The basic premise of the scenario revolves around the leaders of Hungary acting more competently and decisively in the closing days of WW1 and during subsequent events.

I didn't yet work out the exact details, but one idea of mine is getting Károlyi Mihály appointed Prime Minister of Hungary already on October 30th, thus preventing the Aster Revolution. Without the revolutionary circumstances of Károlyi's appointment, his cabinet faces less opposition from his political opponents, while Károlyi himself is also forced to follow a more compromising course of action. One of these compromises concern the question of military. Károlyi's extreme-pacifist and non-confrontational ideas (which included the army getting completely disbanded) are over-ruled.

At the same time, the efforts of Hermann Kövess and his successor (as Commander of the Balkan Front), Archduke Joseph come to fruition and a new, relatively firm defence position is successfully established on the Balkan Front, on the rivers of Drina, Sava and Danube. The Entente forces fail to penetrate the new defences before November 4th, when the Armistice of Villa Guisti (signed the previous day) comes into effect and brings an end to hostilities. Since the Armistice of Villa Giusti technically did not concern the Balkan Front, a supplementary treaty is signed in Belgrade within a few days (by Homo Regius Archduke Joseph and French General Franchet d’Espèrey. According to the treaty, Austrian and Hungarian forces have to evacuate all of Bosnia and Croatia-Slavonia and Entente forces are allowed to create bridgeheads through the Danube and Drava. Following these events, Romania reenters the conflict on the side of the Entente, and in violation of the armistices attempts to occupy Transylvania. The attack is poorly organised on the spur of the moment, which allows local Hungarian forces and some hastily sent reinforcements to soon eject the invaders. A similar event takes place in the Northwest too, against Czech irregular forces.

Meanwhile, various political developments happen in Hungary. By this point it's nothing more than a formality, but the separation of Common Army is officialised by Emperor and King Charles I/IV. This proves to be one of Charles' last political acts before his official withdrawal from state affairs (de facto abdication). Albeit a republic is quickly declared in Austria (Republic of German-Austria), the Hungarian Government officially adopts a policy of postponement on the question of state form. In a temporary capacity, Archduke Joseph is declared Governor (independently from his previous "Homo Regius" position). Another important development is the passing of the new electoral law. According to the new law, among those who are capable of reading and writing in any of the spoken languages of Hungary, every man over 21 and every women over 24 are given the equal right to vote. New elections are scheduled for January. The vote is to be conducted with secret ballots.

Even before the elections, the Hungarian Government and representatives of the various national minorities engage in a long and extensive talks concerning minority rights, representation and language issues. The talks are by no means smooth-sailing, but they seem to produce results. Consequently, the various national councils through Hungary, as a sign of goodwill, embrace the upcoming new elections and encourage participation in it. Despite relentless calls for boycott from abroad (Romania, Serbia, Czecho"slovakia"), the election yields high turnover from all parts of the country, signalling the non-Hungarian population's willingness to participate in state affairs. In this way, the election also functions as a successful referendum on the issue of the country's enduring territorial integrity.

Such results come as a huge shock for the leaders of surrounding countries, who begin to panic. In an act of despearation, Serbia, Romania and the Czechs decide to launch a coordinated invasion of Hungary to enforce their claims militarily. Albeit Hungary previously managed to repel attacks from each of these powers, by now the situation for Hungary is less favourable. While Hungary was forced to downsize its armed forces and give up valuable military and logistical assets, the opposing side didn't have to deal with such restrictions and also had time to consolidate its forces. Despite all this, the combined Serbian-Romanian-Czech invasion faces difficulties right from the start. Not only Hungarian resistance is stronger than anticipated, but much more importantly the reaction from Entente leadership is harsher as well. Although the locally present (primarily French) Entente forces seemed willing to cooperate (or atleast turn a blid eye) initially, once the attack began, it was heavily criticised and condemned by the Americans and British as well, both of them being extremely anxious concerning the potential instability brought about in the region by such act. Shortly, instructions arrive from Paris to cease all kind of support and cooperation for the attack. As a result, the invasion fails and the attackers are forced to evacuate occupied lands.

Aside from being a huge diplomatic and military blunder for the invaders, the whole fiasco provides and excellent propaganda opportunity for Hungary. The invasion is presented as proof that people from the so called "mother countries" don't actually care about the wishes and needs of their ethnic brethren within Hungary, they only view them as useful tools for their agenda of conquest and plunder. This greatly eases the ongoing national minority negotiations as well. Furthermore, similar messages are also contructed aimed at the outside world too, which actually manage to build up some sympathy for Hungary among the populaces of the winner Great Powers.

Everything presented so far ultimately results in the peace treaty with Hungary ending up confirming one thing: the continued territorial integrity of Hungary Proper.

