Onderzeeboot Nekt Navalisme - Or: The Dutch Submarine Service during World War 2

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Sorry for the total lack of updates! The board of my school has decided that they want to close us, so my sparse free time has been spend trying to stop that from happening. The good news is that if I fail to do that, I will have loads and loads and loads of spare time for writing after the end of this schoolyear ;)
We don't know how important schooling is to us until its done. Best thing after good health and happiness, is a good education, they can't take that away from you. I hope your school stays open, (but I do love your TL)

Wished I'd paid more attention to my English Grammar lessons!
 
Nice work so far, Dutch centred WW2 TLs are rare to say the least, and with the POD being this early, changes should be interesting to see. Submarines are certainly cheaper to both build and man, and I presume that money (and political will) are easier to secure for them then attempting to build a surface fleet capable of taking on IJN.

I am not exactly an expert, but it seems there was nothing wrong with Dutch Submarines (or any other weapons, aside from availlability), so with greater numbers and doctrine that does not have "Anarchy" in its name, they could really make a difference. Of course, it is not as straightforward as that, but I really look forward to seeing what future holds.
 
Nice work so far, Dutch centred WW2 TLs are rare to say the least, and with the POD being this early, changes should be interesting to see. Submarines are certainly cheaper to both build and man, and I presume that money (and political will) are easier to secure for them then attempting to build a surface fleet capable of taking on IJN.
Thanks for the compliment! While the POD is pretty early, not much will change until the the 1930s. That was when the influence of Furstner really started to make a difference and turned the KM towards navalism.

There were basically three big problems for a submarine-based defence of the DEI:
  1. The KM decided to switch to a (light)cruise-based defense in the 1930s.
  2. ABDACOM screwing up the link between naval units and aerial reconnaissance.
  3. Deployment of submarines in Europe and Malaya instead of being concentrated.
These three problems have to be solved and Furstner being more submarine-minded is the beginning of the solution.
 
Well, consider me subbed. I've heard about the sucesses Dutch submarine assest in the Far East were able to achieve in the initial phase of the war there. A realistic chance of turning it up will be nice to see
 
Thanks for the compliment! While the POD is pretty early, not much will change until the the 1930s. That was when the influence of Furstner really started to make a difference and turned the KM towards navalism.

There were basically three big problems for a submarine-based defence of the DEI:
  1. The KM decided to switch to a (light)cruise-based defense in the 1930s.
  2. ABDACOM screwing up the link between naval units and aerial reconnaissance.
  3. Deployment of submarines in Europe and Malaya instead of being concentrated.
These three problems have to be solved and Furstner being more submarine-minded is the beginning of the solution.
Well you have two decades to play around this :)
.... point 2 and 3 are at the very end of the decade and more a strategic error not only made by the Dutch.
Although if they had a tiny bit more assets in the NEI they could do the defence of NEI on their own way, that is not alone but their own tactics and strategy as they developed in the interbellum.
Given that there will be no strong navalistic lobby emerging whitin the KM
 
Well you have two decades to play around this :)
.... point 2 and 3 are at the very end of the decade and more a strategic error not only made by the Dutch.
True! I have some fun (though not always for those involved) ideas to counter 2 and 3 but they are indeed much later in the game, when the war has already started.
Given that there will be no strong navalistic lobby emerging whitin the KM
I have to disagree I'm afraid. There is certainly going to be a navalistic lobby within the KM, and Furstner will have a tough job countering them. There is just something about big guns and naval officers I guess. That's also why I kept Furstner alive, he is needed for this fight!
 
True! I have some fun (though not always for those involved) ideas to counter 2 and 3 but they are indeed much later in the game, when the war has already started.

I have to disagree I'm afraid. There is certainly going to be a navalistic lobby within the KM, and Furstner will have a tough job countering them. There is just something about big guns and naval officers I guess. That's also why I kept Furstner alive, he is needed for this fight!
I will wait your updates with anticipation!
I think this big gun thing is something with boys and toys not with common strategic sense....
The whole navalistic discussion seems that the propagist of big guns created conclusions in order to justify the gigantic budgets for type of ships which proved in the last war of nearly no value..... a bit the same as Admiral Tirpitz did befor the Great War.
 
On the other hand, did submarines ever prove decisive in preventing an invasion as the Dutch submarine service apparently thought they would be?

I'm not really a big gun fan (my interest lie more in convoys and small escorts) but subs were fairly specialised pieces of equipment that were also over-rated in some areas.
 
On the other hand, did submarines ever prove decisive in preventing an invasion as the Dutch submarine service apparently thought they would be?

