As mentioned above, the US entry was not critical to settling the mutiny. It actually initially made things worse (though by no fault of the US). So settling the mutiny is unlikely to go any different than OTL. Addressing the soldiers concerns and stopping the offensive.
What would have to change is the French strategy going forward. They would still have to wait and build up confidence in the Army. And they would probably do that by precluding major offensives in 1917 and stating that they are waiting for tanks and new tactics to be ready. But at some point they will need to consider that they will eventually need to once again go on the offensive.
Materially, this doesn’t actually change anything. The French only went on the offensive again in summer 1918, and by then they had rebuilt their confidence and planned an offensive that they were sure they could accomplish. American presence didn’t actually add much material strength to that attack.
Morale wise though, French High Command is going to have to be careful about when and how they eventually announce the idea of new offensives. They will likely need to do some smaller limited ones before attempting something like the OTL Meuse-Argonne. They may also need to consider the long term objective if they feel that British and French strength alone needs to carry them all the way to Berlin.
But, I will reiterate, French collapse is not likely in 1917 even without American DOW.
Imo, you brush the USA contribution away a bit to much. But that is only my opinion.
The entry of the USA allowed Imo the "unlimited" material faucet to be opend. That granted the Entente the possibility to keep figthing the "rich mans war". Again that is only my opinion and I am more than happy to learn new things.
I can agree that the USA entry and subsequent French offensives could have worsend the situation more then said offensives without the USA. But Imo the USA entry allowed the Entente to make promisses backed by the USA industrial and material might as well as American boys doing the dying.
In a way the importance of the USAs entry and supposed Entente (British) financial problems play a massive role here. At least that is my read. And I suppose I rate both as more important then you.
POD’s have got mixed around. The OP called for everything to be basically the same until 3 March when Zimmermann denies the telegram rather than confirms it. At that point I doubt you stop American entry. Wilson and his government are already aware of the authenticity of the ZT and USW has already been declared. The only difference then is that Wilson’s government still has the dilemma of how to convince the public of their authenticity without revealing that the British had broken the German diplomatic code.
The ZT was transmitted using diplomatic code 13040, which had been in use for years. The newer code 3512 was already in existence as an update and the British had already broken it too. What’s more with the US against them there weren’t really many places the Germans can talk to diplomatically anyway. So if nothing else can be found to explain it Wilson will probably just get the go ahead to reveal that the British cracked the German codes and that allowed thé US to confirm the message in their own system. It could, at worst case, cause the Germans to review all their codes and possibly cause the British to lose access to them for a while. This would be a serious loss, but would likely be considered worth it to bring the US on board. And it’s likely the loss is not so serious anyway.
If, however, we are talking about the delay of the return to USW than we have butterflied or delayed r the ZT anyway. The ZT was an attempt to soften or avoid the consequences of USW that the Germans had accepted were likely to occur. So, no USW, no ZT.
It’s true that Russian instability had already shown itself with the February Revolution. However, this did not make an anti-war posture the standard. The Provisional government was made up almost entirely of those who believed that Russia must continue the war. Stavka counselled Nicholas II to abdicate only after determining that the new government would be in favour of continuing the fight. And even the more radical soldier Soviets at the front were, though often not in favour of offensives, on board with a continued war in a defensive stance. And were talked around to supporting the offensive in many cases. Even the Petrograd Soviet was not exactly anti-war. It was divided on the issue and did not lay out an official anti-war stance until after the Kerensky offensive was already going badly. Previous to that they had said that they wanted a peace without annexations or reparations but had also said that the revolution should not retreat in the face of foreign conquest.
So, yeah, the Russian commitment to the war was definitely shaken by the February Revolution. But anti-war did no become the obvious winning strategy to Russian populists until the Kerensky offensive started going badly.
You are right that as soon as USW was declared in 17 the clock started ticking. But I think one should try to keep to the proposed initial post. And for me to make sense, and it seemed to other posters as well, for a no Zimmermann to be important one has to grant no USW as well. A not unimportant decision, sure, but I think it is possible to get there without too much trouble. As in OTL, afaik, it was a debated topic and could go either way.
As for Russia, I think absent USA entry and new material support therefrom, that they would probably bow out mid 17ish. The problems were there and without the incentives I think the internal situation has less pro war points but more pro peace ones. Degrees may vary on who does the talking, but I think the Russian leadership after the February Revolution was aware of their precarious situation. So would absence of OTL incentives make then seek peace before the Bolsheviks can do the Oktober thing? I think yes.
And that earlier Russian exit without the USA entry may force the Western Entente to think about their position.
