I thought it was FDR's decision....When did the Wallies and Stalin decide to make the boundary the Elbe?
It was Ike's decision to halt there and not to take Prague or Berlin.
I thought it was FDR's decision....When did the Wallies and Stalin decide to make the boundary the Elbe?
It was Ike's decision to halt there and not to take Prague or Berlin.
According to Forrest C. Pogue, Author of the official history: The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Pages 479 to 480I thought it was FDR's decision....
According to Forrest C. Pogue, Author of the official history: The Supreme Command (Washington, 1954), UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Pages 479 to 480
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On 12 April 1945, the day of President Roosevelt's death and eighteen days before the Russians took Berlin, Ninth U.S. Army units crossed the Elbe River near Magdeburg, some fifty miles from the German capital. (See Map X inside back cover.) They established a second bridgehead farther south on the following day. German counterattacks forced them to withdraw from the northern position on the 14th, but the Americans held the southern bridgehead. These elements were ordered to hold in place while other units arriving at the Elbe were turned toward objectives south and north along the west bank of the river. On 5 May, a week before the Russians liberated Prague, the Third U.S. Army pushed spearheads inside the Czechoslovak frontier and, on the day the war ended, was in a position to advance in force to the Czechoslovak capital.
Despite the pleas of the Czechoslovak leaders and the appeals of Mr. Churchill, these units were not sent forward. Many observers have concluded that only a political decision, perhaps made weeks before, could have held General Dwight D. Eisenhower's forces at the Elbe.
Careful examination of the Supreme Commander's action indicates that he halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only.
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He suffered 7,000 casualties including 2,000 dead to take Aachen, a city of around 25,000 for symbolic purposes. It was the preferred medieval Imperial residence of Emperor Charlemagne of the Frankish Empire, and, from 936 to 1531, the place where 31 Holy Roman Emperors were crowned Kings of the Germans.Correct me if I’m wrong but I believe Eisenhower made this decision because he didn’t feel Berlin was worth the projected 100,000 American soldier deaths that his logistician estimated id cost to take Berlin?
Your same quoted source says the following later on (page 484):So Berlin wasn't that excessive. The 100,000 was for casualties, not deaths. US infantry units lost 3% of their strength every day on the. Average.
I'm a bit confused what you mean with both statements. Are you arguing that the settlement at Yalta would be the same in all timelines barring leadership changes no matter what the progress of the war was? The dividing lines at Yalta were pretty much directly influenced by the pace of the war and assigned occupation zones based on what would likely be occupied by each army. If the Soviets don't liberate Bulgaria and Romania for instance, I think there is an open possibility of them not hosting Soviet troops after the end of hostilities. It also seems like you are implying that the Yalta Conference was some great kowtow to Stalin by Soviet-sympathetic politicians which I find objectionable, but maybe I'm misreading your comment.I don't think a less pro-Soviet result at Yalta is possible with OTL leaders. Why wouldn't they wait on the Elbe? What difference does the length of time make?
The overall cost of the Siegfried Line Campaign around Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest, in US personnel, was close to 140,000 for a city of around 25,000. Bradley wanted to capture the first German city by the Wallies. He's telling Ike Berlin's worth less than Aachen.Your same quoted source says the following later on (page 484):
"Nearly two hundred miles separated Montgomery's Rhine bridgehead from the Elbe, while Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov had nearly a million men on the Oder with some elements within thirty or forty miles of the German capital. Even if the Allies reached the Elbe before Zhukov crossed the Oder, the British and U.S. forces would still have to cross fifty miles of lowlands marked by lakes, streams, and canals to get to Berlin. When asked by General Eisenhower for an opinion, General Bradley estimated that a breakthrough from the Elbe would cost 100,000 casualties. "A pretty stiff price to pay for a prestige objective ," he told the Supreme Commander. And, remembering that the Allies had already agreed that the Russian occupation zone would run within one hundred miles of the Rhine, he added, "Especially when we've got to fall back and let the other fellow take over." He says candidly of his thinking of this period:
I could see no political advantage accruing from the capture of Berlin that would offset the need for quick destruction of the German army on our front. As soldiers we looked naively on this British inclination [the desire to go on to Berlin] to complicate the war with political foresight and non-military objectives. [10]
With these arguments in mind and fearing that the enemy might successfully establish his redoubt in the south, General Eisenhower concluded near the end of March that he should push his main force from the Kassel-Frankfurt area to the Elbe, split the German forces, cut off Berlin from the National Redoubt area, and then turn his forces directly to the north and to the southwest of the Elbe. These maneuvers would enable him to seize ports on the North Sea and the Baltic and also clean up the area to the south before the enemy could assemble a force there. This meant that the main offensive would be under Bradley's command. [11] On 28 March he asked the Allied military missions in Moscow to inform Marshal Stalin of his intentions."
