PART FORTY FIVE: THE POWELL DOCTRINE
PART FORTY FIVE: THE POWELL DOCTRINE
Well, we are now getting a look at how the Americans are countering the UIS, and introduced to a host of new names that will come into play in the coming posts. We also see that, in TTL, the Powell Doctrine means something completely different that what we know as the Powell Doctrine. Some new names in this update:
The M-16 Rifle
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M16_rifle
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduard_Shevardnadze
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warren_Christopher
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colin_Powell
Former Republican House Minority Leader Robert Michel
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_H._Michel
New York Congressman Rick Lazio
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rick_Lazio
Former Texas Congressman Charlie Wilson
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Wilson_(Texas_politician)
Operation Cyclone (of Charlie Wilson’s War fame)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone
And the M-47 Anti-Tank Missile System
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m47-dragon.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M47_Dragon
Secretary of State Mondale resigns, President Kerrey poised to name Warren Christopher as his replacement
USA TODAY
Published: September 17, 1993
Secretary of State Mondale resigns
(WASHINGTON)- Controversial Secretary of State Walter Mondale has announced his resignation “effective immediately”, ending speculation that President Kerrey would be firing the much maligned former vice president. Mondale thanked President Kerrey and indicated a desire to “leave politics behind” him and spend time with his family back in Minnesota. The former democratic presidential nominee for president proved controversial during his short, nine month tenure as secretary of state. Many in Washington, both Republican and Democrat, criticized his role in spearheading the Split Peace Accord, and pressure from inside the Democratic party for his ouster had grown since the election of Vladimir Zhirinovsky two days ago.
“He really put all his cards in getting rid of Zhirinovsky through the ballot box,” commented one White House insider, “and when that fell through it became abundantly clear he didn’t have a plan B.”
Excerpts from the book “A Diplomat’s Life: An Autobiography of Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher”
Published by Hyperion © 2003
Chapter VII: Back in Washington
The soft knock at the door surprised me; I didn’t expect any visitors at this hour. I had been unpacking all night and had still made no progress in getting my office looking even remotely presentable, but I was certain that I was the last man in the State Department besides the security detail and Walter, the night janitor who worked on the second floor.
“Come in,” I said, “its open.”
To my shock former Secretary of State Mondale walked in with a smile across his face.
“Warren,” he said as he leaned over and took my hand, ignoring the look of shock on my face, “I just wanted to drop by and congratulate you on your confirmation.”
“Thank you Walter,” I said as I regained my composure, “I appreciate that. I was sad to see you go…”
I immediately regretted the statement; it sounded condescending, insulting even. I felt bad for the man; he was a great American and didn’t deserve to be treated the way he had been by the media and by the Republicans. Rush Limbaugh made it a personal quest on his radio program to see to it that he was ousted before the end of the year, and I wanted to see him tough it out. If for no other reason than to show Limbaugh that we were not going to roll over and die. We were not going to be defeated by his virulent brand of attack politics. But after the election of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in September of 1993 Mondale knew he was finished. He knew he had become a lightning rod for the administration, and quite frankly, he didn’t need to put up with it. He gave this country so much; he had nothing else to prove.
“Thanks Warren,” Mondale said as he let out a hearty laugh, “I wish I could say I agree with you. But I am confident that I am leaving things in capable hands.”
“Well, I assure you that I am not going to let the Republicans bully this administration,” I replied, “I am not about to reward their dirty political games by letting them hijack this office.”
The former Secretary of State said nothing as he looked at me. I wasn’t sure at the time if he was trying to determine if I had the mettle to hold up, or if I was going to keep my word, but what he said floored me.
“That’s what I want to talk to you about Warren,” he said, “I don’t want you to turn this into a battle between Republicans and Democrats. We need to do whatever we can to maintain a unified front. The Powell Doctrine is about to pay some huge dividends and we can’t lose sight of the ball: the UIS doesn’t care who is in charge in Washington. To them, we are one in the same. We need to show them that, right now, in that regards they are correct.”
I was surprised by the magnanimous gesture from the former Secretary of State. I suddenly admired him even more for his calm demeanor and realized how much this country lost when he retired from politics.
“I…I will,” I said softly, almost embarrassed at my previous outburst, “what do you suggest?”
