Plausibility check: Napoleonic Egypt and landing in India

[Hayden Nikerson]

While thinking about how to continue my TL, I was thinking about the plausibility (for France) to threaten British India from Egypt, there are many posts about the topic, and I have been reading them all, but I can't see one addressing the circumstances I have in mind, and are old threads and I don't dare to revive them, so... starting this debate once again seems the best option to me.

Ok, so, these are the circumstances I have in mind... for one, the directory discard the Egyptian campaign of 1798. The war in Europe however ends similarly, and later on, the directory, consulate, Napoleon, or whoever is in charge of France sings a treaty-like Amiens with the British at around the same time as in OTL. So, between 1802 and 1803, there is peace between the United Kingdom and France (it might last a bit longer, for example there is no issue with Malta without the Egyptian campaign...).

I think both sides would make preparations to resume war at some point, and the idea of taking Egypt to threaten India is revived. After all, the plan had some good points, for example, Egypt (together with Syria and Baghdad) were used by the British to communicate faster with India, so even if the French can't go to India from Egypt, they could intercept messages from India to London and back, or, force the British to go around Africa for communications which could be potentially harmful for the British interests.

The mamluks still are in charge of Egypt while Selim III is too busy dealing with rebels in Europe, Napoleon falsely proclaimed that he came to Egypt to restore ottoman authority OTL... and France and the Ottoman Empire had been allies at different points... could the French arrange an alliance with the ottomans allowing the French to get into Egypt to restore ottoman authority? (The outcome might vary, but this would be the plan presented to the ottomans) could France have the ottomans pay for such an expedition like a subsidiary force? Or France should straight invade Egypt like in OTL's 1798?

They got there in 1798 and there is no reason to think they could not do it in 1803, so, one way or another, the French are in Egypt. Could the French, in anticipation, try to reinforce their fleet at Ile the France and Reunion during the armistice in order to have more ships in the Indian Ocean to eventually get one army from Egypt to India? Could they rent some Arab, Somali, Swahili or Malay merchants to help in the effort? Some Batavian ships as well?

Now the land option... In other threads I see that the logistics would be difficult, but we are talking about the land of the gunpowder empires, there is ammunition, clothes (better suited to the climate) and food to acquire from the locals one way or another. And then, I saw many arguing about going thought hostile territory. If the french were allied to the ottomans, they would probably be happy to have them going to Baghdad and remove the Mamluks there on their way, or, if hostile to the ottomans, maybe the French could arrange something with the mamluks. France and Persia were allies at one point, no reason they could not be allies with the persians allowing the French to go throw their territory and maybe join them in invading India (something the Persians used to do). The Durrani empire doesn't have to be entirely hostile, for example, the French could ally with the claimant in Herat, help him to recover Kandahar and Kabul.. and they are already in India. Or... they could deal with Kabul, take Herat, and as reward, have a free passage to India with some afghans joining them (the afghans used to invade India as well). Maybe they could rent or get some ships in Bandar Abbas instead of the Red Sea.

Are 10,000 Frenchmen in the Punjab or Sindh, scaring enough, to force the British to seek another peace treaty? I don't think the Maratha nor the Sikhs would ally them if they come with Persians or afghans, but probably they would not ally with the British neither if the French doesn't come into Maratha territory... and if they came alone, they could ally with the Marathas, Sikh, Jats and Rajputs, which doesn't look good for the British.

For my TL, my idea so far is, and you can discuss any point is:
1. The French signs an alliance with the Ottomans and land in Egypt to restore Ottoman authority, with actual Ottoman aid (this would be one of the triggers of the new war with the English).
2. The French send more ships to the Indian Ocean during the peace (again, another trigger of the war).
3. The French make some reforms to better supply their forces using local resources and train an Egyptian army for the Ottomans.
4. The Russians and British force the Ottomans to turn sides, which makes the French to take full control of Egypt (and it's new native army).
5A. The French use a franco-batavian-arabic fleet to get from the Red Sea to India, but they land in Sindh due to the presence of the Royal Navy.
5B. The French ally or fight the Mamluks in Baghdad, and use a franco-batavian-arabic fleet to get from Basra to India, but they land in Sindh due to the presence of the Royal Navy.
6. At Sindh, the French manage to defeat the Talpurs and establish themselves there just like in Egypt, and probably train some sepoys to serve as allies. Maybe they take some Balochi, Afghan, Punjabi or even Rajput auxiliaries...
7. The British are too busy fighting the Marathas, and while the French can't go farther than the Sindh, they are taken seriously enough to sign an armistice, so the British can deal with the Marathas alone, while the French can secure their new possessions. Maybe Karachi and Alexandria are under direct french administration while the remaining of Egypt and Sindh become protectorates under some native dynasty.
8. Instead of a new coalition war, there is a Cold War between the French and the British for years.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

I added a poll, anyway I would love to have some opinions 🤔 either about the alt historical plausibility given those circumstances or what I thought for my TL.

