchy. He had huge support for that, with half a million Bulgarians flocking to him when he arrived for the first time in 1997 (I think), yelling "We want our Tsar". So such a restoration will put the mindful and cultured Tsar on the throne, meaning that he will be separated between wanting to join NATO and being under pressure from the UIS' war machine in Romania and Bosnia. So he will make some concessions to the UIS, but also involve himself more in Macedonia, providing a helping hand and fostering close relations that might lead to Macedonia and Bulgaria signing agreements that will unify them in all but name.
Those are some ideas I have, feel free to disregard, yell or blame me for ASB, since I have a somewhat bias opinion, living here.
If I may inject on the Bulgaria part, in the 1990s and 1991s the Bulgarian government was especially unstable. At first the UDF (a loose coalition of democratic parties) faced off against the now renamed communists and won, but then in 1991 the renamed communists held a vote of no confidence and seized power again. People begun to protest and riot but the old communist guard moved quickly to try to consolidate their power and transfer their political power into economic such, which in turn caused a massive hyperinflation and political unrest. Now, there are several ways to play the 'wildcard' idea.
First of all, the massive crisis coupled with events around the country, could lead to parties brandishing anti-communist slogans to sweep to power, but what is most likely is a combined front of democrats, nationalists and everyone who is not Communist to take the government down (like it happened in 1997). If somehow in those riots you manage to get the Nationalists (nominally IMRO or a gathering of parties such as the Bulgarian National-Radical Party) to come into the central spotlight (Perhaps via opposition to the Romanian avocation of Greater Romania which includes Southern Dobruja) you can have them win some gains.
The Second idea I had is, following the first idea, with riots similar to those in 1997 and people not being able to consolidate, growing radicalism and American pressure to scrap Bulgaria's significant missile arsenal, (including 67 SCUD-B, 50 FROG-7 and 24 SS-23 ballistic missiles) (In 2002, Bulgaria disbanded the Rocket Forces despite nationwide protests, but the US was advocating for that ever since Bulgaria's transition started.) we can see the army, having had enough of it all, returning to prominence as they organize a coup. This could lead to a renewed Bulgarian drive for rearmament and Balkan hegemony.
The third idea I had, is with the conflicts starting and everything going to hell, the Tsar (Simeon II) returns early and instead of advocating for becoming a prime minister, he advocates for the restoration of the monarchy. He had huge support for that, with half a million Bulgarians flocking to him when he arrived for the first time in 1997 (I think), yelling "We want our Tsar". So such a restoration will put the mindful and cultured Tsar on the throne, meaning that he will be separated between wanting to join NATO and being under pressure from the UIS' war machine in Romania and Bosnia. So he will make some concessions to the UIS, but also involve himself more in Macedonia, providing a helping hand and fostering close relations that might lead to Macedonia and Bulgaria signing agreements that will unify them in all but name.
Those are some ideas I have, feel free to disregard, yell or blame me for ASB, since I have a somewhat bias opinion, living here.
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MarshalBraginsky
Banned
For someone who is more knowledgeable on post-communist Bulgaria than I am, that is without the fact, the greatest idea that you came up with. Would Simeon II try and get Macedonia to come closer to Bulgaria through the naming dispute involving Macedonia and Greece?
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Without a doubt he will try to get everyone around him as close as possible to Bulgaria. Obviously, Romania will be a no go, Serbia as well, but Greece and Macedonia will probably be natural allies. However Greece itself had close relations with Serbia, even going as far as helping them in the conflict, now knowing this, Simeon will probably side with Macedonia on the naming dispute and on many other disputes. As Macedonia will become Bulgaria's only regional credible ally.