“I talked to General Powell right before the Russian election,” he replied, “I think you need to call that kid from New York. He has a really, really interesting idea that I think you need to hear.”
Excerpts from the book “The Dragon’s Last Stand: A Biography of Former Vice President Rick Lazio”
By Frank Ryan
Published by Random House © 2009
CHAPTER FIVE
By mid-1993 the 35-year old rookie congressman had grown restless. Finding himself limited not only by his party affiliation, but by his lack of seniority, Rick Lazio began to complain to his colleagues at Congress’ perceived lack of action in regards to the UIS.
“Like many young Republicans he fancied himself as a prodigy of Ronald Reagan,” commented former Democratic New York Congressman Floyd Flake, who served with Lazio in Congress in 1993, “as a result much of his world view, at least in regards to the Cold War, was an attempt to emulate the former Republican president. But as one of the only Republicans in Congress with no first hand experience in dealing with the Reagan presidency, he often tended to look at Reagan’s presidency in much more ideological terms. He really believed Reagan was an uncompromising hardliner because he had no first hand evidence of anything to the contrary.”
Lazio was angry at the lack of action from the Kerrey administration, and was one of Secretary of State Mondale’s loudest critics after the Split Peace Accord ended the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, unlike many of his fellow Republicans at the time, he often went beyond mere rhetoric, countering White House policy with proposals of his own. It was this willingness to “stick his neck out” that seemed to limit his effectiveness with his fellow congressmen, but which also attracted the attention of many policy makers in Washington who were growing increasingly disillusioned with Walter Mondale’s handling of the new Cold War.
“He was virtually shunned by House Minority Leader Robert Michel,” added Flake, “Michel wanted the Republicans to maintain a unified front and not offer any specifics of their own to counter the Kerrey administration’s handling of the UIS. But Lazio was constantly telling C-SPAN all about
his ideas, which often led to Michel having to address those sometimes controversial proposals in the media.”
Across the aisle a veteran Democratic Congressman, who like Lazio had become ostracized by his own party, also grew concerned about the lack of a concrete policy in regards to the UIS. It was from these bizarre beginnings that one of the most unusual friendships in Washington would emerge. On March 11, 1993 Texas Democratic Congressman Charlie Wilson called his Republican counterpart from New York to set up a meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, General Colin Powell.
“Rick,” Lazio recalled the Texan saying, “we are going to have a lot to talk about. Have you ever heard of
Operation Cyclone?”
Congressman Rick Lazio in 1993
Excerpts from the book “Soldier: The Life of General Colin Powell”
Written by Catherine Wilcox-Miller
Published by Random House © 2000
Chapter Eight
By September of 1993 the Powell Doctrine was showing its first signs of success. Recognizing that the military of the former Soviet Union was designed as more of a “blunt instrument of brute force” as he once famously quipped, Powell also recognized that it was also a military which was considerably more vulnerable than many policy makers realized.
“General Powell saw that the Soviet military was designed to overwhelm with numbers,” added Captain Terry Fenton, a former aid to Powell during his time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “that was what would have made the Soviet military so effective in Western Europe. It was a relatively small, condensed area that could have conceivably been overwhelmed by the combined forces of the Soviet Union.”
However, Powell also saw that the UIS military had a “chink in the armor” and believed that the irrational policies of Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky were fueling, and exacerbating that one weakness.
“Prior to 1993 there was not the emphasis on smaller, highly skilled and meticulously trained units,” Fenton added, “it was more about strength in numbers, and as the economy of the UIS imploded the emphasis on training suffered.”
By September of 1993 many in the Pentagon recognized that the UIS military was stretched to the breaking point, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the time had come to implement the second phase of the Powell Doctrine.
“Many wondered if phase two could have been implemented as early as May or June of that year,” added Fenton, “but President Kerrey didn’t want to give the Russian nationalists any fuel to use in their election so he recommended holding off until after the Russian elections in 1993.”
With the election of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Powell moved rapidly to implement phase two. Recognizing that the UIS military would be unable to “overwhelm” a belligerent force due to the severe over-commitment of the UIS military in Bosnia, Serbia, and Azerbaijan coupled with the lack of viable recruits due to the civil wars in Estonia and Latvia, Powell focused on a small, mountainous Republic inside of Russia where the Powell Doctrine would focus its greatest attention.