I think that while the French could get some more ships in the East Indies, it would not be enough or would be too risky to embark the army... but maybe a small fleet could carry supplies and the artillery along the coastline if for example the French goes through Balochistan.

 

[OxSpace]

Napoleon's invasion of India is as silly as Sealion for the same reasons. And doing an Alexander-esque march through the Mid-East and Iran to India seems like a complete and total waste of resources and manpower and an absolute logistic nightmare.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

I chose 3, the French can take Egypt with Ottoman blessing and hold it, but can't get to India. I think they could probably take Egypt even without Ottoman blessing, but once war breaks out again between the UK and France (which it would, especially if the invasion of Egypt was known or suspected to be preparatory for an invasion of India), the Royal Navy would be able to interfere with the arrival of fresh troops and supplies, and the French garrison would be gradually whittled down, much as happened IOTL.

As for sailing to India, I don't think it's very likely -- the French navy had been seriously damaged by the Revolution (most of the experienced officers were royalists), and proved unable to hold its own against the British even in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, much less all the way over in the Indian Ocean. So I don't think the French would be able to ferry an army across to India, and even if they did manage to get across before the Royal Navy can show up, they'd just find themselves cut off in a distant land without any reinforcements or supplies, again like what happened in Egypt IOTL.

As for marching to India, I think there are three main issues, any one of which would probably be enough to sink the project, but which combined make it virtually impossible: (1) It requires co-operation between the Ottomans and the Persians, two powers which were historically antagonistic towards one another, and which don't have any real reason to view the British as a bigger threat than each other. (2) Even if the land route can be secured, getting troops all the way from France to India would still be a logistical nightmare. It would take years for any French army to appear in the Subcontinent, and the extreme distances would made it difficult to send and maintain enough troops to pose a serious threat to British rule. (3) The French lines of communications would be horribly vulnerable. It's easy to envisage a scenario where one of France's allies defects -- say, if the British offer the Persians assistance in reconquering Iraq -- leaving the French army stranded and helpless on the other side of the world.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

Napoleon's invasion of India is as silly as Sealion for the same reasons. And doing an Alexander-esque march through the Mid-East and Iran to India seems like a complete and total waste of resources and manpower and an absolute logistic nightmare.

Which are those same reasons? The context is too different to make any comparison. I agree that it would be a logistic nightmare.

I chose 3, the French can take Egypt with Ottoman blessing and hold it, but can't get to India. I think they could probably take Egypt even without Ottoman blessing, but once war breaks out again between the UK and France (which it would, especially if the invasion of Egypt was known or suspected to be preparatory for an invasion of India), the Royal Navy would be able to interfere with the arrival of fresh troops and supplies, and the French garrison would be gradually whittled down, much as happened IOTL.

As for sailing to India, I don't think it's very likely -- the French navy had been seriously damaged by the Revolution (most of the experienced officers were royalists), and proved unable to hold its own against the British even in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, much less all the way over in the Indian Ocean. So I don't think the French would be able to ferry an army across to India, and even if they did manage to get across before the Royal Navy can show up, they'd just find themselves cut off in a distant land without any reinforcements or supplies, again like what happened in Egypt IOTL.

As for marching to India, I think there are three main issues, any one of which would probably be enough to sink the project, but which combined make it virtually impossible: (1) It requires co-operation between the Ottomans and the Persians, two powers which were historically antagonistic towards one another, and which don't have any real reason to view the British as a bigger threat than each other. (2) Even if the land route can be secured, getting troops all the way from France to India would still be a logistical nightmare. It would take years for any French army to appear in the Subcontinent, and the extreme distances would made it difficult to send and maintain enough troops to pose a serious threat to British rule. (3) The French lines of communications would be horribly vulnerable. It's easy to envisage a scenario where one of France's allies defects -- say, if the British offer the Persians assistance in reconquering Iraq -- leaving the French army stranded and helpless on the other side of the world.

Thanks

I agree that with or without Ottoman blessing, the French can land and control Egypt. The idea of having some deal with the Ottomans is for the French to have an easier time in Egypt, avoid the invasion of Syria and acquire supplies from the Ottomans. Still, I agree that it would be hard to get supplies and reinforcements from France, so they would have to really on local resources and train local troops in Egypt.

