Zhirinovsky's Russian Empire

[MarshalBraginsky]

What's chillingly accurate about this update involves Cyprus since they've negotiated with Russia on getting the loans, though the deal fell apart. On the other hand, does Zhirinovsky have an insane string of good lucks with his political career? I also forgot to mention if ITTL Boris Berezovsky would die by suicide or not since his OTL death occurred yesterday.

 

[Tongera]

Thank you Tongera!

I enjoy throwing current events in this TL whenever possible, I think it does give this TL a unique feel...

I am also surprised that a brawl between the committee and members of the LDP haven't taken place yet.

Anyhow, how would poisoning with radiation go and be used in this TL? Who could be victims?

 

[Pellegrino]

What's chillingly accurate about this update involves Cyprus since they've negotiated with Russia on getting the loans, though the deal fell apart. On the other hand, does Zhirinovsky have an insane string of good lucks with his political career? I also forgot to mention if ITTL Boris Berezovsky would die by suicide or not since his OTL death occurred yesterday.

In regards to Zhirinovsky's luck: yes, absolutely. The thing is these are all incidents that occur in OTL, and I really don't see any way Zhirinovsky can win legitimately in Russia in 1996 unless: (1) he is a dictator or (2) the vote is rigged. I considered both options for the 1996 election, but to create an absolute dictatorship in TTL takes away a Lot of the tension between Lebed, Zavidiya, Burbulis, Putin, and others that gives this TL it's backbone. I really like how this UIS is a borderline totalitarian state which is struggling to find its identity. At times it spirals into a full fledged totalitarian dictatorship and at times it tries to struggle to become a democracy. It it this struggle that adds to the story in my opinion. So we know he loses in 1996, but bounces back later in the year when he runs for UIS president. But we start to see something here. First, Yuri Luzhkov is being tempted out of politics (just as Zavidiya was) and he may not be interested in a figure head position like UIS president when he could be making billions like Zavidiya and his wife.

Second, although Russia has Democrtic elections, many parts of the UIS do not, and who is the one person in both OTL and TTL who is crazier than Zirinovsky and who could give him the UIS national election through badly rigged elections?

As for Berezovsky, I assumed his death in OTL was "preventable" which is why he doesn't die in TTL's March 23.

 

[General Mosh]

I enjoy throwing current events in this TL whenever possible, I think it does give this TL a unique feel...

I think it helps make it feel a lot more realistic, as if I actually live in this world.

 

[Nekronion]

I wonder who is german Chancellor in TTLs 2013?

Regarding the TL will Schröder and Putin become friends like OTl?

Will Berlin still become Capital TTL?

Will the Mass Immigartion of Russia-Germans still happen? And if not what happens with them?


So many questions .


Also with Kohl gone earlier, this might blow up earlier: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CDU_donations_scandal_(1999)

 

[MarshalBraginsky]

In regards to Zhirinovsky's luck: yes, absolutely. The thing is these are all incidents that occur in OTL, and I really don't see any way Zhirinovsky can win legitimately in Russia in 1996 unless: (1) he is a dictator or (2) the vote is rigged. I considered both options for the 1996 election, but to create an absolute dictatorship in TTL takes away a Lot of the tension between Lebed, Zavidiya, Burbulis, Putin, and others that gives this TL it's backbone. I really like how this UIS is a borderline totalitarian state which is struggling to find its identity. At times it spirals into a full fledged totalitarian dictatorship and at times it tries to struggle to become a democracy. It it this struggle that adds to the story in my opinion. So we know he loses in 1996, but bounces back later in the year when he runs for UIS president. But we start to see something here. First, Yuri Luzhkov is being tempted out of politics (just as Zavidiya was) and he may not be interested in a figure head position like UIS president when he could be making billions like Zavidiya and his wife.

Second, although Russia has Democrtic elections, many parts of the UIS do not, and who is the one person in both OTL and TTL who is crazier than Zirinovsky and who could give him the UIS national election through badly rigged elections?

As for Berezovsky, I assumed his death in OTL was "preventable" which is why he doesn't die in TTL's March 23.

I can think of Putin, Lukashenko, Limonov and that Vasilyev guy who's depicted as an idiot.

 

[Pellegrino]

I can think of Putin, Lukashenko, Limonov and that Vasilyev guy who's depicted as an idiot.

Lukashenko is pushing to become president of the UIS in 1996, which means he is unlikely to back Zhirinovsky.

However (spoiler alert!!!)...