Other changes in the Treaty of Trianon include:
  • Hungary being allowed to maintain an army of 50k instead of 30k.
  • Hungary being required to pay a significantly higher amount of indemnity in accordance with its increased ability to pay.
  • Hungarian territories within a 100 km radius of Belgrade becoming demilitarised.
If you managed to read through all this fluff, congrats! Now that is taken care of, allow me to pose my questions:
What would happen next in this scenario? What are the effects of these changes? How could politics within Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechia or in other places develop?

Since the treaty would also forbid union with Austria and likely require the dethronement of Charles IV and his line, the question of state form or a new ruling dynasty is also present. I'm really attracted by the idea of having the Palatine branch of the Habsburgs become the new ruling dynasty of Hungary. Archduke Joseph IOTL seemed to be willing to entertain the idea (once it became certain that Charles' restoration was impossible). Any other potential candidates? What do you think?

Also, if the Nazis still happen to rise to power in Germany, how could things go down ITTL? I suppose the Anschluss of Austria would still go similar to OTL, but how about the Sudeten Question and its aftermath? What about Polish-Hungarian relations? How likely is alliance between the two? Anything else?

I'm looking forward to reading your thoughts!

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P.S.: Please engage with the scenario as presented! Thanks in advance!
 
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Sorry but short story no, long story hell no.
While with more luck and competence Hungary can keep more, there is no way that remain that large...Wilson humiliated Italy a supposed ally due to his 14 points and his perception of italian imperialism declaring null and void a signed treaty, this little Hungarian empire will make him have a stroke earlier.
Plus yeah, the hungarian telling the minority: yeah we know that we are treated you like manure till now but we are changed, cross on our heart, we swear that we will be all friends from now on is credible like a three dollars bill
 
Sorry but short story no, long story hell no.
While with more luck and competence Hungary can keep more, there is no way that remain that large...Wilson humiliated Italy a supposed ally due to his 14 points and his perception of italian imperialism declaring null and void a signed treaty, this little Hungarian empire will make him have a stroke earlier.
Plus yeah, the hungarian telling the minority: yeah we know that we are treated you like manure till now but we are changed, cross on our heart, we swear that we will be all friends from now on is credible like a three dollars bill
If you're not willing to engage with the scenario, then don't bother replying.
 
If you're not willing to engage with the scenario, then don't bother replying.
Oh i'm willing it's simple that as at the time and with the players at Versailles there is no way that Hungary get out of the war with the equivalent of a slap on the wrist and with everybody knowing that everyoone will gang up to her the first moment possible, unless it rebel before the Battle of Vittorio Veneto (just after second Piave will be better)...a more succesfull war by communist Hungary with communist slovackia puppetized it's more possible but open another can of worm...but at least it's on the realm of realistic possibility to get your map
Your scenario is possible if the border are more or less what Hungary get from the Nazi during WW2
 
If you're not willing to engage with the scenario, then don't bother replying.
Instead of dismissing the premise out right like the other guy might I suggest a minor change like delaying amarican entery into the war to reduce thier otl influance at the peace conference in order to make the premise easier to achive by marganalising amaricas otl national sovereignty demands and instead prehapse some kind of alternative hungarian solution like organizing it as a confederation with extensive autonomy for its minority or compensating the entante nations in other ways may also be viable but would more greatly diverge from your original premise which you would like to keep as intact as possible
 
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Instead of dismissing the premise out right like the other guy might I suggest a minor change like delaying amarican entery into the war to reduce thier otl influance at the peace conference in order to make the premise easier to achive by marganalising amaricas otl national sovereignty demands and instead. Prehapse some kind of alternative hungarian solution like organizing it as a confederation with extensive autonomy for its minority or compensating the entante nations in other ways may also be viable but would more greatly diverge from your original premise which you would like to keep as intact as possible
Probably significantly greater odds of a state forming along those lines if the Hungarians refrain from declaring independence and maintain the monarchy, which has more legitimacy amongst ethnic minorities.
 
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Oh i'm willing it's simple that as at the time and with the players at Versailles there is no way that Hungary get out of the war with the equivalent of a slap on the wrist
Losing sea access and having to pay exorbitant reparations is not a mere slap on the wrist though.
Also, Trianon IOTL wasn't harsh (territorially) because the Entente was hell-bent on punishing Hungary. No. The treaty was harsh because it was little more than mere formality by that point. It only confirmed the facts on the ground. The scenario I presented above achieves its result in the same vein.
and with everybody knowing that everyoone will gang up to her the first moment possible
I don't think that's guaranteed. For example, if the Zaolzie dispute still arises between the Czechs and Poles, then the Czechs would be in a rather difficult situation. They could hardly afford willy-nillily joining any offensive anti-Hungarian coalition.

Yugoslavia would be quite preoccupied with consolidating itself, especially now that the Croats would have a slightly larger relative political weight compared to OTL. But also, even IOTL, Hungary and Yugoslavia managed to churn out a "Treaty of Eternal Friendship" (let's not delve into what came of it), so, if the matter of minorities (on each side) is adequately addressed, then I'm not ruling out the possiblity of normalisation in the relations of the two countries. Yugoslavia would also already have to deal with a less than friendly Italy, anyway.

