I like this, though my preference would be to align it with when it was abolished in America
And really the goal is to get the US to a public holiday structure more like the UK or whatever where there’s 12-13 of them rather than 8-9
Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
And really the goal is to get the US to a public holiday structure more like the UK or whatever where there’s 12-13 of them rather than 8-9
For reference - by massive, stations are usually thousands of square kilometres. The largest sheep station, Rawlinna Station in Western Australia, is just over 10,000 square kilometres (about 3900 square miles), and is larger than the entire nation of Cyprus.
But the largest cattle station and the largest station in Australia is Anna Creek in South Australia, at 23,677 square kilometres/9140 square miles. It's just a bit smaller than the island of Sardinia in Italy.
Washington's Birthday would likely still be celebrated, though the lack of the cult of Lincoln means that we won't have Presidents Day
Thanksgiving (though that date can be moved around a bit as it wasn't fixed to a third Thursday in November until FDR in OTL)
Fourth of July
Labor Day
Rememberance Day (a Turtledove move, yes, but the US probably would want to commemorate the end of the Civil War, and calling it "Stabbed in the Back byFrickin Napoleon Day" doesn't have the same ring
)Armistance/Victory Day
Christmas
Immigration Day (a day to commemorate the different peoples who have emigrated to the United States. Kind of the initial idea behind Columbus Day, but without the questionable character of the grand navigator, mixed with the fact that you have stronger migrant communities here and it makes sense to ahve ONE day rather than showing preference to, say, the Irish or Italians . Obviously, not something from OTL, but I think it fits the vibe of this US)
Liberation Day/Freedom Day (the day the US ended slavery)
Easter? (Floating, of course)
Constitution Day (might be pushing it. It IS a holiday in OTL, though not a widely celebrated one - and I suspect that it's celebration would be merged in with the 4th)
Veterans Day (Commemorates living veterans, not those who died. That would be Armistance/Victory Day)
Democracy Day (The Day the Liberal Party finally faltered and stopped always winning
Initially suggested by a Democratic Congressman from Illinois)5th of May (A day for everyone to commemorate the fact that way too much important stuff has occurred on this single day. People gather to drink and nervously wonder what the hell is going to happen THIS year)
That would bring us up to 13. There may be some major moments that just haven't occurred yet inthe TL that could also be commemated - and some of these are a bit weaker than others (looking at you Consitution Day! Nor have I really mapped these out so that there would be one a month or so)
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September 30, 1914 is Directive Day (De Facto)
I bet the day where the 3rd Amendment is officially ratified will be ITTL Version of Juneteenth (De Jure)
Considering the state of the confederacy, I don't think it's going to be enforced.
It’s mind boggling how massive that is. Wow.
A lot of these are probably close to where it would end up. Easter especially maybe you see be a bigger holiday (like 4 day weekend) in a world where government functions are less overtly secular even if the American populace is way less religiousWashington's Birthday would likely still be celebrated, though the lack of the cult of Lincoln means that we won't have Presidents Day
Thanksgiving (though that date can be moved around a bit as it wasn't fixed to a third Thursday in November until FDR in OTL)
Fourth of July
Labor Day
Rememberance Day (a Turtledove move, yes, but the US probably would want to commemorate the end of the Civil War, and calling it "Stabbed in the Back byFrickin Napoleon Day" doesn't have the same ring
Armistance/Victory Day
Christmas
Immigration Day (a day to commemorate the different peoples who have emigrated to the United States. Kind of the initial idea behind Columbus Day, but without the questionable character of the grand navigator, mixed with the fact that you have stronger migrant communities here and it makes sense to ahve ONE day rather than showing preference to, say, the Irish or Italians . Obviously, not something from OTL, but I think it fits the vibe of this US)
Liberation Day/Freedom Day (the day the US ended slavery)
Easter? (Floating, of course)
Constitution Day (might be pushing it. It IS a holiday in OTL, though not a widely celebrated one - and I suspect that it's celebration would be merged in with the 4th)
Veterans Day (Commemorates living veterans, not those who died. That would be Armistance/Victory Day)
Democracy Day (The Day the Liberal Party finally faltered and stopped always winning
5th of May (A day for everyone to commemorate the fact that way too much important stuff has occurred on this single day. People gather to drink and nervously wonder what the hell is going to happen THIS year)
That would bring us up to 13. There may be some major moments that just haven't occurred yet inthe TL that could also be commemated - and some of these are a bit weaker than others (looking at you Consitution Day! Nor have I really mapped these out so that there would be one a month or so)
Yes!