Many of the other Republic's in the former USSR have sham elections in OTL where the incumbent wins 93% of the total vote. What if there is an anti-Lukashenko block that emerges? These republic's could pull a few totals like that together, which coupled with a badly watered down ticket (as was the case in OTL and as we are seeing in TTL) and we can see how Zhirinovsky can make his next comeback.

 

[MarshalBraginsky]

So for the Armenian portion, what happens to people like Serj Sargsyan, Raffi Hovssanian and Vartan Oskanian? Since the latter two have ties to the West and Sargsyan may not be much of a contender, how does Armenia's expanded role affect the careers of those three?

Moreover, I can only think of an anti-Lukashenko bloc that can act as a wild card, since this wild card will also be an anti-Zhirinovsky bloc as well. How does a wild card bloc led by either Yuliya Timoshenko, Viktor Yanukovych and/or Viktor Yuschenko sound?

 

[Pellegrino]

I wonder who is german Chancellor in TTLs 2013?

Regarding the TL will Schröder and Putin become friends like OTl?

Will Berlin still become Capital TTL?

Will the Mass Immigartion of Russia-Germans still happen? And if not what happens with them?


So many questions .


Also with Kohl gone earlier, this might blow up earlier: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CDU_donations_scandal_(1999)

Great questions!

To be honest, I am not sure who would be Chancellor in 2013 in TTL yet. This TL does require a lot of research on areas outside my expertise, and German politics is one of them. I do think that Merkel would emerge in TTL, especially with Kohl's humbling defeat.

But as for Schröder and Putin, I doubt we'd see them emerge as close friends in TTL. Putin has a good run in 1996 from what we can tell, but he still emerges as sort of a perennial candidate and isn't really taken seriously by anyone after 1996.

And I think Berlin still emerges as capital of Germany in TTL. On top of that, I would expect the mass immigration of Russian-Germans to still happen. Leaving the UIS is not nearly as tough as leaving the USSR, and there is a huge incentive to leave in the 1990s...expecially if you are not Russian.

 

[Pellegrino]

So for the Armenian portion, what happens to people like Serj Sargsyan, Raffi Hovssanian and Vartan Oskanian? Since the latter two have ties to the West and Sargsyan may not be much of a contender, how does Armenia's expanded role affect the careers of those three?

Moreover, I can only think of an anti-Lukashenko bloc that can act as a wild card, since this wild card will also be an anti-Zhirinovsky bloc as well. How does a wild card bloc led by either Yuliya Timoshenko, Viktor Yanukovych and/or Viktor Yuschenko sound?

Or how about 97% of the votes in Turkmenistan going to Zhirinovsky to off set his poor performance in Belarus and Russia

Crazy as it may sound, Turkmenbashi might have reason to want to see Mad Vlad emerge on top (remember the "rotating seat on the Security Council?")

 

[MarshalBraginsky]

Or how about 97% of the votes in Turkmenistan going to Zhirinovsky to off set his poor performance in Belarus and Russia

Crazy as it may sound, Turkmenbashi might have reason to want to see Mad Vlad emerge on top (remember the "rotating seat on the Security Council?")

I know that part: so the UIS Turkmen Republic could hold the Russian seat when the time comes.

 

[Dan1988]

Well, there may be a few retcons when I get my hands on a certain portion [] but that last update was good, Pellegrino.

 

[James G]

The last update showed Zhirinovsky just as I always imagined him to be. I've been an OTL "fan" of his for many years... or maybe a fan of how OTL Putin uses him as a puppet for the purposes of showing the West that 'without me, you get someone like him'.
Anyway, personal views on Tsar Putin aside, this still remains a damn brilliant story!

 

[Pellegrino]

Well, there may be a few retcons when I get my hands on a certain portion [] but that last update was good, Pellegrino.

Don't worry, the state media and its apparent privatization is going to be a big issue in coming updates. Perhaps Zhirinovsky and the junta know that if Zavidiya has a vested interest in it they can do something they have been unable to do yet. Control him. With Putin and Lukashenko breathing down Zavidiya's neck we may see him doing the unthinkable before the 96 election: beg Zhirinovsky for help.

 

[Pellegrino]

The last update showed Zhirinovsky just as I always imagined him to be. I've been an OTL "fan" of his for many years... or maybe a fan of how OTL Putin uses him as a puppet for the purposes of showing the West that 'without me, you get someone like him'.
Anyway, personal views on Tsar Putin aside, this still remains a damn brilliant story!

Thank you!

the last two updates are based on real events, real world Zhirinovsky is a literal gold mind of crazy antics.

