"C" (Mansfield Smith-Cumming) was a Captain in the Royal Navy as well as the head of MI6. Captains do what the 3rd Sea Lord tells them.
Optimize the RN for WWII
- Thread starter Spencersj345.346
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"C" (Mansfield Smith-Cumming) was a Captain in the Royal Navy as well as the head of MI6. Captains do what the 3rd Sea Lord tells them.
Riain
Banned
This becomes a magnet for uboats. I keep thinking about the siege of Tobruk and how after the first time the Allies decided not to do it again.
100%.
I'd like to think big, but am a negative Nancy and there were no shortage of signatories for the naval treaties. My aim would be to build up to the the Treaty limits and within that get as high quality and forward thinking as possible.
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Do you understand the logistics of supplying such a force?
Trondheim is only 50,000 people.
Where are you going to position these troops around the fjords ?
The law of unintended consequences might come into play. What if he's replaced by another Fascist who runs Italy better than Mussolini did?
He died on 14th June 1923 and the POD's 1st January 1923 so "Our Man" has six months to do it. Except that he doesn't have the authority to do it. "C" (Mansfield Smith-Cumming) was a (retired) Captain in the Royal Navy and the 3rd Sea Lord was an admiral but he wasn't in the "Our Man's" chain of command. The closest British intelligence organisation to our "Our Man's" chain of command was the Royal Navy's Naval Intelligence Department which was under the First Sea Lord, not the Third Sea Lord. Therefore, he can't tell the Director of Naval Intelligence what to do either. The best he can do advise the First Sea Lord who follows that advice by ordering the DNI to do it or passes the suggestion onto the First Lord of the Admiralty who advises the Foreign Secretary who (after obtaining approval from the Prime Minister or Cabinet) orders "C" to do it.
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Do you want expedient demises to be arranged for Adolf Hitler and certain Japanese Army officers too? Be careful what you wish for. They might be replaced by people who are just as (if not more) evil and more competent.
let's focus on what the RN can do. not stuff that's alas the foreign office's bailiwick for the most part. not to mention we really can't afford to ruin the UK's international image since we need as much trade as possible. Got a economy to rebuild and debt to pay off old boys
That might not be a bad thing. If they're attacking the Norwegian convoys they're not attacking Atlantic convoys. Plus the Norwegian convoys would be heavily defended. So the net result might be fewer merchant ships and more U-boats sunk. However, this TL's alternative historians won't know that. All they'll see is the heavy losses in merchant ships and escorts that the Norwegian convoys suffered and not the heavier Atlantic convoy losses that otherwise would have been.
Even better, holding Crete almost certainly means either allies take Rhodes or that Rhodes is harassed and largely isolated. Either would put a major crimp on axis air activity from Rhodes which OTL caused quite a few problems for convoy routing.
But then holding Crete also (more than likely) saves a few destroyers and cruisers.
Of course this is getting into hindsight rather than foresight, but 'we need to have the naval strength to take and hold Crete, Rhodes and Malta if we are to control Libya and Sicily' is (mostly) foresight as is adding 'whether France supports us or not'
Edit. While the army will put the boots on the ground (with help from the marines and naval parties), and provide the harrisons, it's definitely navy business getting them there, providing air cover, shore bombardment, supply etc
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Hmmm. You think it's plausible to pull a toranto that doesn't just nail the Battleships but also the other stuff in the harbor in particular the cruisers?
Riain
Banned
Yes, IOTL Taranto was attacked with 22 aircraft from 1 carrier which limited the amount of targets that could be attacked. If there were 2 or 3 carriers and these carriers had CAGs of maybe 50-60 aircraft each then the attack could be conducted by a minimum of 60 to up to 120 aircraft in 2 waves. That's enough to allocate plenty of aircraft to the battleships with some left over for the cruisers.
Give Violet Gibson a bigger gun (not sure of this is in the remit of the 3SL)
11 torpedo carrying Aircraft attacked 5 battleships getting 5 hits on 3 of them (3 on Littorio)
Littorio was saved from sinking by being run aground - more hits and she is likely unable to be beached
Riain
Banned
I'm thinking about the planes the optimised FAA would require. By my count at the lower end in September 1939 there would be 4 Ark Royals aircraft and 3 follies 384 aircraft on decks, so likely 600 including training and reserve squadrons. That's a hell of a lot more that OTLs 160 carrier aircraft.
Then there's the wastage rate, IOTL the small CAGs dwindled to impotence extremely quickly. It will be very difficult to keep 2 or 3 carriers in the Eastern med full of aircraft.
Then there's the wastage rate, IOTL the small CAGs dwindled to impotence extremely quickly. It will be very difficult to keep 2 or 3 carriers in the Eastern med full of aircraft.
Asian Jumbo
Monthly Donor
I think that we are working the poor chap pretty hard here so a nice cultural break in Italy seems perfectly reasonable
It might become a magnet for U-Boats, but the German fleet is fundamentally limited for some time in the early war. In 1939, they built 18 and in 1940, 50; on top of their existing pre 1939 fleet of 45, including the earlier coastal boats. Every U-Boat committed to operations against the 'Norway convoys' is one that isn't operating elsewhere. not to mention putting it in an area where the RN and RAF can concentrate escorts and airpower, particularly with preparation. This isn't a siege operation, but a strategic move that pays off in a lot of ways. As Nomisyrruc says, it sucks the enemy submarines away from areas where they can do more meaningful damage to the British/Allied war effort, particularly in 1940.
