PART THIRTY TWO: THE QUASI-JUNTA
UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.
Discussing the shakeup of the UIS military in 1992 after the Romanian intervention.
BBC: You indicated that Zhirinovsky had no role in the emergence of what most historians now call the “Quasi-Junta” in October of 1992. Where much of the military leadership was purged while others were recruited into a “16-man Committee for State Security and Defense” that almost acted independently of Moscow in regards to the war effort in the former Yugoslavia.
Putin: Correct. General Lebed organized it.
BBC: So why did Lebed attack the institution that was crucial to his power base? Didn’t the purges threaten to alienate his most valuable ally?
Putin: First of all, I hardly consider them purges. Those generals didn’t end up in gulags. They weren’t tried for treason and shot. They were just reassigned to desk jobs or given private sector jobs. Even General Dubynin was going to be given a lucrative private sector job before he committed suicide.
BBC: But those generals who were removed must have opposed the reassignments.
Putin: Some of them did, sure. But by and large the military recognized that the cronyism and corruption that had infected the UIS military had to be removed. And after the removal of General Dubynin the previous month after his role in the Moscow Airlift, there was a problem with leadership. He was the head of the armed forces, but without him you had an emerging power struggle. Dozens of generals now acted independently of each other, and some were openly vying to emerge, like General Lebed and General Ivanenko, as major power brokers. But once the “Quasi-Junta” emerged, there no longer was a question of whose orders to follow. If the UIS told you one thing and the Russian republic gave you a conflicting order, you deferred to the "Junta” and followed their orders.
BBC: How did General Lebed recognize that there was a problem?
Putin: Romania. That was beyond a disaster.
Excerpts from the book “The Soviets and the Serbs: Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the conquest of Yugoslavia
By Edward Ellis.
Published by Random House © 2004
Moscow, UIS, September 29, 1992:
As soon as UIS Marshal Alexander Lebed discovered how disastrous the Romanian situation had become he became outraged. Although he was angry at UIS President Anatoly Lukyanov for ordering troops to cross into Romania so quickly, most of his anger was directed towards Northern Group of Forces commander Leonid Kovalyov. General Kovalyov had struggled to maintain morale with his troops stationed in Poland, even after Polish admission into NATO. But his failure to withdraw troops in a timely fashion led to an embarrassing withdrawal that had been broadcast on international television, and his failure to mobilize his troops properly for the entry into Romania infuriated Lebed.
Still, many felt that General Kovalyov was burdened with what most felt was an almost impossible task. After the arrest the previous month of the former Northern Group of Forces commander Viktor Dubynin, many of the troops stationed in Poland were in a near rebellion. General Dubynin was a firm leader, but widely popular with the troops, and his arrest resulted in a noticeable decline in morale.
“As soon as he was arrested, at least 1,000 troops just abandoned their post,” commented a corporal stationed in Poland at the time of the withdrawal, “and others just started to drink and create discord.”
The lack of a clear chain of command also complicated matters. With the vacancy of the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the UIS (after General Dubynin’s arrest) it became unclear where central command originated. Conflicting orders often came from the federal government and the Russian President. Further complicating the issue was the clear power struggle inside of the military for an appointment to General Dubynin’s vacant position.
“We had a situation where commanders were trying to align themselves with either Lukyanov or Zhirinovsky,” commented an officer who worked in Moscow at the time, “but both tended to defer to General Lebed on matters of military.”
It was this attempt to align with a power broker that led to the poor performance of the Russian military in Romania. Apparently unwilling to admit that his grip on the Northern Group of Forces was perilously weak, and also unwilling to admit that his troops simply were unable to fully mobilize with such short notice, General Kovalyov elected to hide the truth from President Lukyanov.
“The plan was for the UIS troops to enter Romania no later than 2AM on September 27th;” commented a unit commander who was part of the mobilization,” the hope was that they would be out of Romania no later than 7 AM, before most people woke up.”
