Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Looking at the British tanks, I think the closest real world equivalent to the Victor or the Valiant II would probably be the Excelsior, that was a heavily armoured and pretty well armed design. Obviously there's differences but the roles similar. The Victor of course will have the bigger gun.
I would have said it's the rough equivalent of the Comet but it probably falls somewhere between the two in capability.
 
Even so they only carried a fraction of the cargo of even a small freighter. Although the greater chance of not being sunk makes up for that. 😋
The most successful blockade runners to Bataan-Corregidor were indeed small interisland vessels. Some details are here - https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/5-2/5-2_22.htm
My great-grandfather owned one of these, the MV Fortuna. Skippered by the intrepid Captain Razon, she, carrying rice, made the Corregidor run three times, past minefields and Japanese patrols. She was destroyed at Puerto Princesa in a Japanese air raid.
 
ACM Brooke-Popham noted that the reinforcements that had arrived in Malaya and Burma were most welcome, but there were still areas under his command that were in dire need of even the minimum of protection. He really wanted to strengthen the Sarawak and Borneo force. Looking at the forces available, he requested that Percival and Heath would agree to send two more battalions to make the force on Borneo a Brigade. There were two Punjab Battalions (3rd Bn, 16th Punjab Regiment and 5th Bn, 14th Punjab Regiment) in Heath’s organisation that could possibly be spared. These had originally been assigned to Krohcol before 10th Indian Infantry Brigade had arrived. Lt Col Henry Moorehead (OC 3/16 Punjab) would be a suitable acting Brigadier to take over the Sarawak force.

Air Vice Marshall Conway Pulford (AOC RAF Far East) was the last to speak and perhaps gave the most negative assessment of the situation. Despite all the efforts of ACM Brooke-Popham to persuade London to strengthen the RAF in the Far East, there was very little to show for it. Promises of reinforcements were still to be seen. 96 crated Tomahawk IIbs were due to arrive in the same convoy that was bringing 18th Infantry Division. It would be well into January before those had arrived, were assembled, tested and the pilots familiarised with them. The request from Admiral Philips for more reconnaissance and fighter cover was something that Pulford wanted to offer, but his resources were so stretched that he couldn’t promise everything that Philips wanted. He was aware that the Royal Navy and RAF had worked out a very efficient and effective support structure in the Mediterranean, but in Malaya that wasn't so much the case.

This gives me the impression that the British will be able to repulse the forces landed on Malaya in reasonable time and continue to contest the seas, but since the Japanese will hold air superiority and will be mostly successful in Borneo (necessitating more commonwealth forces there if Java is to be safe), the British will be unable to actually go on the attack for at least the first year or so.
 
This gives me the impression that the British will be able to repulse the forces landed on Malaya in reasonable time and continue to contest the seas, but since the Japanese will hold air superiority and will be mostly successful in Borneo (necessitating more commonwealth forces there if Java is to be safe), the British will be unable to actually go on the attack for at least the first year or so.
If the Japanese haven't taken the Malay Barrier and Burma after a year they'll be in dire straights.
 
In the event of Imperial Japan expanding their wars, MacArthur in Singapore would presumably be there to handle media interviews and pretend that he's in charge 'oversee operations'.
The question, from a British perspective, is what would be the 'Quid Pro Quo' for MacArthur as a high visibility representative of the USA being in Singapore apparently 'leading the fight' against Imperial Japan?
 
In the event of Imperial Japan expanding their wars, MacArthur in Singapore would presumably be there to handle media interviews and pretend that he's in charge 'oversee operations'.
The question, from a British perspective, is what would be the 'Quid Pro Quo' for MacArthur as a high visibility representative of the USA being in Singapore apparently 'leading the fight' against Imperial Japan?
I guess him being highly visible makes it easier for an IJA sniper to take a bit off the top.
 
Wouldn't it be a more effective use of said submarines to sink Japanese surface logistics ?

24 tonnes in or a few hundered minimum deprived from Japanese effort.... seems to be a logical way to go.
I was thinking more of American submarines, since Macarthur is their man, and their torpedoes don't seem to be particularly stellar. Otherwise, you do have a point.

Also wounded and high value individuals can still be evacuated at the end of the war cruise .
True.

If British submarines are used to supply the Philippines it will be a political decision to keep the Americans happy. It is a waste of resources that would be better used attacking Japanese logistics.
Also true.

24 tonnes is not a lot.

24 tons = 48,000 pounds
Let's assume that anything that is getting shipped is 25% packaging

36,000 pounds of throughput is about 3,000 75mm shells (including propellant) OR ~36,000 men/day worth of food OR ~100,000 .50 caliber rounds in ammo boxes

Now a quartermaster will never sneeze at an infusion of supplies. But a submarine squadron (8-10 boats) can't keep a reinforced army corps in supply with high volume consumables. Instead, they can deliver low weight and low volume critical spare parts, and supplement any other sources of supply.

If Bataan is to be supplied it has to be by surface ships.
All true.

