they technically just need to last a few months before reinforcements could arrive, and that shouldn't be that big of a problem especially since the US holds the oceans anyways. Holding more pieces that'll allow for the defence of Ionia and bits of the Rhodope mountains would be paramount.
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
- Start date
What parts would be the best to claim if they wanted to get the best value out of the annexations, whilst limiting the most Turks and imultaneously maximizing the Greek population?
Serpent
Banned
Cannakkale, Sokia/Soke (includes Kusadasi, Didim) and Halikarnassos/Bodrum +Milas/Miletos would seem reasonable for the big 3 to accommodate I believe though.
EDIT: Apart from these 3, the Rest of Mugla province is also a viable claim, that the Wallies should accommodate, especially if it's limited to a narrower area that's predominantly Greek.
In general, apart from Cannakkale which is a strategic nessecity to possess and remove this enclave that is like a knife from the back of Greece, the rest of the territories, being on the borderline allows the flexibility of rearranging the borders so that the maximum amount of predominantly Turkish populated settlements are left outside of Greek territory, as long as that doesn't lead Greece to passing up the opportunity to own a strategically advantageous terrain, such as a mountain, a river etc, that would strengthen Greece's ability to defend it's borders.
But if the terrain in question is flat, why keep the old provincial borders of the Ottoman empire unchanged?
Now, I wouldn't really worry about the few hundred thousand Turks that will remain inside Greek borders, because of the upcoming migration of Greeks from Egypt that will even out the situation, even if this can't be used as a further reason to claim these areas, because they couldn't possibly have that knowledge of what will happen in the future, I'm just saying that I'm not really worried about the demographics of the region, the Turkish inhabitants would pass into minority even without proper suppression and hellenization efforts against them being implemented.
I believe that regardless of whether Greeks in the area constituted a minority or a majority of the population of these regions however that, the Greek state would push it's claims regardless and actively seek to incorporate these regions, just like France did with the territory of Alsace Lorraine for example, undeterred by the existence of a German majority in this region, among many other examples.
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On the other hand, how else can the Wallies contain a USSR that has bases in the Straits? In any case the Black Sea will be a soviet lake. It will be rather easy for the Red Army to reinforce their bases and embark on conquering parts of Anatolia where they cannot be contained.
Ah, but the majority didn't see themselves as German; therefore, they were not German. Alsatian, speaking a German language, yes. German, no.
They agreed on "reasonable border adjustments. But what does constitute reasonable adjustments? Now
THAT is open to interpretation.
Quite probably but that's a separate question.
The problem, from the Greek point of view is that pushing for a more defensible border puts you squarely into Turkish territory that post TTL 1922 doesn't have a single Greek.
As you probably noticed the list of territory aside from the coastal areas is what you'd need to put a border line along Mount Uludag - Simav- Banaz...
Arguably Usak. There is an excellent video here by Konstantinos Travlos of the geography of the wars in 1919-22... the strategic calculation is no different in 1945.
Serpent
Banned
Not to overstate the hightened localist element of the region of Alsace Lorraine, they are Southern Germans culturally, that isolation gave them a self inflicted sense of uniqueness, growing apart from the rest of their people, but not remotely as much as e.g. Swiss German people, (or if we were to go further than that, the Dutch people), although more than Austria for sure, however both are counted as German people, (with the exception of the Dutch, they drifted too much apart), culturally and otherwise, however all other nations, including France, saw them for what they were, that is German, even if southern.
Here I would say that, the Cappadocian Greeks and the Pontic Greeks have way more differences with the rest of the Greek people than the Alsatian Germans from the rest of the German people, a result of close to nine hundred years of relative isolation, (considered with just three hundred years of separation with the Alsatian Germans from Germany), yet they still consider themselves to be Greek people nonetheless.
Now again, they have some compatibilities with French people, their shared catholic religion, but alas, that alone is not enough.
You are mixing up culture and nationalism. Though Germany based itself on an ethnic nationalism in large part, that was not the case of the French universalist civic nationalism.