Looking at the operations in the East Indies during the Napoleonic wars, I don't think the French and Batavian had enough ships (counting transports and civilian ships) to ferry 10,000 troops from Egypt to India, it would require to move transports there during the peacetime (they could avoid invading Haiti, or at least, reduce the resources employed there), even then, it would be extremely difficult to coordinate, and many things can go wrong.

I agree that it would be difficult to be welcome by the Persians coming from ottoman lands unless the French fought the Ottomans, and the same way, the Durrani would not like to see an army coming from Persia neither. Embarking in Bandar Abbas looks less risky than embarking in Suez or Basra, but still many things could go wrong.

And you made a good point about changing alliances.

"It would take years for any French army to appear in the Subcontinent, and the extreme distances would made it difficult to send and maintain enough troops to pose a serious threat to British rule."

Either way, I see it as a multiphasic operation, having to secure one place, repose and make some new alliances before moving to the next and as you said, it would not pose a serious threat to British rule, but maybe they can look like one (after all, their presence in Egypt was already considered a threat). Would that perceive threat, be enough to look for a diplomatic solution?

 

[Fabius Maximus]

Either way, I see it as a multiphasic operation, having to secure one place, repose and make some new alliances before moving to the next and as you said, it would not pose a serious threat to British rule, but maybe they can look like one (after all, their presence in Egypt was already considered a threat). Would that perceive threat, be enough to look for a diplomatic solution?

TBH I think it more likely that it would just lead to a renewal of hostilities between Britain and France well before the French are in a position to invade the Subcontinent properly, and once that happens, the chances of France successfully pulling off an invasion become pretty remote.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

TBH I think it more likely that it would just lead to a renewal of hostilities between Britain and France well before the French are in a position to invade the Subcontinent properly, and once that happens, the chances of France successfully pulling off an invasion become pretty remote.

Definitely, any sort of peace would be temporally and once the British secure their holdings against the Marathas they would try to remove the French, whoever I don't expect the French to use the peace to get enough forces to properly invade India, just to hold what they got and force a stalemate. Maybe giving the Cape to the British might appease them until a canal is built in Suez, which would probably trigger another war.

 

[OxSpace]

Which are those same reasons? The context is too different to make any comparison. I agree that it would be a logistic nightmare.

The Royal Navy. Even if the French somehow make it out of the blockade or go on their expedition prior to renewal war with Britain, you'll just end up with a Blockade of Saint-Domingue style situation.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

The Royal Navy. Even if the French somehow make it out of the blockade or go on their expedition prior to renewal war with Britain, you'll just end up with a Blockade of Saint-Domingue style situation.

The thing is, the Royal Navy isn't omnipresent, it can't blockade Brest, defend Sicily, intercept supplies to Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, protect the British West Indies, patrol the North Sea, blockade the French privateers in the East Indies and intercept the ships moving troops from Egypt to Sindh without any leaks. Too many ships in one point could be translated into too few ships in another. I'm not saying it would be easy for the French, of course it wouldn't be, but it wouldn't be easy for the British neither.

For example, if the French fleet used to take the army from France to Egypt goes back to France, the British would be forced to move most of its Mediterranean fleet back to the west to defend Sicily and blockade Toulon, and there are many ports in the western Mediterranean (even in the Adriatic) from where the French could send supplies to the army in Egypt, of course the British can intercept many of those ships, but not all.

Many things can go wrong for both sides.

 

[OxSpace]

The thing is, the Royal Navy isn't omnipresent, it can't blockade Brest, defend Sicily, intercept supplies to Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, protect the British West Indies, patrol the North Sea, blockade the French privateers in the East Indies and intercept the ships moving troops from Egypt to Sindh without any leaks. Too many ships in one point could be translated into too few ships in another. I'm not saying it would be easy for the French, of course it wouldn't be, but it wouldn't be easy for the British neither.

You say that as if the British didn't do exactly that iotl, once one area was secured (ie the West Indies), the ships could be allocated elsewhere. The Royal Navy was 3x larger than the French. If you look at French naval victories, they were all small skirmishes between a few ships; nothing that would change the tide of naval dominance.

For example, if the French fleet used to take the army from France to Egypt goes back to France, the British would be forced to move most of its Mediterranean fleet back to the west to defend Sicily and blockade Toulon, and there are many ports in the western Mediterranean (even in the Adriatic) from where the French could send supplies to the army in Egypt, of course the British can intercept many of those ships, but not all.

Are we implying the Royal Navy just lets the French fleet go? The British were highly aware of French naval movements.
The French Mediterranean Fleet had been annihilated in 1798 which allowed small squadrons to quite easily blockade the French coast. You're making it out to be that the British would just have some weird death stack of ships and that's it.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

You say that as if the British didn't do exactly that iotl, once one area was secured (ie the West Indies), the ships could be allocated elsewhere. The Royal Navy was 3x larger than the French. If you look at French naval victories, they were all small skirmishes between a few ships; nothing that would change the tide of naval dominance.

