The End!
Chapter XII: Emergence of the New Cold War, 2012-2017.
The Iraqis tried to forge the Sunni Arab groups together into a united front with coherent leadership, despite the sometimes divergent interests of these groups. At this point it still included Kurds, Druzes and other groups. In April 2012, they officially proclaimed a rivalling interim government in Aleppo known as the Democratic Republic of Syria. Assad subsequently bombed Aleppo with mustard gas, killing thousands. Saddam, now 75, was no bleeding heart kind of guy, but when the Aleppo government requested his aid against this onslaught, he gave it to them. On May 2nd 2012 about 150.000 Iraqi troops, spearheaded by four elite Iraqi Republican Guard divisions and Iraqi Army Special Forces units equivalent to a full division, with air support from MiG-29s, Su-24s and Su-27s as well as Mil Mi 24 helicopter gunships, crossed the border at the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal. These forces performed well and put their superior equipment to good use (Moscow had prioritized Iraq over Syria since the 1990s, providing the former with the best equipment).
Iraq effectively invaded Syria, which totally altered the dynamic of its civil war: it changed from regime vs. rebel groups dominated by Sunni Arabs to regime vs. Kurds and non-Sunni rebel groups vs. the Sunni Arab government propped up by Iraq. The latter was effectively a puppet state of Baghdad. Iraqi forces advanced along the highway towards Aleppo and blunted furious attempts by the government army to take the city. Syrian government army pincers were in fact flanked and were under threat of being cut off until President Assad ordered a retreat. Concomitant Kurdish attacks on Aleppo and Raqqa were dispersed by mere spoiling attacks by a few Republican Guard armoured brigades. With Iraqi support, the Sunni government in its provisional capital managed to take control of about two thirds of the country. The government still controlled the governorates of Latakia, Tartus, Damascus, Rif Dimashq, Quneitra, Daraa and Al-Suwayda in the west and southwest of the country.
Most of the world condemned Iraq’s invasion, but there was one exception. Turkey quietly hoped that the Sunni Arab faction in the civil war supported by Saddam would win since they feared the establishment of an independent Kurdish state carved from parts of Syria. Such a state would lay claim on ethnically Kurdish regions in Turkey, would be a safe haven for the separatist PKK and thusly fuel the Kurdish rebellion at home. The Turkish air force even bombed Kurdish positions across the border in northern Syria, effectively aiding Iraqi forces who were also struggling against the Kurds. Israel, on the other hand, ironically supported Assad’s regime, despite it being hostile to them, since they definitely didn’t want Saddam Hussein’s army directly on their border in the Golan Heights. They provided intelligence, weapons and ammunitions to the government army. Iran, a longstanding ally of Syria, provided logistical, technical and financial support as well as training and combat troops. Lebanese Hezbollah fighters backed by Iran entered frontline roles, supported by elite Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops and paramilitary Basij fighters. The Arab states looked away or quietly supported Assad for fear of what Saddam might do if he annexed Syria. The fear of that happening was strengthened when Iraq’s puppet regime subordinated its forces to Iraqi command. As much as pan-Arabism had been talked about in the past decades, nobody was up for it now, and certainly not if Saddam was to lead a future pan-Arab state. Moscow regarded both Syria and Iraq as important allies and was therefore caught in a bind. Assad lambasted the Russians for lacking support while the latter tried to restrain the Iraqis and prevent a wholesale annexation. At this point Saddam certainly began entertaining demented fantasies of becoming the leader of all Arabs.
Those fantasies, however, couldn’t become true because in January 2013 Saddam Hussein was diagnosed with lung cancer in an advanced stage. He bought himself access to exclusive private clinics in Switzerland for the newest treatments, in addition to regular radiation and chemotherapy. He quit smoking and drinking. Six months later he was informed by his Swiss doctors that the cancer had metastasized to his bones. His condition was terminal and that all they could do was to delay the inevitable. He was put on a regimen of two weeks on chemo and three weeks off and was given morphine for the pain. By late 2013, he had been eaten alive by the cancer and he finally died in January 2014, aged 76, after which a succession struggle erupted between his sons Uday and Qusay Hussein. Qusay was the supervisor of the Republican Guard and head of the Special Security Organization (SSO), which was part secret police, part security detail for Saddam and part umbrella group for his elite military forces. He had been thrust into these important positions because he didn’t display the erratic violence of his brother and because Uday was left with a permanent limp after an assassination attempt in 1996. Uday had been given the minor positions of chairman of the Iraqi Olympic Committee and of the Iraqi Football Association. Allegations levelled against him included multiple counts of rape, murder and torture, including of Iraqi Olympic athletes and the national football team after failing to perform. Despite his weak position, Uday nonetheless tried to stage a coup d’état against his brother, who had just succeeded their father as President, by bribing a bunch of Iraqi colonels. Uday had amassed a massive personal fortune with which to do so, often by stealing from victims of his father’s regime.