The hardest to placate neighbour would be Romania. It's probably impossible to satisfy them. The only thing I can think of is the Soviet threat keeping them realtively docile.

On the other hand, I don't think relations with either Austria or Poland would have any particular problems. I don't rule out a straight up alliance between Hungary and Poland either, especially if Hungary still supports Poland as extensively (or more) as it historically did during the Polish-Soviet War.
unless it rebel before the Battle of Vittorio Veneto
Hungary unilaterally disbanded its real union with Austria in mid-October and the king got pressured to appoint a notoriously pro-peace, pro-democracy, '48-er Prime Minister by the end of the month. It's not rebellion, but the intentions were clear.
a more succesfull war by communist Hungary with communist slovackia puppetized it's more possible but open another can of worm...but at least it's on the realm of realistic possibility to get your map
If there's anything that is unrealistic, that is a more successful communist Hungary, IMO.
prehapse some kind of alternative hungarian solution like organizing it as a confederation with extensive autonomy for its minority
The new government had plans to cantonise the country.
kanton_j%C3%A1szi_1918.jpg
kanton_str%C3%B3bl_1918.jpg
The actual implemented approach may differ and would probably be somewhat less ambitious, but the Hungarians by this point were willing to concede a great deal to ensure the continued unity of the country.
 
But please, let's not focus on the premise, but rather on its consequences!
I think the problem is, the premise does a titanic amount of work.
This Hungary has managed to achieve ludicrous success in internal policy (as apparently minorities have all opted to buy in), exceptional military success (by winning where it mattered the most, late 1918-early 1919) and significant diplomatic success (by convincing three of the Big Four to pressure others into renouncing the attack). On top of that, they also brilliantly defused the Habsburg question.
It's a very wankish situation to begin with, but the follow-up is equally hard; it would essentially be a multiethnic equivalent to OTL Interwar Romania, whose main thrust has to be conservation of the status quo and an anti-USSR alliance with Poland, except despite the above, it still risks to slide into fascism fast when the next economic crisis hits, and the delicate balance to blow up by the party most affected by events (either minorities going back to belligerence, or Hungarians attempting to gain more sway). Chances are they still lose some, come next crisis, anyways.
 
If we ignore the massive improbability (not impossibility) of this chain of event (that would require Racist in Chief Woodrow Wilson be left far away from any treaty, IMHO), it would be in a very uncomfortable position after the war.
It's surrounded by ennemy/hostile/rival nations, some (Romania and Czecho(slovakia)) that are much more important in France's geopolitical goal of containing Germany and have minorities inside Hungarian borders. With its 2 "defenders" Britain and America out of the continent, Hungarian actions become heavily limited.
The political scene would be heavily destabilized by the infighting between communist/leftist, royalist/fascist and ethno-minority parties.
Maybe it could ally with Italy to dismember Yugoslavia but outside of a WW2 equivalent conflict it would be quite the geopolitical powder keg, especially if it's surrounded by rivals.
 
Losing sea access and having to pay exorbitant reparations is not a mere slap on the wrist though.
Also, Trianon IOTL wasn't harsh (territorially) because the Entente was hell-bent on punishing Hungary. No. The treaty was harsh because it was little more than mere formality by that point. It only confirmed the facts on the ground. The scenario I presented above achieves its result in the same vein.
Compared to the rest of the various treaty of the period? It's like a fine for jaywalking (plus OTL showed us how military limitation and reparation payment truly last) and while Trianon reflected the fact on the ground i doubt that Woodrow will support Hungary at the expense of Jugoslavia or the British ok with a big blob in east europe that's the weak link of any contaiment of the URSS due to the limitation of the peace treaty
Hungary unilaterally disbanded its real union with Austria in mid-October and the king got pressured to appoint a notoriously pro-peace, pro-democracy, '48-er Prime Minister by the end of the month. It's not rebellion, but the intentions were clear.
Like the promise of reform for the minority it's really on 'too little and too late' territory, with some luck if he do what you propose will obtain a better treatment? Sure but not that level of wank.
Hungary supported Poland because frankly Budapest don't have any dispute against them, in your scenario they have a direct border and resolving the situation by giving up slovack territory will not be a great beginning for this new Hungary.
 
Others have pointed out the improbability of events required to make this pod, but I think the real issue is the timeline itself a lot can happen from 1920 to 1940.

By that a lot you've got a massive powder keg in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, Italy, Romania, the USSR if it's pro Poland all have an interest in seeing collapse, yet after the initial attempt they decide to do nothing for decades?

Like why should Romania say not team up with Czechoslovakia to have another grab a couple years later with allied to the the USSR to prevent Poland from intervening in 1924? It's in all of their interests.