This gives me the impression that the British will be able to repulse the forces landed on Malaya in reasonable time and continue to contest the seas, but since the Japanese will hold air superiority and will be mostly successful in Borneo (necessitating more commonwealth forces there if Java is to be safe), the British will be unable to actually go on the attack for at least the first year or so.
It depends what you mean by 'unable to go on the attack'. British submarines, with reliable torpedoes, and close to their base of operations will make an absolute pig's breakfast of the Japanese logistics. I think it's very probably that the Japanese don't even set foot in the southern or eastern parts of the DEI due to having lost so much in Malaya and Borneo.
 
I think it's pretty clear from the correlation of forces that a Japanese invasion of Malaya as in OTL had minimal chance of success and while the IJA had a record of ignoring reality they also made sensible strategic decisions on occasion, see their handling of the Soviet Union post Khalkhin Gol. Bearing that in mind there might not be any fighting in Malaya or Burma, while it's too late in the day to avoid Pearl Harbour Operation E, the invasion of Burma and Malaya via Thailand might be cancelled, preserving Thai neutrality, instead the Japanese could send all of the Southern Expeditionary to Borneo where it will role over the single Aussie Division and the DEI forces and acquire the oil fields, at least for a while
 
I think it's pretty clear from the correlation of forces that a Japanese invasion of Malaya as in OTL had minimal chance of success and while the IJA had a record of ignoring reality they also made sensible strategic decisions on occasion, see their handling of the Soviet Union post Khalkhin Gol. Bearing that in mind there might not be any fighting in Malaya or Burma, while it's too late in the day to avoid Pearl Harbour Operation E, the invasion of Burma and Malaya via Thailand might be cancelled, preserving Thai neutrality, instead the Japanese could send all of the Southern Expeditionary to Borneo where it will role over the single Aussie Division and the DEI forces and acquire the oil fields, at least for a while
Pretty much no chance. What's more likely IMO is that the forces previously assigned to Borneo get diverted to Malaya, and fed into the meat-grinder there.

This will have significant effects down the line. Retaining Singapore as a fleet and (particularly) submarine base will lead to the Japanese losing far more shipping far more quickly, including, quite possibly, some of their carriers.
 
Last edited:
4 December 1941. Liverpool. England.
4 December 1941. Liverpool. England.

Another Winston Special Convoy was being prepared to sail in a few days. The ships were gathering, the equipment and stores were being loaded on. Generally, the troopships would sail from the Clyde, and many of the men were enjoying their last few days of home leave for the foreseeable future. There were however plenty of men of 8th Armoured Division working in Liverpool to make sure that their tanks were prepared for an ocean voyage and that nothing of any importance went missing in the process.

23rd and 24th Armoured Brigades had been formed originally as Army Tank Brigades, but in November 1940 had been redesignated as Armoured Brigades when 8th Armoured Division was formed. The two Brigades were made up of six battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment (23rd Brigade: 9th, 46th, 50th; 24th Brigade: 10th, 45th, 47th). Four of the Battalions were equipped with Valiant I*, the cruiser variant of the Valiant I. 9th and 11th Battalions were the first equipped with the Valiant II*, with the 6-pdr gun, to be shipped abroad.

Major-General Richard McCreery, GOC 8th Armoured Division, was aware that his orders were likely to change after they sailed. The plan originally was that 8th Armoured Division were going to relieve 7th Armoured Division in North Africa, allowing the men of that Division to rest and regroup since they had been in the thick of the action for almost two years. As well as the Valiant I* & II* tanks of his own Division, the convoy would carry another 350 tanks to re-equip 2nd and 7th Armoured Divisions, covering their losses during Operation Crusader. Nearly all the Valiant II* tanks built so far would be sailing in WS 14.

With the news coming from Tripoli, McCreery and his staff weren’t sure what the future would hold for them. He could find himself fighting the French, or working with 10th Armoured Division holding back the Germans if they broke through the Caucasus Mountains into Persia. Rumours of action in the Far East were also swilling around. The fact that the equipment issued was for the tropics meant that he knew at least that he could look forward to sunnier climes.

Changes had been made to the Support Group due to the lessons of North Africa. While the three RA regiments, 5th RHA, 73rd Anti-tank and 56th LAA were still assigned, 133rd Motorised Infantry Brigade (4th Bn Buffs, 4th & 5th Bn Royal Sussex Regiment) had been added to 8th Armoured Division. The three Battalions were equipped with the new Viking Tracked Personnel Carrier Loyd carrier, designed by Vivian Loyd, an expanded and better protected version of the Loyd Carrier. The other two Motorised Infantry Brigades of 44th Infantry Division (131st & 132nd) had been assigned to 6th and 9th Armoured Divisions to have one Motor Brigade to two Armoured Brigades.

For McCreery the power of 8th Armoured Division was breath-taking. Along with 340 excellent tanks, 2 Derby Yeomanry in a mixture of Humber Armoured Cars and Daimler Dingoes were his reconnaissance force. He had two more Royal Horse Artillery Regiments (11th and 104th) in addition to 5th RHA, all equipped with Birch SPGs, as well as 146th Field Regiment RA, with towed 25-pdrs. The Royal Engineers and Signals and all the other Administration units meant that he was going to war with a force that he could only have dreamed of when fighting as part of 1st Armoured Division in France in 1940.

