The Washington Treaty - fails a possible story i'm working on.

[sharlin]

Across the Globe the newspapers told the same story. The planned naval treaty in Washington had been relatively minor news until the Empire of Japan, followed by France and Italy (both Germany and now Soviet Russia were not invited) withdrew from the conference.
The Japanese representatives had read out that they were withdrawing due to "...attempts to weaken the defence of the Empire and attempts by other nations to impose control on a country and territories that are not theirs."

The French and Italians also resented American and English attempts to limit their navies and make them 'third rate' powers. All three resented the UK/US monopoly on sea power and attempts to impose restrictions. With three of the five planned signatures missing the Washington Naval Treaty collapsed, the only thing that was agreed was a limit on cruiser sizes with them being no larger than 12000 tons as that was seen as 'ideal' by all parties involved.



Any ideas or thoughts?

 

[abc123]

The thing that I would like to see is TL where Japan is happy because of Agreement, because they are aware that they can't outbuild US or UK.
But that probably goes into ASB waters..

 

[sharlin]

The Washington treaty was seen as a national insult by Japan an attempt to limit them by the US/UK it went down like a lead balloon.

 

[David S Poepoe]

The Japanese delegation was divided in two: one side wanted to work with the Western Powers and the other didn't want to. Those that were pro-West won temporarily.

A major point missed is that as part of the Treaty the US and Britain were prohibited in building new or reinforcing existing naval bases in the Far East. Japan is more screwed if they walk out.

The French didn't really like it but they recognized that they couldn't do anything about it. They were still recovering economically from the Great War and didn't have the industrial capability to even build up to second rate navy.

The Italians liked the Treaty since they couldn't afford to build up to achieve parity with the French.

No nation will want to be accused of deliberately walking out and scuttling an arms limitation conference, especially when such a conference is widely supported.

 

[NHBL]

finger pointing

As David said, no one wants to be blamed for the collapse--that doesn't begin to prevent it, all it does is create anotehr round of finger pointing--and quite possibly, depending on how acrimonious it gets, prevent any chance of trying another treaty between the Great Powers.

 

[anon_user]

I wonder what would happen if the Black Chamber's operations (America's codebreaking team successfully reading the secret cables of the delegates) were revealed, somehow? Diplomatic embarrassment, to be sure; would it be enough to end the Conference?

 

[Cook]

I wonder what would happen if the Black Chamber's operations (America's codebreaking team successfully reading the secret cables of the delegates) were revealed, somehow? Diplomatic embarrassment, to be sure; would it be enough to end the Conference?

Definately.

 

[Flubber]

I wonder what would happen if the Black Chamber's operations (America's codebreaking team successfully reading the secret cables of the delegates) were revealed, somehow? Diplomatic embarrassment, to be sure; would it be enough to end the Conference?

I believe such a revelation would end the conference as both the US and UK were reading Japan's mail and sharing the results with each other. However, weren't the results of the conference somewhat economically and/or politically preordained?

None of the powers involved could afford their planned postwar building programs financially or politically. The UK, France, and Italy were all heavily in debt thanks to their war efforts, Japan's post-war 8+8 plan was an economic fantasy considering the size of their nation, and, while the money would have been available and as unlikely as it seems to us in 2011, the post-war US Congress was growing more and more unlikely to agree to spend that money.

Socially too all of the powers, with perhaps the exception of Japan, were faced with growing public perceptions, right or wrong, that the war had solely been a result of pre-war arms spending and arms races.

For nearly all the powers involved, there simply wasn't the money for another naval arms race and, again for nearly all the powers involved, supporting such a race would have been electoral suicide.

A diplomatic incident may scupper *the* Washington Naval treaty, but economic and political realities mean that something like *a* Washington Naval treaty or a series of treaties is still going to be negotiated.

So, no South Dakotas, G3s, or 8+8s will be prowling the interwar oceans absent of some very fundamental changes.

 

[Hyperbolus]

There was a splinter group wedged between the pro and anti treaty factions of the Japanese navy that was willing to accept a 70%, but not a 60% ratio.
If the Kanto quake still occurs in 1923, the attendant human, financial and industrial damage might compel Japan to accept a similar treaty.
Even if talks publicly fail, I think the US and UK might reach some sort of "gentlemen's agreement" on capital ship numbers.
OTL the preliminaries of a 1927 conference at Geneva to limit cruisers failed, but the parties agreed to make a fresh effort relatively soon, which led to the 1930 London treaty.
In as many words, I doubt failure of the 1921 talks would put paid to the interwar naval conferences. The economic, political and possibly technological (Jutland was indecisive, and planes could theoretically sink battleships) momentum was present throughout the 1920's.

 

[anon_user]

All very, very true. I think the more interesting implications are these, in no particular order:
1) No naval arms transfer restrictions - possible second naval arms race among the ABC powers?
2) No restrictions on building up bases in the Pacific.
3) Diplomatic embarrassment for the US
4) Possibly significant damage to the reputation of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes
5) No 'Treaty cruisers' - cruisers probably evolve somewhat differently, perhaps with heavy cruisers becoming more like 'pocket battleship'-style large cruisers.
6) Another scandal to add to the pile of fail that was the Harding administration

 

[Flubber]

All very, very true. I think the more interesting implications are these, in no particular order:
1) No naval arms transfer restrictions - possible second naval arms race among the ABC powers?

Perhaps. Those nations have relatively little money for such a race. The pre-war dreadnoughts the various ABC powers purchased were discounted either as hand-me-downs or loss leaders built to test certain designs and construction techniques.

2) No restrictions on building up bases in the Pacific.

Maybe. Such concession was an important bargaining chip in the OTL and ITTL would be equally important in "luring" an indignant Japan back to any future conference(s).

3) Diplomatic embarrassment for the US
4) Possibly significant damage to the reputation of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.

Definitely. Especially considering the many revelations of "secret diplomacy" among the European powers which led directly to the war and the general public revulsion towards that diplomacy. Hughes might even be inclined to disband the US Black Chamber much as Stimson would do in 1929.

5) No 'Treaty cruisers' - cruisers probably evolve somewhat differently, perhaps with heavy cruisers becoming more like 'pocket battleship'-style large cruisers.

The various reasons behind the "treaty cruiser" agreements still exist, so some sort of cruiser treaty is going to occur. The details will vary while the broad brushstrokes will not.

6) Another scandal to add to the pile of fail that was the Harding administration

An excellent point. Perhaps enough to assist a Democratic presidential candidate in 1924?