PART TWENTY TWO: PRUSSIAGATE
PART TWENTY TWO: PRUSSIAGATE
As we see in this update, things go from bad to worse with the West, with Germany now leading the charge agaisnt Russia and Zhirinovsky. Also, the political situation in the US starts to clarify itself, with Bush taking a beating in the press as Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey emerges as the Democratc nominee.
Just an FYI, the SNL skit is a bit hard to understand if you never saw Dana Carvey's George Bush bit. I would suggest doing a Youtube or Hulu search if you are curious, as those phrases ("na ga da it" and "wouldn't be prudent") were commonly used in his skits where he portrayed the President.
THE 1992 CAMPAIGN: TSONGAS AND CLINTON ABANDON CAMPAIGNS, LEAVING KERREY A CLEAR PATH TOWARD SHOWDOWN WITH BUSH
By ROBERT ROBERTS
Published: March 20, 1992
Clinton thanks supporters in Little Rock as he bows out of the race
Former Senator Paul E. Tsongas of Massachusetts and former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton withdrew from the race for the Democratic Presidential nomination today, a decision that many in the party said all but guaranteed the selection of Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska as the Democratic candidate for President.
Mr. Tsongas announced his departure at a news conference in Boston, where he cited a lack of money in his decision. Clinton announced his departure in Little Rock, citing disappointing results in his native South, where he hoped to score a major coup ten days ago during Super Tuesday.
“We appreciate all the support we received in Louisiana and Mississippi,” Clinton said during a press conference, “but I cannot in good conscience continue this campaign when all it would do at this time is damage Senator Kerrey’s prospects in November.”
Although Clinton was expected to be a major player in the race, personal scandals coupled with his perceived lack of foreign policy experience crippled his campaign. After a disappointing third place showing in New Hampshire, he focused on winning big in the South. However, Kerrey’s win in Florida and Texas on Super Tuesday dwarfed Clinton’s wins in Louisiana and Mississippi, and all but sealed the nomination for the Nebraska Senator.
“While Senator Tsongas played to President Bush’s weaknesses regarding the economy, Senator Kerrey capitalized on his foreign policy blunders in regards to the former Soviet Union,” commented former Senator Eugene McCarthy, who dropped out of the race early on. “As a result, Governor Clinton was really left out in the cold this election. I really think if it were just about the economy, he would have emerged victorious. But once Russia started flaring up, Senator Kerrey was able to ride on his experience in Vietnam and his strong foreign policy background to really derail the Clinton campaign before it had a chance to take off.”
Kerrey’s victory in Florida was seen as a direct result of the situation with Russia, coming weeks after Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s bizarre anti-Israel comment in New York City during his visit the previous month.
“It was clear that the Jewish community in Florida were very, very worried about Zhirinovsky,” McCarthy added, “and Bob Kerrey was the man who most comforted the Jewish-American community in regards to Russia. If not for that, I think Clinton might have won Florida, and maybe even this election.”
Exit polls showed Senator Kerrey polling as high as 85% with Jewish Democrats in Florida after the primary election.
Harold Stassen, America’s Winston Churchill, died on March 4th, aged 93
The Economist
Mar 8th 2001
Stassen speaks ot the 1992 Republican National Convention in Houston
Harold Stassen, one of the elder statesmen in American politics and the man who was famously described as the “moral compass of the Republican Party” by former President Ronald Reagan in 1992, died this week at his home in Minneapolis at the age of 93.
Although Stassen’s early political career saw him emerge as one of the most attractive young Republican politicians in the country in the 1940s, his multiple failed presidential runs soon diminished his appeal within political circles. By the time Harold Stassen had announced his candidacy for president in 1992, he had already been relegated to the role of a virtual national joke. After eight unsuccessful campaigns for President between 1948 and 1988, Stassen was better known for the comical “Stop Stassen” movement, which humorously tried to convince the former governor to abandon another impossible campaign. However, by the end of 1992 Harold Stassen mounted one of the most improbable political comebacks in American history and became the elder statesmen of the Party. He famously received the loudest standing ovation during the 1992 Republican National Convention in Houston when he said: “the greatest threat to America today is this new fascist union that has replaced the Soviet Union. Make no mistake, Russia cannot be trusted, they are not our allies.” The statement, and the outpouring of support it created, surprised many political insiders, and was dubbed “Stassen’s Churchill speech” by conservative commentators. Even Ronald Reagan, who spoke after Stassen, was genuinely impressed with the former governor when he said in his speech “I’m glad we have patriots like Harold Stassen on our side.” The line from Reagan also led to a standing ovation from the crowd in Houston.
After the 1992 election, Stassen continued to serve the Republican Party in an advisory role, and in one of the great ironies of politics, turned down an offer by numerous Republican officials to run in the 1996 election, citing his advanced age.