As a matter of fact, the British didn't secure the West Indies until 1810 and the East Indies until 1811. Within the Mediterranean, they secured the Adriatic around 1812-3.

"You say that as if the British didn't do exactly that iotl", yes they did, in the lapse of years, you have thousands of kilometers of coastline in France and the sea is quite wide. In any moment I said that the French could attain naval dominance, only that the blockades did not work like in the games, you could not click on a port and automatically nothing could enter or leave an entire region.

Are we implying the Royal Navy just lets the French fleet go? The British were highly aware of French naval movements.
The French Mediterranean Fleet had been annihilated in 1798 which allowed small squadrons to quite easily blockade the French coast. You're making it out to be that the British would just have some weird death stack of ships and that's it.

Are you implying that the French fleet could not leave France in 1798? How did Napoleon get to Egypt? Teleport?

And yes, the French Navy could leave Egypt after landing the army and the sea is wide enough to avoid the British on the way home. Could they have been intercepted on the way back? Yes, of course, it could happen, but the opposite could also happen. Again, this is not a game, you didn't have a satellite view, and you could not blockade an entire naval region with a click. I am not implying that the Royal Navy would simply let the French fleet go, just that there were chances that the Royal Navy might miss the French Fleet or intercept it too late.

Btw, I said that there was no Egyptian campaign in 1798, so there are chances that the French fleet wasn't destroyed in 1798. Could it have been destroyed in another place and year? Yes, but not in the battle of the Nile.

The sea is wide, just keep that in mind, I didn't say that the French could dominate the British at sea, just that blockades weren't perfect. And during the Egyptian campaign, the British did consider the threat posed by the French there real enough to delay any planned action against the French Islands in the Indian Ocean, Java and Manila in order to patrol the Red Sea, so it didn't seem "silly" from the British point of view.

Opportunity cost. Let us consider for a moment that the British think that the Napoleonic invasion of India is a "silly" idea, and decide to ignore it to invade Java, the cost of such an invasion would be not being able to prevent different transports from leaving the French islands for Egypt. The British used to be well aware of french plans and movements (although they didn't have a detailed satellite map), so they would eventually learn about it. The question is, at what point would they be able to intercept said fleet, in the middle of the Red Sea, already ferrying a small army towards India? In the Gulf of Aden? On the shores of India? Before or after landing the army?

As I said before, I am not saying that it is an easy task for the French, only that interfering in the French plans was not easy for the British either.

 

[OxSpace]

As a matter of fact, the British didn't secure the West Indies until 1810 and the East Indies until 1811. Within the Mediterranean, they secured the Adriatic around 1812-3.

I'm talking about naval dominance. The British were dominant in the West Indies seas several years before 1810. French expeditions to break it like Troude and Roquebert's expedition were both failures. Just because the French could levy ships from ports to try to break it doesn't mean that Britain didn't have control of the seas there. I'm not saying the French navy had 0 hope of winning naval engagements with the British, it's just that the victory would be short lived because the French simply didn't have the sea faring capability of a prolong competition with the British.

Are you implying that the French fleet could not leave France in 1798? How did Napoleon get to Egypt? Teleport?

I was talking about after the French were in Egypt and "going back to France". Nelson was actively searching for the French fleet when Napoleon was going to Alexandria, but once the French were harbored there it was extremely unlikely they could just waltz by the British fleet at that point.

And yes, the French Navy could leave Egypt after landing the army and the sea is wide enough to avoid the British on the way home. Could they have been intercepted on the way back? Yes, of course, it could happen, but the opposite could also happen. Again, this is not a game, you didn't have a satellite view, and you could not blockade an entire naval region with a click. I am not implying that the Royal Navy would simply let the French fleet go, just that there were chances that the Royal Navy might miss the French Fleet or intercept it too late.

You're really exegeting that the "chance" factor of interception. If the French could just conveniently tippy-toe with a fleet of several dozen ships around the British then blockades and naval engagements would be near non-existent. Whether or not it was at the Nile or somewhere else, the French were forced to engage the British one-way-or-another. A hostile fleet patrolling the seas makes any prolonged Egyptian-to-India operation at a risk of disaster or you'll just end up stranded. Ironic, because that's exactly what happened.

I didn't say that the French could dominate the British at sea, just that blockades weren't perfect.

Who said anything about perfect? And the instances where the French were able to slip through the blockade involved a small squadron of 1-2-3 ships. These instances doesn't mean the French could traverse anytime they wanted.