In anyway, the harsh policies of the Kaiserreich alienated the Alsaciens. Alsacien nationalism was expressed within Germany as the following sentence (translated) : Can't be French, will not be German, I'm Alsatian. In latter decades of Imperial rule, the can't be French was disemphasized at the profit of the Alsatian bit, but the fact of their refusal to be German remains.
This, more than the cultural aspects, is why I object to Alsace and Moselle being deemed German. They were civically French, not German, even if their culture was Alemannic like the Badeners, and thus closer to Berlin than Paris.
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What is the attitude of the Greek leadership about 'relocation'?
What I have in mind is, even if I know the memory of it is still contentious today, the expulsion of German ethnics or nationals from Czechoslovakia and Poland in the aftermath of the war. My knowledge of these events is superficial, and I need to get some reading on it, but the question I then think of is, if the Allies can accept as much for Germans (Poland's case seems to me the most relevant comparison give the size of the territorial shift and the relocations that followed) , can't they accept as much for Turkish populations within the "defensible borders" ?
The areas whose ethnic makeup you cite and that could be claimed has one million Turks, but compared to the millions of Germans displaced from Poland...
Not saying it could or should happen, just wondering how much of that could cross the Greeks' mind when something similar is happening across Eastern and Central Europe at a much larger scale.
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1944–50_flight_and_expulsion_of_Germans
I kind of feel like the Greeks can get a defensible border to the south. The further north you go the harder it gets to justify to everyone though. I feel like as some point the Greeks are going to accept that some portion of the north is going to be more vulnerable. As you mention Usak is probably the best “bang for their buck”, but the area near Bursa would presents a variety of problems for the Greeks and their Allies.
Honestly I wonder if the Greeks won’t try to persuade the Allies to break off that North Western portion of Turkey as some type of puppet based around Bursa. I could see that happening, particularly if they surrender to the Soviets and seem to be getting chummy with them. Plus I don’t think the UK or Greece would be particularly happy if Turkey proper still had any presence in the straits after this.
Population movement out of the area are likely already happening given the offensive actions by the Greek army.
While the area is under military occupation, military governors will also have leverage over the local populations. Receiving ration cards, ID papers etc can be tied to one's action during the war, whether someone is a CHP member etc. This could ultimately led to the population divided in several categories, ranging from disloyal elements to be expelled, to potential collaborators and even Hellenisable 'Crypto Greeks'. This is a similar system than the one France used when retaking Alsace Lorraine.
TTL Greece is a far more cosmopolitan country than OTL with numerous Greek Muslim minorities kept unlike OTL. So one can be Greek and Muslim TTL. Given time and efforts they likely can therefore absorb a Turkish minority. The majority of locals in Lydia in this new Asiatic Greece are likely to be illiterate too. They will learn to read in Greek letters, with Greek as the prestige language and dialect. Having Greek speaking imams will also help assimilation too.
Let us consider some things
1) That video is very useful. I think the Greeks will open negotiations with the Metxas 1915 line (the Zonguldak to Finike line). That was the line of control Metaxas considered defensible in his 1915 Memorandum. In OTL this was the line Gouveles advocated for in his 1921 Memorandum , and Dusmanes in his 1922 Memorandum. The Venizelists were less clear, though Venizelos was opposed to taking Bursa, and envisioned working with a Turkish client state over the rest of Asia Minor beyond the Greek zone. I expect thus the Greeks will open with the Finike- Zonguldak line expecting not to get it, but using it as the staring position. I expect an attempt to also demand Kutahya , but again expecting that to be blocked by the Soviets.
2) I fundamentally believe the Soviets will focus on making sure the Izmit-Mersin railway axis (including Kuthya, Eskisehir, Afyon) will remain in Turkish hands and out of Greek lands. This is land alternative to the straits. I expect them to be willing to sacrifice a lot to make sure that line of communication remains intact and in Turkey.
3) The Soviets will pursue a Finlandization strategy with Turkey. They will let the officer corps survive and control the country in return for Turkey being semi-neutral semi-allied to them. The dominant position of the Army in Turkey permits them to be able to promise the Soviets such a deal, as they can guarantee Turkish political stability orientated towards the USSR. Also the strategic situation post-war will leave little choice anyway. Indeed the Soviets can give the Turks many incentives for playing nice, in the sense of asking for less than they appear to be asking in official negotiations.