“I really don’t think he was running all those times because he necessarily wanted to be president,” commented a former aid to Stassen who worked with him in his 1992 campaign, “but he had a message, and he really believed if he remained authentic, if he refused to sell out his principles, sooner or later people would recognize he had been right all along and respect his convictions. He always took the hard positions that hurt him politically, such as supporting the Civil Rights Act and Martin Luther King when it wasn’t popular with some Republicans. But in the end, he was proven right, time and time again.”
CNN interview with James Baker, former Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush
July 13, 1997
CNN: Did President Bush do enough to contain the UDR after the war in Estonia and Latvia exploded?
Baker: I think so. But unfortunately it came during an election, so it looked like everything we did was in response to the poll numbers. When he froze aid to the UDR after the convention, the press called it a shallow attempt to appease the Stassen-block of the GOP. And when President Bush pushed to have Hungary and Poland admitted into NATO most of the media criticized it as a feeble attempt to contain the surging Kerrey movement.
CNN: Do you think the media gave you a bum rap?
Baker: Yes. President Bush was on the cover of Newsweek and he was called a ‘wimp’ in 1987. Saturday Night Live was making fun of him every weekend with some skit about how President Bush was afraid of his own shadow. In 1988 we didn’t have a problem looking like a strong leader compared to Michael Dukakis, but in 1992 the media really unfairly attacked Bush and portrayed Kerrey as this ‘man’s man’ who was going to stand up to Russia and restore America’s place in the world.
CNN: Much like what Reagan did in the 1980 election.
Baker (long pause): Yes, I suppose so. Once Zhirinovsky started creating absolute havoc across Europe, in Romania and Yugoslavia, it became a big problem and Kerrey was able to come out looking like Ronald Reagan and Bush ended up looking like Jimmy Carter to a certain extent. But if the media would have fairly reported what we were doing, I think things would have been different. If the American people saw the steps we took to contain Russia, they would have seen that, in many ways President Bush did an incredible job in stopping the Russian threat. Considering that for eight years President Kerrey was unable to contain the UIS, it was clear that it was a very difficult situation we were in back in 1992.
Transcript from Saturday Night Live
June 20, 1992
Guest: Tom Hanks
Clip features Kevin Nealon as Sam Donaldson and Dana Carvey as George Bush
Donaldson: Mr. President, it was recently announced that the Russian army has invaded Alaska. Senator Kerrey has criticized your response of doing nothing as, and I quote, “being way too French”.
(Audience laughter)
Bush: Now Sam. Not going to send troops to fight in Alaska. Na ga do it. Wouldn’t be prudent. It’s cold up there. Na ga da it.
(Audience laughter)
Twenty Years Later, Prussiagate Still Defines German Foreign Policy
Der Spiegel – English Edition
April 22, 2012 at 11:15 AM EDT
By: Hans Wirth
For Norbert Blüm, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs under former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, he remembered the day as if it were yesterday.
“We were in the middle of a meeting when a young page came in with a personal message from the UDR embassy.” Blüm said as he sipped his coffee, “The Chancellor took it and read it quietly for just a moment. Had it ended there I would have forgotten about it. We receive memos and letters and communications every day. But his response was such that I would never forget.”
Blüm had known the stoic Kohl for over thirty years, and had worked with Kohl in German politics since they were both young men. But never did he see the Chancellor respond the way he did that day.
“He swore,” Blüm said, “In thirty years I never heard him swear. But as he read that letter I heard him loudly yell ‘what the fuck is this?!’ as he crumpled up the paper and threw it in the wastebasket. I didn’t know what the letter said, but I never saw the Chancellor so visibly upset.”
The incident might have ended there had it not been for the Chancellor’s angry response. Across the cabinet whispers began to circulate as to the contents of the letter. And before the end of the day the memo would be removed from the wastebasket, although the culprit would remain a source of controversy to this day. Within two weeks it would be sent to the German press, causing one of the biggest scandals to his the country since the end of World War II.
“Clearly, in hindsight the Chancellor should have responded differently,” Blüm said with a sigh, “but I really believe him when he said he thought it was some sort of sick joke. Today we know what kind of man Vladimir Zhirinovsky is, but in early 1992 we were still discovering what he was. You don’t get a letter like that and assume a sane person would send it to you!”
The infamous Prussiagate scandal started with that personalized, hand written letter, from Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky to Kohl, proposing an alliance to invade Poland and divide the country up between the two nations with the pre-World War I borders (excluding the Kaliningrad enclave). The letter was written in German and full of grammatical errors. It often rambled and in several places made absolutely no sense whatsoever (in one German comedy magazine, a satirical classified ad was posted in which the Russian government was seeking German translators, with the only qualification being that the translator know how to spell “concentration camp”). However, the portions of the letter that could be deciphered were frightening.