And during the Egyptian campaign, the British did consider the threat posed by the French there real enough to delay any planned action against the French Islands in the Indian Ocean, Java and Manila in order to patrol the Red Sea, so it didn't seem "silly" from the British point of view.

Yes, it's why they sent the Red Sea squadron. But the Red Sea squadron was small and was effectively operating with impunity.

Let us consider for a moment that the British think that the Napoleonic invasion of India is a "silly" idea, and decide to ignore it to invade Java, the cost of such an invasion would be not being able to prevent different transports from leaving the French islands for Egypt.

You're essentially waving your hand that the British are purposely inept in this scenario and contradict yourself a few sentences ago about the British being aware of the threat. Regardless if they think any French invasion of India is silly, ttl Mauritius campaign would still be before any invasion of Java because the Indian trade routes were far more valuable than taking Java at the time. And the Mauritius were a nuisance for the British because it was a home for French privateering. The Javanese frankly had no threat to the British, its no coincidence the invasion of Java was the last of the non-European Napoleonic campaigns by the British.

blockades did not work like in the games, you could not click on a port and automatically nothing could enter or leave an entire region.

Again, this is not a game, you didn't have a satellite view

What are you genuinely talking about? Who said anything about games or satellites? Why do you keep bringing up about games??

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

I'm talking about naval dominance. The British were dominant in the West Indies seas several years before 1810. French expeditions to break it like Troude and Roquebert's expedition were both failures. Just because the French could levy ships from ports to try to break it doesn't mean that Britain didn't have control of the seas there. I'm not saying the French navy had 0 hope of winning naval engagements with the British, it's just that the victory would be short lived because the French simply didn't have the sea faring capability of a prolong competition with the British.

Who said anything about perfect? And the instances where the French were able to slip through the blockade involved a small squadron of 1-2-3 ships. These instances doesn't mean the French could traverse anytime they wanted.

Well your first argumentation was "The Royal Navy" like if it could be everywhere at once. And again, the fleet that took Napoleon from France to Egypt weren't just 1-2-3 ships.

I was talking about after the French were in Egypt and "going back to France". Nelson was actively searching for the French fleet when Napoleon was going to Alexandria, but once the French were harbored there it was extremely unlikely they could just waltz by the British fleet at that point.


You're really exegeting that the "chance" factor of interception. If the French could just conveniently tippy-toe with a fleet of several dozen ships around the British then blockades and naval engagements would be near non-existent. Whether or not it was at the Nile or somewhere else, the French were forced to engage the British one-way-or-another. A hostile fleet patrolling the seas makes any prolonged Egyptian-to-India operation at a risk of disaster or you'll just end up stranded. Ironic, because that's exactly what happened.

I will copy-paste something from wikipedia:

Spoiler

On the evening of 22 June, Nelson's fleet passed the French in the darkness, overtaking the slow invasion convoy without realising how close they were to their target.[28] Making rapid time on a direct route, Nelson reached Alexandria on 28 June and discovered that the French were not there.[29] After a meeting with the suspicious Ottoman commander, Sayyid Muhammad Kurayyim, Nelson ordered the British fleet northwards, reaching the coast of Anatolia on 4 July and turning westwards back towards Sicily.[30] Nelson had missed the French by less than a day—the scouts of the French fleet arrived off Alexandria in the evening of 29 June.[31]

Concerned by his near encounter with Nelson, Bonaparte ordered an immediate invasion, his troops coming ashore in a poorly managed amphibious operation in which at least 20 drowned.[32] Marching along the coast, the French army stormed Alexandria and captured the city,[33] after which Bonaparte led the main force of his army inland.[34] He instructed his naval commander, Vice-Admiral François-Paul Brueys D'Aigalliers, to anchor in Alexandria harbour, but naval surveyors reported that the channel into the harbour was too shallow and narrow for the larger ships of the French fleet.[35] As a result, the French selected an alternative anchorage at Aboukir Bay, 20 miles (32 km) northeast of Alexandria.[36]

Nelson's fleet reached Syracuse in Sicily on 19 July and took on essential supplies.[37] There the admiral wrote letters describing the events of the previous months: "It is an old saying, 'the Devil's children have the Devil's luck.' I cannot find, or at this moment learn, beyond vague conjecture where the French fleet are gone to. All my ill fortune, hitherto, has proceeded from want of frigates."[38] Meanwhile, the French were securing Egypt by the Battle of the Pyramids. By 24 July, the British fleet was resupplied and, having determined that the French must be somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nelson sailed again in the direction of the Morea.[39] On 28 July, at Coron, Nelson finally obtained intelligence describing the French attack on Egypt and turned south across the Mediterranean. His scouts, HMS Alexander and HMS Swiftsure, sighted the French transport fleet at Alexandria on the afternoon of 1 August.[40]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Nile#cite_note-WLC355-40

This highlight what I said about the sea being wide. I don't think that I overexaggerate the "chance" factor.