Ah so a reasonable incentive for Greek- Ottoman alliance/federalism but that particular dance takes two. And I'm getting the impression the Ottoman Empire is at the moment taking a turn for the worse though hopefully it won't descent into three pashas levels?
As an American friend correctly put it its fighting over which church you don't go to in Sunday. Which much like the similar Irish joke has a fair bit of sting in it. Frex the Pomaks on at least two occasions are on record preferring between Greek and Bulgarian annexation the Greeks. (and would had preferred the Ottomans over both if they were an option)
The way to see it is I think in a similar to the relation of Greece with Britain and France in OTL with Germany and Italy in the place of France. Yes for reasons starting with Greece being entirely dependent to the sea Britain was the most important ally. But this was hardly precluding a French alliance, on the contrary. Here we see a similar pattern and Germany being more liberal compared to OTL certainly helps.
So the Americans are out of the picture for obvious reasons, the French the same, Venizelos has no political reasons to direct big naval contracts to Germany which is I understand taking a more leisurely pace with her navy, France is still the big naval threat for Britain, its a fair assessment to make the Greeks are building their super dreadnoughts to British yards this time round. A pair of the TTL equivalent of the Queen Elizabeth class I'd think.
Funnily TTL 1917 Greece even without Thessaly is likely militarily more dangerous than her OTL 1912 counterpart. Yes Thessaly meant about a 15% reduction in population and somewhat smaller in GDP in 1881, but the economic difference is likely more than covered by avoiding the Eastern crisis of 1885-86 and the war of 1897 while even the population is affected to a somewhat lesser degree by presumably less mass migration to the United States. Plus of course OTL Greece got caught in the middle of military and naval reorganization, TTL you likely had a German mission as early as 1906 instead...
It will be an interesting question as to how strong the US Navy remains post war. The primary nations that the US was worried about from a Naval Standpoint are mostly gone. The British are still around, but they don't have much reason to oppose them. The French and Germans (and their client states are a concern, but mostly pointed at each other) How much can the navy keep asking for money based on a Brazilian threat?
Sorta? Sabahaddin is in charge which has its own wrinkles, the conservative counterreaction to his radical liberalism is more of the Islamist variety rather than the CUP Turkish nationalist variety, however. So you won't see anything like the Three Pashas to stick their fingers in the eyes of OE minorities, that's for certain.
Oh yeah, Greece's Navy is essentially entirely British-built.
Interesting not on the subtraction of Thessaly! It's hard to calculate where Greece's TTL population would land, tbh, but there'd probably be a hair less outmigration to the US, yes. One feature of the TL has been steady outflow of Balkan Christians to the US post-1878 (Serbians and Bulgarians in particular, but also fair number of Greeks) so ironically there's more Greek Americans, but to your point perhaps fewer of them from Greece, proper. Hehe.
Oh yeah those contracts are gonna dry up fast, and the US will likely want to sell off some of their older, pre-1907 vessels pretty soon here as surplus. The expansion plans from 1909 and 1913 are definitely getting deferred or at least extended in terms of window, too.
The Firm Hand of Freedom: Soft Imperialism by the United States in Latin America 1917-69
"...poorly remembered in the United States for the disastrous economic conditions of his term and his perceived flippancy towards the struggles of the working class in this period; Root is also not particularly well liked across much of the Americas, either, viewed as one of the architects of yanquismo chauvinism over the next five decades, particularly in the Caribbean Basin and Isthmian republics.
It is ironic, then, that Root's belief in the Panamerican Congress was genuinely held, as evidenced by his contemporary correspondence and public proncouncements. "A grand congress of this hemisphere and her two continents," Root argued in an open letter published in early October 1917 in the New York Times, "well-regulated and cabined in its powers and purviews, comprised of the best men of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races in harmony, would be the chief guarantor against any such conflagration on Western soil ever repeating." The Panamerican Congress had first begun in 1881 at the behest of James Blaine, and while a failure in accomplishing its more grandiose goals of permanent intra-hemispheric cooperation, it had been generally well-received by its participants; they had continued every four years until the start of the war beginning in 1893, which was held on the sidelines of the Columbian World Exposition in Chicago, arranged by Blaine's political protege John Hay, who had in many ways been a mentor to Root. Root's attachment to the Panamerican Congress was as much personal as ideological, and it would be fair to say that well-intentioned as it may have been, his dogged belief that the Congress could have avoided the GAW had it been convened in 1913 as planned and that it would prevent future conflicts in the Americas was naive utopianism. It was also a position where he found himself unusually isolated, even within his own party.