I'm not really a big gun fan (my interest lie more in convoys and small escorts) but subs were fairly specialised pieces of equipment that were also over-rated in some areas.
The big thing is the Japanese invasions in 1941-1942 were very precariously on the edge of their logistical string, and arguably the most useful role of a large, properly used submarine service is to attack supply lines, something that should be pretty successful given OTL Dutch prowess with the handicaps they shouldn't have here, and the poor Japanese ASW capabilities that should carry over.
 
On the other hand, did submarines ever prove decisive in preventing an invasion as the Dutch submarine service apparently thought they would be?

I'm not really a big gun fan (my interest lie more in convoys and small escorts) but subs were fairly specialised pieces of equipment that were also over-rated in some areas.
German subs performed rather poor in Norway 1940.
 
On the other hand, did submarines ever prove decisive in preventing an invasion as the Dutch submarine service apparently thought they would be?

I'm not really a big gun fan (my interest lie more in convoys and small escorts) but subs were fairly specialised pieces of equipment that were also over-rated in some areas.
I know of no amphibious operation that was thwarted because of submarine attacks on the invasion force.
The big thing is the Japanese invasions in 1941-1942 were very precariously on the edge of their logistical string, and arguably the most useful role of a large, properly used submarine service is to attack supply lines, something that should be pretty successful given OTL Dutch prowess with the handicaps they shouldn't have here, and the poor Japanese ASW capabilities that should carry over.
I don't want to spoil to much but the KM considered the supply lines to be of secondary importance. All efforts should be expended to attack and destroy the invasion force. After that battle was over the fight would shift to the supply lines, with what was left of the submarine force.
 
On the other hand, did submarines ever prove decisive in preventing an invasion as the Dutch submarine service apparently thought they would be?
That is the crux, the submarine strategy and tactics developed during the interbellum and even trained for the last time in 1940, to prevent an invasion fleet was torpedoed (pun intended) at a crucial point in history. It must be maddening for the KM submariners that their commanders kept believing in artillery ships even they did not have any of these ships. While there were at least 4 submarine divisions in the NEI and if the KM admiralty wanted this could be increased to 6 divisions, that is 24 submarines. Most of them of modern to relative modern types or the old ones at least capable enough to ambush the invasion forces in the narrow straits of the NEI archipelago.
 
Last edited:
German subs performed rather poor in Norway 1940.
Correct but the German Rudel tactic, if that already existed during the Norway campaign in 1940 was different than the Roedel-Division tactic of the Dutch.

The Dutch tactic was not intended for warships as primary target, this were the transports and for the Germans cargo ships.

The Germans subs did not cooperate with aerial reconnaissance as a standard and if the German subs used aerial reconnaissance information the information was prosessed by the HQ on land and had at least several hours delay before it was transmitted to the submarine comanders at sea.

The Dutch submarine commander had direct contact with his eyes in the sky and had the responsibility to act on his own judgement whitout any interference of the HQ far away on land.

The Dutch submarine divisions, 3 to 4 boats, operated much closer to each other than the Germans, furter the Dutch divisons were activly comanded by the divison commander by radio, while the German subs operated far from aech other and relative in a solisistic manner. Some sort of concentration, Rudel, only occured if on of the German boats spotted a convoy, The attack of this German Rudels was not a concentrated attack of 3 to 4 boats in a short time, but more a prolonged atack of several independent boats on the same target/convoy.

@ HJ Tulp, I hope I explained above correct, if not please correct me.
 
Chapter 3: Protecting the Emerald Empire
III. Protecting the Emerald Empire


800px-1916_Dutch_East_Indies_-_Art.jpg

The Netherlands’ most precious jewel


The 17th century is known in the Netherlands as the Golden Century and with good reason. Though the Netherlands – or the Republic of the United Provinces as it was called in that period – lacked the territorial size or population of powers like Spain, France or England, it was very much a great power which was often envied by them. It’s merchant fleet were omnipresent while the Dutch navy was more than a match for it’s competitors. Though the Netherlands didn’t face economic decline as such in the following 18th century – or Silver Century [1] –, until 1830 it was the richest country in the world, there certainly was stagnation compared to other countries. The resulting decline in economic and diplomatic status would continue during the 19th century and it’s Industrial Revolution, as the Kingdom of the Netherlands lacked the population and natural resources to be an earlier adopter of steam-powered industry.