The signatories to the Naval Treaties were the USA (which generally abided by them but adopted a more flexible approach to some definitional issues), the Japanese (who decidedly didn't abide by them in the letter or spirit), the French (who don't really matter as they are presumably going to be on our side) and the Italians (who adopted a mixed approach that culminated in not abiding by them). The moment that Italy and Japan don't play ball in 1936, then the Treaty system is dead in the water. Abiding by them at that point in any meaningful way isn't the best means of optimising the RN for victory.
During the time that we are subject to them then, I agree with building up to whatever limits are in place (which don't effect light cruisers and destroyers in the 1920s) whilst putting in place the ways, means and devices to o'erleap the known enemy the very moment they no long apply. Furthermore, given that we have some degree of political flexibility with regard to 1st London, I support using every bit of it in whatever ways can be accomplished.
Being a negative Nancy is no bad thing and provides a very useful perspective to balance the more ambitious faction, as it were. However, with the amount of strategic warning supplied, we'd be not using the opportunities presented to maximum effect if we only go for a slightly improved force in both numbers and quality. The money is most certainly there, in both the more circumspect programme ably proposed by Nomisyrruc and the more aggressive one that I've mooted.
Yes, insofar as a chap without military education/experience can, but with the background of 27+ years reading and study. Each division will need ~500 tons per day, an increased allowance cover the exigencies of cold weather operations. I wouldn't think that the field forces of the early war would approach the late war divisional slice requirement oft quoted of 700 tons due to the unsuitability of Norwegian terrain to the same extent of motorised operations postulated for France in 1944/45. There wouldn't be much change out of 20,000 tons per week for the ground forces.
On top of that, there would be a requirement for quite a few airfields, both forward ones for fighters around Trondheim and rearward ones for light bombers and strike aircraft as well as long range fighters at Namsos; I don't have any figures on the necessary supply needs (fuel, lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, bombs plus food and necessary personnel supplies) for 200 Hurricanes, 100 Spitfires and 100 Blenheims (or more preferably a proper dive bomber adapted from an RN development in the 1930s), but would be very interested to find out; they would be supported in turn by long range fighters and strike aircraft operating from Scotland and the Shetlands. I'd think it might be in the region of 250 tons a day, just as a wild guess. The weather will have an effect on the possible scope for operations, which in turn will impact the needed supplies.
I don't know the port capacities of Trondheim and Namsos during this period, but they would necessarily need to be increased to support such a force, including construction of a new dedicated port in Trondheimfjord and associated infrastructure. I'm further not sure on the food/supply production capacity of Northern Norway, but would presume the majority would be focused upon localised civilian needs rather than any considerable surplus. Again, I'd be quite interested to find out.
If the Kriegsmarine has been very nastily dealt with, then the possibility of being outflanked by German naval transport or amphibious assault is minimal. That leaves their possible lines of advance as coming up the Dovrebanen through Dombas or up the coastal road system. The former is more likely, given the importance of having a railway to support an offensive; a priority would be disabling the line up from Dombas if it fell to Jerry. Andalsnes is important as there is a railway line between it and Dombas since 1924, so at least one corps would be based there, with the other at Oppdal and a Norwegian division covering the flank to Roros.
The Germans would be operating aircraft out of Stavanger (555km away from Trondheim), Bergen (461km) and Oslo (391km). The Bf-109 in the early war is going to have a combat radius of 300km, which is going to put it out of the picture for operations other than from limited forward airfields. The Bf-110 can make it from Bergen and Oslo, with the former being a more limited base; the combat record of 110s up against single engine fighters isn't the best. That gives a window of potential for the establishment of land based air in the Trondheim area of operations, whilst covered by RN carriers.
The strategic advantage of holding half of Norway is that it allows for purchase of Swedish iron ore through Narvik, with a knock on effect on the broader British shipping situation and industrial production if and when French North African iron ore shifts in availability; allows for more general courting of Sweden, including buying ball bearing production or a portion thereof; allows for more effective Allied engagement with Finland from 1940 onwards, potentially preventing them jumping into the Nazi camp for Barbarossa and the Continuation War and fairly significantly impacting the Eastern Front, including preventing the same level of losses from any Arctic convoys; it saves hundreds of thousands of Norwegians from the tender mercies of German occupation; it severely constrains the Kriegsmarine from being able to contemplate surface operations out into the Norwegian Sea and breakout operations into the Atlantic; it deprives Germany of Norwegian heavy water by putting the Vemork plant in range of air raids that would make its ordinary operations quite unlikely; and ties down German land and air forces from other theatres, such as the Mediterranean.
The combination of those advantages make the eye watering logistical price worth paying.
Given that the RN can't reasonably interdict the invasion forces bound for Oslofjord and Stavanger apart from submarines, cutting off the whole Norwegian campaign at its initiation would seem to be rather difficult without extraordinary luck bordering on the supernatural. If a march can be stolen on the Germans and a window open up for holding Southern Norway, then matters shift even further. I agree with your earlier conclusion that it would be a logistical headache to garrison and defend Norway, but the British Prime Minister in 1940 was the same chap who advocated the Greek campaign of 1941.
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If it helps...
A transcript of the British Official History of the Campaign in Norway is on Hyperwar.
Here's a link to it.
A transcript of the British Official History of the Campaign in Norway is on Hyperwar.
Here's a link to it.
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