An actual peace of exhaustion, at least one that lasts more than a couple years, is really hard to get in WW1 (or any war really). It’s a very small needle to thread. Everyone might be sick of war and want peace but they have to be in a position that they will accept what the other side is offering. But each side only hardens their positions as the costs pile up. The Entente was winning. They have more troops, more material and more money. As long as that is the case they have little incentive to accept anything but the most generous of German terms. The CP, having got into this war, needed to get something out of it and be assured that they would not be more vulnerable after it than before. And that incentivized them to keep trusting that the next thrust would change things and that the Entente was less committed to the war than they were. For a peace of mutual exhaustion you need everyone to have a collapse of morale at the exact same time. Otherwise the one in less bad shape rally’s as they see their enemy flagging and continues on to enforce their own peace.
I disagree with the bolded part. For me the Entente was not winning as they would have to push back the Germans to do that and even in OTL they needed the entry of the USA and the utterly exhausted Germans to acomplish that.
I agree that they have the potential for more troops, India is there after all, but it would take considerable swallowing of worms to get the British to open that faucet to conscription. As it Imo would destroy the hold they had over the Crown Jewl of the Empire.
And as said, I personaly, rate the financial situation of the British / Entente less rosy then you. Again, I do not think a colapse would happen, but there were unpalateble choices to be made for HM Gov. That is something I think would play massively into the Entente ability to wage the "Rich Mans War" that they were doing until then. So I personaly rate the ability to supply the material to the wareffort as impeded. Nothing that would imediately force them out. But maybe something that would force them to either economise on the fronts... with the reprecussions that could bring, or that they could seek a victory on the field while they still had the ability to support the methods they had.
That again is feeding into the loop of problems with troop morale that the French had, and I think after Pashendale even the British were concerned about that. Again I do not say it would be imideate but there were points there Imo.
That is ofc, if Germany does roughly the same in the West as OTL. If they sit in their trenches and let the Entente come to them, they Imo could hold 1917 in a better position then OTL, but again, it depends on the specific circumstances and I can totaly agree the Germans can do stoopid things too.
The British financial weakness was not a lack of money. The domestic financial environment was quite healthy. What they lacked was a currency acceptable to the US for purchases there. In a worse case scenario when the ability to purchase in the US was cut off entirely (unlikely in itself) , ability of the Entente to continue as they have done would be compromised. But the British and French would still be some way from the internal cannibalization of their economy that Germany had been forced into since 1914. If they kept the will to do so, they could still very much outlast the Germans.
I think we will respectfully disagree here. As I mentioned it already, I think the Entente fought the "Rich Mans War" were they supplemented their industry by purchase. And if the material inflow drops noticably, I totaly agree that a total stop of USA trade is very unlikely, they would have to economise more.
And that the CP could do it (keep fighting without much external trade)... well yes but they realy started in 1914 and had already build up the internal production.
As such I think the Entente would face choices it did not want to make. Like with the above mentiond financial problems looming.
On the other hand, I agree that a sudden total colapse is unlikely. The Entente would keep fighting. But the problem for me here is that the Germans sat on French soil and the French wanted that back. Somewhat badly too. And as such I am sceptical on the "simple" solution of the Entente sitting back and "waiting the Germans out". If there is some thing, I belive that the Great War was in the balance but shifting to the CP until the USA entered. Again only my personal opinion and very open to disagrement.
You know, that might be the first time I have ever been accused of going easy on Wilson. Usually it’s the other way around.
Just to restore some balance let’s try saying what I think a little more clearly. Wilson was a moralistic blowhard of the Gladstonian school. Surpassed or equaled as a moralistic blowhard only by Gladstone himself. And Wilson was possibly even more hypocritical in it than was Gladstone. Wilson’s naive, over idealistic and under informed policy possibly extended the war, and almost certainly contributed to much chaos and heartbreak after it. I would go so far as to say he had a stronger hand than most of his day in bringing about WW2.
So, that’s out of the way. I often come across the idea that Wilson was pro-Entente but generally don’t get specifics. Sometimes it seems to come from the idea that if a nation is neutral it must not have an opinion. Occasionally it seems to come from the belief that since the US did not use its fleet to force through trade to Germany (an act that would be against its own interests and would have been seen to be a direct support of Germany against the Entente by the American population of the day) it was not neutral.
Could you give me some specifics on how Wilson was not neutral? Cause his designs on dictating the peace and the world which would emerge from it seem to have harmed whoever stood between him and them, regardless of allegiance.
As others have mentioned, Imo it was more the tone of his communication. As I understand it, he was very confrontative against the CP but much more concilatory and hands of to the Entente. One example is in 14 he urged all sides to keep to the acepted rules of naval warfare and said nothing when the British blockaded all of Europe to strangle Germany.
The other was the sinking of a certain RN auxiliary cruiser, the ship was on the official list and build with that in mind, that was carrying at least questionable cargo... where the Germans afaik expressly warned that British ships may be sunk.
Other things are the Ram Order and Q-ships, as well as flying the USA flag on Britsh ships. I am not aware of any open and clear condemnation of that. If there is, well I always try to learn more...
Also I did not "accuse" you of anything... it was more that that part read a bit to good for me.