As the United Kingdom of the Netherlands came to a dramatic end, the choice was made for the geopolitical anonymity of neutrality. This would remain a broadly supported policy for over a hundred years. At least, in Europe. Because there was something that separated the Netherlands from other geopolitical minnows like Belgium, Denmark or Sweden: the Indies. For with the Dutch East Indies, the Netherlands possessed the third largest colonial empire (in terms of population) and one of the few truly profitable colonial possessions. The Dutch were certainly not being neutral and aloof in the ‘Girdle of Emerald’, as the colony was affectionally nick-named. The possessions of the once-omnipotent VOC[2] had been transferred to the Dutch state after it’s bankruptcy and would be more and more expanded throughout the 19th century.

Tropisch Nederland.png

The size of the European Netherlands (the windmill) compared to the size of ‘Tropical’ Netherlands (the palmtree).

verovering-nederlands-indiee-19de-eeuw.large.jpg

Expansion of the Dutch East Indies

During the expansion, the Dutch initially didn’t have much to fear, militarily speaking. Dutch military technology or arms production was far from a frontrunner, but it’s technological advantage over native powers was significant enough that the outcome of a military conflict was almost [3] never in doubt. European powers, against which the Netherlands did not enjoy any technological advantage, were dissuaded from interfering in the East Indies by the policy of neutrality and British economic interests. The security of the colony was further enhanced by the fact that the situation in Europe forced the great powers to keep their capital ships mainly in their home waters, to guard against each other. Because of this, it could be argued that in around 1880 the Royal Netherlands Navy was in possession of the most powerful ship in the region, the Zr. Ms. Koning der Nederlanden[4]! This couldn’t be argued for long though.

wwwopac.ashx

Lithographic of Zr. Ms. ramtowership Koning der Nederlanden, 1876

The Netherlands wasn’t the only country that was expanding it’s empire in Asia. The same can be said for the British, French, American and even the Japanese at this point. As more and more of Asia was colonized, competition for the remainder increased. As a consequence of that competition between great powers, the arms race increased. In an attempt to gain dominance over the others, new, and increasingly powerful, ships were build. This had the side effect that there were now second-rate capital ships available for service overseas. The navy in the Dutch East Indies was becoming outgunned and outpaced, and with it the defense of the prized colony. That defense, and any solution to its weakness, was further complicated by the fragmentation of its organization. The Dutch naval forces were divided in three separate commands:
  • The Auxiliary Squadron. Formed by ships of the Koninklijke Marine that were detached to the Indies. This force was under control of the Ministry of Navy and meant to guard the colony against an external enemy.
  • The Indische Military Marine, or Indian Military Navy. Controlled by the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, with the ships being paid for by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, while the personal was in service of the Navy. The Indian Military Navy assisted in the efforts to expand Dutch authority in the archipelago.
  • The Gouvernementsmarine, or Governmental Navy. Naval police force paid for and under control of the Governor-General.
Including the Koninklijke Nederlands-Indisch Leger, the Royal Dutch Indian Army [5] (KNIL), there were four military organizations reporting to two separate ministries (the Ministry of Navy and the Ministry of Colonial Affairs), each with their own wants and interests. This fragmentation made the question of how to defend the Indies a problem of enormous proportions. To solve this gordian knot two commissions were convened, one on the question of how the naval forces should be organized, the other for the defense of the Indies as a whole. As we shall see, while the solutions of these commissions were not without merit, the Dutch government proved not to be an Alexander.


‘Coups de main’

vkwxgqhbdso2


Frederik Herman Pieter van Alphen, Commander of the Navy in the Indies 1883-1885

In the discussions regarding the defense of the Netherlands, it is clear that neither the KNIL nor the Navy were inclined to see the problem as something they should solve together. Both organizations were afraid that the other would make them a secondary or even auxiliary force and thus made all possible efforts to achieve their own primacy. This way of thinking clouded their perception of the casus to be solved, as both the KNIL and the Navy saw only those types of conflicts as likely, which put their own service in the center of it’s defense.

For the commander of the Navy in the Indies, schout-bij-nacht [6] Fredrik van Alphen, the only two likely scenarios were (a) violations of the country’s neutrality in the outer regions of the colony and (b) coups de main, a surprise attack on one or two ports on Java. Both scenarios offered different advantages to the Navy in their struggle against the KNIL. The first (a) stressed the importance of the Outer Regions, where the ships of the Navy with all their mobility could operate, and the, pretty much Java-based KNIL, could not. A coups de main meanwhile, had the advantage that such a operation by a foreign power, unable to concentrate forces without giving away the element of surprise, would be within the realm of possibilities for the KM to defeat.