“With the UIS meddling in the former Yugoslavia many in Washington, and many even in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wanted the focus to be on Croatia and Bosnia,” Fenton said, “but General Powell recognized that even if Russian morale weakened in Croatia, Serb morale would remain high as long as the Russians and the UIS seemed to be a viable world power. Rather, he focused on the breakaway Republic of Chechnya as the place to challenge the myth of Russian military invincibility.”
Many in Washington openly questioned the viability of supporting a landlocked republic surrounded on all sides by UIS territory. With Russia bordering three sides and the UIS Republic of Georgia bordering on the south, for many it looked like a foolhardy endeavor.
“He knew that it would be difficult,” Fenton added, “but he knew that after Azerbaijan there would be no way the Chechens would ever surrender to the Russians. And he knew that if they drove the Russians out, if they beat the Russians, it would be a literal knife through the heart of the UIS. It would destroy the UIS from the inside out. There was no way the UIS could survive as a unified country if a small, backwater Russian ‘province’ was able to become independent.”
Still, problems emerged when NATO weapons slated to go to the Chechens were having little impact in the region.
“Anything that was slated to go to Chechnya had to first go through Georgia,” added Fenton, “and Georgian President Shevardnadze was desperate to play both sides of the field. He was picking out the best weapons for his own army, while turning other weapons over to the Russians as ‘proof of his commitment to stop smuggling from NATO.’ When all was said and done, less that 10% of the weapons slated to go to the Chechens actually reached Grozny.
“It was Congressman Wilson and Congressman Lazio that really came up with the coup de grace,” Fenton added, “they approached General Powell with a suggestion, an idea that proved to be the final piece of the puzzle for the Powell Doctrine:
Dragons.”
“Azerbaijan and Chechnya- “Profiles on the Russian "War on Terror”
(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies) – by John Miller
Routledge Press, (2007)
CHAPTER NINETEEN
Although most Chechens found little use for the M-16 rifles that the Americans were sending into the country, preferring the Kalashnikovs that they had more familiarity with, one weapon that proved popular with the Chechens were the shoulder fired anti-tank M-47 “Dragons”. Recognizing that the Russian military would almost certainly be invading behind a column of T-55 and T-72 tanks, the strategy of the Chechen fighters had been to prepare a defense based on small, mobile units set to target the Russian tanks.
“The Chechen commanders had prepared a strategy of attacking the lead tank in a convoy with small groups of less than five or six men,” commented a Russian veteran of the Chechen war, “and to take out the tanks one at a time.”
However, the strategy was rife with problems and dangers. Automatic rifle fire seldom did serious damage to the Russian tanks, and most of the time the small units had to focus almost entirely on taking out the treads of the tanks in a hope of demobilizing it long enough for a second attack wave to hit. It was a plan that promised a large number of casualties. As a result the first shipment of M-47 dragons electrified the Chechen commanders.
“This fit with their military strategy perfectly,” commented a former Chechen officer, “not only were these missiles designed to take out the T-55 and the T-72s, but they were small and highly mobile.”
Ironically it was for that very reason that the dragons were unpopular with the United States military. While the small, mobile nature of the M-47 made it the perfect weapon for the guerilla tactics of the Chechens, it also was a weapon that required a much closer range than many in the American military felt comfortable with.
“Many American soldiers hated the Dragons,” commented a former American infantryman who served in Desert Storm, “they were death traps and they were not very accurate. As a result they were in the process of being phased out in 1993.”
The M-47s were used only sparingly in Desert Storm and were slated to be decommissioned entirely by the end of the decade. But when New York Congressman Rick Lazio discovered the plight of the much maligned weapon he intervened to see to it that the M-47s would be sent to the Chechens to assist with their struggle for independence.
“Many in the military opposed sending the dragons to Chechnya,” a former aid to Lazio said, “they were worried about them falling into the hands of the Russians or Iranians and being reverse-engineered. But Lazio had a powerful ally in the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Colin Powell. Powell knew that this was just the weapon to tilt the balance of power in the Caucasus. This was just the weapon to expose the myth of Russian invincibility.”
By the time Russian troops moved into Chechnya on October 31st, 1993 it was estimated that over 5,000 Dragons had been dispersed throughout Chechnya and Georgia.
An American with an M-47 in Kuwait (1991)