Point of order, they would use the China Clipper route with the San Fransisco, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, GUAM, then onto Clark Field. B17 had the range to do it this way and it was the direct route that Pan Am had pioneered and the Army Air Corps used because of all the infrastructure including the Radio beacons were in place.
Iirc, the B-17s flew direct from Wake. I don't believe there was an airfield on Guam at that time, only a seaplane ramp used by Pan Am and the Navy PBYs, detached from the Philippines Patrol Wing 10..
 
1941, Friday 12 September;

The radio message had pre-warned them, allowing Brigadier General Henry B Clagett, USAAF, commander of all Army Aircraft in the Far East, accompanied by his staff, to be present, packed in the Control Tower of Clark Field, Philippines. Nine B-17 Flying Fortresses of the 14th Bombardment Squadron, still in their shiny metal factory finish, were battling through the winds of a dying typhoon, completing the last leg of a journey from the USA. The control tower operative was on the R/T to the leading Fortress, discussing the approach, the aircraft still not in view, another gust of wind bringing lashing of rain hard against the windows. All navigation lights were on to help compensate for the dark leaden sky, while binoculars scanned the sky for a first appearance. “There she is”, an officer pointing to the far distant end of the runway, as the first aircraft, a black speck, emerged from the gloom. Already she had her wheels down, the pilot battling with the winds to keep her on a gradual descending course, aligned with the runway. The plane grew in size, and the fight to keep control more evident as she swung about, taxing the pilot’s skill. Bigger and lower she grew, until her wheels touched down briefly, the plane bunny hopping, before making a firmer contact and running along the runway, past the control tower to shouts of jubilation from all watching.

Way back in May the US had made its first attempts to try and improve the air defence of the Philippines, with the creation of the Philippine Department Air Force, mostly by sending out a number of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft, all under the command of the newly arrived Clagett. The results were disappointing, the force was poorly equipped and to compound that, Clagett, who was not in good health and had suffered two periods of sickness over the summer, had clashed badly with his subordinates, resulting in a badly run organisation. Continuing with the reinforcement plans, in July, Chief of the Army Air Force, Major General Henry H Arnold, had allocated four heavy bombardment groups, 272 aircraft with another 68 in reserve, totalling 340 heavy bombers, and two pursuit groups of 130 modern fighter planes each, the majority not yet manufactured. These planes, according to Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, were not for offensive missions, but to provide a strategical defence in Asia, but given the range of the bombers, the Japanese were unlikely to view them as such.

This also necessitated the development of several airfields in the Philippines to operate the bombers, while MacArthur was asked to obtain permission from the British, to have them develop a number of airfields for US heavy bomber use, Singapore, Port Darwin, Rabaul, and Port Moresby being identified, as well as a new airfield in Northern Borneo. MacArthur was also asked to do a similar thing with the Dutch. An Air Warning Service was being formed, initially using just observation posts, reporting on airplane movements through one of, five radio, two telegraph and ten telephone networks, but there had been little training in aircraft recognition. Radar had begun to arrive, which would improve things immensely, but production times and shipping the equipment over, along with building facilities and training staff, meant only one was in operation at the outbreak of war, with a second used in a training unit.

Further P40 fighter aircraft would soon be arriving, enabling Clagett to form the 24th Pursuit Group of three squadrons. This unit was forming around a cadre of 28 pilots with some experience, the rest would be straight out of flight school, and need considerable individual training, before they could undertake unit tactical exercises. Also planned to join was a Light Bombardment Group, the 27th, equipped with three squadrons of the Army, land-based version of the Douglas Dauntless dive bomber, the A-24, which would soon be shipped out, all personnel, both air and ground crews arriving in November, the aircraft in mid-December.

Clagett wasn’t aware yet, but after conversations between MacArthur and Marshall, Arnold had met with Marshall to identify his replacement. That man would be Maj Gen Lewis H Brereton, but he wouldn’t arrive until early November. Completion of the aircraft build-up would be April 1942, MacArthur convinced he had that much time, which was just as well as things wouldn’t run smoothly.