McCreery had turned down the chance to command the Armoured Group of Home Forces, consisting of 1st, 6th, 9th, Armoured Divisions, along with Canadian 5th Armoured Division. Guards, 11th and 42nd Armoured Divisions were still equipping and training. Sending the 8th Armoured Division abroad earlier than planned was only because the Canadians had their own tanks built in Canada and shipped over with their men.

The opportunity to take the Division that McCreery had trained into battle was too good to miss, wherever that might take them.
 
Three days away from Pearl Harbour. Safe bet is that they'll be diverted to either Malaya or Burma.

The big question is whether they'll risk a fast run through the Med or go around the Cape.
 
Three days to PH, then hopefully Hitler pulls the same 'idiot lever' as OTL, and declares war a few days later. If he does, I'm 95% sure Weygand will throw in the towel, which ought to allow Mediterranean convoys to be run.

It also occurs to me that if the submarine picket spots the Japanese invasion convoy days before it's in position, they ought to be able to both set their own counters going, and give Macarthur warning of suspicious Japanese activity. Whether Dugout Doug will actually do anything with it is debatable, though if it comes out afterwards he'd been warned of the goings on, and still hadn't reacted, that would be a serious black mark against him.
 
Last edited:
Pretty much no chance. What's more likely IMO is that the forces previously assigned to Borneo get diverted to Malaya, and fed into the meat-grinder there.

This will have significant effects down the line. Retaining Singapore as a fleet and (particularly) submarine base will lead to the Japanese losing far more shipping far more quickly, including, quite possibly, some of their carriers.

Once again the Japanese often did very unwise things on a strategic level (invading China, then after that stalls doubling down by attacking the US and British) but on an operational level they were often fairly smart, it wasn't all Allied incompetence that saw them advance so far.
So reacting to the British reinforcement of Malaya by cancelling that part of their plans and doubling down on Borneo would be both plausible and much, much smarter.
 
Last edited:
Once again the Japanese often did very unwise things on a strategic level (invading China, then after that stalls doubling down by attacking the US and British) but on an operational level they were often fairly smart, it wasn't all Allied incompetence that saw them advance so far.
So reacting to the British reinforcement of Malaya by cancelling that part of their plans and doubling down on Borneo would be both plausible and much, much smarter.
Except that fear of the American fleet led to them attacking PH, so I really can't see them allowing Singapore to remain.
 
Except that fear of the American fleet led to them attacking PH, so I really can't see them allowing Singapore to remain.
I guess the major change here is going to be the British Empire / Dominions not losing Singapore. Given the likely American experience at Pearl Harbor and the Italian one at Taranto I can't see Singapore being used as a forward fleet base although lighter units may be staged from there. When (if) the air force is strong enough to deny the Japanese a realistic attempt at a port strike this may be reevaluated but until then I suspect Ceylon will be the main base for the British.

The thing is that Singapore an by extension Malaya only needs to hold to totally screw up the Japanese. They will have trouble getting to the main DEI islands if it holds and no chance of an effective strike against India or Burma which means the Burma road stays open. They don't have the forces or logistics to fight all these battles at once - the OTL capture of the Malay barrier / DEI / Burma provided them with a defensible perimeter. Without these key chokepoints they have to defend many more positions with limited resources and logistics.
 
...the OTL capture of the Malay barrier / DEI / Burma provided them with a defensible perimeter. Without these key chokepoints they have to defend many more positions with limited resources and logistics.
Even worse, it leaves their merchant shipping routes tragically exposed. For an Island nation who's entire strategic concept for (non-China) WWII was 'Conquer resource rich islands and territories, ship their bounties to the Home Islands, support and expand the War Effort in China', they never put many resources into convoy protection and especially ASW.
 
Except that fear of the American fleet led to them attacking PH, so I really can't see them allowing Singapore to remain.

I agree they will have to launch some sort of operation aimed at neutralising Singapore but with Borneo better defended than OTL and Malaya much better defended than OTL if they try for both in the first phase of the invasion they will fail and they will know that they will fail. The Japanese weren't complete morons, otherwise they would not have achieved what they did in OTL. The only viable path for them is a reinforced over OTL attack on Borneo (which will almost certainly succeed) along with their OTL attack on the Celebes post the Philippines. As soon as the Kido Butai gets back from the Pearl Harbour operation it can be sent on a major raid on Singapore that even if it doesn't work will probably force the RN to fall back to Ceylon which will enable the Japanese to go for Java. The strength with which Malaya is held means Sumatra is out of reach of the Japanese but if they can take Java along with Borneo and Celebes they have secured a vast amount of natural resources including the crucial oil fields.
Of course if the British and Commonwealth Armies can stop the Japanese from doing that then the Japanese are completely screwed, their fleet will run out of oil within 18 months and that's the end of the war.
 
Top