Another ally, he can find in the region will be Turkey, being diplomatically isolated thanks to being surrounded by ether UIS aligned states or nationalist such, he will seek close relations to Turkey under the table, while he tries to play Zhirinovsky's allies around him that he is UIS aligned. Siding with Macedonia over Greece may be actually seen as a good thing, since Greece is a member of NATO and we all know the UIS' position on NATO (and Zhiri's opinion that Bulgaria should annex Macedonia) and actually draw his positions to the UIS. So the whole Bulgarian position will be trying to carve its own middle ground, between NATO and the UIS with no hope of ether of them giving any fucks about it other then advancing their own interests. So in this situation the Tsar will try to do what is best for his country while avoiding evil looks from each of the super powers.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
So in this case Simeon would settle on a union between Bulgaria and Macedonia, and he won't go for southeastern Serbia and parts of Thrace then. I can imagine Bulgaria as the mediator between NATO and the UIS, since they'll be in a position to decide what solutions are best for both sides.
Dementor
Banned
I'm afraid that your version of events of Bulgaria in the early 90s is not accurate at all. First, there were no Communists after 1990; not only did they rename themselves as Socialists, but they abandoned Communist ideology and in fact set in motion many of the dubious free market reforms that caused trouble later on. Secondly, apart from the fact that UDF narrowly won the second free elections in 1991, (after soundly losing the first in 1990), it was their own prime minister who called for a vote of confidence, and he lost it due to a fraction of his own party and his coalition partner, the MRF, abandoning him. Thirdly, the government that was formed after that was not led by the Socialists, but by Lyuben Berov, a moderate economist, who more or less followed in a milder form the policies of his predecessor. Fourth, BSP came in power after winning the next parliamentary elections in 1994 and protests didn't begin until January 1997, after the hyperinflation (and no, that didn't happen due to BSP "seizing economic power").
Now regarding the time line, the UDF might do even worse in the 1991 elections. At this point Zhirinovsky wouldn't have done much to be seen as a threat and the UDF's alliance with the ethnic Turkish party MRF would be awkward if Zhirinovsky brandishes this map. BSP will probably still lose, though some of the UDF breakaway factions might get into parliament this time. In this case, a moderate right-wing coalition government may be formed which may survive for a full term.
Now the UDF government was strongly pro-Western. In fact, they might well ask for admission into NATO after Zhirinovsky begins to look threatening. In any case, when the next election comes around, the UDF might capitalize on the threat posed by Zhirinovsky to weaken BSP. At this point nationalist parties had little influence in Bulgaria and the activities of the UIS are unlikely to change this, as the only possible irredentist target is Macedonia and that is under Serbian influence. And with all the problems Romania has, moving against Bulgaria is rather unlikely. If the socialists still win, that doesn't at all mean an alliance with UIS - their general foreign policy since the democratic reforms has been a balance between Russia and the West. If the UDF wins, they will probably carry on a pro-western policy.
I wouldn't say that this is ASB, but it's close. The demoralized military was never on the brink of carrying out a coup, and especially not against the socialists (who after all opposed the destruction of the missile arsenal). And unless the minds of the Bulgarian military leadership were replaced by those of the Japanese army in the 1930s, there is less than a snowflake's chance in hell of any attempt at "Balkan hegemony".
There is a difference between winning parliamentary elections (and this didn't happen until both parties had become very unpopular) and a restoration of the monarchy. But even if the monarchy was restored it would be a constitutional monarchy, probably with a right-wing government. Macedonia is part of the UIS in this time line (according to the first post in the thread), so no Bulgarian government would dare to intervene there.
Agreed on all those things, apparently working off the top of my memory isn't working out too well for me. Ill try and do my research next time. Kind of embarrassing since its our own history i screwed up.
Dementor
Banned
I see now that Pellegrino was reconsidering Macedonia being a member of the UIS. Still, with a stronger Serbia, Macedonia will be under even stronger Serbian influence, so it would probably still be unwise to interfere there. On the other hand, Serbia might overplay its hand and attempt to directly control Macedonia. In this case, the pro-Serbian Social Democratic party might might be discredited and (unlike in OTL) a pro-Bulgarian IMRO to come to power. In this case, Macedonia could well become a Bulgarian ally, though an union would be still unlikely.
I don't think that Bulgaria would alienate Greece. In OTL, Bulgaria supported Macedonia on most issues until fairly recently, but still has friendly relations with Greece. This will be even more important with an unstable Romania and with Serbia that is a member of the UIS (and probably in an imperialist mood).