Up to now, any aircraft sent to the Philippines had been dis-assembled, crated and shipped over, but these nine Fortresses had just successfully proven that they could be flown in along an air route across the central Pacific. Flying from Hamilton Field, near San Francisco, to Hickam Field, Hawaii, then onto Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, Darwin, and then up to the Philippines, it had taken them eight days, and over 10,000 miles, mostly over water. The leg, Wake to Port Moresby, crossed over the Japanese Caroline mandate islands, but was done at night, at high altitude. Nevertheless, this was far from ideal, and a southern Pacific air ferry route was being developed. More B-17s would follow, leaving the continental USA in October, November, and December, but for now the first B-17s had arrived successfully steered by the CO of the 14th Bombardment Group, Major Emmett O’Donnell Jr, completing a magnificent feat of navigation.
Reading this while watching a documentary about orcas and seal pups. I feel better about the seal pups’ chances…
 
The defense of the Philippines by the Navy, was hamstringed by the obstancy of Mac Arthur and the army Air Corps refusal to allow the Navy to station an air group at Cavite or Mirivales . This was something Admiral Hart and his predecessor had been requesting..
 
The defense of the Philippines by the Navy, was hamstringed by the obstancy of Mac Arthur and the army Air Corps refusal to allow the Navy to station an air group at Cavite or Mirivales . This was something Admiral Hart and his predecessor had been requesting..
Any reason given or was it simply standard Army-Navy obstructive behaviour?
 
Any reason given or was it simply standard Army-Navy obstructive behaviour?

Mac Arthur's ego, and the position that the Army was in charge if the defense of the Philippines out to the range of coast defense artillery. Using ca 1914 defense plan. That included minimg operations. Army only mined Bay. Subic bay to just south of mouth of Manila bay.
In Moy opinion Langely should never have lost her forward flight deck, when "converted to Seaplane tender" With flight deck she could have served as aircraft transport. When lost off Java, with 1/3rd fo flight gone she still deck parked a combo of 40 P-40s and A-24s(SBDs). She should have been making the Honolulu Manila run with assembled aircraft. Another "what if".
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
The post on the deployment of the B-17’s to the Philippines, only goes to show what is becoming increasingly obvious, the major difference between the American and British attitude, towards the defence of the Philippines and Malaya. Both nations lack the resources needed to defend their respective territories, in the case of the Americans because they haven’t yet ramped up their military production to the level necessary to fight a war. While in the case of the British, Malaya is low down on the list of priorities, and there are far more vital areas that need to be addressed first. The American administration is basically dysfunctional, there is no unity of command, poor coordination between the civilian government and the military, and the man in overall command is himself dysfunctional. MacArthur degree of self belief is off the charts, and he is already preparing the arguments for while he failed to retain the Philippines, the US government didn’t give him what he needed to do the job. And his naval, airforce commanders, were not only not his choice, but inadequate to the task. The British in comparison have a completely different approach, they know that they are not going to receive all that they want to do the job. The Home Government is rather stretched right now, so they will have to make the best of a bad situation, and do the best they can with what is available. They have achieved a lot with very little, starting with improving the efficiency of the local government, and making it far better prepared for the task ahead. If we look at the provision of radar coverage for Singapore, we see a typical classic British lash up. The British in Malaya/Singapore have the same problem as the Americans did in Hawaii/Pearl Harbour, they have the radar sets, and can place them high up thus giving them the best coverage. But as in Hawaii, they do not have the communications network to pass the information to a central command centre. And there is not enough telephone cable in the colony, along with the engineers to establish such a communication network, with inbuilt redundancies. Given all the other requirements of improvements to the telephone system. On advice from a local radio expert, who points out that VHF radio, using LOS, messages can be sent to the highest point in Singapore, and from there to the command centre. Is it ideal no, given the local weather conditions, a large electric storm, will render the system temporarily useless, but it works most of the time, and is much better than nothing.

The RN lacks sufficient fast patrol boats, ideally it would have a squadron of the new baby destroyers, Steam Gun Boats or Fairmile B’s, but good luck in getting hold of any of them, you are very far down a very long list. Instead it is converting as best it can local vessels, and trying to build MTB in its own yards. These vessels are very far from ideal, being slow, poorly armed and with green crews, but they are better than nothing, and will just have to do until such time if ever that the region is close to the top of the equipment list. There is no question that Air Marshal would love to have a wing of heavy bombers at his disposal, preferably Shorts Sterlings, which for all their faults were designed for colonial use, and have dual use as both bombers and transports. Again he hasn’t a snowballs chance in hell, he would be lucky to receive a single squadron of the increasingly obsolete HP Hampden’s, and if he did receive such a squadron, he wouldn’t reserve them for bombing missions, but rather use them instead of long range maritime reconnaissance. His Vickers Vildebeest’s which are long past their sell date, and are effectively obsolete especially in daylight. Are being flown by experienced crews, who at night given the right conditions, really make a mark on the coming conflict. He Park is doing his best to cooperate with his army and navy counterparts, and trying to get the best out of the resources available.