The position of Van Alphen was welcomed by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, which struggled with the question how to pay for the defense of the enormous archipelago. If the only threat would be from relatively weak forces, the military apparatus wouldn’t have to be build up to greatly either, with all its financial challenges that would entail. For this reason there were many in the Navy and certainly the KNIL, which opposed the views of Van Alphen. Despite that, the idea of the coups de main as the principle scenario to be defeated, would cast a long shadow on the defense of the Dutch East Indies.



The ‘Fundamentals’ of 1892

As the 19th century was nearing its end, Dutch expansion in the East Indies was nearly at completion. With that, the internal threats to the colony lessened, but the external threats grew larger. It was clear that a concerted and revised effort to defend the Dutch possessions in Asia was necessary. Two successive state-commissions were appointed by the government of the Netherlands to lay the groundwork from which that defense could be formed. The first (or naval) commission would look into the Navy’s organization and role in the defense of the Dutch East Indies, while the second (or defense) commission would see into the defense of the colony as a whole. The composition of the defense commissions is interesting to note, as it consisted of not only representatives of the Navy and KNIL, but also of the Inspector of Engineers, lieutenant-general Joachim Kromhout, of the Dutch Army. This last addition is curious, as the Dutch Army had practically nothing to do with the defense of the Indies. In case of a war against a foreign enemy, there were plans to send officers and maybe a brigade of men to aid in the defense, but nothing more substantial than that. In fact, Dutch conscripts were constitutionally banned from deployment to the colonies. The participation of Kromhout only makes sense when one considers the bad relationship between the KNIL and the Navy, as those two needed a neutral arbiter!

800px-Joachim_Hendrik_Kromhout.jpg

Lieutenant-General Joachim Kromhout, peacekeeper avant la lettre

If there had been the hope that these two commissions would result in a firm bedrock for the military power of the Dutch East Indies to grow on, those were dashed, with the two commissions and the government all sharing in the blame.

The naval commission was soon split in two groups, with a majority wanting to keep the Indian Military Navy and with that, a focus on internal security, while the minority warned for the increasing external threat. In spite of that there was still a unified advice to the government: The Indian Military Navy would phase out over time, with the Aceh War winding down. With that, the two remaining naval structures would the Auxiliary Squadron and the Governmental Navy, with the colonial administration paying more into the former. This constituted a tacit acceptance of the coups de main as the main threat to the colony as was stated by the minister of Colonial Affairs.

Unexpectedly the defense commission was act more unified than expected. It could be the work of ‘peacekeeper’ Kromhout but that hasn’t been proven. Regardless, the commission came to a military (meaning army and navy combined) union of purpose in case of war against a foreign power. In that case the main defensive effort would be focused on the island of Java, and more precisely Batavia as the center of Dutch colonial administration. The Navy would act directly against the invasion forces close to their landing zones. The KNIL would do the same but only once internal stability and colonial authority was certain. Here we clearly see the role of the KNIL as a police-army. The Navy should consist of a mixed fleet in two parts:
  1. Four ‘strijders’ or ‘fighters, meaning large slow-moving armored ships supported by fast but unseaworthy torpedoboats. The characteristics of these ships made stationing near their expected area of operations (West-Java) necessary.
  2. Six cruisers to defend the Outer Regions against coups de main, protect neutrality and escort troop shipments from the Outer Regions to Java. They could also be used to scout against the enemy force moving towards Java but that wasn’t deemed as necessary, the commission had already decided where that was going to land!
As the role of the two commissions was only advisory, their recommendations had to be turned into policy by the government. This policy became know as the ‘Grondslagen’ or ‘Fundamentals’ for the defense of the Indies against a foreign enemy. These were broadly the following:
  • Centre of this defense would be West-Java but only in a late stadium would KNIL forces be concentrated there to avoid internal instability.
  • There would be a second naval base at Tjandong Priok (near Batavia) to accommodate naval forces countering an enemy invasion nearby.
These two fundamentals are not surprising to us by themselves. The devil is in the details however. Where the defense commission wanted all efforts to be made for the defense of West-Java, was this less pronounced in the final policy. Soerabaja (on East-Java) was the main base of the Navy and building up Tandjong Priok to that level was to costly for the liberal government. This also weakened the union of purpose between the KNIL and the Navy as stated in the report of the defense commission. Besides that, there was a glaring error in both the work of the commissions and the fundamentals: the position of Java as the only part of the colony that was truly important. For slowly but surely, the importance of the Outer Regions relative to the capital island grew and grew.[7]