And I must admit, I enjoy turning things in this TL of one where the communist become the sock puppets of the LDPR and Putin becomes the sock puppet of Lukasenko. It seems like poetic irony of sorts...

 

[MarshalBraginsky]

Thank you!

the last two updates are based on real events, real world Zhirinovsky is a literal gold mind of crazy antics.

And I must admit, I enjoy turning things in this TL of one where the communist become the sock puppets of the LDPR and Putin becomes the sock puppet of Lukasenko. It seems like poetic irony of sorts...

And in another world, the UIS hears something about how their KGB director turned Lukashenko into his own sockpuppet.

 

[BgKnight]

I love this shit! Another great update Pellegrino!

 

[MarshalBraginsky]

So what is another irony that will arise ITTL?

 

[Pellegrino]

PART SIXTY SEVEN: THE SHIITE PROMISE

PART SIXTY SEVEN: THE SHIITE PROMISE

_________________________________________________

MSNBC interview with Walter Mondale, Former U.S. Secretary of State

July 16, 2008


MSNBC: The Russian Legislative elections of 1995 appeared to show that the Russian people were growing increasingly fed up with Vladimir Zhirinovsky. However some have criticized the administration for not doing more to foster ties to the opposition. Do you think that is a fair criticism?

Mondale: It is easy to second guess President Kerrey’s decisions after the fact. But I think it was very appropriate. The big winner was Vladimir Putin’s Unity Party, which didn’t appear to be a very appealing alternative. Putin refused to form a government, citing his opposition to forming any coalition with the reformist block or with the Liberal Democratic Party, a move that proved controversial. It looked like he was purposely destabilizing Russia on behalf of his Communist mentor in Belarus: Alexander Lukashenko.

MSNBC: There have been rumors that the so-called Worker’s Party of Russia, which billed itself as the successor to the Communist Party of Russia, was in fact little more than mouthpiece for the Liberal Democratic Party. That it served little purpose other than to rubber stamp the government position.

Mondale: I don’t know, but based on their voting record, it wouldn’t surprise me. There was a reason that Vladimir Putin was able to capture the disenfranchised Communist vote. The Worker’s Party bore little resemblance to the Communist Party of old. It actually resembled the Liberal Democratic Party before its sudden adherence to the free market. It looked like little more than an offshoot of the LDP, and few Russians regarded it as anything more. They certainly were not a viable option as far as we were concerned.

MSNBC: What about the reformist block? Some feel that more should have been done to support Gennady Burbulis and Mikhail Arutyanov.

Mondale: Both Burbulis and Arutyanov had burned President Kerrey in the past. Besides, President Kerrey realized that American support could easily backfire; it could be used against them by Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

MSNBC: But some critics attacked President Kerrey for not supporting the Stepashin Plan to end the war in Chechnya. They felt that President Kerrey actually urged the Chechens to reject the plan and when the Russians retaliated with deadly force, they argue that the Americans ignored its promises of support to the Chechens and allowed the UIS to massacre hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians between 1996 and 1997.

Mondale: I can’t speak for President Kerrey on this; I was not part of the Kerrey Administration at the time. But I doubt he actually urged anyone to reject the peace plan. That ran contrary to everything he believed in. And I know that the failure of both parties to reach a peace accord in early 1996 devastated President Kerrey; he was appalled by the loss of life in Chechnya.

MSNBC: Still, some critics called it his Shiite Promise, comparing it to George Bush’s promise to the Shiite’s in Iraq back in 1991. Both presidents called on the people to revolt, but appeared powerless to stop the slaughter that followed.

Mondale: I don’t fault President Kerrey, I know sending troops into Chechnya was simply impossible. But I know he wishes he did more to push for peace in January of 1996. But you have to realize, the Chechens were sure they had broken the Russians will to fight. Units were deserting and Grozny was still only 25% occupied by January of 1996. After 26-months the Russians still had not even taken Grozny. But what the Chechens didn’t realize was in the ensuing 26-months the Russians had put out fires in Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, Uzbekistan, and Romania. They now could focus all of their attention on Chechnya. To be honest, neither side really wanted peace. The Chechens thought they had won the war; Russian troops were abandoning their post all over the Chechnya. The Russian military didn’t really want peace, they felt the tide was about to turn. To be honest, the only reason they even were at the table was because Vladimir Zhirinovsky needed to form a coalition government with the reformist. And the only thing Zhirinovsky wanted more than victory in Chechnya was to retain power.

______________________________________________________________

“My Russia- An Autobiography by former Russian Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis”
Published by Interbook, © 1998



CHAPTER SIXTY ONE


As I started clearing out my office I heard a soft knock on the door.