And it is here that we see the fundamental difference between the Americans and the British. The British despite the lack of resources, and the obvious difficulties are trying to make the best of a bad situation. Their general motto is what can we do, to make things better, and how can we get around the difficulties in our path. Were as the majority of the Americans, taking the lead from their leader, have their collective heads firmly in the sand. They are convinced that the Japanese would not dare to attack the mighty United States, and that they have all the time in the world, to sip mint julep’s and Mai Tai’s at the club while playing endless games of mahjong. Their is only one senior American commander who is taking the threat of the Japanese seriously, Admiral Hart, and he was very restricted in what he could do, by both MacArthur and the president in Washington. While he would have been happy to engage in meaningful negotiations with the British and Dutch, in regards to cooperation, and combined training to establish methods of working together. He was prevented from doing so by those above him in the command chain, both military and civilian. He received little to no cooperation from MacArthur in preparing for a conflict with the Japanese, and some degree of hindrance. And here we encounter another fundamental difference between the British and American military. Prior to WWII, the majority of American soldiers, could serve their time without once setting foot outside of the Continental United States, unlike their British counterparts. Who other than a very few specialists, would have served at least once in an overseas post, with a good chance that they had seen some sort of minor action. The same is true for the Royal Navy, you would have to be a strange duck not to have been posted to a foreign station at one time or another. Were as there were many members of the USN, who again only served on the home station. While a large portion of the RAF, served in the Middle East and India, and only a few never served outside of the United Kingdom. The majority of the USAAF, were equally home based, and only served in the United States. This meant that along with the different political systems, the majority of American servicemen lacked the experience of serving outside America, and having to make the best of the situation.

Finally there is a major difference between the situation of the American military command in the Philippines, and that of the British military commander in Malaya/Singapore. Due to the different situation in the Philippines to that in Malaya and Singapore. MacArthur has two political masters, the local President of the Philippines, and the President of the United States of America. And this combined with his own political aspirations, he wanted to be the President of the USA himself. Along with his caricature and ego, meant that he was always looking over his shoulder at how his actions would play out in the American press. Lord Gort, on the other hand had only one commander to whom he was responsible, the Governor, and having no political aspirations himself, wasn’t overly concerned about the British press. He had a job to do, prepare the colony as best he could for a potential Japanese invasion, while cooperating with the Naval commander and the Dutch East Indies administration. In preparing the region to resist the potential Japanese attack, as best he could. If he was able to include the Americans and Philippines in his plans, this was all too the good, if not then so be it. Gort has a Governor and subordinates who are very much on board with him, and are supportive of his policies, while the British government and the PM, are not going to take him to task for his actions to replace those he regards as incompetent. They home government is mostly supportive, and will do all in its power to provide him with the resources he needs, from what little is available. For all that the Americans boast of their ‘can do attitude’ it unlike the British seems to be signally lacking in the Philippines.

RR.
 
Mac Arthur's ego, and the position that the Army was in charge if the defense of the Philippines out to the range of coast defense artillery. Using ca 1914 defense plan. That included minimg operations. Army only mined Bay. Subic bay to just south of mouth of Manila bay.
In Moy opinion Langely should never have lost her forward flight deck, when "converted to Seaplane tender" With flight deck she could have served as aircraft transport. When lost off Java, with 1/3rd fo flight gone she still deck parked a combo of 40 P-40s and A-24s(SBDs). She should have been making the Honolulu Manila run with assembled aircraft. Another "what if".
Wasn't it a case of not being allowed to have her as an aircraft carrier due to treaty limits?

