I was reading some of the lit on Anglo-Soviet and Nazi intelligence/diplomacy in Afghanistan during the 30s and 40s. For Nazi Germany, Afghanistan (Along with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey) played a significant part in its strategic vision of a land corridor by which the German Army could attack Soviet Central Asia or British India. 100s of millions of Marks were invested into Afghan roads, airbases, and communications by German industry, including Organization Todt, in order to improve its military viability. Lufthansa even established a flight route via Iran to Kabul, with German pilots regularly switching out to gain experience with the flight path. There were multiple groups of fascist sympathizers within the Afghan government, including senior officials in the ministries of war, energy, and education. The Nazis even discussed with Molotov the possibility of the USSR allowing them to send SS men and the deposed King Amanullah Khan to Afghanistan via Central Asia to instigate a coup, ostensibly for anti-British purposes. The Afghan government was very interested in territorial expansion at the expense of British India and the USSR, and Pashtun tribes along the Afghan-Raj border and thousands of Basmachi (Anti-Soviet Central Asian insurgents) along the Soviet-Afghan border able to cause substantial disorder.
Despite this infrastructure in place for a major influence operation, the Abwehr only began deploying a serious agent network in 1940-41 - coordinating with various pro-Nazi Afghan groups had barely gotten off the ground before Barbarossa had begun. Contacts with the Basmachi only developed into substantial promises of support in late 1941 - early 1942, by which point the window of opportunity had long since passed and the Afghan government was disinterested in supporting the Basmachi.
So a POD is a decision in 1936 to avoid the mistakes of the last German influence operation in Afghanistan during WW1 and actually try to establish a pro-German network ahead of time, with the Abwehr deploying agents under the cover of Organization Todt. A pro-Nazi influence network forms in opposition to PM Mohammad Hashim Khan's pro-neutrality policies, centered around the Ministry of War and military intelligence. In early 1941 a pro-German coup against Khan occurs in Afghanistan in coordination with the pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in April. The new pro-German government steps up efforts to fund the 8,000 Basmachi insurgents along the Afghan-Soviet border and Pashtun tribes in insurgencies against the USSR and UK in coordination with the Abwehr.
While obviously this won't change the fundamental course of the war, it does have interesting knockoff effects on Anglo-Soviet policy in Central Asia. While the UK was opposed to a repetition of its interventions in Iraq and Iran in 1941, the USSR was fully prepared to occupy Northern Afghanistan to secure its borders and root out pro-German influence. Down the line, a Soviet occupation of part or all of Afghanistan (Along with Northern Iran) is going to have substantial influence on Anglo-Soviet politics during and after the war, perhaps with an earlier Soviet interest in the Indian independence movement.
Despite this infrastructure in place for a major influence operation, the Abwehr only began deploying a serious agent network in 1940-41 - coordinating with various pro-Nazi Afghan groups had barely gotten off the ground before Barbarossa had begun. Contacts with the Basmachi only developed into substantial promises of support in late 1941 - early 1942, by which point the window of opportunity had long since passed and the Afghan government was disinterested in supporting the Basmachi.
So a POD is a decision in 1936 to avoid the mistakes of the last German influence operation in Afghanistan during WW1 and actually try to establish a pro-German network ahead of time, with the Abwehr deploying agents under the cover of Organization Todt. A pro-Nazi influence network forms in opposition to PM Mohammad Hashim Khan's pro-neutrality policies, centered around the Ministry of War and military intelligence. In early 1941 a pro-German coup against Khan occurs in Afghanistan in coordination with the pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in April. The new pro-German government steps up efforts to fund the 8,000 Basmachi insurgents along the Afghan-Soviet border and Pashtun tribes in insurgencies against the USSR and UK in coordination with the Abwehr.
While obviously this won't change the fundamental course of the war, it does have interesting knockoff effects on Anglo-Soviet policy in Central Asia. While the UK was opposed to a repetition of its interventions in Iraq and Iran in 1941, the USSR was fully prepared to occupy Northern Afghanistan to secure its borders and root out pro-German influence. Down the line, a Soviet occupation of part or all of Afghanistan (Along with Northern Iran) is going to have substantial influence on Anglo-Soviet politics during and after the war, perhaps with an earlier Soviet interest in the Indian independence movement.