However, poor communication and preparation led to troops entering Romania in sporadic fashion. As late as 11 AM UIS troops were still crossing the border from all over the country, most with little more than a general command to “get to Belgrade as soon as possible.” Troops became scattered all over Romania over the course of the day, with the effect of electrifying Romanians as they headed to the polls.
“One tank even ended up in downtown Bucharest,” added the soldier involved in the mobilization, “it really was a complete mess.”
But more than the embarrassment of the situation, it also deeply frightened Marshal Lebed. Recognizing that with units stumbling into Romania in small groups, the Marshal saw that had the Romanians elected to resist the UIS troops, it could have lead to a humiliating defeat. He decided to send the controversial UIS 14th Army into Romania in an attempt to pacify the region and rally the UIS units scattered across the country.
“He took a gamble.” commented one officer, “The 14th Army could have brought the Romanians out in full force. But if it turned into a fight, they were the unit best equipped to handle the situation.”
UIS President Lukyanov also found his plans thwarted by the disastrous intervention. His original plan was to publically apologize as soon as the last unit entered Yugoslavia, and humbly beg President Iliescu for forgiveness over “the misunderstanding”, hoping that would pacify the situation before it erupted. However, realizing that his troops were still entering Romania as late as noon, he was forced to switch gears and claim he had “permission”. Although President Iliescu initially remained silent on the matter, by early afternoon, as opposition candidate Gheorghe Funar was calling on Romanians to put up barricades to block Russian troops from passing through the country, Iliescu relented and confirmed that the UIS troops were in fact there without authorization. The statement electrified the international community, and badly embarrassed the UIS President, who prior to the fiasco was still admired by some in the west for his role in perestroika and glasnost.
As the final unit entered Yugoslavia, General Lebed fired General Kovalyov and turned over general command of all units located in Yugoslavia to General G. I. Yakovlev of the 14th Army. It was this decision that would become the foundation of what Russian would soon refer to as “the quasi-junta”.
Excerpts from the book: “Croatia: The Nation That Almost Was”
By Steven Martinovic
Published by University of California Press, © 2009.
Chapter Four: The Battle of Knin
Moscow soon became worried over the Croatian advances into the UN Protected Areas (or what the UIS regarded as the Republic of Serbian Krajina), and issued a strongly worded condemnation of the assault. The threatening message from Moscow badly worried the UN, which now was faced with the unenviable task of trying to rein in the surging Croatian military.
“We learned a hard lesson in September of 1992,” commented UN observer Phil Macklin, “a lesson that history has repeated time and time again. You can’t control people in the Balkans when there get their blood boiling. The Croatians were disregarding us and trying desperately to crush the Serbs.”
Just weeks ago the Croatian army was desperately trying to rid the Serbs from what they referred to as “pink zones”, Serbian-occupied areas outside of the UN Protected Areas.
But the lack of supplies from Belgrade, coupled with NATO support, turned the tide of the battle for the Croatians almost overnight. Badly routed Serb units began to flee to the capital city of Knin as the Croatians entered the UN Protected Areas and launched a major offensive on the Serb defensive positions in Knin.
“The Croatians knew that if Knin fell, the war would likely be all but over,” added Macklin, “the problem was we were not sure if it would lead to World War III. Although the Croats were willing to take that chance, we obviously were not.”
However, the battle of Knin, which began as Croatian troops surrounded the capital city on September 29th, began to turn as UIS troops began to cross the border of Romania into Yugoslavia. The UIS troops initially arrived in the eastern enclave of Vukovar. Removed from the rest of the Serbian Republic of the Krajina, the initial Croatian belief was that the UIS troops would not be able to reinforce the troops in Knin without a full fledged invasion of Croatia itself. Although the presence of UIS troops worried Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, he believed that the 33,000 UIS troops would be unable to cross Croatia and capture Zagreb even if they wanted to lift the siege of Knin.
“I think he badly underestimated the disregard the Russians had shown for international borders up to that point,” added Macklin, “I mean, all he had to do was look at what happened in Romania.”