4) I thus expect the Soviets to focus on naval base in Izmit rather than Uskudar (they will be happy to provide of course occupation forces for a Soviet Zone in the international city) but their focus would be Izmit and its development of a major port (and then linking Sinope to the Iznik-Mersin railway system).
5) I thus do not expect the Soviets to go for a Kaliningrad style resolution. They will be happy enough with their part of the International Zone, and a naval base at Izmit. For that reason they will oppose any Greek territorial control over Bursa, to provide strategic depth to their position at Iznik.
I am attaching a picture of the borders I expect in that region.
6) In the rest of Asia Minor, as long as the railway line is safe, the Soviets are likely to be ok with Greek demands, though they can always raise objections as a way to locking in the Turkish leadership with a Soviet alliance.
1) That video is very useful. I think the Greeks will open negotiations with the Metxas 1915 line (the Zonguldak to Finike line). That was the line of control Metaxas considered defensible in his 1915 Memorandum. In OTL this was the line Gouveles advocated for in his 1921 Memorandum , and Dusmanes in his 1922 Memorandum. The Venizelists were less clear, though Venizelos was opposed to taking Bursa, and envisioned working with a Turkish client state over the rest of Asia Minor beyond the Greek zone. I expect thus the Greeks will open with the Finike- Zonguldak line expecting not to get it, but using it as the staring position. I expect an attempt to also demand Kutahya , but again expecting that to be blocked by the Soviets.
2) I fundamentally believe the Soviets will focus on making sure the Izmit-Mersin railway axis (including Kuthya, Eskisehir, Afyon) will remain in Turkish hands and out of Greek lands. This is land alternative to the straits. I expect them to be willing to sacrifice a lot to make sure that line of communication remains intact and in Turkey.
3) The Soviets will pursue a Finlandization strategy with Turkey. They will let the officer corps survive and control the country in return for Turkey being semi-neutral semi-allied to them. The dominant position of the Army in Turkey permits them to be able to promise the Soviets such a deal, as they can guarantee Turkish political stability orientated towards the USSR. Also the strategic situation post-war will leave little choice anyway. Indeed the Soviets can give the Turks many incentives for playing nice, in the sense of asking for less than they appear to be asking in official negotiations.
4) I thus expect the Soviets to focus on naval base in Izmit rather than Uskudar (they will be happy to provide of course occupation forces for a Soviet Zone in the international city) but their focus would be Izmit and its development of a major port (and then linking Sinope to the Iznik-Mersin railway system).
5) I thus do not expect the Soviets to go for a Kaliningrad style resolution. They will be happy enough with their part of the International Zone, and a naval base at Izmit. For that reason they will oppose any Greek territorial control over Bursa, to provide strategic depth to their position at Iznik.
I am attaching a picture of the borders I expect in that region.
6) In the rest of Asia Minor, as long as the railway line is safe, the Soviets are likely to be ok with Greek demands, though they can always raise objections as a way to locking in the Turkish leadership with a Soviet alliance.
Attachments
I’m not an expert on the situation, but is Finlandization even realistically possible for Turkey? It’s much more populous, likely more militaristic, and more strategically placed. It feels like one of NATO’s main goals in this scenario would be to woo Turkey at all cost. And the concept of Turkey flipping is going to give folks in the Kremlin nightmares. If I’m Stalin do I think a loose leash is enough to keep Turkey on my side long term?
And none of this addresses how Turkey herself would feel about the issue. At first it might not be to bad but what happens when they inevitably want to do something the Soviets don’t agree with? It could happen as early as the Marshall plan. The Soviets are going to demand they turn down the money, and the Turks won’t want to. What happens then? I don’t know but Finlandization seems like an unlikely fate in my mind.
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Why not? Turkey is dominated by a corps of military officers who are quite practical. They are initiating ceasefire agreements with them. Strategically they are surrounded by either the USSR or states detached from Turkish territory. With Greece playing the Wally proxy role, and Turkey too weak to play and independent role the only option is to be a Soviet client. The Soviets can also assure security via their presence in The City and Naval bases. What are the Tutks going to do? Attack Skviet troops etc?