“Come in,” I said.

I was pleasantly surprised to see General Sergei Stepashin step inside. Although I initially distrusted him, he had proved himself to be a valuable ally for democracy in Russia and the UIS.

“Gennady,” he said as he walked over and put his hand on my shoulder, “I wanted to visit you before…before you left.”

“Thank you General,” I said with a smile, “I appreciate it.”

“Do you know who your replacement is yet?” he asked.

“No idea,” I said with a chuckle, “I am guessing you need to ask Vladimir Putin that question…whenever he gets off his high horse and forms a government.”

“I doubt that will happen,” he replied before sitting down. He looked around the shifted in his chair uncomfortably before he blurted out what was on his mind. “Gennady, I need to ask you something,” he said nervously.

“If you are asking me to form a government with the Liberal Democrats you can forget it,” I replied as I returned to the box I was filling up, “even if I were considering it, which I am not, there is no way the rest of the Reformist block would sign on for it. Yabloko has already made peace in Chechnya a prerequisite for any coalition government they are part of, and although the Party for a Free and Democratic Russia is in disarray right now, the one thing they agree on is they want no deals with Zhirinovsky. They blame him for their disastrous showing in the last election.”

“Gennady,” the General said softly, “I know it won’t be easy, but I think you are the only person who could pull it off. Think about it. There are 159 seats between the three reformist parties; between the Democratic Choice of Russia, Yabloko, and the Party for a Free and Democratic Russia. At least eight more seats held by minor parties would sign on for a coalition government with the Reformist. If you get the Liberal Democrats on board you have the majority. And we already know that they are not opposed to economic reform as long as-“

“As long as they have a free hand in Chechnya,” I interrupted, “and that is a deal killer for us. We need a serious plan for peace in Chechnya, and we need General Tikhomirov out of the picture for that to happen.”

“What if we reach a ceasefire?” he asked, “what if we can negotiate a ceasefire with the Chechens?”

“After everything that has happened over the course of the war, I don’t see how they will agree to anything short of full independence,” I responded skeptically, “even concessions like those we gave to Georgia will be unlikely to appease them.”

“Mr. Prime Minister,” he said softly, “I just got done with speaking with President Zhirinovsky. He wants to form a coalition with the reformist block. He will agree to peace in Chechnya under certain conditions.”

My interest was peaked. Could this be? Could Vladimir Zhirinovsky really be willing to sacrifice his core beliefs just to hold onto power?

“What are the conditions?” I asked skeptically.

“He wants the military to propose a settlement and handle the negotiations,” General Stepashin replied, “He wants a peace agreement that will preserve the honor of the Russian military.”

“I can imagine what that means,” I said sarcastically as I started packing my box up again, “General Tikhomirov the butcher would be the chief architect of this ‘honorable’ peace plan, right?”

“No Mr. Prime Minister,” General Stepashin said softly, “he knows General Tikhomirov is not a viable option. He wants someone else.”

“Who?” I replied.

“Me."

______________________________________________________



UIS Presidential Candidate Vladimir Putin in an interview with the BBC on August 1, 2011.

Discussing his successful performance in the 1995 Russian Legislative Elections..


BBC: Mr. Putin, many people feel that you missed your one chance in 1996 to become President of Russia when you refused to form a government with the Worker’s Party after the 1995 legislative elections.

Putin: That is completely unfair. We were willing to form a government with the Worker’s Party, but they told us that they would refuse to form any government with us if it included any party other than the Liberal Democratic Party. Once I heard that I realized they were nothing more than lap dogs for Vladimir Zhirinovsky. We refused to form a government with the Liberal Democrats, and we assumed if we held out long enough that the so called Reformist Block would come to their senses and form a coalition with us. After Zhirinovsky’s meltdown in the Duma we assumed they would want to have nothing to do with him. We were shocked to see that they had no qualms about getting back in bed with Vladimir Zhirinovsky though.

BBC: Your party was widely seen as an obstructionist party after that, and many critics felt that you were under orders from Alexander Lukashenko to purposely create disarray in the Duma in order to strengthen his position. They say that you were instructed by Lukashenko to try and weaken Russian democracy by not forming a government.

Putin: That is absurd. I never took orders from Lukashenko. That was Andrei Zavidiya, creating rumors to attack me. He was frightened that I would be elected president in 1996 because the first thing I would have done is renationalize the state media.

BBC: But what about Chechnya? You purposely obstructed any sort of agreement on Chechnya.

