The Soviet Invasion of Europe, 1945...

MacCaulay

Banned
...I was wondering what the basic feeling is on this site regarding that. Suppose the Soviets decide somewhere around November-1944 that they're going for it.

What's your take on their chances? (I'm going to keep my opinions to myself for now)
 
First, welcome back.

Second, I believe we already discussed this in a previous thread a few months ago, although the search function is defeating my efforts to find it.

The consensus there was that it's too soon; the Western Allies are still nearly full strength and the Soviets are near the end of their manpower reserves. They need time to recover from the horrific struggle they've just undergone.

Now if they wait till 1946, after the Allies have sent most of their troops home and the Red Army has had a chance to reorganize ...
 
...I was wondering what the basic feeling is on this site regarding that. Suppose the Soviets decide somewhere around November-1944 that they're going for it.

What's your take on their chances? (I'm going to keep my opinions to myself for now)

i always thinked that after the taking of Berlin the Red Army was not in a very good shape logistically speaking, basically at the end of the rope and go further will be difficult.
This not counting in the fact that Uncle Joe was a bastard, but a very cautious bastard if he was not certain at 100% to not begin or at least win a war with the rest of the allies after this blatant grab of land he will not even try and after the A-bomb he will be to preoccupied to try this.
But going for the OP, their change will be not very good, logistic problem, cut of external aid, facing a serious strategic bombing campaign, allied air superiority and monopoly of the atom will be cause the soviet to retreat...but only after inflicting crippling loss to the allies and further devastate Europe, btw France and Italy can face a low/medium level civil war due to communist partisan
 
Mac naming conventions at work, I see...

What's Stalin's goals? Take as much as possible? Take territory, force greater concessions over the occupation of Europe (perhaps control over all of Germany)? Something else?

If Stalin's made his choice in November of 1944, then he can also try to manipulate negotiations at Yalta (and Potsdam, if it happens). Perhaps request larger amounts of rolling stock to support the transfer of forces to the front with Japan, offering (perhaps) an earlier declaration of war on the Japanese?

On the plus side for the Soviets, they outnumber the Western Allies. On the minus side for both sides, morale would be low - regardless of what incidents are contrived to start the war, nobody would be happy about having to keep going, having to fight on. Not to mention the frustration with being betrayed by the Reds/Capitalists. On the minus side for the Soviets, they lose out on lend-lease supplies and are outmatched in the skies and seas (though the latter isn't too relevant)... and there's the issue of the atomic bomb.
 
...I was wondering what the basic feeling is on this site regarding that. Suppose the Soviets decide somewhere around November-1944 that they're going for it.

What's your take on their chances? (I'm going to keep my opinions to myself for now)

The Soviet war economy would have collapsed within months. It was basically being kept going only through lend lease. Once that runs out all they have to support their armed forces are whatever left over plus the devastated western portions of the nation, which include the majority of its resources and agriculture. The end of lend lease would also force the Soviet Union to demobilize the vast majority of its army and tone down its war industry; only lend lease of food and raw materials allowed the Soviet Union to field such a large army and produce so many weapons while most of the country was occupied, as it didn't have to deal with many sectors of the economy and could focus completely on war making. By the end of the war the Soviet manpower pool was completely empty; the vast majority of rifle divisions were well below full strength. Some of the divisions were little more than reinforced brigades. According to David M. Glantz, the Allies deployed some 4 million men for their final offensive into Germany, with 6 millions Soviets in the east. At this time the US manpower pool has barely been scrapped and the wartime economy is at the height of its prowess. Finally, the majority of the Red Army, from the common soldiers to the high command, would never accept a war with the west. The soldiers simply wanted the war over once Germany was defeated, and to return home; starting a new one would not be an option for them. Many would simply desert and head home, and likely would never be caught due to the anarchy in the western Soviet Union. All soldiers in the Red Army also had a very high level of respect for the Allies and regarded them as comrades in arms and brothers.

Finally, Stalin himself would never approve of such an insane plan. He more than anyone was aware of the problems his nation faced, and how much it relied on the Allies.
 