While you were mistaken on some details, you gave me some ideas on how Bulgaria might develop in this time line, so your post is welcomeAgreed on all those things, apparently working off the top of my memory isn't working out too well for me. Ill try and do my research next time. Kind of embarrassing since its our own history i screwed up.
MarshalBraginsky
Banned
I don't think Bulgaria would want to piss off both Greece and Turkey in this case since the two countries are both NATO member states.
Thanks Kriegdämmerung, and I just want to add I enjoy your blog!
I won't lie, I have spent a lot of time researching Tajikistan and Central Asia and read two books on the region in the last six weeks and I still can't really figure out what the hell happened in Tajikistan in OTL. It is a very confusing war and I had a lot of difficulty understanding the factions and the ethnic distinctions between the groups.
1.) In regards to Rahmonov (thanks for the heads up on the name, I am correcting it!) I was really at a loss as to who would be picked. I figured that if the Communist in Belarus (and perhaps Putin
) would want a former Communist and would never back Nuri, but they also couldn't tick of Nuri either, it could break the coalition. This would eliminate Qahhor Mahkamov, who is hated by Nuri and the IRPT due to his crackdown on Muslims during his time heading the Republic in Soviet times. In a way, the end result sort of fits withyour theory, the pro-UIS opposition wins the war for the precise reason that Rahmonov is not strong enough to hold the coalition together.2.) The reason I picked the pamiris was because they controlled so much land but had such a small population that it almost is impossible for them to hold Tajikistan...without Moscow's help. It also sets up a potential union betwen the Pamiris and their ethnic kin in the South, whom they would love to see join up with them to help them maintain control over the Republic (it took awhile, but you are now getting an idea on how this "super-Tajikistan" comes into existence). Also, Davlat Khudonazarov (who took 2nd place in the 1991 election and led the opposition to Nabiyev) was a Pamiri. It is possible that the Russians and the UIS don't realize how fractitious the country has become during the war and just see Khudonazarov as the natural leader since he "leads" the UTO and took 2nd place in the election.
Thanks BgKnight! And I appreciate your input and your ideas! I am still trying to find a good way to fit Bulgaria into this TL and right now I really think this "play both sides" approach would be the way they would go. They can't afford to tick off NATO or the UIS, but they can get some goodies from both of them...if they play their cards perfectly.
I see now that Pellegrino was reconsidering Macedonia being a member of the UIS. Still, with a stronger Serbia, Macedonia will be under even stronger Serbian influence, so it would probably still be unwise to interfere there. On the other hand, Serbia might overplay its hand and attempt to directly control Macedonia. In this case, the pro-Serbian Social Democratic party might might be discredited and (unlike in OTL) a pro-Bulgarian IMRO to come to power. In this case, Macedonia could well become a Bulgarian ally, though an union would be still unlikely.
I don't think that Bulgaria would alienate Greece. In OTL, Bulgaria supported Macedonia on most issues until fairly recently, but still has friendly relations with Greece. This will be even more important with an unstable Romania and with Serbia that is a member of the UIS (and probably in an imperialist mood).
While you were mistaken on some details, you gave me some ideas on how Bulgaria might develop in this time line, so your post is welcome
Thanks for the input Dementor! And I tend to agree with you on Greece. Any "territorial' claim Bulgarian nationalist might make on Greece (or Turkey) is out of the question since both are members of NATO (and NATO is on edge and would have zero tolerance for any problems from Bulgaria). So I can imagine even the most radical nationalist in Bulgaria would conceeded that the borders with Greece and Turkey are not going to change. This should foster stronger ties between Greece and Bulgaria, and if NATO is courting Bulgaria to join them (which they might be, it would be a huge slap in the face for the UIS to lose Bulgaria to NATO) look for Greece to be really pushing to strenthen ties.
So Türkmenbashi finally makes a brief appearance. I was wondering when he was going to show up.
In a word...yes.
But it also shows that the UIS is less interested in politics and more interested in nationalism. They will support a crazy Socialist-style dictator in Turkmenistan and a pro-democracy human rights activist in Tajikistan.