WI: North Carolina Campaign

[Arnold d.c]

While reading through my university’s copy of Brooks D. Simpson’s “The Civil War in the East: Struggle, Stalemate, and Victory,” I came across the observation that Federal leadership failed to take advantage of the footholds along the Carolina coast. Union planners failed to incorporate these areas into planning for the Eastern Theater for the remainder of the war. Only Ulysses S. Grant would raise the idea of renewing offensive operations in North Carolina and that plan was met with disapproval.

The author brings up two examples: T.W. Sherman’s (not related to the more famous W.T. Sherman) expedition to Port Royal and Burnside’s expedition. This thread will be focused on the latter.

The Burnside expedition was launched in the first week of January 1862 and, owing to weather-related delays, arrived at the Tar Heel State a month later. By the start of April, Burnside was successful in building a sizable foothold in North Carolina and was in position to plunge into the North Carolina interior. With Goldsboro and Raleigh captured, a critical rail link between Virginia and the Confederate heartland would be severed. This obviously did not come about as this railroad would be a target of Grant’s offensives at Petersburg two years later.

Burnside’s expedition was stretched thin by the need to garrison newly acquired territory and suffered limited logistical capacity to sustain operations deep in North Carolina. So what if preparations for an in-depth campaign had been made?

At the start of April, Burnside had 6,700 available soldiers to conduct the offensive. I figure that he would at least need a force of 30,000 men to execute a full-scale offensive. This leaves us with several questions:

1. Where do the Federal get the additional troops from? McClellan would surely refuse any detachment from the Army of the Potomac, as they are needed for the Peninsular Campaign. Another option would be to withdraw from other Union footholds and reinforce Burnside. This might be unpalatable for Northern politicians; the idea of surrendering ground after Bull Run might just come too soon.

2. Assuming that Burnside was able to get everything necessary to renew the offensive, what would the Confederate reaction be? Could this offensive draw troops from the Army of Northern Virginia as the Peninsular Campaign is underway? How would the severance of the Weldon Railroad affect Confederate forces in Virginia?

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

I'll admit that the Union tendency to launch various long distance amphibious campaigns on the Confederate coasts puzzles me. Yes, the Union had command of the seas and the capacity to do that, though they never managed to advance far inland from their coastal gains. However, federal armies could cross the Confederacy's long land border and be supported logistically by rail, and in the West by rivers. Something like a tenth of Union strength was tied up in various Anzios. And as for assisting the blockade, the Confederates were able to run the blockade almost ot the end and turned out to not need that many ports to do it. Of the Union amphibious campaigns, only the one against New Orleans makes sense since that was the only real city in the CSA.

 

[Arnold d.c]

I'll admit that the Union tendency to launch various long distance amphibious campaigns on the Confederate coasts puzzles me. Yes, the Union had command of the seas and the capacity to do that, though they never managed to advance far inland from their coastal gains. However, federal armies could cross the Confederacy's long land border and be supported logistically by rail, and in the West by rivers. Something like a tenth of Union strength was tied up in various Anzios. And as for assisting the blockade, the Confederates were able to run the blockade almost ot the end and turned out to not need that many ports to do it. Of the Union amphibious campaigns, only the one against New Orleans makes sense since that was the only real city in the CSA.

In fairness, those little “Anzios” were successful at reducing the number of deep sea ports the Confederates could have otherwise used. After more reading on the subject, these little “Anzios” had great potential to disrupt the flow of supplies from the Deep South to Virginia and weaken the main Confederate armies on the front.

Imagine if David Hunter had captured Savannah after the fall of Fort Pulaski. A cotton exporting port, railroad center and the largest manufacturing center in Georgia in Union hands would surely draw off numerous Georgia regiments back to Georgia as well as disrupt the Confederacy’s ability to provide supplies to the front.