I cannot find anything on that after a short google fu - so there must have been a reason to 'dedeck' her in such a way
 
their British counterparts. Who other than a very few specialists, would have served at least once in an overseas post, with a good chance that they had seen some sort of minor action.
Excellent little bit in one of John Masters' books. In a bad situation on one of the Chindit campaigns, a Gurkha NCO comments to him "If they were Pathans instead of Japanese we'd be in real trouble now"
 
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Wasn't it a case of not being allowed to have her as an aircraft carrier due to treaty limits?
I believe so. Langley counted towards the total but was old enough she could be replaced, hence she was de-decked to allow Wasp to be built.

That said technically Langley should have been disposed of at that point, but like everyone the US was happy to bend the treaties when it suited them so I believe took the position that as sea plane tenders weren't explicitly mentioned it was fine.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Point of order, they would use the China Clipper route with the San Fransisco, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, GUAM, then onto Clark Field. B17 had the range to do it this way and it was the direct route that Pan Am had pioneered and the Army Air Corps used because of all the infrastructure including the Radio beacons were in place.
and
Iirc, the B-17s flew direct from Wake. I don't believe there was an airfield on Guam at that time, only a seaplane ramp used by Pan Am and the Navy PBYs, detached from the Philippines Patrol Wing 10..
Hi jickansas and Butchpfd, as I've said before, I'm no expert on the Philippines, so when you both questioned the air route, I had to re-check. Firstly, given what I had already written about MacArthur asking the British to develop the airfields at Darwin and Port Moresby to allow B17's to operate, how could they be used as stages for the ferry route? But rechecking my sources, I have these




suggesting that they did fly via Port Moresby and Darwin.

It does look questionable, so I'll go and ask on a couple of other forums and see what they think
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I think its worth remembering, when we criticise, that the USAAF build up in the Philippines was working with an end date of April 1942, just like MacArthur's land forces, and both the British and Dutch forces. To be sure, they still wouldn't have had everything there that they planned for, but instances of troops and equipment arriving at different times, doesn't play out so badly in that time frame. I think what the planners were putting together, while it alone, wouldn't have stopped the Japanese advance, it would have bought more time and a very different series of campaigns to what we know would have been fought. The criticism does have to be, and loudly in my opinion, on the intelligence and leaders who thought they had that time!
 
MWI 410913414 On Overtime

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 13 September;

They’d never had it so good, that’s what they all thought, but you never know how long these things will last, and so when the call for volunteers was made, to do extended shifts, and Saturdays, to a man and boy, they signed up. Furthermore, the management, aware of the hours being asked to work, had slackened some of the working conditions, char boys, for instance, were allowed to move around the factory floor, the furnace excepted, providing tea on the job! Furthermore, in an effort to show their appreciation, every Sunday a train excursion was laid on by the company for family members.

Sentul, home to the engineering workshops of the FMSR, was a hive of activity, as more and more orders for new rail stock was placed, along with the ongoing maintenance and upkeep of the companies steam locomotives. And the increase in rail traffic had meant that those engines due retirement, in the G, H and I classes, were now undergoing, or planned to undergo, complete refurbishments, to extend their lifespans another five to ten years. New engines were on order from North British Locomotive and Kitson, but with the war in progress, Malaya wasn’t a priority, so the numbers needed were unlikely to arrive.

The workforce of over 2,500 was mainly Indian, railways seemingly in their blood, although there were some Malays employed and all the carpenters were Chinese. More workers were wanted, but this was a country now in full employment, and skilled workers were at a premium. To compensate for this, in part, the number of apprentices had more than doubled, and some sections were now working two shifts, but there was only so much they could do. Some of the lighter work had been moved to outlying newly built attap huts, allowing the expansion of the heavier work sections within the factory.

Thanks to the imported material from Canada, the building of rail stock had been greatly expanded, and this was made easier by the large demand for flatbeds, which just required constructing a rail chassis with a hard wood floor. It had taken a little while to sort out that production line, and for the workers to gain confidence and experience in building them, but now they were turning them out at a rate of two a day! A second type of flatbed, able to carry a load as heavy as 18 tons, equipped with double bogie wheels each end, had proved to be more difficult to construct, and despite having its own separate production line, would only be produced at a rate of one every other day, or three in a week, now they were working Saturdays. Other rail stock work, like converting older passenger coaches into troop transporters took longer, while specialist coaches, like the casualty bed ones were much harder, but as skills were picked up, so completion times came down. And the introduction of a bonus scheme, along with a rigorous quality control, helped.

