PART EIGHTEEN: A SECOND CHANCE TO MAKE A FIRST IMPRESSION
“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998
CHAPTER THIRTY
Zhirinovsky was adamant against going to the United States and meeting with Bush. He held a deep-seated distrust of the West, and he was fearful that going to the United States could impact his credibility at home with the Russian people. But with privatization just implemented, coupled with the growing power struggle between Luzhkov and Alksnis, many of the reformers in the Russian government saw this as a golden opportunity to develop stronger ties with the United States.
However, the question quickly became who to send? Luzhkov was unwilling to leave the country, afraid of a possible coup in his absence that would consolidate power behind Alksnis. And quite frankly, he didn’t trust Zhirinovsky. None of us did. If he left the country he feared Zhirinovsky might just switch gears and suddenly back Alksnis. He was already showing a talent for that. Backing hardliners one moment and then reformers the next. He was like a butterfly, floating from camp to camp. But I was more concerned about letting him loose in America. I was afraid he would do more damage to Russian interests if we let him go than if he stayed put. I suppose secretly I was hoping that he wouldn’t go. So much so that when he screamed and pouted like a child when it was suggested to him I actually smiled. I was glad he was making such a scene! Maybe this would convince Prime Minister Ivan Silayev to abandon this dangerous plan.
“We don’t need the West to recapture Dushanbe,” Zhirinovsky screamed at the cabinet. “All we need are 10,000 loyal Russians willing to quash this Turkish rebellion!”
“Mr. President,” Silayev countered angrily, “the United Nations is already preparing to admit Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in February. We need to take steps to delay that vote. If we can woo the United States they can pressure the UN not to admit those nations.”
“A nuclear bomb will convince them just as effectively,” Zhirinovsky shot back, “and a reminder that we have enough of them to turn all of New York City into a desert of glass.”
“Well, us having a nuclear bomb didn’t stop them from admitting Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,” Silayev said mockingly.
I stood up to separate the two, it was clear Zhirinovsky was not going to go to the United States. That was fine. We would send someone else, someone less volatile. Perhaps Silayev would go. Suddenly a deep voice interrupted me. I saw Zhirinovsky freeze like a deer caught in the lights of a truck.
“You will go to America,” General Victor Ivanenko said as he walked into the room and dropped a black folder in front of Zhirinovsky, “or you run the risk of losing the support of the KGB and the military. And with all due respect Mr. President, you should remember where you would be right now had it not been for the KGB.”
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Putin: If there was any questions as to whether or not Lebed and Ivanenko were really in control of the country or if Zhirinovsky was the real leader, then the cabinet meeting of January 21st, 1991 should have extinguished any doubt. General Ivanenko interrupted the meeting, walked right in, and told Zhirinovsky to do exactly as instructed! Like a puppet! He handed Zhirinovsky a script and told him to read these statements to the western media and to give these documents to President Bush when they met. And Zhirinovsky said nothing! He didn’t complain, he didn’t protest! He just took the documents in the black folder and meekly sat down, like a timid rabbit!
60 Minutes on CBS News - “Lebed: The man behind the mask?” from April 23, 2008
Portions of a Mike Wallace interview with Andrei Zavidiya, former Vice President of Russia.
Courtesy of CBS
Mike Wallace: Mr. Zavidiya, let me ask you, did President Zhirinovsky go to the United States in January of 1992 on his own free will, or was he ordered to go by General Ivanenko as Vladimir Putin alleges?
Andrei Zavidiya (long pause): I really don’t know-
Mike Wallace: Wouldn’t the fact that you are not sure indicate that many of you recognized that General Ivanenko and General Lebed were the ones really in charge?
Zavidiya: Not necessarily. Ivanenko was still head of the KGB, and it was still a fully functional agency, despite the growing lawlessness throughout the country. Zhirinovsky didn’t want to cross Ivanenko because he saw what Ivanenko had in the black folder. And I think he went to the United States to prevent Ivanenko from being able to use it against him. By releasing it to the world first he was able to rob Ivanenko of that one, last weapon that the KGB had against him.
Wallace: I’m sorry, what was in the black folder? It was alleged by Putin and former Secretary of State Gennady Burbulis that it was a script that Zhirinovsky was supposed to follow.
Zavidiya: No. I assure you if Zhirinovsky was on a script he certainly wouldn’t have made his “Israeli threat” statement in New York. They didn’t need a script for Zhirinovsky. That was why Burbulis was forced to go with him as well. To control what he said and who he said it to.
Wallace: So what is the black folder?
Zavidiya: The black folder was the file that the KGB had on Zhirinovsky, and more importantly, his father.