One of his few American supporters was, perhaps unsurprisingly, his immediate predecessor as Secretary of State, Lindley Garrison, who had served the Democrat William Hearst in that role 1909 to 1913 and would return to the State Department in 1921 for a further seven years in the job. Garrison was the early 20th century's most important Democratic diplomat, an important thinker on how to synthesize the party's domestic worldview into a coherent set of principles for conducting foreign policy that did not reject Blainism but rather enhanced and progressed it rather than simply simmer in glories gone by, as it was thought Liberals were fond of. Garrison was thus of the internationalist wing of his party, opposed to an isolationist wing gaining force in the Midwest and Prairie States that was deeply skeptical of international treaties and involvement "outside the lines," as it was stated once by Senator John Eugene Osborne of Wyoming. He agreed in the value of a Panamerican Congress, having represented the United States in 1909, but even though he regarded Root a peer and friend, he found Root's staunch belief in its almost divine value misguided.
Rather, Garrison - who was himself the first champion of the American-Argentine Treaty and "special relationship" - saw a Panamerican Congress as a way to cement the new, American-led order coming out of the Great American War. Continentalism, arbitration, common international law - all these were things that the United States had always pressed for, and a single forum for disputes rather than bilateralism appealed to him. (In this mode he ironically sounds more like the Liberal Party of present day). Garrison saw the postwar settlements as a smattering of treaties that failed to chart any kind of architecture for what the postwar Americas would actually look like, drawn up to either end a war expediently (Kansas City with the Native chiefs of what would become Sequoyah, Coronado with the Mexicans) or to hash out punishment towards enemies that the United States did not like (Lima with Chile, Mount Vernon with the Confederacy). Garrison viewed a new Panamerican Congress, ideally convened every other year, as a permanent court of hemispheric arbitration and perhaps a venue for settling matters of trade (invariably in yanqui favor), navigation, and free movement of peoples; the contours of modern debates over the Free Travel Area or the proposed Common Market can be seen in this vision. This was not some grand forum for peace - it was a method of explicitly enforcing a new American hegemony that had already been formed through peaceful and commercial means.
Garrison was typically assisted in his internationalist instincts by George Turner, the most tenured Senate Democrat, its longtime chair on the Foreign Relations Committee, one of the drafters of the Treaty of Mount Vernon and the potentate of a small clique of senior Western Democrats known colloquially as the "Synod." Turner, representing the state of Washington and keenly aware of the interests of Seattle's ports, was usually a reliable ally on such measures, but by late 1917 he had begun growing increasingly skeptical of the value of the Panamerican Congress. The Americas had been cowed, in his view, and the future of the United States lay across the Pacific - in enhancing its position in Chusan (an island concession off the eastern coast of China), expanding its ties to Asian ports, and becoming the guarantor of a "belt of democracies" around the Pacific Rim that included not just South American states but also Australia, the Philippines, China, and perhaps Korea, where American business and missionary interests held great sway. Turner was not vehemently opposed to Garrison's ideas of a permanent Congress, but he was not interested enough to advocate for his friend, and without Turner, Garrison - in private life at the time, still - saw little interest across the Democratic Party as a whole for a push. It was also the case that Root's standing with Democrats had collapsed by the time 1917 turned to 1918 - the economy was in tatters, his administration had shown itself hostile to organized labor and outside ideas, and the occupation of the Confederacy was increasingly an incompetent, inept bloodbath. There was no trust that Root's vaunted "wise men" who had proven themselves anything but could deliver such a delicate diplomatic program.