Only thing I can largely think of is some very scary USSR that virtually crushed Poland, gobbled up Finland ect early on makes that alliance to impossible out of fear it would just lead to their nations being crushed a little while after.
 
I think the problem is, the premise does a titanic amount of work.
I don't deny it's a tall order. But I still would like to request everyone to indulge me.
This Hungary has managed to achieve ludicrous success in internal policy (as apparently minorities have all opted to buy in)
To be fair, there never was any solid proof they wouldn't. After all, unlike Austria, Hungary (Proper) didn't lose control over its territories to internal separatist forces, only to foreign occupying forces.
significant diplomatic success (by convincing three of the Big Four to pressure others into renouncing the attack).
That would be more of a blunder on the part of the attackers, really. The Hungarians would just take advantage of that.
On top of that, they also brilliantly defused the Habsburg question.
That one was just a fleeting thought, tbh. The country might very well end up a republic. The only thing that is needed is a little delay in the decision though, to avoid creating internal rifts. The same idea why Denikin(?) didn't openly declare wether he's for monarchy or republic during the Russian Civil War.
It's a very wankish situation to begin with
Yes, you could certainly categorise it as a wankish scenario, with a not exactly high level of probability, but I believe it to be probable nonetheless.
but the follow-up is equally hard; it would essentially be a multiethnic equivalent to OTL Interwar Romania, whose main thrust has to be conservation of the status quo and an anti-USSR alliance with Poland
Now this is the kind of thing I'm really curious about! Internal politics of this Hungary don't really interest me that much, what I'm curious about are the geopolitical ramifications.
except despite the above, it still risks to slide into fascism fast when the next economic crisis hits
Why do you think so? I would expect the multiethnic (and probably decentralised/federalised) nature of the country being a strong check against the rise of fascism in the country. Also, having a larger and more well-rounded economy (resources, industry, consumer base) could also somewhat blunt the edge of the coming economic crisis (at least compared to OTL).
and the delicate balance to blow up by the party most affected by events (either minorities going back to belligerence, or Hungarians attempting to gain more sway).
The possiblity of that cannot be ruled out, yes.
It's surrounded by ennemy/hostile/rival nations, some (Romania and Czecho(slovakia)) that are much more important in France's geopolitical goal of containing Germany
Why would either of those be more important to France's Cordon Sanitaire, especially Romania? France's most important "Eastern" ally against Germany is Poland. Considering the uneasy relations between Poland and "Czechia" (for lack of a better name) and the good relations (and lack of conflict in interests) between Hungary and Poland, Hungary would be a valuable potential ally to France.

As for Yugoslavia, as I wrote above, I don't rule out the possibility of normalisation in the relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia. If the French mediate, it's even likelier. Yugoslavia could benefit from this configuration too. A good trade deal with Hungary would be beneficial to the Yugoslav economy, but without a non-friendly Northern neighbour, Yugoslavia would have more leeway to contest Italian interests in Albania. Of course, such diplomatic breakthrough would certainly need time to materialise, but it could be achieved by the '30s, perhaps.
have minorities inside Hungarian borders. With its 2 "defenders" Britain and America out of the continent, Hungarian actions become heavily limited.
Hungary's relations with its neighbours would be heavily influenced by how well do the various ethnicities of the country fare. If adequate linguistic/cultural reforms pass (which is one of the core points of the scenario), then the ethnic question couldn't really be brought up against the country. Of course, that cannot guarantee reconcilation with neigbouring countries, but it's a good start.

"Czechoslovakianism" probably wasn't so heavily entrenched in the Czech psyche by this point to remain a defnitive long-term obstacle to Hungarian-Czech relations, and I already wrote about my vision of Yugoslav-Hungarian reconcilation. Romania is the only almost-guaranteed long-term issue.

Hungary would also need a strong French alignment, of course.
The political scene would be heavily destabilized by the infighting between communist/leftist, royalist/fascist and ethno-minority parties.
The cantonal/federal system could allow the outsourcing of most ethnic/linguistic/cultural issues to the regional political scenes. If the competences of the national-level legislation and government is defined to be limited to defence, cross-country infrastructure and other country-level issues, then the functionality of the highest level of government could potentially be maintained.
Maybe it could ally with Italy to dismember Yugoslavia but outside of a WW2 equivalent conflict it would be quite the geopolitical powder keg, especially if it's surrounded by rivals.
Italy, being an anti-status quo power, would be a poor fit as the primary international partner of the country. Again, I propose France. I would also expect the French to be open to cooperation.
 
