Koblenz'44? - WI V Corps exploits the Wallendorf Gap?

[Arnold d.c]

I was recently playing TOAW IV and tried out a scenario called Koblenz'44. In this hypothetical scenario, the WAllies commit the resources from Op. Market Garden to exploit the bridgehead at Wallendorf and race towards Koblenz. IOTL the U.S. 5th Armored Division had managed to seize the town of Wallendorf on the 14th of September, securing a crossing over the Sauer River. The Americans did not know it but they had actually gotten between the I SS Panzer Corps and the LXXX Corps. The Germans could only muster Kampfgruppe of the Panzer Lehr and the remnants of the 5th Parachute Division to oppose the peneration, both of which were too weak to counter CCR of the 5th Armored Division. On the 15th, Gen. Gerow, CO V Corps, planned to strike deep behind enemy lines, finally re-opening the front for his infantry. (Map)

However, Gerow gave the order to call off the offensive on the 16th. Apparently, the reason for this was that V Corps had been operating on borrowed time and borrowed supplies. The resources provided was supposed to be assigned to the other corps of the U.S. 1st Army. Thus, to the relief of Rundstedt and other German Generals, the bridgehead was abandoned on the 18th after relatively minor fighting. This begs the question: what if the U.S. V Corps made a full effort to exploit the gap?

On its own, I think that the U.S. V Corps could have used the opportunity to secure their end of the West Well - the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions did achieve progress on their own. With the support of 5th Armored Division, it's not unlikely that they could breakthrough the defenses. That said, the Germans did send the 108th Panzer Brigade and the 19th Volks Grenadier Division to counterattack the bridgehead. There's also the 107th Panzer Brigade as well as the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Division that could have been sent from the Netherlands if Op. Market Garden was cancelled. Could the U.S. 1st Army or the other U.S. forces have transferred units to support the drive? If Market Garden was cancelled by this and the airborne and logistical resources was reassigned to support the push, could the V Corps have gone over the Rhine in '44?

Admittedly, the WAllied logistical problems in late '44 would've prevented further exploitation across the Rhine, but surely securing a bridgehead over the Rhine would be worth the risk right? How much would this shorten the war?

 

[Post]

Ever been in the area? I have, and the terrain doesn't strike me as particularly suited for a quick advance when there's enemy opposition. It's a bit hillier than the Ardennes. Although the Germans went through the Ardennes quite nicely in 1940 when nobody expected them, it didn't work as well for them in 1944.

The Germans have a nice solid two-track railway from Arnhem to Koblenz, and from Koblenz along the Mosel, the allies are faced with mostly small roads and single track railways with a lot less capacity. So there logistical situation seems a bit better than that of the allies.

Due to the terrain (hill) there's a lot more chance of parchutedrops being dispersed, There are actually locations were in a birds flight you only need to travel 1km, but doing so you have to go 200-400 meters up and down again. So that makes slow progress if you're dispersed during your drop.

I'm sure it could go about as well as Market Garden if everything goes right, but that's not really well enough. And there's a good chance everything doesn't go right (as it did with Market Garden).

 

[Julian]

I think even with Market Garden uncanceled , V Corps had the resources on its own to rip open a 40km gap in the Westwall between Bitburg and Prüm in mid-September. With the Aachen attacks grinding to a halt at the same time, a shift of 12th AG’s main effort to 1st Army’s right wing in order to outflank the rest of the Westwall and reach the Rhine between Koblenz and Cologne would be an entirely reasonable strategy.

If 1st Army achieves a genuine breakout by November to coincide with Patton’s breakout from the Nancy bridgehead (Entirely achievable) and TLL’s breach of the Aachen position by 9th Army, the German position West of the Rhine (Certainly north of the Moselle) becomes untenable without committing the WaR reserves to stem the Allied tide. After that Allied strategy probably resembles what happened IOTL March 1945 but in December-January, with 3rd Army shifting its left to cross the Moselle and clear the Upper Rhine while 1st and 9th Army + 21 AG clear the Lower Rhine. If the Allies are especially lucky, you might get a Rhine bridgehead in December and a full crossing in January.