Root was unhelped, too, by his own party - Lodge, his Secretary of State, indeed saw the permanent Rootian Panamerican Congress as insufficiently hegemonic, as a way in which the "conquered can now dispute the conqueror." While this kind of language was unusually extreme, most Liberals were extremely reluctant to extend olive branches, especially to smaller Latin states. Relations with strong and important Mexico were improving, Brazil was held in check by the alliance with Argentina, and wartime allies Peru and Bolivia looked increasingly unreliable, while all others were "minnows," as Lodge put it, or politically dominated by European states, such as Colombia's relationship with France or Venezuela and Costa Rica with Germany. The appetite for actually trying to chart out a postwar "order" was not there - the order already existed de facto to most of Philadelphia, and it was the order of American businesses now unhindered across the hemisphere by protectionist or nationalist governments, supported by American guns whether in the hands of a Marine or the decks of a battlecruiser.
The push of 1917-18 to create a league or permanent congress for the Americas was thus a dismal failure before it even passed an idea charted out in Philadelphia drawing rooms; and, to be sure, it would likely have run aground against strong opposition around the Hemisphere, where sufficient governments still regarded the idea as very clearly a vehicle for further American hegemonic domination of her smaller "sisters and cousins," as the popular parlance at the time was. A Panamerican Congress would be held, poorly attended, in 1921, a far cry from Root's vision; the permanent annual sitting of the Panamerican Congress would not come about until decades later. Root, one of the most famous foreign policy minds of his generation, saw the chief diplomatic endeavor of his Presidency fizzle and die with a whimper; it was, perhaps, emblematic of his unloved Presidency as a whole, and a failure despite best intentions that augured ominously the clientelism that would come to define pan-American relations for the next fifty years..."
- The Firm Hand of Freedom: Soft Imperialism by the United States in Latin America 1917-69
It is ironic, then, that Root's belief in the Panamerican Congress was genuinely held, as evidenced by his contemporary correspondence and public proncouncements. "A grand congress of this hemisphere and her two continents," Root argued in an open letter published in early October 1917 in the New York Times, "well-regulated and cabined in its powers and purviews, comprised of the best men of the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races in harmony, would be the chief guarantor against any such conflagration on Western soil ever repeating." The Panamerican Congress had first begun in 1881 at the behest of James Blaine, and while a failure in accomplishing its more grandiose goals of permanent intra-hemispheric cooperation, it had been generally well-received by its participants; they had continued every four years until the start of the war beginning in 1893, which was held on the sidelines of the Columbian World Exposition in Chicago, arranged by Blaine's political protege John Hay, who had in many ways been a mentor to Root. Root's attachment to the Panamerican Congress was as much personal as ideological, and it would be fair to say that well-intentioned as it may have been, his dogged belief that the Congress could have avoided the GAW had it been convened in 1913 as planned and that it would prevent future conflicts in the Americas was naive utopianism. It was also a position where he found himself unusually isolated, even within his own party.
One of his few American supporters was, perhaps unsurprisingly, his immediate predecessor as Secretary of State, Lindley Garrison, who had served the Democrat William Hearst in that role 1909 to 1913 and would return to the State Department in 1921 for a further seven years in the job. Garrison was the early 20th century's most important Democratic diplomat, an important thinker on how to synthesize the party's domestic worldview into a coherent set of principles for conducting foreign policy that did not reject Blainism but rather enhanced and progressed it rather than simply simmer in glories gone by, as it was thought Liberals were fond of. Garrison was thus of the internationalist wing of his party, opposed to an isolationist wing gaining force in the Midwest and Prairie States that was deeply skeptical of international treaties and involvement "outside the lines," as it was stated once by Senator John Eugene Osborne of Wyoming. He agreed in the value of a Panamerican Congress, having represented the United States in 1909, but even though he regarded Root a peer and friend, he found Root's staunch belief in its almost divine value misguided.
Rather, Garrison - who was himself the first champion of the American-Argentine Treaty and "special relationship" - saw a Panamerican Congress as a way to cement the new, American-led order coming out of the Great American War. Continentalism, arbitration, common international law - all these were things that the United States had always pressed for, and a single forum for disputes rather than bilateralism appealed to him. (In this mode he ironically sounds more like the Liberal Party of present day). Garrison saw the postwar settlements as a smattering of treaties that failed to chart any kind of architecture for what the postwar Americas would actually look like, drawn up to either end a war expediently (Kansas City with the Native chiefs of what would become Sequoyah, Coronado with the Mexicans) or to hash out punishment towards enemies that the United States did not like (Lima with Chile, Mount Vernon with the Confederacy). Garrison viewed a new Panamerican Congress, ideally convened every other year, as a permanent court of hemispheric arbitration and perhaps a venue for settling matters of trade (invariably in yanqui favor), navigation, and free movement of peoples; the contours of modern debates over the Free Travel Area or the proposed Common Market can be seen in this vision. This was not some grand forum for peace - it was a method of explicitly enforcing a new American hegemony that had already been formed through peaceful and commercial means.