“-and for make no Poles in Prussia, and no Poles in Danzig, Germany make to be for in camp of Poles to be die,” the letter chillingly said in one portion, “Russia will to have Poles too much, and not want more.”
The letter caused an uproar in Germany and Poland, with Polish President Lech Walesa furious at what he deemed was a “casual and dismissive response to a call for a second Holocaust.”
“Kohl just underestimated the impact of Polish fears and concerns over both Russian and a unified Germany,” Blüm said. “He already had one gaffe when he suggested in 1990 that the Oder-Neisse line might be open to negotiation as a permanent border once Germany was unified.”
The backlash against Kohl and Zhirinovsky was furious, and in hindsight created one of the most unusual developments of modern Europe.
“Kohl knew he had to do damage control,” Blüm said, “but more importantly, as Estonia and Latvia spiraled into civil war, he also knew that steps had to be taken to stop Russia before they started a major conflict all across Europe. Once he realized the Prussiagate letter was legitimate he championed Polish admission into NATO. In fact, had it not been for Kohl, I doubt the French or Italians would have allowed NATO expansion into Poland and Hungary in 1992. They were worried about provoking Russia, but Kohl’s firm leadership and determination on the issue made it happen.”
However, despite steps taken to lead Western Europe’s opposition to the UIS, Kohl remained on the defensive throughout his career over the Prussiagate memo.
“I think there might have been some overcompensating,” former US Special Envoy to UN Cyrus Vance once famously quipped in 1995, “because the Germans were always refusing to make any compromises when it came to the Russians.”
It is a sentiment that Blüm tends to agree with.
“Kohl was determined to stop the Russians at any cost,” Blüm said, “and it is probably Kohl’s NATO expansion that led to the creation of the UIS and the occupation of the Croatian Krajina by the UIS. In hind sight, we should have told the world about that letter. Then we wouldn’t have to constantly be playing hardball.”
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR
The cabinet was in a near riot. Even Zhirinovsky’s strongest supporter, Vice President Andrei Zavidiya was furious with the Russian President.
“Why would you send that letter to the Germans?!” he screamed as Zhirinovsky cowered sheepishly in his chair, “not only do we sound like a bunch of Nazis, but we sound like a bunch of retarded Nazis as well!”
Zhirinovsky tried to backpedal, and say that he didn’t mean for the letter to have been made public, as if that was some sort of defense.
“I can’t believe Kohl would do this,” he mumbled under his breath, “I extended my hand to him in friendship.”
“Not everyone is a fucking idiot,” Zavidiya screamed at the President, “they don’t all think like you do!”
I honestly wondered if we the President’s cabinet was going to beat him to death right then and there. I had to hold Prime Minister Silayev back on several occasions to prevent him from trying to hit Zhirinovsky. After Estonia and Latvia the world was already turning on us. The Finns, alongside with the Swedes and Norwegians had cut all diplomatic ties with us, and we knew that after the scandal this letter caused, the rest of the world would follow suit. That stupid letter had turned Russia into North Korea over night. And after all the progress we had made, strengthening ties with the United States and Western Europe just a few weeks ago. For Zhirinovsky to grab a German-Russian dictionary and propose a Hitler-esque invasion of Poland was the most idiotic thing he could have done! I honestly couldn’t believe he was that stupid and reckless. He didn’t even have the common sense to properly translate the letter, making a mockery of our country on top of everything else!
Finally, after everyone had taken turns screaming at Zhirinovsky we finally had to decide how to deal with the problem.
“We better call the federal government” Silayev said angrily, “considering this Republic just destroyed the federal economy.”
I decided we couldn’t deal with this anymore. I know Silayev was worried about Alksnis, but we simply could not have Zhirinovsky in leadership anymore. I knew we had to destroy everything we had been working so hard for under Boris Yeltsin: we had to weaken the strength of the Republics and hand over power to the federal government.
“Gentlemen, I think there is only one option right now,” I said. “We need to let the world know that this madman does not speak for the country.”
The entire cabinet began to shuffle uneasily. They were worried, and understandably so. But if we could marginalize Zhirinovsky then perhaps the international community would not impose sanctions. Perhaps we would still be able to be seen as a responsible member of the international community if we could just convince the world that Zhirinovsky wasn’t really in charge; that he was just some unelected low level regional government official who really didn’t have any say in matters of international policy. I saw them all nod their heads in approval as Prime Minister Silayev stood up.
“I will call Prime Minister Luzhkov,” he said solemnly, “I think that we should only deal with him. I am willing to hand over our country to him, but not to Alksnis.”
We all nodded in agreement, and quickly voted on the matter before Prime Minister Silayev stepped out of the room to make the call we all prayed would never have to be made.
“I hope you know what you’re doing,” Sergei Filatov said to me under his breath, “because if Zhirinovsky is working under the table with Alksnis, then you were just conned. If that is the case then you just handed the entire country over to the fascists and the communists.”