A reminder of the potential of these footholds came at February 1863 when Lee dispatched Longstreet’s Corps to check if the Federals would conduct a full-scale offensive. This decision left Lee immensely vulnerable, and only Hooker allowed the Chancellorsville Campaign end in Confederate victory.

 

[highwayhoss]

I'll admit that the Union tendency to launch various long distance amphibious campaigns on the Confederate coasts puzzles me. Yes, the Union had command of the seas and the capacity to do that, though they never managed to advance far inland from their coastal gains. However, federal armies could cross the Confederacy's long land border and be supported logistically by rail, and in the West by rivers. Something like a tenth of Union strength was tied up in various Anzios. And as for assisting the blockade, the Confederates were able to run the blockade almost ot the end and turned out to not need that many ports to do it. Of the Union amphibious campaigns, only the one against New Orleans makes sense since that was the only real city in the CSA.

The thing to remember is that those amphibious campaigns were recommended by the "blockade board" as a means of making the blockade more effective. In that regard they were very effective as they not only denied the Confederates the use of these ports but acted as forward bases for blockaders to resupply and conduct repairs. (Port Royal, NC was very important in this regard.) Also, another effect of these operations was the liberation of thousands of "contraband" slaves on the coasts. These contrabands proved quite valuable not only as manpower for the Navy, but also as pilots and intel sources regarding Confederate defenses. (one interesting effect of these operations was that they changed the attitudes of Union Naval officers regarding slavery; most were proslavery prewar but the sight of slave treatment during these early operations changed their minds.)
Regarding the blockade, the author James McPherson said it best; the real measure of the blockade's effect was not in the number of successful Confederate runs or Union captures: it was the number of ships dissuaded from running the blockade in the first place. In that regard, the blockade was very successful. The skyrocketing costs of transportation and insurance was as crippling to the CSA as any battlefield loss.

While reading through my university’s copy of Brooks D. Simpson’s “The Civil War in the East: Struggle, Stalemate, and Victory,” I came across the observation that Federal leadership failed to take advantage of the footholds along the Carolina coast. Union planners failed to incorporate these areas into planning for the Eastern Theater for the remainder of the war. Only Ulysses S. Grant would raise the idea of renewing offensive operations in North Carolina and that plan was met with disapproval.

This was one of Grant's greatest strengths; unlike Lincoln or Eastern Army officers, he understood the importance of logistics and the need to cut off supply for the CSA forces in Virginia. IMHO, North Carolina was a big missed opportunity for the Union; a logical followup would have been sealing or cutting off Wilmington. Such an early neutralization of the port would have seriously crippled the Armies and industries in Virginia.

At the start of April, Burnside had 6,700 available soldiers to conduct the offensive. I figure that he would at least need a force of 30,000 men to execute a full-scale offensive. This leaves us with several questions:

1. Where do the Federal get the additional troops from? McClellan would surely refuse any detachment from the Army of the Potomac, as they are needed for the Peninsular Campaign. Another option would be to withdraw from other Union footholds and reinforce Burnside. This might be unpalatable for Northern politicians; the idea of surrendering ground after Bull Run might just come too soon.

Burnside recruited soldiers for his force from the New England states; he particularly worked on getting men with experience as sailors. With, support, Burnside could get the men he needed without affecting other operations.

2. Assuming that Burnside was able to get everything necessary to renew the offensive, what would the Confederate reaction be? Could this offensive draw troops from the Army of Northern Virginia as the Peninsular Campaign is underway? How would the severance of the Weldon Railroad affect Confederate forces in Virginia?

Look at the 1864 Confederate NC campaign featuring the CSS Albermarle; the Confederates showed that they regarded the Union footholds in NC as a serious threat. A more sustained NC campaign, combined with a landing of a smaller army on the Peninsula plus a thrust from the north with a large army covering Washington would have seriously stretched the AoNV.
BTW Lee understood the threat of the US Navy very well; as a former commander of South Atlantic coastal defenses, he learned the hard way just how effective an enemy navy could be.