Garrison was typically assisted in his internationalist instincts by George Turner, the most tenured Senate Democrat, its longtime chair on the Foreign Relations Committee, one of the drafters of the Treaty of Mount Vernon and the potentate of a small clique of senior Western Democrats known colloquially as the "Synod." Turner, representing the state of Washington and keenly aware of the interests of Seattle's ports, was usually a reliable ally on such measures, but by late 1917 he had begun growing increasingly skeptical of the value of the Panamerican Congress. The Americas had been cowed, in his view, and the future of the United States lay across the Pacific - in enhancing its position in Chusan (an island concession off the eastern coast of China), expanding its ties to Asian ports, and becoming the guarantor of a "belt of democracies" around the Pacific Rim that included not just South American states but also Australia, the Philippines, China, and perhaps Korea, where American business and missionary interests held great sway. Turner was not vehemently opposed to Garrison's ideas of a permanent Congress, but he was not interested enough to advocate for his friend, and without Turner, Garrison - in private life at the time, still - saw little interest across the Democratic Party as a whole for a push. It was also the case that Root's standing with Democrats had collapsed by the time 1917 turned to 1918 - the economy was in tatters, his administration had shown itself hostile to organized labor and outside ideas, and the occupation of the Confederacy was increasingly an incompetent, inept bloodbath. There was no trust that Root's vaunted "wise men" who had proven themselves anything but could deliver such a delicate diplomatic program.
Root was unhelped, too, by his own party - Lodge, his Secretary of State, indeed saw the permanent Rootian Panamerican Congress as insufficiently hegemonic, as a way in which the "conquered can now dispute the conqueror." While this kind of language was unusually extreme, most Liberals were extremely reluctant to extend olive branches, especially to smaller Latin states. Relations with strong and important Mexico were improving, Brazil was held in check by the alliance with Argentina, and wartime allies Peru and Bolivia looked increasingly unreliable, while all others were "minnows," as Lodge put it, or politically dominated by European states, such as Colombia's relationship with France or Venezuela and Costa Rica with Germany. The appetite for actually trying to chart out a postwar "order" was not there - the order already existed de facto to most of Philadelphia, and it was the order of American businesses now unhindered across the hemisphere by protectionist or nationalist governments, supported by American guns whether in the hands of a Marine or the decks of a battlecruiser.
The push of 1917-18 to create a league or permanent congress for the Americas was thus a dismal failure before it even passed an idea charted out in Philadelphia drawing rooms; and, to be sure, it would likely have run aground against strong opposition around the Hemisphere, where sufficient governments still regarded the idea as very clearly a vehicle for further American hegemonic domination of her smaller "sisters and cousins," as the popular parlance at the time was. A Panamerican Congress would be held, poorly attended, in 1921, a far cry from Root's vision; the permanent annual sitting of the Panamerican Congress would not come about until decades later. Root, one of the most famous foreign policy minds of his generation, saw the chief diplomatic endeavor of his Presidency fizzle and die with a whimper; it was, perhaps, emblematic of his unloved Presidency as a whole, and a failure despite best intentions that augured ominously the clientelism that would come to define pan-American relations for the next fifty years..."
- The Firm Hand of Freedom: Soft Imperialism by the United States in Latin America 1917-69
Around there, but I know why you asked 😏Is Confederate segregation going to end in 1994?
.....please have Lodge run for President only to be humiliated so badly its just destroys his political career...
This guy is just, like wow! /s
I'm now curious as to what happens in 1969 to be important enough in the US - Latam relationship as to be the ending point of this book.
Also if it's a Latin American event specifically or if it's an American President going "fuck it!"
I think Garrison will lose. Democrats will become an isolationist party
Liberals will become the an interventionist party. The next Lib president is Pershing. I imagine a military man would think that intervention to preserve and maintain American supremacy would be necessary.
American Union (AU)
Well Pershing is essentially meant to be the Eisenhower analogue, so using his Presidency as a base might give an idea of what to expect from Pershing.