At the time it was considered a steep price to pay for territories they had already promised to give up to the USSR at the Yalta Conference. There was a deeper concern about possible German resistance in the so-called National Redoubt which directed their attention south rather than focusing on an effort to cross the Elbe in force.
Yes.I'm a bit confused what you mean with both statements. Are you arguing that the settlement at Yalta would be the same in all timelines barring leadership changes no matter what the progress of the war was? The dividing lines at Yalta were pretty much directly influenced by the pace of the war and assigned occupation zones based on what would likely be occupied by each army. If the Soviets don't liberate Bulgaria and Romania for instance, I think there is an open possibility of them not hosting Soviet troops after the end of hostilities. It also seems like you are implying that the Yalta Conference was some great kowtow to Stalin by Soviet-sympathetic politicians which I find objectionable, but maybe I'm misreading your comment.
And it doesn't seem at all absurd to you for Allied armies to stop at the Elbe and just let the German war effort continue to power on in the east? If all political and military imperatives demand the end of the war and the defeat of Nazi Germany, then of course the length of time is important. Especially if you just hunker down and open yourself to the possibility of German formations regrouping and smashing through your defensive line or a continued hail of rockets smashing into London or the continued economic dislocation caused by total war footing. I could go on.
Okay.. mind elaborating? Like I said in my post, Yalta was a very involved negotiation and the maps that came out of that conference were highly contingent on the progress of the war at the time of the Conference. If Czechoslovakia was quite far from the Soviet front in an alternate timeline, I'm not sure why you still believe it will always be assigned to the Soviets. Its like saying we could never have an alternate Congress of Vienna and it would always 100% play out the exact same. Your position makes little sense here.Yes.
No, I don't think American leadership was "too trusting". I think, given the context of the time, they were as trusting as they should have been. If they had blown up the deal over suspicions which they had no way of actually confirming, it would have made the post-war situation noticeably worse and probably would have led to things like a Sovietized Greece - why would Stalin keep to the Percentages Agreement if no deal could ever be reached with a paranoid Allied leadership? The Soviets did keep to a number of agreements in the immediate post-war period. In fact, studies that I've read of post-war Soviet policy indicates that there was never some pre-formed design to subvert the agreements with the Allies and consolidate a closed off bloc in the east. It turned out that way, but only due to years of zigs and zags and diplomatic brinksmanship between east and west from 1945 - 1950. Mistrust on both sides fueled the start of the Cold War, it wasn't just about whether one could "trust Stalin" or whether he backstabbed the utopian dreams of harmony drawn up at Yalta. Trusting them less wasn't exactly a great option either - it took Churchill down the road of proposing a Third World War and nuclear hellfire.As for Yalta, I don't know how anyone could conclude with hindsight that FDR was generally too trusting of Soviet leadership.
If the Soviets are lagging, Yalta might still be under German control.Yes.
Now, what's less politically tenable, stopping where you've agreed the divide postwar will be with your ally that started the war effectively on the opposite side, or fighting to liberate more land, countries, and people then surrendering them to the same? As for Yalta, I don't know how anyone could conclude with hindsight that FDR was generally too trusting of Soviet leadership.