Compared to the rest of the various treaty of the period?
It would be in the same weight-class as Versailles though. Germany lost 12% of its territory, while Hungary ITTL would lose 13%.
(plus OTL showed us how military limitation and reparation payment truly last)
Yeah, but that's hindsight.
and while Trianon reflected the fact on the ground i doubt that Woodrow will support Hungary at the expense of Jugoslavia
Why? Also, I think the successful election in early 1919 could make quite the impression.
or the British ok with a big blob in east europe that's the weak link of any contaiment of the URSS due to the limitation of the peace treaty
That's actually a fair argument. Hungary is not neigbour of the Soviets though, so I think the Hungarian monetary compensation (reparations) could make up for that. Basically Hungary would subsidise the armies of its neigbours that way.
Like the promise of reform for the minority it's really on 'too little and too late' territory, with some luck if he do what you propose will obtain a better treatment? Sure but not that level of wank.
I hope you do know that Hungarian rule did not entail boiling Romanian babies or skewering poor Serb peasants on large sticks or any other such thing? The sin of the Hungarians was the sabotage of the use of minority languages in official matters (above municipial level), the Magyarisation of placenames, and a heavy-handed approach in the enforcement of the Hungarian language being a cumpolsory subject in schools (at first in middle schools, then also in groundschools). A few schools were closed as a result of non-compliance, but despite that, Hungary in 1913 still had more Romanian-language elementary schools than Romania itself had for example. Hungary's pre-WW1 treatment of its minorities is more or less comparable to modern day Ukraine's.
Hungary supported Poland because frankly Budapest don't have any dispute against them
Hungarian-Polish friendship already had a long tradition by this point.
in your scenario they have a direct border and resolving the situation by giving up slovack territory will not be a great beginning for this new Hungary.
The dispute over the Slovakian borderlands existed only because it was Czechoslovakia that controlled/claimed the area. The Poles wouldn't claim the area in this scenario.
 
I do have my doubts about this idea, but, taking this as broadly as possible, viewing it as a 'How do we make sure Hungary is as big as plausible in 1920', I think we need to put the POD back to 1914 for it to work. Nevertheless, with that accounted for, we have 2 possible options I think.

Approach #1 - the Hungarian Army has to do better on the ground during the War and they have to avoid the attempted Hungarian Soviet State. Presumably this means that the Romanians have to be in a worse state during 1917 and 1918 than they were in real life as they recovered from their disastrous showing during their relatively brief involvement in the First World War. Perhaps the Central Powers get a little deeper into Romania than they did irl? The Central Powers did capture the Romanian capital which is normally game over for wars at this point. I don't know, but the Romanian recovery was one of the bigger 'rabbit out of hat' jobs in the War. The death of King Ferdinand maybe? Something that really staggers the Romanians and buys the Hungarians some time and except killing the King and possibly the Queen too is about all I can think of.

I doubt the Slovaks and any Croatians, Serbs and Romanians stuck there will take well to being run by Hungarians regardless. The long-term stability of any state also has to be accounted for too, unless we are assuming some kind of really ugly state filled with repression instead. Population exchanges, at least of Romanians seems inevitable for this scenario to work and that's going to take time and money. The money is potentially there, if say the British (who were actually fairly financially sound in the First War) decided to facilitate that as a means of maintaining a status quo of sorts of the Balkans to buy time to come up with some more sustainable plan, which would be especially urgent if the War in Romania went worse for Romania than irl and the British concluded that they weren't going to get the results they hoped from Romania's participation. If the Romanian Royal Family (which includes Queen Marie, granddaughter of both Queen Victoria and Tsar Alexander II and first cousin of Tsar Nicholas II), had to go to flight minus a deceased King Ferdinand, the Romanians might not be in a position to oppose their borders being altered in a negative fashion or them coming out of Versailles as losers rather than the big winners they were on the ground.

At least some of their success diplomatically in 1919 was due to the reality on the ground, a weaker performance in the war would scotch that, regardless of the diplomatic skill and dark arts displayed by Queen Marie (Romania's not so secret weapon in Paris). She's too busy just trying to save her family's position and ensure that her son, the newly minted and less than ideal Carol II, currently without a direct heir is recognised as king (his 16 year old younger brother Prince Nicolae would be Heir Presumptive) and not deposed and replaced with a random Habsburg for example. She'd probably settle for recognition of her son's right to reign, an appropriate royal bride, possibly Habsburg for political reasons, and money to support Romanian refugees fleeing the worst affected areas in the west. She'd then have to convince Romanians that a bad treaty for them where Hungary comes out doing alright is all her fault and take the fall, going into exile in Switzerland to live a purposeless life on a British pension and leaving the government and Carol's hands clean to recover from the mess and swear vengeance later on to engage on a long mission of revanchism that would likely make the French look quite tame.

Naturally, a lot would depend on what was going on elsewhere, whether the Serbs were doing well or the same as in irl and the status of the Russian Empire at this point. Much depends on whose making the decisions, if for example, the Russians adopted a defensive only strategy or opted out altogether after the February Revolution, at least not asking their men to go on the offensive in-order to buy time concentrate on sorting out the food and supply issues at home, this brings the Polish issue with their border into play in the longer term, especially given we know that the Poles are organising under Józef Piłsudski and the borders with that eventual state will have to come into play at some point, say the Rusyn majority north-east of Slovakia.