Oddly enough, many historians believe it was the intervention in Romania that gave President Tudjman a sense of false hope.
“He knew that if the Russians came stumbling into Croatia like they did in Romania that it would be a bloodbath for the Russians,” commented Croatian General Anton Tus, “we were not going to let them clumsily waltz into our country like the Romanians did. We were ready to fight them off.”
General Tus recounted the controversial order than many felt cost the Croatians the war in October of 1992. Realizing that the Russians were in Vukovar, President Tudjman decided not to fortify the front lines in the east near Vukovar. He believed that if the Russians invaded, they would have ample warning, and decided to try and destroy the resistance in Knin before the Russians would be fully mobilized. The decision proved disastrous for the Croatians.
“For one thing, the UN had now cut off the Croatian army’s supply line,” commented Macklin, “the Croatians were surprised at this move. They saw it as a betrayal. But we were ordered to keep peace, and prevent World War III.”
But it was more than just the fractured supply lines that created havoc for the Croatians. Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was desperate to regain the nationalist high ground in Belgrade and suddenly switched gears, restoring aid to the breakaway Serb Republic.
“Milosevic might not have liked how the Russians usurped him with Babic,” commented Borislav Milic, “but there was no way he was going to let Knin fall. Especially considering it would have been blamed on his ego if it did fall.”
As the Croatians entered the outskirts of Knin, their badly fractured supply line finally broke as the Serbs regained the upper hand. By October 1st the Serbs began an offensive that began to drive the Croats out of the city and, by the following week, out of the breakaway republic. Still, most observers believe that total capitulation might have been avoided had it not been for what President Tudjman once famously called “the Bear looking in the kitchen window”. On October 2nd, as Serbian troops began their march to the Adriatic Sea, Serbian troops in Bosnia launched a coordinated assault on the Croatian border city of Slavonski Brod. Although Croatian troops bravely attempted to repel the Bosnian Serb invasion and repel the Serbian offensive on Biograd na Moru, the badly overextended Croatian military was finally broken on October 7th. On that day, UIS troops under the command of General Gennady Yakovlev crossed into Croatia and destroyed all remnants of the Croatian Armed forces.
UIS troops cross into Croatia on October 7, 1992
Croatia “overrun” by Russian troops as full-scaled invasion begins
By Vincent J. Shanks
Chicago Tribune
October 10, 1992
UIS troops with captured Croatian troops in Osijek, Croatia
(ZAGREB, CROATIA) Croatian officials tonight claimed the country had been “overrun” by Russian troops after a full-scale ground invasion. Croatian president Franjo Tudjman indicated that the eastern city of Osijek was captured by UIS forces while Serbian militias from Bosnia have seized the border town of Slavonski Brod. Reports from eastern Croatia remain unreliable, but most eyewitness reports indicate that the Croatian military has been “thoroughly routed” and are in full retreat.
“At this point it doesn’t look like there is anything standing between the Russians and Zagreb,” commented American ambassador Mara M. Letica, “but we are not sure of what the situation is in the east right now.”
In the central portion of the country Serb troops from the breakaway republic were closing in on the strategically vital costal city of Biograd na Moru. The capture of Biograd na Moru would give the Serbian republic a valuable port to the Adriatic Sea while also splitting the Croatian republic in two. Croatians in the southern city of Dubrovnik are preparing for another siege of the city as Serbian troops in Bosnia crossed into Croatian territory and have taken positions in the mountains surrounding the city.
American President George Bush interrupted his preparations for tomorrow’s Presidential debate to condemn the Russian and Serbian offensive.
“The Russian military continues to escalate the situation in Croatia,” said President Bush in a press conference, “but we want to be abundantly clear to Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky: the world will not continue to tolerate these acts of aggression.”
However, for many Croatians the time for words from NATO and the United States has passed.