When someone dies without having an heir, it goes to the country and there's nothing weird about that. That's also how in OTL the Polish People's Republic and the western Jews agreed on that (something the Jews try now to deny). As for the polish nationalists, the actual ones, their National Armed Forces were much smaller than the Home Army. While they could be influencial within postwar Poland, they wouldn't be the dominant force.I suspect the museums of Western Europe are a fair bit fuller here, depending on whether or not the Germans decide to destroy art or if it is kept in areas that end up bombed. I bring that last part up mostly because I remembered that in a book it said the zsoviets declared the gold and diamonds found in concentration camps they liberated (or walked into after the German guards who preferred killing babies and the elderly over fighting on the Eastern Front scarped) as war booty. I feel it will just go into a pension fund or something if the Allies take it (though I imagine corrupt officials or some Polish nationalists claiming a large cut of it) as blood money
They managed to reach the 1938 soviet border. This is not going to happen without a complete german collapse.So are you trying to argue that a largely weakened Soviet Union and the WAllies having to play a much larger role in the defeat of Nazi Germany will somehow not lead to more WAllies casualties?
Sure, but it also means a near total Soviet collapse since they can't push forward from there - Now maybe you can handwave this a bit by the Germans simply choosing to 'let' the Wallies go forth and hold the east, but it is still going to be much much more difficult than in OTL - Where 90% of German combat power was expended.They managed to reach the 1938 soviet border. This is not going to happen without a complete german collapse.
There is a weird belief in certain American political segment about FDR being too Soviet-friendly during the war for no good reason. Which is objectively false thing and basically amounts to projecting partisan US politics into the past to score points against the opponents.I'm a bit confused what you mean with both statements.
One thing the Jews did not agree in was Poles attacking them if they tried to returning to their old homes and farms that said Polish people took for themselves. As well as the Austrians refusing to giv back art and other things stolen by Jews, either to the owner or the heirs. Anyways, I suppose that in this case all the people in the camps get to go through the warehouses to find glasses that fit them, as well as spare clothing, and the any lockers of jewelry with inscriptions get set aside until they see if the owner of an heir is alive. It should be interesting to see what the Polish border with Germany ends up being and how the Polish government distributes the property of the evicted Germans. The Poles did give the Ukrainians deported from the border with the USSR to Silesia and Pomerania where they got nice houses, versus the Soviets dumping the Ukrainians (they had some independence thing going) on their side of the border into Kazakhstan without any houses. I wonder how much pressure it will take to get the Soviets to return the Poles, Jews, Balts, and Westerners they kept in gulags and camps by the hundreds of thousands.When someone dies without having an heir, it goes to the country and there's nothing weird about that. That's also how in OTL the Polish People's Republic and the western Jews agreed on that (something the Jews try now to deny). As for the polish nationalists, the actual ones, their National Armed Forces were much smaller than the Home Army. While they could be influencial within postwar Poland, they wouldn't be the dominant force.
I’ve certainly heard Wallace smeared constantly for it even though it’s mostly just a myth propagated by his opponents, but seeing it ascribed to FDR too is interesting and sort of new to me at least. But yeah, it does seem to be pretty much just projecting the end result onto decisions taken in 1943/1944, and buying into a new form of the International Communist Conspiracy shtick.There is a weird belief in certain American political segment about FDR being too Soviet-friendly during the war for no good reason. Which is objectively false thing and basically amounts to projecting partisan US politics into the past to score points against the opponents.
There is a weird belief in certain American political segment about FDR being too Soviet-friendly during the war for no good reason. Which is objectively false thing and basically amounts to projecting partisan US politics into the past to score points against the opponents.
Poland is getting some territory from Germany, although nowhere near Oder-Neisse, since Oder-Neisse was a combined result of Poland being shorn of land in the east and Stalin wanting to ensure he had as much of a buffer from the West as possible given that the future existence of East Germany wasn't really certain at that point. They're definitely getting Danzig, Upper Silesia, southern East Prussia, and likely further land in Silesia and Pomerania though exactly how much is uncertain. Everywhere else (the Balkans, Czechoslovakia, etc.) is likely going to revert to 1938 borders, and Italy will likely make the same territorial concessions to Yugoslavia as otl.