Yes, it's why they sent the Red Sea squadron. But the Red Sea squadron was small and was effectively operating with impunity.


You're essentially waving your hand that the British are purposely inept in this scenario and contradict yourself a few sentences ago about the British being aware of the threat. Regardless if they think any French invasion of India is silly, ttl Mauritius campaign would still be before any invasion of Java because the Indian trade routes were far more valuable than taking Java at the time. And the Mauritius were a nuisance for the British because it was a home for French privateering. The Javanese frankly had no threat to the British, its no coincidence the invasion of Java was the last of the non-European Napoleonic campaigns by the British.

The very need to maintain the Red Sea squadron (as well as guard the Cape) was what prevented further operations in the Indian Ocean, which speaks to British limitations in the region. I agree that Ile de France is a bigger threat, but in 1798, it seems that the people in charge of making decisions did not agree at all. Anyway, it was just an example to explain the cost of opportunity when you can't be everywhere and how a wrong decision or dismissing a threat may have undesirable consequences. Of course, the British would be either blockading Ile de France or the straits of the Red Sea, that's why I proposed a different context and alternatives to the Red Sea to discuss its plausibility.

What are you genuinely talking about? Who said anything about games or satellites? Why do you keep bringing up about games??

Because I think that you don't understand how wide is the sea, and the limitations of a naval blockade in the age of sail even when you had naval dominance. Blockade Toulon or the Strait of Gibraltar is one thing, control the whole Mediterranean is another. Not to speak about the Indian Ocean.

 

[BlazedSoulofHate]

Something that hasn't been mentioned yet is why the French needed to get to India by 1798. Tipu Sultan, ruler of Mysore was the last indian ruler to hold Indian coastal territory and be a clear and definitive French ally. In 1798, he was at war with the British in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, and requested French assistance. However, Tipu would fall in the Siege of Seringapatam in 1799, removing any chance of a friendly port for France after that point. So by 1803, there's no way for France to penetrate India, as the Marathas were de facto ruled by a pro-British minister, and the Sikhs were not consolidated by Ranjit Singh.

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

Something that hasn't been mentioned yet is why the French needed to get to India by 1798. Tipu Sultan, ruler of Mysore was the last indian ruler to hold Indian coastal territory and be a clear and definitive French ally. In 1798, he was at war with the British in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, and requested French assistance. However, Tipu would fall in the Siege of Seringapatam in 1799, removing any chance of a friendly port for France after that point. So by 1803, there's no way for France to penetrate India, as the Marathas were de facto ruled by a pro-British minister, and the Sikhs were not consolidated by Ranjit Singh.

The EIC provided a great income for the British Crown, therefore, anything harming British interests in India should benefit the French, I am wondering if the fourth Anglo-Mysore war could be delayed for few years, it was triggered by the French landing in Egypt, maybe the British would find another excuse to invade Mysore. By 1803 the Maratha Peshwa was powerless, and more than being pro-british, he was concerned about his own safety. Also in 1803 the British were fighting the Scindia and Bhonsale, and from 1804 to 1805, they fought against the Holkar. In 1807 the Holkar and Scindia (the real powers of the Maratha at that time) made an alliance, and Yashwantrao Holkar was busy until he died in 1811 building cannons and assembling a big army to eventually invade Calcutta.

As long as Yashwantrao Holkar is alive, the British should be nervous about the prospect of a French army landing in India, and if they manage to overcome the bad blood and rivalry between the Holkar and Scindia... The British are going to have a bad time.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

The entire plan was insane from the start. There is no viable route from Egypt to India that Britain can't control. French power projection ended at the Med. and India is....rather farther away.

 

[OxSpace]

. And again, the fleet that took Napoleon from France to Egypt weren't just 1-2-3 ships.

You're misunderstanding what I said and the general context. The British blockade wasn't present in the Mediterranean when Napoleon left for Egypt. And the note about the number of ships was in context of the existing blockade as it was after Trafalgar.

I will copy-paste something from wikipedia:

This highlight what I said about the sea being wide. I don't think that I overexaggerate the "chance" factor.

I never objected that Nelson wasn't going on some wild goose chase for the French fleet, I even said such. My point was that you're implying the French can slither around the British all they want despite the fact is was pure dumb luck that the French weren't spotted (which is even supported in the quoted section you posted).

The very need to maintain the Red Sea squadron (as well as guard the Cape) was what prevented further operations in the Indian Ocean, which speaks to British limitations in the region.