The coup d’état seized control of key buildings in Baghdad and controlled most of the city for several days and Uday declared martial law. Ultimately, however, the Republican Guard retook control of the city and the coup failed, forcing Uday to flee the country, taking with him everything he could carry, to evade arrest and certain torture and execution by his brother (he settled in Tunisia, where he was arrested for rape in 2015 and sentenced to eight years in prison, a sentence that the judge maintained after his appeal in 2016). His co-conspirators were less fortunate: after being subjected to all kinds of torture they were strung up with piano wires, an extremely painful way to die. The short power struggle relaxed the regime’s totalitarian control mechanisms long enough to open up a window for opponents of the regime to vent their dissatisfaction. As Qusay’s Republican Guard and SSO ran roughshod through the city to eliminate remaining supporters of Uday’s plot, they paid less attention to other opposition. Using the mass medium of internet, which wasn’t monitored as much as usually at this time, ordinary Iraqis voiced their criticisms of the government’s violence and demanded that it should stop. More specifically, they protested against authoritarianism, human rights violations, inflation, kleptocracy, Sunni domination of the government and the ongoing involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Large protests took place in the Shia south, particularly in Basra.
Despite Qusay’s violent repression, that cost the lives of thousands, protests continued and turned into an armed insurgency against him. Iran actively supported the Shia insurgency that picked up over the course of 2014 and seriously destabilized Ba’athist Iraq, particularly when the Kurds rose up too. He pulled all Iraqi forces out of Syria, although that came too late to save Assad’s regime, which just wasn’t viable anymore after the beating it got from Iraq. That was one post-mortem fait accompli that Saddam could present to the world, giving the world the finger one last time. After pulling the troops back, he regained some control but he couldn’t end the civil war which Iran was fuelling, not even after he repeated his father’s example of using chemical weapons against his own people (Saddam had bombed the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988, using mustard gas and sarin). Qusay continued to use chemical weapons liberally and received international condemnation for it, which didn’t stop the largest sectarian conflict ever seen. Qusay controlled most major cities and the Sunni parts of the country, while the rest was controlled by Shia Arab and Kurdish rebels. As of early 2017 an estimated 400.000 people have died in this conflict.
The West and a resurgent, albeit somewhat democratized, USSR backed by China each had their own agendas in the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, which together formed a war zone stretching from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. China had invested in Iraq in recent years and wanted to see its investments secure by whatever regime came out on top and leaned towards the Ba’ath regime. They feared that a regime sponsored by Iran, never mind that it’d flip a longstanding Sino-Soviet proxy in the Middle East, would prioritize Teheran’s economic interests over Beijing’s. The Chinese government sold weapons and provided funds and military advisors and trainers to Qusay’s regime. Moscow more or less went along with it although the democratically elected Nemtsov (the USSR’s first parliamentary elections took place in 2010) felt uncomfortable by continuing support to what was in fact a brutal dictatorship, even with Soviet interests at stake. Western leaders, headed by President John McCain, were unanimous in their opinion that the Ba’ath regime had reached the end of its lifespan and had to make room for a democratically elected government. They were, also, however, unanimous that undue influence on Iraq by Teheran should be avoided. Due to these conflicting interests, the Iraqi Civil War is still ongoing as of 2017.
The dynamic between China and the USSR in this conflict showed how dramatically the balance of power had shifted in the 2000s. After the Sino-Soviet reconciliation in the late 1980s, Moscow and Beijing had pretty much been equals in a true partnership. The shift to Chinese dominance began as the Soviet Union became mired in the Eastern Bloc Civil Wars, starting in the late 90s. The shift became definitive when the Soviet Union’s communist regime imploded between 2005 and 2007 and underwent a civil war that lasted until 2009, turning Moscow into the junior partner in the relationship. An increasingly assertive, aggressive even, Chinese foreign policy partially replaced the Soviets’ confrontational foreign policy that had lasted until the end of the Cold War (it doesn’t have an official end date, but the 1999-2005 timeframe is regarded as the end, with debates about the actual date still continuing among historians). The main difference is that the Soviets supported anti-Western revolutionary movements worldwide – of which Ethiopia, Angola and Cuba are remaining examples – while China is primarily concerned with its regional pre-eminence in East and Southeast Asia. With greater Russian need, relations between Moscow and Beijing became more tightly knit than ever.