First, welcome back.

Second, I believe we already discussed this in a previous thread a few months ago, although the search function is defeating my efforts to find it.

The consensus there was that it's too soon; the Western Allies are still nearly full strength and the Soviets are near the end of their manpower reserves. They need time to recover from the horrific struggle they've just undergone.

Now if they wait till 1946, after the Allies have sent most of their troops home and the Red Army has had a chance to reorganize ...

Of course many seem to forget that Soviet combat troops currently mobilized in 1945 outnumber Allied forces in Europe by quite a bit. Added to the fact the USA would take a long time to expand it's forces further and was indeed having trouble training infantry replacements. These institutional problems hampered the war-effort against the Axis and couldnt be solved quickly.

As for the canard that the USA hadnt mobilized a high persenage of it's manpower that is untrue. The USA had up to ten million men under arms by 1945.

Of course neither-side would have the willpower to fight WW3, a settlement of some sort would be thrashed-out quite quickly...
 
The likelihood of Stalin doing this while still at peace with Japan and while Germany and the minor Axis still have several million men under arms ready to join with the Western Allies strikes me as...low.
 
And the Mac came back!

Welcome back Mac.

As to the premise....well since Stalin probably knew as much about the atomic bomb project as Roosevelt and definitely more than Truman knew when he first succeeded to the presidency I don't see how Stalin would be crazy enough to go for it unless he knew the Bomb wouldn't work.
 
Of course many seem to forget that Soviet combat troops currently mobilized in 1945 outnumber Allied forces in Europe by quite a bit. Added to the fact the USA would take a long time to expand it's forces further and was indeed having trouble training infantry replacements. These institutional problems hampered the war-effort against the Axis and couldnt be solved quickly.

Untrue. According to David M Glantz, regarded as the premier American military historian on the Red Army, the Allies in total deployed 4 million men in Europe in 1945, with more incoming, against 6 million Soviets with no reinforcements.
 
Unlike most people on this board, I don't believe the Soviets are realy that doomed in this situation. They do have some strong points - most importantly their armed forces in 1945 are superior to those of the allies in both quality and quantity. However, I too believe that they are at a disadvantage. Starting the preparations in late 1944 may or may not help them overcome this disadvantage. In any case there are some aspects they need to be mindfull of:

1. manpower: as pointed out allready, historically the soviets were scraping the bottom of the barell in terms of reinforcements, while the western allies (especially the USA) still had a huge manpower pool. If ww3 lasts for more than a few months it's the soviets who are going to find themselves with a steadily shrinking army faced with endless wawes of enemies. A POD in 1944 may not do much good but they still need to try and keep casualities at a minimum in the last months of the war, particularly by slowing down their offensives. After all, they have allready decided to start ww3 so there is no pressure to gain as much land as possible before ww2 ends.
The secondary advantage of this change would be that the western allies will be forced to expend more men and material to defeat Germany.

2. economy: they need to reorganize the economy, especially by strengthening tose areas where they are most dependant of lend lease. Since I'm not very knowledgeable about the relative impact (not the absolute numbers) of lend lease on the soviet war-making capability, I don't know how easy this will be. In any case, it is likely to result in an even greater slowing down of soviet offensives.

3. air power: the Soviets were inferior to the westerners in exactly 2 areas: navy and strategic airforces (including high altitude fighters). If the former will probably not be a major problem, the latter will definitely be one. Allied strategic bombers will be able to do great damage even with conventional payloads, and once the atomic bomb comes online they become even more dangerous. Therefore, going to war without a sure way of stopping the bombers would be madness on the part of the soviets. While the soviet airforce of 1945 was very powerfull at low lever its ability to perform interceptions at high altitude was very limited. What the soviets need to do is to start developing a powerfull hig level interceptor. They did have such a plane in 1941 (the MiG 1) but the type was abandoned as it was of limited use on the eastern front. It should be resurected and maybe upgraded with western tech while this is still available.
Even worse for the soviets is that the jet age is coming and they have missed the train. They should start a crash program of jet fighter development and try to beg or steal as much tech from the west as possible before they go to war.