But that’s the thing, are they to weak? Even after being demilitarized they still have a lot of manpower and whatever they were able to hide. If they accept Marshall plan funds are the Soviets going to invade? Especially since Turkey would likely get significant Western backing if the Soviet did invade? It’s not a as easy to control as Finland
Actually what I am describing is much stronger than the Soviet influence in Finland. And no, Turkey will not be strong enough in the Cold War to pursue a regional hegemony policy. The Wallies were very circumspect about breaking Soviet redlines. Turkey will not be permitted to be part of the Marshall plan , and indeed may not be asked anyway.
I don't think that is politically expedient even as a negotiating tactic. And it wasn't when Dousmanis was playing with his maps either. We are talking about a Greek government claiming everything to the west of this rough line, actually more. It would be met by ridicule at best with outrage at worst and the public perception wouldn't be much better. Greece would be burning a lot of the public goodwill it has gained since 1941 for no apparent gain.
Which is another way of saying that Metaxas in 1915 and the royalists in 1920-22 were tone deaf to the wider world around them.
This is not mutually exclusive with a defensible Greek border at Dumlu Pinar which as can be seen here would be quite strong
Logically the Americans would be supporting what became the OTL Democratic party here. The obvious question is, that in its internal politics TTL Turkey has had multiple parties after 1922 even though in practice CHP was the dominant one. So when *DP does win an election in say 1949, which without foul play it has every chance of doing, what will happen?
Samsun is already linked to the system...
There is also Channak which has been part of the international zone up to 1941, and it's guaranteed the Soviets will not want to see in Greek hands, this gives Greece both sides of the straits and preferably under their control direct or otherwise.
Backing Turkey at the peace conference when the British and Americans are locked into backing Greece is an obvious ploy here and not one the West can do much about. Yes the Americans could support Turkey instead but this drives a wedge with their main ally in the region...
Absorbing any territory would likely be a much taller order than French re-absorption of Alsace Lorraine, after all France had there a very strong French element to work with, despite the difficulties. TTL Greece roughly has three Muslim groups that associated themselves with it in 1921-22. First the Circassians that found themselves on the wrong side of the Turkish civil wars and just like OTL jumped on the Greek bandwagon, second Pomaks and third the Vallahads and Muslim Cretans, both Greek speaking and relatively recently converted.
How does this apply beyond the TTL border?
1. There are numbers of Circassians. To clarify there is a very large number of Turkified Circassians and a much smaller number retaining the language, Turkish censuses put them at below 100,000 and TTL they are even fewer given many of these are already Greek since 1921. The second group was likely the subject of repression TTL, they did suffer repression OTL and TTL they will be directly linked to the Circassians in Greece that Turkey considers, not without reason, traitors. So they are a very likely element to go to Greece but small in numbers.
2. Pomaks... some were around in Anatolia but negligible in numbers. By 1945 they are likely fully Turkified. They are a factor in Europe though...
3. Greek Muslims. Now here it gets funny. There are actually tens of thousands of Greek speaking Turkish Cretans... in or near the Aegean coast. Primary material to absorb right? Well not so much. This may be Greek speaking and their great-grandparents may had been converted Greeks. But these are people who in 1880-1922 voted with their feet that they wanted to be Turkish and not Greek. Think Alsatian refugees in post-1870 France. Few to none would be changing sides.
There is another largish group of Pontic Greek speaking Muslims but they are on the other side of Anatolia in the East Black sea coast. Now funnily enough these are in the path of the Soviet advance as are crypto-Armenians. Would someone get the idea of proposing their immigration to Greece? Perhaps. Would many actually choose to follow their Christian cousins there? At a guess some if presented with the option would take it, particularly recent converts. A majority? I would very much doubt it. IF the idea came up in the first case and the Soviets did not think the same thing...
On Cretan Turks. The hard reality is that those who wanted to revert to Christianity did so after Tanzimat. You have a huge decrease of the Muslim community in Crete in 1840-1880 as all those who became Muslim after Orlov and 1821 denounced Islam and reverted to Christianity. Anybody after that is a hardliner either due to genuine faith or vendetta.