The RSS was only a couple ships and barely even a fraction of the British naval size. I think there's more context to a lack of British outward operations til the 1800s than a limited naval outreach.

Because I think that you don't understand how wide is the sea, and the limitations of a naval blockade in the age of sail even when you had naval dominance.

Please lay off the patronized assumptions because I disagree with you. I'm fully aware of the scale of the sea, I just don't know why you're projecting the limitations of the Atlantic campaign on a hypothetical Indian invasion. The British blockade was closely knitted, the main contingent of the blockade didn't need to run around in circles. You had inshore squadrons of small frigates and scouting ships, and not far off you had the main ships of the line that could easily intercept French ships spotted by inshore squadrons. It was extremely effective and confined the French that communication outside of the continent was extremely limited.

Blockade Toulon or the Strait of Gibraltar is one thing, control the whole Mediterranean is another. Not to speak about the Indian Ocean.

Controlling the Mediterranean isn't as far fetch as you're making it out to be. Once the main French fleet was destroyed and only a handful of frigates remained, the British plied the Mediterranean sea, which completely disrupted supplies to the campaign in the Levant. And once the British seized Malta and secured Sicily, any cross-Mediterranean contact would be near impossible. To quote Napoleon himself in 1806 about the British prolonged presence in Malta and Sicily: "an impenetrable barrier that [would block] communication between the Adriatic and Constantinople". When Napoleon tried to relieve forces in Malta and the Levant in February of 1800, the French squadron slipped out of Toulon but then got immediately intercepted near Malta. Any hypothetical luck for the French where they slip by would be stretched far and thin and would not be a stable supply for the troops in Egypt. The problem also is that the ships that did slip into Alexandria for supplies like the Africaine and Régénérée were immediately captured after they got to Alexandria and weren't able to head back to France. These one-way missions were not practical.

As for India, there really isn't any need to have expensive and inadequate maintenance of the entire sea. There's only one logical route to Sindh unless you want to do some contrived maneuver that just prolongs your stay on the sea. Which I don't think would be wise for an invasion. If the RSS is operational, it will easily intercept.

And the problem becomes direr in the scenario that the French do land. How are they going to effectively get supplies from France to Egypt, and then from Egypt to India? Or go all the way around Africa, which wasn't going to happen. Is Napoleon going to make his canal?
To quote Denis Decrès
"...the difficulties of maritime operations have never been as great as on this occasion! The enemy has never had as many ships available and we have never had fewer ports of call and greater shortages in our distant ports. All of these expeditions of nine or ten months at sea appear to me to have no chance of success, and especially no parity between their probable advantages and the nearly inevitable dangers that are associated with it."

The only chance Napoleon has with this is completely dislodging the British from the Mediterranean

 

[Hayden Nikerson]

You're misunderstanding what I said and the general context. The British blockade wasn't present in the Mediterranean when Napoleon left for Egypt. And the note about the number of ships was in context of the existing blockade as it was after Trafalgar.

I never objected that Nelson wasn't going on some wild goose chase for the French fleet, I even said such. My point was that you're implying the French can slither around the British all they want despite the fact is was pure dumb luck that the French weren't spotted (which is even supported in the quoted section you posted).

The RSS was only a couple ships and barely even a fraction of the British naval size. I think there's more context to a lack of British outward operations til the 1800s than a limited naval outreach.

I didn't say that the French can slither around the British all they want, just that this wasn't something impossible. Napoleon's fleet needed luck (I think Nelson was dealing with a storm while Napoleon left Toulon) and yes, the fact that Nelson passed them was pure dumb luck, but confirms that it wasn't impossible, it was easier (Easier not easy) however for frigates and other small ships, and in my opinion, the transports should be left in Egypt after landing the army while the ships of the line and frigates go back to Toulon, so the French can keep a fleet in being in the western Mediterranean. As for the fleet in the Red Sea, the Royal Navy didn't have so many ships in the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic was a priority.

Please lay off the patronized assumptions because I disagree with you.

Actually, I appreciate such a detailed reply.

I just don't know why you're projecting the limitations of the Atlantic campaign on a hypothetical Indian invasion. The British blockade was closely knitted, the main contingent of the blockade didn't need to run around in circles. You had inshore squadrons of small frigates and scouting ships, and not far off you had the main ships of the line that could easily intercept French ships spotted by inshore squadrons. It was extremely effective and confined the French that communication outside of the continent was extremely limited.