“They castrated our military in Knin, and now they sit by and do nothing while the Russians lay siege on our country,” commented refugee Anton Martinovic, “NATO is worthless, and so is George Bush. If they didn’t plan to help us, at least they should have told us from the beginning so we wouldn’t rely on their worthless promises.”
TRANSCRIPT FROM THE FIRST UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE (OCTOBER 11, 1992)
JIM LEHRER: Mr. Perot, you have come out in criticism of President Bush’s handling of the crisis in Croatia. Would you care to elaborate?
PEROT: Yes. Look at what’s going on over there. The Russians threaten us and we go running out of the country. Then they go and invade Croatia and all this President is doing is telling him to stop ‘or else’. Well, as far as I’m concern, ‘or else’ crossed the cattle guard about a month ago when all those refugees were killed in the French embassy. That’s the point when I would have said, ‘OK partner, that was a line in the sand, and you just stepped over it’.
JIM LEHRER: Any comment Governor Kerrey?
KERREY: If President Bush had no intention of helping the Croatians, he should have told them so from the start. But to lie to them, just like he lied to the Shiites and Kurds in Iraq, is beyond reprehensible. If the world community cannot believe the word of the American President when he promises not to abandon our friends, then this country loses a great deal of prestige. And the actions of President Bush have caused more harm to the prestige of this country than any President since Richard Nixon.
JIM LEHRER: President Bush, you have one minute for a rebuttal.
BUSH: I resent that accusation that I have abandoned our friends in Croatia. Right now this administration has gotten the UN to authorize one of the most crippling rounds of sanctions in world history, and nearly every country has signed on with these sanctions. The Indians, once close allies to the Russians, have severed economic ties to Russia. The Chinese have agreed to cut all trade to Russia. Even the Iranians have agreed to sanctions. The Russian nation will not be able to continue this aggressive policy of intervention for long as long as we remain diligent and maintain the economic pressure that will force them to abandon their occupation of Croatia. In fact, Russia has already shown that it already is stretched too thin. They cannot turn their nose to the international community and think they can get away with it-
PEROT: Mr. President, I don’t know if you have been keeping up with the news, but those Russians are turning their nose to the international community right now. And thanks to you they are getting away with it.
“Romania after Ceaușescu” (Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)
by Robert Solomon
Routledge Press, (2003)
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE ZHIRINOVSKY FACTOR
As Romanians took to the polls on October 11th to vote in the Presidential runoff election, UIS president Anatoly Lukyanov knew that regardless of who won the election, relations with Romania would sour quickly. Romanian Democratic Convention candidate Emil Constantinescu was eager to implement major free market reforms and see to it that Romania would join NATO, perhaps as early as December. The prospect of such a thing deeply troubled Lukyanov, who recognized that a NATO presence in Romania could devastate the UIS war effort in Croatia. However, his opponent, radical nationalist Gheorghe Funar of the Romanian National Unity Party, had made no secret of his desire to see Moldova “ripped away from the clutches of the Russian occupiers” and had made no secret of his plan to support secessionist groups that had already begun to form in Moldova. Neither scenario particularly appealed to the UIS president, but it was Russian president Vladimir Zhirinovsky who helped the UIS president make the decision that would decide the fate of the election and give Funar the unlikely victory.
Zhirinovsky recognized that Funar was deeply disliked with the Hungarian minority, and believed that as long as Funar was president the Hungarians would oppose NATO membership for Romania. It was enough to convince Lukyanov to support Zhirinovsky’s bizarre plan to help elect Funar president of Romania. Hours after the still unpopular Ion Iliescu announced his support for Emil Constantinescu; Russian media outlets released a controversial press release from Russian President Vladimir Zhirinovsky:
“I hereby announce my support for the candidacy of Emil Constantinescu and call on the Romanian people to vote for Constantinescu. Mr. Constantinescu has entered into a preliminary agreement with the UIS government to permanently allow UIS troops free access through their country, and we look forward to seeing this agreement implemented after October 11th.”
Constantinescu was defeated by less that 5,000 votes after the final votes were tallied.