Putin: I did not. I said I supported peace in Chechnya, but the Stepashin Plan was horrible. It was unworkable. Even Vladimir Zhirinovsky said so.

BBC: But you never offered a counter proposal.

Putin: I never got around to revealing my plan.

BBC: So you are saying you did have a plan.

Putin: Yes.

BBC: But you just forgot to tell anyone about it.

Putin: That is not fair. I was preparing for the 1996 election and I had a lot going on at the time. The plan I proposed was much better than the Stepashin Plan, much better.

BBC: Would you care to disclose the details of it now, fifteen years later?

Putin: I can’t remember all of the details right now.

BBC: Well can you give us a summary of the Putin Plan?

Putin: Yes: peace with honor.

BBC: And what were the concessions you were willing to make to the Chechens in 1996 as part of the ‘peace with honor’?

Putin: To secure an end to hostilities between Russia and the Chechen rebels by implementing a firm peace accord which preserved the honor of the Russian nation.

BBC: And can you tell us what that included?

Putin: I just did.

BBC: No sir, you did not. You just repeated some talking points but you didn’t actually say anything.

Putin: Well I suppose we will disagree on this issue then.

BBC: It is not an issue. I asked you a question that you have refused to answer for over 15-years and you still are refusing to answer the question.

Putin: I don’t know how I can make it any clearer.

BBC: OK, how about this. Describe the Putin Peace plan without using the word ‘honor’.

Putin (long pause): Peace with…dignity.

________________________________________________________________

“Standoff in the Caucasus: Dudayev’s Chechnya and Zhirinovsky’s Russia”

(Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)
By Jeff Sampson
Routledge Press (2010)




CHAPTER EIGHT

For Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, the realization that Vladmir Zhirinovsky was not only prepared to form a coalition government with the Reformist Block, but to agree to a peace accord with the Chechens was absolutely stunning.

“He believed that the Chechens had won the war,” commented an American military advisor familiar with the conflict, “that the Russians would come to the peace table and agree to full independence. We knew that was a pipe dream though. The best he could reasonably hope for was a delayed option for independence like the Uzbeks and Turkmen received.”

Dudayev had seen his badly outnumbered forces perform valiantly in the conflict. After two years only a quarter of Grozny was under Russian control and none of southern Chechnya was occupied. But he failed to recognize that his small army of around 9,000 troops was now all but wiped out.

“Much of the fighting was done by militias who were not under Dudayev’s authority,” the American advisor added, “they were often a handful of men and women who had some Dragons and who plotted ambush attacks on Russian convoys on their own, but were not actually part of the Chechen army. Unfortunately for Dudayev, the real Chechen Army was now all but destroyed. He wanted to believe that the sacrifice of his men had now produced a victory and as a result he refused to accept that his capability ot wage war was badly diminished after two years.”

Dudayev, perhaps due to his surprising success up to that point, failed to recognize that more and more Russians were streaming into Chechnya everyday whereas there were no reinforcements for the Chechens killed in battle.

“Dudayev was very successful in forming a Mannerheim Line around Grozny,” the advisor added, referring to the Finnish defense line that gave the Red Army fits during the Winter War of 1939, “but like the Mannerheim Line it to was now broken and there was nothing behind it to stop the tide of Russians from overtaking the country.”

Still, the proposed Stepashin Plan did seem to make some major concession that indicated a new willingness from the Russians to deal.

“He knew that the Stepashin Plan would have been completely unacceptable to Vladimir Zhirinovsky,” added the advisor, “and for Zhirinovsky to accept it told Dudayev that the Russians were desperate. And tragically he misinterpreted some communications with US President Bob Kerrey as a blank check of sorts; as a promise of support for an independent Chechnya.”

The Stepashin Plan, which would have created a new UIS Republic of the Northern Caucasus (encompassing Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia) was ultimately rejected by Dudayev, who claimed it would turn Chechnya into a “colony of Dagestan and Ingushetia.” The rejection caused deep resentment in the other Republic’s who saw the Stepashin Plan as an opportunity to break free from Moscow. The Reformist Block of the Russian Duma decided to try one more time to reach a peace accord by having a leading member of the 16-man committee fly to Grozny and personally speak with Dudayev in regards to the Stepashin Plan on February 3, 1996. They desperately wanted to try and salvage the peace accord and sent the one man who still carried enough weight to save the dying plan: General Alexander Lebed.
_______________________________________________________________

The proposed UIS Republic of the Northern Caucasus (in RED) as part of the Stepashin Plan

 

[Pellegrino]

I love this shit! Another great update Pellegrino!

Thank you!