Controlling the Mediterranean isn't as far fetch as you're making it out to be. Once the main French fleet was destroyed and only a handful of frigates remained, the British plied the Mediterranean sea, which completely disrupted supplies to the campaign in the Levant. And once the British seized Malta and secured Sicily, any cross-Mediterranean contact would be near impossible. To quote Napoleon himself in 1806 about the British prolonged presence in Malta and Sicily: "an impenetrable barrier that [would block] communication between the Adriatic and Constantinople". When Napoleon tried to relieve forces in Malta and the Levant in February of 1800, the French squadron slipped out of Toulon but then got immediately intercepted near Malta. Any hypothetical luck for the French where they slip by would be stretched far and thin and would not be a stable supply for the troops in Egypt. The problem also is that the ships that did slip into Alexandria for supplies like the Africaine and Régénérée were immediately captured after they got to Alexandria and weren't able to head back to France. These one-way missions were not practical.

That's why I suggested an alliance with the Ottomans, so the French can get supplies from the Ottomans (at least until the British and the Russians force the Ottomans to switch alliances) and get local resources in Egypt to make the army more or less self-sustaining.

As for India, there really isn't any need to have expensive and inadequate maintenance of the entire sea. There's only one logical route to Sindh unless you want to do some contrived maneuver that just prolongs your stay on the sea. Which I don't think would be wise for an invasion. If the RSS is operational, it will easily intercept.

And the problem becomes direr in the scenario that the French do land. How are they going to effectively get supplies from France to Egypt, and then from Egypt to India? Or go all the way around Africa, which wasn't going to happen. Is Napoleon going to make his canal?
To quote Denis Decrès
"...the difficulties of maritime operations have never been as great as on this occasion! The enemy has never had as many ships available and we have never had fewer ports of call and greater shortages in our distant ports. All of these expeditions of nine or ten months at sea appear to me to have no chance of success, and especially no parity between their probable advantages and the nearly inevitable dangers that are associated with it."

Any sea route should be as short as possible. I personally think that the best option is an alliance with Persia once the Ottomans switch sides and take a land route, which probably implies some confrontation with at least one afghan claimant. And before anything is done, the French needs to secure their position in Egypt and be less dependent on supplies from France, even then, I can't see the French going farther than Sindh, that's why I asked if "an army in being" there would be enough to force negotiations with the British.

 

[OxSpace]

it was easier (Easier not easy) however for frigates and other small ships, and in my opinion, the transports should be left in Egypt after landing the army while the ships of the line and frigates go back to Toulon, so the French can keep a fleet in being in the western Mediterranean.

The fleet in being strategy only really works when you don't have any serious operations outside of your sea ports and the pure presence of a possible sally out of the fleet keeps the blockader at their toes. This strategy seems like it'd factor more British naval presence in the Mediterranean, which isn't good for the French as the Armée d'Orient requires French control of the Mediterranean.

That's why I suggested an alliance with the Ottomans, so the French can get supplies from the Ottomans (at least until the British and the Russians force the Ottomans to switch alliances) and get local resources in Egypt to make the army more or less self-sustaining.

The problem is that Egypt cannot properly sustain the French army. It has food, but lacks ammunition, replacement equipment, medicine, reinforcements, and other goods. And when the Ottomans do inevitably switch sides, this will put a lot of pressure on the French.

Any sea route should be as short as possible. I personally think that the best option is an alliance with Persia once the Ottomans switch sides and take a land route, which probably implies some confrontation with at least one afghan claimant. And before anything is done, the French needs to secure their position in Egypt and be less dependent on supplies from France, even then, I can't see the French going farther than Sindh, that's why I asked if "an army in being" there would be enough to force negotiations with the British.

I said in my first comment that an Alexander style march is really impractical. It's 2400 mi / 387 km away from Alexandria. Not only would you need to march through the Ottomans (which is likely hostile at this point), but you need to make sure to defend Egypt. Iran isn't going to be able to supply the French, they have their own problems. Afghanistan has always been a geographic nightmare for armies, so it's not remotely a reliable area. How big is the French army in India? Because the army of the East India Company is quite large through the Maratha wars. The French army by the time they even reach what was British India at the time, the army will be a fraction of what left Alexandria. This is also taking into account that the French meet 0 hostilities between the Afghans or Punjabs.

 

[Fabius Maximus]

The thing is, the Royal Navy isn't omnipresent, it can't blockade Brest, defend Sicily, intercept supplies to Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean, protect the British West Indies, patrol the North Sea, blockade the French privateers in the East Indies and intercept the ships moving troops from Egypt to Sindh without any leaks. Too many ships in one point could be translated into too few ships in another. I'm not saying it would be easy for the French, of course it wouldn't be, but it wouldn't be easy for the British neither.

Sure, there'd be plenty of leaks, but nowhere near enough to support an army all the way off in India. Even if the French do manage to get forces there, they'd just get whittled down and eventually destroyed without more support than a few blockade runners can provide.