  1. Also named because of the large sums earned by lending money to foreign powers.
  2. Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, United East India Company.
  3. Almost is the right word, for the Netherlands would fight a bloody guerilla war in Atjeh (or Aceh) from 1873. Though the last major engagement would be in 1914 (more than 40 years later!), one could argue that the area was never truly pacified. Even before the Japanese would land on Sumatra in 1942 (OTL of course 😉 ) there was a popular uprising which ended tenuous Dutch rule forever. Might do a chapter on Atjeh if it becomes relevant.
  4. King of the Netherlands.
  5. While the Dutch Indian Army received the title of ‘Royal’ in 1836, when it was added to its standard, colloquially it was called the Dutch Indian Army or Indisch Leger/Indian Army. Only in the 1930s would the abbreviation KNIL become widespread.
  6. Rear-admiral. Literally: sheriff-by-night, though it is also thought that schout is from the Dutch word schouwt or to survey..
  7. Everything in the update is as OTL.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I first planned to write an update up to the First World War but fear that it might make it too long in time and length. Feedback on the latter very appreciated, just like feedback on anything else!
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Hi HJ Tulp, I love this, yes it is all historical, but few of us know any of this. I feel its important to provide a good base of historical background before you go off on your POD, as we will better understand the why's and wherefores as well as the restrictions and reservations of not only the Dutch Government, but also the colony. I am following with great interest.
 
Very interesting, will follow with great attention!

I guess that ITTL Furstner keep his original idea of using light cruisers to bait the ennemy fleet into a submarine embush ?
 
I know of no amphibious operation that was thwarted because of submarine attacks on the invasion force.

I don't want to spoil to much but the KM considered the supply lines to be of secondary importance. All efforts should be expended to attack and destroy the invasion force. After that battle was over the fight would shift to the supply lines, with what was left of the submarine force.
Considering the choke points such as the northern neck of the Makassar Strait, Belitung -Borneo Strait, If subs can keep the IJN or at least it's transports out of the Java Sea, there is a chance.
Another issue with the recon was the lack of fighter protection for Seaplane bases and for patrol aircraft as far as fighters could reach. With the loss of the Philippines and decimation of the USAAC the Japanese had no aerial opposition.
 
Thanks for the compliment! While the POD is pretty early, not much will change until the the 1930s. That was when the influence of Furstner really started to make a difference and turned the KM towards navalism.

There were basically three big problems for a submarine-based defence of the DEI:
  1. The KM decided to switch to a (light)cruise-based defense in the 1930s.
  2. ABDACOM screwing up the link between naval units and aerial reconnaissance.
  3. Deployment of submarines in Europe and Malaya instead of being concentrated.
These three problems have to be solved and Furstner being more submarine-minded is the beginning of the solution.
The issue imo with ABDACOM was too many missions over too large an area with too few aircraft. USAAC B-17s were few and far between and in a constant fight between Mac Arthur and Adm. Hart Naval commander of ABDA afloat and the Asiatic Fleet ,and Hart and the Dutch dwindling numbers of PBYs and other amphibious recon aircraft.
 
Hi HJ Tulp, I love this, yes it is all historical, but few of us know any of this. I feel its important to provide a good base of historical background before you go off on your POD, as we will better understand the why's and wherefores as well as the restrictions and reservations of not only the Dutch Government, but also the colony. I am following with great interest.
Thanks for the feedback and - literally - lovely words! I was afraid that it might be a bit dull but I do agree that the background is needed to fully understand what is going to happen in the Interbellum.
Very interesting, will follow with great attention!

I guess that ITTL Furstner keep his original idea of using light cruisers to bait the ennemy fleet into a submarine embush ?
Thanks for reading! I also see you have delved into the subject already by reading Furstners wikipedia page, is that a cue for me to hurry up? ;) The wikipedia page is mistaken I'm afraid, the submarine ambush wasn't an idea of Furstner himself but of the commander of the navy at that moment. Dutch submarine tactics would evolve quite a lot after WWI as we will see!
Another issue with the recon was the lack of fighter protection for Seaplane bases and for patrol aircraft as far as fighters could reach. With the loss of the Philippines and decimation of the USAAC the Japanese had no aerial opposition.
Thanks for reading and welcome to the thread! I have some ideas regarding the deployment of Japanese airpower but I'm not sure how plausible they are.
The issue imo with ABDACOM was too many missions over too large an area with too few aircraft. USAAC B-17s were few and far between and in a constant fight between Mac Arthur and Adm. Hart Naval commander of ABDA afloat and the Asiatic Fleet ,and Hart and the Dutch dwindling numbers of PBYs and other amphibious recon aircraft.
There were a myriad of issues with ABDACOM unfortunately, in this instance I'm mostly concerned with those that kept the KM from deploying their original submarine tactics. There will be side effects from solving those issues though!
 
Last edited:
Top