 

[Arnold d.c]

ver been in the area? I have, and the terrain doesn't strike me as particularly suited for a quick advance when there's enemy opposition. It's a bit hillier than the Ardennes. Although the Germans went through the Ardennes quite nicely in 1940 when nobody expected them, it didn't work as well for them in 1944.

The Germans have a nice solid two-track railway from Arnhem to Koblenz, and from Koblenz along the Mosel, the allies are faced with mostly small roads and single track railways with a lot less capacity. So there logistical situation seems a bit better than that of the allies.

That is a fair argument. TOAW IV certainly simulated the frustration of having to batter through the hilly terrain. The impact on the paras is something that I hadn't considered as well. However, my objection is how on many troops the Germans could muster to actually turn the hills into defensive positions. Looking at chapter 3 of the Siegfried Line Campaign by Charles B. MacDonald, the Germans had very little in terms of reserves. I've only seen comments by German Generals on how they could not have stopped an advance from the bridgehead to Bitburg - although as you mention the railroad from Arnhem to Koblenz would've probably allowed from the transfer of German troops from the Netherlands to Koblenz. Still, rather than having to batter their way through the rubble and bunkers of Aachen, wouldn't a shift of focus for the U.S. 1st Army from Aachen to the less prepared German defenses of the Eiffel sector have paid more dividends?

I think even with Market Garden uncanceled , V Corps had the resources on its own to rip open a 40km gap in the Westwall between Bitburg and Prüm in mid-September. With the Aachen attacks grinding to a halt at the same time, a shift of 12th AG’s main effort to 1st Army’s right wing in order to outflank the rest of the Westwall and reach the Rhine between Koblenz and Cologne would be an entirely reasonable strategy.

If 1st Army achieves a genuine breakout by November to coincide with Patton’s breakout from the Nancy bridgehead (Entirely achievable) and TLL’s breach of the Aachen position by 9th Army, the German position West of the Rhine (Certainly north of the Moselle) becomes untenable without committing the WaR reserves to stem the Allied tide. After that Allied strategy probably resembles what happened IOTL March 1945 but in December-January, with 3rd Army shifting its left to cross the Moselle and clear the Upper Rhine while 1st and 9th Army + 21 AG clear the Lower Rhine. If the Allies are especially lucky, you might get a Rhine bridgehead in December and a full crossing in January.

I hadn't considered the impact for other WAllied armies. Another thing to consider is that the U.S.6th Army Group, south of Patton, will achieve their own breakthrough in late November. Historically, these troops (of the French 1st Army) were the first to reach the Rhine. If these two breakthroughs occur within November, then the German 1st Army opposing Patton would be in a salient. This might just force the Germans to abandon the Saar Industrial region to Patton or they stay in place where they risk encirclement.

What do the British and Canadians do in the meantime? If the logistical resources are given to the U.S. 12th and 6th Army Group, could the British continue to push into the Netherlands? Or would logistical constraints force them to focus on clearing the Scheldt?

 

[sonofpegasus]

I know this is probably complete nonsense but if the gap is made and an instant decision to exploit it when Wallendorf was seized on the 14th, how quickly could the Us and British airborne have made a drop instead of operation Market. Just beyond the furthest penetration achieved by the 5th divison the land gets a lot better for Gliders and Paratroops. Looking at a modern map there are two airfields at Bitberg and Spangdahlem, these fall on the OTL junction between two German Divisions, could these provide suitable landing zones to throw in both American airborne divisions in a single lift on March 15th. Exploiting west they meet up with the 5th division and everything is committed to the gap now forced. The British and Polish airborne are kept as a reserve and flown in the next day to expand the bridgehead.
Mad I know but interesting.