4. Allies: The soviets are again at a disadvantage because most of the minor allies are more simpathetic towards the Anglo-Americans, and most of the former axis countries feel the same. In eastern europe in particular, the soviets were hated in many areas so at least initially they will be fighting on hostile ground. They need to strengthen the puppet governments as much as possible, at least in those areas where there is some hope of success. (I rate Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia as the countries most sympathetic towards the soviets, while Romania and Hungary are the most hostile, being essentially lost causes).
Allso, a formal alliance with Japan is a must, and even in 1945 it can bring great benefits to both sides.


And finally, the USSR needs a good casus beli and needs to make it look like the other side started the war, or else morale will collapse imediately.
 
It does depend when in 1945 this occurs, as this has an affect upon demobilization and movement of (primarily US) assets out of theatre.

In my view, it would not be a cakewalk for either side, but the weight of strategic and tactical airpower, logistics and manpower do come down on the side of the 'Allies'.

The Soviets would be facing manpower issues, as previously outlined, and would also face issues regarding medium and long term supplies and stressed supply lines.

A full strength commitment by the US, Britain, Canada, France, supported by Polish and other Allied forces as well as whatever rearmed German units could be put together, stands a decent chance of holding the Rhine-Alps-Piave line provided that they have air superiority and some sense of strategic warning. This buys time for strategic bombing by the USAAF and RAF and eventual deployment of USN carrier fleets to Europe; the former have the ability to hammer railheads and supply lines to the substantial detriment of the Red Army's future offensive capacity.

The atom bomb is not a war winner in and of itself, but is a game changer if delivered successfully and used in a concentrated fashion.

The Communist offensive needs to break through and break through quickly. If they are held up, the correlation of forces shifts decisively to the Allied side.
 
It does depend when in 1945 this occurs, as this has an affect upon demobilization and movement of (primarily US) assets out of theatre.

In my view, it would not be a cakewalk for either side, but the weight of strategic and tactical airpower, logistics and manpower do come down on the side of the 'Allies'.

The Soviets would be facing manpower issues, as previously outlined, and would also face issues regarding medium and long term supplies and stressed supply lines.

A full strength commitment by the US, Britain, Canada, France, supported by Polish and other Allied forces as well as whatever rearmed German units could be put together, stands a decent chance of holding the Rhine-Alps-Piave line provided that they have air superiority and some sense of strategic warning. This buys time for strategic bombing by the USAAF and RAF and eventual deployment of USN carrier fleets to Europe; the former have the ability to hammer railheads and supply lines to the substantial detriment of the Red Army's future offensive capacity.

The atom bomb is not a war winner in and of itself, but is a game changer if delivered successfully and used in a concentrated fashion.

The Communist offensive needs to break through and break through quickly. If they are held up, the correlation of forces shifts decisively to the Allied side.
No, at worst if the Soviets break through then the USSR becomes a parking lot by 1948
 
Precisely. Continued production of atomic weapons as well as the construction of new production lines would allow for a decent sized attack in 1947 at the latest, in combination with conventional bombing and the possibility of biological weapons.
 
Of course many seem to forget that Soviet combat troops currently mobilized in 1945 outnumber Allied forces in Europe by quite a bit. Added to the fact the USA would take a long time to expand it's forces further and was indeed having trouble training infantry replacements. These institutional problems hampered the war-effort against the Axis and couldnt be solved quickly.

Numbers aren't exactly necessary, I would rate the average Soviet as at least equal or not better than his or her western counterpart. Their logistics will be a nightmare however, probably killing any real chance of victory. They'll reach the Rhine then be knocked back by fresher Allied troops with air superiority.
 
No way. Too many dead, Stalin's USSR was substantially on its knees and incapable of planning any further long campaign with doubtful prospects of victory. Manchuria was willingly postponed when Japan's defeat was imminent, and came out as quite "easy" - at least in comparison with the conquets of central Europe against the Nazi diehards and the desperate not-so-Nazis trying to defend their homes from the red horde while avoiding hanging at the hands of the SS.
 
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