General Secretary Xi Jinping got more backing from Russia when Nemtsov lost support in the Duma since he couldn't deal with the post-war crime wave, corruption, economic problems and Russia’s diminished position in world politics. In 2014 he lost the State Duma elections to newcomer Alexander Lukashenko. After a military career between 1975 and 1982, Lukashenko became deputy chairman of a collective farm in 1982 and director of a state farm and construction materials plant in the Shklov district in 1985. The hard-line political climate in the Soviet Union in the late 80s/early 90s proved good for his budding political career, the seeds of which had been planted when he joined the party in 1979. He seemed to have the “correct” political opinions and in 1988 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Byelorussia (a branch within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In 1990, he was made a member of Byelorussia’s politburo at the age of 36, making him the youngest politburo member of the Byelorussian SSR. He assumed a tough anti-crime, anti-corruption stance from the get-go and was considered a dynamic figure in Minsk, the “great white hope” of the Byelorussian party’s hardliners. In 1993, he was appointed head of an anti-corruption sub-committee of Minsk’s politburo, which allowed him to collect dirt on senior party and government officials in Belarus. He combined his popularity, stemming from his youthfulness, with blackmail to become General Secretary and, therefore, de facto leader of the Byelorussian SSR in 1995.
He became close to Putin and was made a politburo member in 2002, but just as easily defected to the Russian nationalists when Putin was assassinated and Soviet communism fell. In the 2014 elections, Lukashenko won the elections by a campaign based on aggressive nationalism, Soviet nostalgia, his reputation as a crime fighter and the promise to make Russia great again. He became the authoritarian strongman many wanted and he maintained their support by indeed weakening corruption and organized crime while the economy took off (in part due to rising oil prices from the Middle Eastern conflict). Moscow took a more aggressive foreign policy stance after his election, for example by bullying the Baltic States into breaking off negotiations to enter the EU (producing major protests in Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius). Russia also sought to maintain some influence over the former Warsaw Pact states, and was particularly successful in the cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia. With its influence over the former two as well as friendly relations with Yugoslavia, Lukashenko has secured traditional Russian interests in the Balkans. He was less successful in Poland and Hungary, which both joined the EU despite Soviet disapproval, but refrained from joining NATO after they’d been spooked by Soviet Army and Soviet Navy exercises. A further example was Lukashenko stepping up support for Qusay Hussein in the ongoing Iraqi Civil War.
Increased tensions in Eastern Europe due to a resurgent Soviet Russia are part of a consolidation of a new bipolar dynamic after a brief power vacuum after the collapse of communism. The Cold War bipolar structure of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact was replaced by NATO vs. the Sino-Soviet bloc. This bloc has associates such as Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Cuba, Venezuela and several African states formerly aligned with the Soviet Union. Whether or not Soviet foreign policy was deliberately coordinated with Chinese moves, this distraction of Western attention was certainly convenient. In 2015, the People’s Republic of China settled the Senkaku Islands Dispute (Diaoyu Islands in China). China claimed the discovery and ownership of the islands from the 14th century, while Japan had ownership of the islands from 1895 until its surrender at the end of World War II. The United States administered the islands as part of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands from 1945 until 1972, when the islands returned to Japanese control under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement between the United States and Japan. In 2014, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAAN) commissioned its first nuclear-powered super aircraft carrier named Han, the first of the eponymous Han-class, heavily drawing from the design of the Soviet Ulyanovsk-class. In her first operation, her carrier group delivered two battalions, which occupied the islands in the name of China and began construction of barracks, a radar station, anti-aircraft defences, an airstrip and a jetty that could handle small ships. Tokyo protested vociferously against what it called an annexation and Sino-Japanese relations reached their deepest low in decades, and still haven’t recovered. These tensions were emphasized by joint naval exercises between the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the PLAN in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, scaring Japan, Taiwan and Korea.
In terms of shifting foreign policy interests, China dialled down its relationship with Pakistan since that country remained unfriendly toward Afghanistan, still supporting the Taliban even though it had practically been made irrelevant. China had cultivated friendly relations with Kabul and had helped build its military because of Chinese interests in Afghan mineral riches such as lithium, crude oil, natural gas, coal, gold, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc and precious and semi-precious stones among others. After Pakistan’s Islamist oriented government couldn’t be reconciled with Kabul’s communist regime, Beijing cut Islamabad loose (and left them to the mercies of the CIA, which had labelled Pakistan a “terrorism sponsoring state”). Relations between China and India improved as a result and Xi Jinping became the first Chinese leader to visit New Delhi, negotiating economic, strategic and military cooperation. In 2012, the Beijing Agreement signed in 1989, which had led a lingering existence since the early 2000s, was transformed into the Beijing Cooperation Association: a political, economic and military organization composed of the USSR, China, Romania, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba and Venezuela. India, Burma and Laos became observers of the organization in the few years that followed. Today, the organization has become the new rival of the West.