But when the siren wailed, announcing the end of the working day, or shift, the roads away to their homes teemed with bicycles, many now owning their first bike, most often a Japanese made one, as the increase in wages improved their living standards. Yes, Life had never been so good.
 
Unfortunately the Americans are putting the cart before the horse, where they should have built up the fighter force along with the air defence network first.
It's worth noting here that in addition to believing that the Philippines were safely out of range of Japanese fighters from Formosa or Indochina, the USAAF leadership (in general, not just MacArthur & co) also believed both that the B-17's defensive armament allowed it to overcome fighter defences unescorted and in daylight and that the B-17 was an effective naval strike aircraft capable of destroying any hostile fleets attempting to approach the Philippines. Seen from that perspective, sending a large force of B-17s is the obvious way to secure the Philippines.

Besides, what option did they have? The USN is desperate to avoid assigning asserts to an outpost they consider indefensible, MacArthur's Philippine Army will take a year or more to train and there are no US Regular Army forces to send, even if Congress would authorise their deployment. The USAAF are the only people outside of MacArthur's inner circle who are claiming they can hold off the Japanese with the forces likely to be available, hence they get the job. It turned out OTL that they were peddling rainbows, but no-one knew it at the time.
 
Wasn't it a case of not being allowed to have her as an aircraft carrier due to treaty limits?

I cannot find anything on that after a short google fu - so there must have been a reason to 'dedeck' her in such a way
It was to "meet " treaty requirements, already abandoned by everyone else, in carrier tonnage to build, I believe, Hornet. It could have been done by installing the cranes on the flight deck, or just plain calling her an Aircraft Transport, and converting one of the other Jupiter class colliers into a Seaplane tender.
 
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It was to "meet " treaty requirements, already abandoned by everyone else, in carrier tonnage to build, I believe, Hornet. It could have been done by installing the cranes on the flight deck, or just plain calling her an Aircraft Transport, and converting one of the other Jupiter class colliers into a Seaplane tender.
I thought Wasp had used up the remaining tonnage from the Washington Limits?

Was it part of the Self imposed limits set by congress then?
 
You were correct that it was Wasp traded for Langley. Langley was converted to Seaplane tender in October 1936 and Wasp was laid down in April of 1936. It appears this was the trade off Hornet being part of the Pre War Naval Acts.
 
It's worth noting here that in addition to believing that the Philippines were safely out of range of Japanese fighters from Formosa or Indochina, the USAAF leadership (in general, not just MacArthur & co) also believed both that the B-17's defensive armament allowed it to overcome fighter defences unescorted and in daylight and that the B-17 was an effective naval strike aircraft capable of destroying any hostile fleets attempting to approach the Philippines. Seen from that perspective, sending a large force of B-17s is the obvious way to secure the Philippines.

Besides, what option did they have? The USN is desperate to avoid assigning asserts to an outpost they consider indefensible, MacArthur's Philippine Army will take a year or more to train and there are no US Regular Army forces to send, even if Congress would authorise their deployment. The USAAF are the only people outside of MacArthur's inner circle who are claiming they can hold off the Japanese with the forces likely to be available, hence they get the job. It turned out OTL that they were peddling rainbows, but no-one knew it at the time.

The USN had it's largest concentration of Submarines based in the Philippines. Hart was as stated before Hart had 26 submarines, 8 S class subs, and 23 Fleet Boats. The S boats have very functional Mk X torpedoes, while the Fleet boats have the very disfunctional MK XIV torpedoes. There are 200 Torpedoes in the Torpedo Warehouse at Cavite Naval station about 30% MK X and the remainder MK XIVs. Aboard the3 tenders are about 200 torpedoes each. Canopus and Otus have the majority of MK X reloads. By 29 December OTL Canopus the last Ship of the Asiatic Fleet in Manila had been crippled by a bomb penetrating her shaft alley, and breaking a shaft. living her unable to ever leave her berth at Mirivales.
Only 4 S boats were on patrol stations off Lingayen and Sarosogon Bay, Luzon. If Hart had been able to deploy to Formosa Straight and toward the Marianas Perhaps the S boats at least would have had a chance at the invasion convoys
 
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