The Bosnian question and the strength of the Serbs determines the probability of a Yugoslavia that includes a meaningful number of pre-war Austria-Hungarian territory, i.e. Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina itself. The Austrians might want to disengage from Bosnia as a sop to the Serbs in-exchange for good terms at any peace treaty, but that would land the Hungarian Lands in the firing line with a shared border and lots of Hungarian citizens, i.e. ethnic Croats, on the wrong side of the border. A Yugoslavia focused on Serbia, Montenegro, half of Bosnia and at least part of what became North Macedonia seems realistic here, also raising questions about the future of Albania in this picture. A Serb-led Yugoslavia potentially backed by Great Powers would inevitably be caught in a Great Game-type scenario with Hungary, a rivalry in Bosnia and Albania which can never be resolved without one state buckling under the pressure, with Hungary being backed by Germany, probably by Bulgaria and Greece as a means to keep Yugoslavia under control.

Approach #2 - avoiding the First World War itself, say if Franz Ferdinand doesn't visit Sarajevo on that particular day and the Balkans continues on as a regular powderkeg whilst the Empire degenerates with the Austrian and Hungarian halves heading in different directions naturally anyway.

If we assume peace continues into 1915, some sort further regional conflict is pretty much inevitable at some point in the second half of the 1910s given Bulgaria feels disatisfied, a Greek-Bulgarian-Serbian war seems destined. The Empire would inevitably be divided about how to respond to a war that doesn't directly affect them but is on their borders, so will Romania. The Austrians might want to play regional power broker and try and settle the dispute and maybe offer a guarantee of sovereignty to Albania whilst the Hungarians might want to stay well out of things and concentrate on maintaining the status quo in fear of what Franz Ferdinand might do as Emperor, as say Franz III Ferdinand, which will happen in 1916 regardless as Franz Josef dies.

This could be very messy indeed, with Russia and France attempting to support Serbia and Britain and Germany competing for influence in Greece. Germany could also potentially be playing both sides in Bulgaria too, given the German ethnicity of 'Foxy' Ferdinand I of Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary could exert a lot of regional soft power by trying to tamp down the conflict and negotiate a sensible solution. I can see Bulgaria losing that conflict and Ferdinand maybe having to abdicate in-favour of Boris III whilst facing fairly serious consequences here, losing more territory in the south-west of the country and seeing more ethnic Bulgarians retreat back to the heartlands. Modern day North Macedonia split between Serbia and Greece and emptied of Bulgarians would certainly be an ironic outcome given the naming and language disputes and perhaps somewhere for Austrian and Hungarian Serbs to re-settle?

Nevertheless, a Third Balkan War in 1915 or 1916 could well be a last hurrah for the Empire as the twin questions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the long-term governance of core territories become untenable. I wouldn't be too surprised if the Empire doesn't survive any serious attempt at reform and the Hungarians decide that to sustain their position within the Crown Lands of St Stephen walking away is the best option. If that's the case, yes, Archduke Joseph August might be approached to assume the throne of Hungary, given his pre-existing relationship with the power-players of Hungarian politics as Palatine of Hungary. The Future Blessed Charles I as the Heir Apparent to the combined throne was pro-reform, so he could be deemed too positive towards his uncle Franz III Ferdinand's position on the long-term future of the Empire. The Hungarians would also be very keen to clamp down hard on any attempts at Croatian, Slovakian or Romanian nationalist movements and might end up quite a repressive place regardless, perhaps resembling the way Spain behaved under Franco until the 1960s, conservative, restrictive, militarised and diplomatically somewhat isolated, deeply suspicious of their neighbours, Austro-Bohemia, Serbia-Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Russia and potentially limited in their access to the international money markets in London, Paris and New York. I can imagine a not destroyed by the First World War Germany would step in to help in the way they cultivated their relationship with the Ottomans.

I do not think that this would develop in a vaccum though. If we assume that due to existing structural and economic strains within Russia and the weaknesses of the Romanov dynasty with their autocratic reliance on Nicholas II and his haemophiliac heir and the exclusion of the Grand Duchesses from the succession, I think Poland has to be considered as a concept whose moment will come at some point in the 1920s, especially if there is some kind of a 1905-style revolution that sparks an uprising in places like Poland and Ukraine and is met by repression. What's to say that a mischievous Wilhelm II doesn't figure that he can put one of his sons, say Prince Adalbert, on a Polish throne and maintain control of it that way, especially if Habsburg attempts at internal reform de-stabilise the Empire there, leaving a state composed of Congress Poland, Galicia and Lodmeria and the Duchy of Warsaw possible. An independent Kingdom of Hungary would thus have a new Kingdom of Poland to the north, albeit German-aligned and with sensible diplomacy there is grounds to cooperate to contain Russia, especially if socialists make the running after Nicholas II is convinced to abdicate to carry the can in order to let Alexei try to save the Russian Empire. Poland and Hungary don't automatically HAVE to fall out necessarily, Hungary and Romania DO, that's a rather big distinction.