Barbara Walters/ABC Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovsky
(January 30th, 1992)
ABC's Barbara Walters: Mr. President, thank you for taking this opportunity to speak with the American people. I would like to start with what your impressions of the United States are?
Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky: Very positive. I have been warmly received in America and I am very impressed with your country.
Walters: You have nonetheless made a few statements that have raised eyebrows since going on this world tour-
Zhirinovsky: There are many enemies of democracy who want nothing more than to embarrass me. But I did err in my choice of words. I should be much more careful in the future and not say things that can be misinterpreted. I want to say here and not, I am not an enemy of the Jewish people.
Walters: Many people feel that your statement in New York City on the 13th, where you said “Russia must be on guard against the threat from Israel” was bordering on anti-Semitic. What did you mean by that statement?
Zhirinovsky: I chose a terrible way to say that. I wanted to stress that we cannot let ourselves be dictated by foreign policy. We must focus on Russia first, and at times, Russian interests may be different that those of other countries. When that happens we must respectfully put foreign policy aside and do what is best for Russia.
Walters: So you reject those accusations that you are anti-Semitic?
Zhirinovsky: Absolutely. I have very warm feelings towards Israel and the Jewish people. Israel is not our enemy; in fact, it is a close, close friend to the UDR. Many Israelis come from Russia; we share a common bond, a common blood. In fact, I myself am half Jewish.
Walters: What?
Zhirinovsky: Yes. My father is Jewish. I hope someday to visit Israel, not as a Russian, but as the son of a Jewish man who is visiting his heritage.
BUSH AND ZHIRINOVSKY DECLARE FORMAL END TO COLD WAR; AGREE TO EXCHANGE VISITS
By MICHAEL WAXMAN
Published: February 01, 1992
President Bush and President Vladimir Zhirinovsky of Russia today proclaimed a new era of "friendship and solidarity" as they declared a formal end to over seven decades of tension, declaring the “Cold War is over.” Both Presidents then agreed to exchange visits in Moscow and Washington in April of this year.
Meeting in casual winter attire at the Presidential retreat at Camp David, the two leaders discussed the recently enacted economic reforms implemented in the UDR and in Russia, as well as the status of Russia and the other republics that make up the successor state to the Soviet Union.
President Bush also discussed growing concerns that both the United States and the international community have over the status of the Central Asian Republics, where UDR control is tenuous, and the status of the nuclear warheads currently deployed there.
“Both President Zhirinovsky and I are deeply concerned with the situation in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,” Bush said, “and we implore President Alksnis to implement real reform and to work with the Central Asian Republics so that peace can be realized throughout the former Soviet Union.”
President Zhirinovsky also became the first Russian politician to confirm the number of Soviet nuclear weapons, and to confirm that a small handful of these weapons were stationed in Uzbekistan and are now in control of rebel Islamism. He expressed deep concern over the lack of federal control over the nuclear arsenal in Uzbekistan and called on the UN to withhold recognition until the nuclear weapons are accounted for.
“The United Nations is to consider admitting Uzbekistan as a member in two days,” Zhirinovsky said, “but we call on the UN and the international community to withhold recognition until all nuclear weapons have been accounted for and disarmed. Although we still seek a negotiated settlement with the loyal Uzbek citizenry, if independence is unavoidable, so be it. But we cannot have a country which is already establishing dangerous ties to terrorist groups in Afghanistan, and to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, to have over 200 nuclear weapons.”
CNN interview with Jack Matlock, former ambassador to the USSR
August 18, 2000
CNN: How was Zhirinovsky able to win over the West so effectively in January of 1992 with his first visit to the United States?
Matlock: After Azerbaijan, he was vilified in the West, but privatization gave him a second chance to make a first impression. He really came off as someone we could reason with, someone we could work with. He was humble, soft spoken, polite, and even proud of his Jewish heritage. He just won over everyone. And he threw in just enough scare tactics to get what he really wanted: time to crush the Uzbeks and Tajiks.
CNN: Was his infamous “Camp David Speech” by itself the major reason the UN decided against admitting Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as members in February of 1992?
Matlock: Absolutely. You know, when I was ambassador to the USSR, we really didn’t know a whole lot about our Cold War enemy. We didn’t know how many nuclear weapons they had and exactly where they were located. So when he said that over 150 were stationed in Uzbekistan, America didn’t really question it. And when he started implying that they were looking to sell the weapons to Saddam Hussein, well, it sounded far-fetched, but better to err on the side of caution, right? We thought a little time to let Russia round up its rogue nukes was a good thing, but Zhirinovsky was looking at it in a much different way. At that point all he wanted was time to shore up the military, and he successfully accomplished that. By the time Russian troops marched into Tashkent in 1995, the world realized what his real plan had been all along.