 

[Arnold d.c]

I know this is probably complete nonsense but if the gap is made and an instant decision to exploit it when Wallendorf was seized on the 14th, how quickly could the Us and British airborne have made a drop instead of operation Market. Just beyond the furthest penetration achieved by the 5th divison the land gets a lot better for Gliders and Paratroops. Looking at a modern map there are two airfields at Bitberg and Spangdahlem, these fall on the OTL junction between two German Divisions, could these provide suitable landing zones to throw in both American airborne divisions in a single lift on March 15th. Exploiting west they meet up with the 5th division and everything is committed to the gap now forced. The British and Polish airborne are kept as a reserve and flown in the next day to expand the bridgehead.
Mad I know but interesting.

The biggest issue, I think, with an airborne landing on Bitburg is that the U.S. commanders expected Bitburg to be seized quite quickly. Looking through the airborne plans drafted before Operation Market Garden, I see two plans that could've been executed to support the breakthrough effort - Operations Milan I & II. Operation Milan I envisioned the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps jumping into Trier and Milan II envisioned a jump between Neuweid and Koblenz. Depending on the ambition of U.S. commanders, I can see one of these plans getting adopted. Capturing Trier could secure the southern flank of the advance from an attack by troops from the German First Army and provide a route for U.S. forces to outflank the German forces in front of Patton. It doesn't do much, however, to secure the advance to Koblenz.

Milan II is definitely a more ambitious plan. Landing around Koblenz and Neuweid meant that the paratroopers were expected to seize the town and its bridges over the Rhine. From Bitburg to Koblenz, that's about 103km - just as long the XXX Corps' starting point to Arnhem IIRC. To the Americans' advantage, there's only 1 water obstacle (little Kyll River) that could delay them and off-road movement is actually an option for them. Furthermore, I believe that there were only Alarmbataillon (emergency alert battalion) located in Koblenz, which makes things less difficult than they were in Arnhem (though the Germans could've railed the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Division to Koblenz). On the other hand, it has to be noted that beyond the Kyll River, there is a high mountain-like plateau which slopes, grooved and broken, to the Rhine. Again, the Germans don't have much in the way of reserves but a tenacious defense could put the paratroopers in jeopardy.

 

[sonofpegasus]

Do plans Milan I and II mean that airborne forces planners have looked at landing grounds around Bitburg prior to September 14th?
If so that could mean that a go decision on the 13th or 14th could be actioned quickly if Market Garden had been accepted as compromised by the movement of Panzers towards Arnhem prior to that date. If Market is cancelled at the last moment the Airborne are 'all dressed up with nowhere to go'. .

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Wasn't Milan I and Milan II the plans 'written on the back of a napkin' by Brereton, who I still believe was trying to win an Iron Cross at this stage of the war.

I seem to recall that the plan lacked maps and detailed knowledge of the region was limited and I have heard it was simply proposed to keep the 1st Allied Airborne Army away from Monty but I am not sure if that is true or not.

 

[Julian]

Wasn't Milan I and Milan II the plans 'written on the back of a napkin' by Brereton, who I still believe was trying to win an Iron Cross at this stage of the war.

I seem to recall that the plan lacked maps and detailed knowledge of the region was limited and I have heard it was simply proposed to keep the 1st Allied Airborne Army away from Monty but I am not sure if that is true or not.

From a brief review of what sources I could find Milan II at least wasn’t firmed up until October. Milan I had better planning behind it because Trier was a more immediate objective.

Milan I ends up being more useful down the road because a Trier bridgehead over the Moselle puts 3rd Army’s left wing in the rear of the Westwall. Instead of the November offensive’s shallow envelopment of Metz followed by a drive to the Saar, you get a deep envelopment of all of Lorraine from Trier and Nancy plus the quick clearing of the Saar Westwall positions. Turns the end of November into a major German strategic crisis as their entire left gets caved in between the Moselle and Swiss border.