Regardless of which Approach - how actively involved either version of Hungary would get involved with Bosnia and Herzegovina is up for discussion. Again, it seems inevitable that some kind of terrible conflict would happen there to decide how Serbian it is given the reasons for the 1914 Crisis occurring in the first place. Splitting the territory two ways also doesn't really solve the Bosniak problem either, though I suppose this would be another argument for financial support for population migration, probably to Ottoman Thrace or Anatolia or Albania.

The Italians are also going to make a play for Austrian held territories in Italy and Austria probably wouldn't be in a position to resist them. How far they could be salved with those gains and not say Slovenia and control of the Croatian coastline, cutting Hungary off from the sea, would be a debate and that's actually more likely to be a cause for tensions regardless, though Italy could I suppose be bought off if there was no war with some tasty investment money, permission to interfere in the domestic politics of Romania and Albania and some colonial scraps, say French and British Somaliland, recognition of their regime in Libya and a few islands here and there and cultivation of their egos.
 
Others have pointed out the improbability of events required to make this pod, but I think the real issue is the timeline itself a lot can happen from 1920 to 1940.

By that a lot you've got a massive powder keg in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, Italy, Romania, the USSR if it's pro Poland all have an interest in seeing collapse, yet after the initial attempt they decide to do nothing for decades?
Once the war is over and armies are demobilised, rallying the public for another war would face difficulties. None of the countries would be in such financial state to go warring either. Furthermore, the peace treaty stipulates Hungary paying reparations to its neigbours. A war would inevitably put a stop to those payments permanently. Disturbing the post-war order wouldn't be seen favourably by the Great Powers either, tbh.
Like why should Romania say not team up with Czechoslovakia to have another grab a couple years later with allied to the the USSR to prevent Poland from intervening in 1924? It's in all of their interests.
I think it's fairly safe to say that peace would last through the '20s, all things considered.
 
Once the war is over and armies are demobilised, rallying the public for another war would face difficulties. None of the countries would be in such financial state to go warring either. Furthermore, the peace treaty stipulates Hungary paying reparations to its neigbours. A war would inevitably put a stop to those payments permanently. Disturbing the post-war order wouldn't be seen favourably by the Great Powers either, tbh.

I think it's fairly safe to say that peace would last through the '20s, all things considered.

That's the part I'm doubting to be honest, I don't think a post war world would occur as easy in the Balkans and central Europe both because of what Hungary is and what it brings. A lot more nations have incentives of striking out against this status quo, I would expect this intact Hungary to be constant border clashes and war scares with it's neighbours for decades that make demobilisation a far harder and less fast process.

By that a single nation managed to reject the demands of the world powers (given by this period already had various plans drawn up and known for the lands in the Hungarian part of the AH empire) why should they not follow Hungary's own example? It worked out wonderfully for them after all.

With the exception of Hungary and maybe Poland I'm not really anyone in the region has any real interest in peace in the region. Mainly because the longer Hungary exists in this current form the longer it can build a common identity, get more stable and begin to grow which will make getting land from it much harder.

I guess there is a way I can see it happen though, the lack of any gains from the first war with Hungary lead a series of revolutions/uprisings going through Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia ect that lead them far more focused on internal politics as blood flows in rivers and the entente decides the region is quite unstable and maybe Hungary could make a good policemen given the status quo benefits them the most and after this upheaval ends the new or surviving governments in a desperate attempt to stabilize their nations swallow the bitter pill to get reparations for currency to rebuild.
 
I don't deny it's a tall order. But I still would like to request everyone to indulge me.

To be fair, there never was any solid proof they wouldn't. After all, unlike Austria, Hungary (Proper) didn't lose control over its territories to internal separatist forces, only to foreign occupying forces.

That would be more of a blunder on the part of the attackers, really. The Hungarians would just take advantage of that.

That one was just a fleeting thought, tbh. The country might very well end up a republic. The only thing that is needed is a little delay in the decision though, to avoid creating internal rifts. The same idea why Denikin(?) didn't openly declare wether he's for monarchy or republic during the Russian Civil War.

Yes, you could certainly categorise it as a wankish scenario, with a not exactly high level of probability, but I believe it to be probable nonetheless.

Now this is the kind of thing I'm really curious about! Internal politics of this Hungary don't really interest me that much, what I'm curious about are the geopolitical ramifications.

Why do you think so? I would expect the multiethnic (and probably decentralised/federalised) nature of the country being a strong check against the rise of fascism in the country. Also, having a larger and more well-rounded economy (resources, industry, consumer base) could also somewhat blunt the edge of the coming economic crisis (at least compared to OTL).

The possiblity of that cannot be ruled out, yes.
I honestly think you keep making the order too tall to be accepted. Like here.
The prerequisites are two-and-two-prong-fold:
a) Hungary convincing all minorities
b) Hungary doing great militarily when it counts and
c) either doing it again, and/or also doing well diplomatically.
To this, you also add d) a perfect resolution of the Habsburg knot, which is another very hard thing to do no matter how you want to untangle that mess.
In each of the points, your reaction downplays the dangers and plays the strengths to the maximum.

Like, no, there was plenty of proof nobody trusted the Hungarians, the OTL dissolution proved it in spades. Collaborationists vanished. The Hungarian minorities were swiftly abandoned, and nobody cried a tear for it save Hungary. And of course, you're calling in the blunder card to justify the military stall needed for diplomacy to 'win the day'. It's hard for me, or others, to watch all of this and accept 'it's probable nonetheless'. It's a wank, and a fairly unlikely one.

Same goes for the beyond: the country apparently manages to cross the 20s and the 30s without either falling to authoritarianism or - I'd add - a deadlock where the Hungarian plurality and the various ethnic minorities endlessly wrestle just because they can (precisely because external menace is, for the time, ruled out). And ethnic strife never quite simply restarts when things go south, as has happened to the economy of everybody in the early 30s.
Of course, if all of that goes well, then Hungary just becomes the utmost status quo-oriented country, because why the heck would they want to risk losing it all? They just pick a reliable partner or two to have diplomatic cover, and hope their newfound strength never comes under test (which certainly is a problem with the two the most likely allies, Poalnd and Yugoslavia, which still risk to drag them into a defensive conflict).
 
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The relations between Poland and Hungary might be different. First of all, in OTL Czechoslovakia was an enemy to Poland. It's not just the border disputes, but also something else: Czechoslovakia was prorussian and believed that only mighty Russia is capable of defending the Czechs against Germany. During the polish-soviet war the czechoslovak diplomacy had been doing whatever it could to talk the west out of aiding the Poles, and after Germany blocked the passage of french weapons for Poland through Germany, Czechoslovakia blocked the passage of weapons through Czechoslovakia too. All in a practical view that "Poland should be ruled by Russia, because only then the Russians will be able to charge at Germany to defend the Czechs". Despite these obstacles the Poles fought off the Soviets anyway, so Czechoslovakia spent most of the interwar period on complaining about Poland's lack of love for Russia.

Czechoslovakia was basically advocating for Poland to de facto renounce her independence to the Soviets, and the Soviet Union was the one Czechoslovakia tried to form an alliance with. This was dangerous for Poland, and so it was an additional reason for Poland to like the hungarian claims upon troublesome Czechoslovakia. However, in OTL Czechoslovakia was the only one against whom the Poles politically supported the Hungarians. Simultaneously Poland objected the hungarian claims upon Romania, with whom Poland had the anti-soviet defence pact.

In TTL it really depends on whether Czechs want to form Czechoslovakia. If they don't and instead stay at neutral relations with Hungary, then Hungary becomes "useless" for Poland. In such case, Poland will be supporting the Romanians who are the only ones who can offer something practical to Poland (a defensive pact against the Soviet Union).
 
I get it, it's a wank-scenario, I know! There are so many just as outlandish (or even much more outlandish) ideas going around in the countless threads of this forum, though. Many of them are taken at face value without issue, and some interesting discussions arise. Tbh, I was just merely curious about what people think how this different situation in Central Europe (presented on the map posted above) would have influenced the events leading up to WW2. How exactly the shown status quo came to be is tertiary, but rules are rules and context needed to be provided, so I came up with something.

So, with that out of the way, what I want to know is:
- How could the failure of acquiring Slovakia influence Czech politics? What effects would the increased relative weight of the German elements have on the country?
- If Germany still follows the same trajectory as OTL and the nazis take over, then how would the changed circumstances influence their actions? Anschluss? Sudeten Crisis?
- In relation to the previous part, how could the Sudeten Crisis play out ITTL? Could the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles create an early united front against Germany? Or would the Zaolzie dispute, bitterness over Slovakia and Hungarian military weakness prevent that?
- If the Germans still take the Sudeten Land and then invade the rest of Czechia like IOTL, then what about Poland's case? Would Hungary stand with Poland? If the two countries have an alliance, then would the Poles activate it upon the German invasion or not (like in the case of Romania IOTL). If Hungary doesn't enter the war, then what effects could its long common border with Poland have? Would Germany not being able to use Slovakia as a staging ground influence the course of the campaign? What about the Polish withdrawal? The Polish Army being able to secure its Southern flank with the Carpathians should certainly need to have some effects.
- If Hungary didn't enter the war during Poland's invasion, then how long could it avoid getting dragged into the conflict? Could it attempt a Sweden? Or would the country be seen as liability and get invaded before Barbarossa? Perhaps it could be attacked simultaneously to the Axis invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece? How could such campaign progress? Or would Yugoslavia become and Axis member ITTL instead?
- Anything else in this vein?
 
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