The Resistance
Vescovato, Theodore's second capital
Lieutenant-General Marquis
Luca d'Ornano had faced a frustrating campaign season. Charged with the conduct of the war in the southwestern quarter of the country, his logistical situation had always been difficult; most of the cargo from the syndicate fleet had remained in the north, where the threat seemed most pressing and the land was most valuable. Theodore had continually promised d'Ornano muskets, powder, and money, all of which he badly needed, but he repeatedly failed to deliver owing to organizational challenges, the influence of Captain-General Marquis
Simone Fabiani, and the desperate struggle against the French in the
Diqua. Although d'Ornano had more men than his French opponents in Ajaccio, the French commander
Louis-François Crozat, Marquis du Châtel had taken advantage of d'Ornano's shortage of arms and want of initiative to proceed much further than his original objective. The plan of Lieutenant-General
Louis de Frétat, Marquis de Boissieux had only required Châtel to occupy d'Ornano's forces and prevent them from being deployed in the north, but Châtel had actively taken the offensive, pushing inland from Ajaccio and capturing Cinarca.
With the collapsing rebel position in the north, pressure from Châtel's disciplined and well-armed troops, and his apparent lack of support from Theodore, d'Ornano's devotion to the cause began to wane. At some point in June he opened a line of communication to Châtel and inquired about possible terms. Châtel extended Boissieux's longstanding offer—if his men were to lay down their arms, they would be spared, and d'Ornano himself would be permitted honorable exile. D'Ornano was of distinguished Corsican nobility and not especially keen to abandon the country; in Corsica he was an influential figure, but with a relatively modest fortune by the standards of continental nobility his "honorable exile" seemed likely to be obscure and uncomfortable. Furthermore, he was uncertain that he could actually force the bands of rebels under his command to disarm, and was reluctant to disband his own personal followers. Dissatisfied with the French offer, he decided to try negotiating, although Châtel warned him of the June 15th deadline which Boissieux had set.
D'Ornano does seem to have come to some preliminary agreement with Châtel more congenial to d'Ornano's desires, but its implementation was delayed while Châtel communicated with Boissieux and d'Ornano discretely tested the waters among his officers as to a truce and disarmament. The Corsican victory at San Pellegrino, however, gave him pause, for there were competing rumors as to what exactly had happened. Initially there were widespread claims that the French had been completely wiped out. By the time the matter had been clarified, the deadline had expired, although since d'Ornano and Châtel had already come to an understanding this was probably not a significant obstacle to an accord. Had d'Ornano subsequently agreed to capitulate, it seems unlikely that Châtel or Boissieux would have turned him down, deadline notwithstanding.
As these rumors were still circulating, Colonel
Antonio Colonna-Bozzi had arrived in the south. A nephew of Chancellor
Sebastiano Costa, Colonna was a young but already seasoned soldier who had served as a captain in the Genoese army before defecting to the rebel cause. He had been present at Theodore's council of war following the Battle of San Pellegrino in which the king had decided to evacuate the Nebbio without a fight. Colonna had argued the opposite, but once the matter was decided he had accepted the king's orders to travel south. Colonna, like Costa, was a native of the
Dila, and Costa had suggested him to the king as a good candidate to travel south and determine the truth about d'Ornano's alleged treachery.
Colonna found the resistance in the
Dila in a dismal state. D'Ornano, occupied with his negotiations with Châtel, had allowed the military situation to degrade quite seriously. Discipline was lax, many men had gone home while the rest sat idle, and no defenses had been prepared against the French, who had been steadily encroaching inward while Châtel parlayed with his Corsican counterpart. Colonna made his findings known to d'Ornano. The general treated Colonna with respect—they were fellow southern noblemen, and in fact cousins by marriage—but he shrugged off Colonna's specific issues by complaining that any sort of campaigning or defense was impossible without munitions and supplies. Clearly that complaint was not wholly baseless, as Colonna himself was soon writing to Count
Gianpietro Gaffori, Theodore's secretary of state, begging for more arms and ammunition, but a shortage of arms did not stop Colonna from taking action.
As a mere colonel, Colonna could not simply commandeer the general's forces. He was, however, on his home turf. After his fruitless meeting with the general, he traveled to his family's hometown of Zigliara and raised a company of local volunteers and militiamen to supplement the small force he had brought over the mountains. On the 25th of June, this party ambushed a Franco-Genoese detachment at Cavara, killing twenty men and seizing several dozen muskets.
Colonna's raid put d'Ornano into a bind. Châtel would presumably be upset, as there seems to have been an implicit cease-fire in effect while d'Ornano explored his diplomatic options. If he disavowed Colonna's actions, however, it would call into question how real d'Ornano's power really was, and if his control over the militants appeared to be slipping it would erode his leverage. Nor could d'Ornano take too much public umbrage with Colonna, for he was still ostensibly on the royalist side, and appearing conciliatory while Colonna was fighting—and, so far, winning—would undermine his credibility with his own men. D'Ornano's solution was to try and bluff Châtel, insinuating that the raid had been made with his knowledge and informing him that he was dissatisfied with the negotiations and the encroachments of the French. If the French wished to conciliate him and disarm his men, they would have to waste no more time and accept his demands in full. Châtel dismissed this as so much bluster, no doubt feeling confident as a result of news from the north that the Nebbio was swiftly falling to the French advance.
Colonna, meanwhile, continued his campaign. Although his force numbered no more than 300 men, they were a picked corps of crack northern militia, detached regulars, and the loyal friends and kinsmen of his hometown, and they made themselves a serious nuisance to the French. Shielded by d'Ornano's inactivity, Châtel had overextended himself, spreading his three battalions (and some Genoese auxiliaries) over an ever-increasing swath of mountainous terrain. Colonna's company moved effortlessly between French outposts, seizing villages and then vanishing when the French arrived to recapture them, and laying ambushes for reinforcing columns and small patrols. His success put pressure on d'Ornano, whose somnolence invited unfavorable comparisons with Colonna and who bristled at accusations of timidity and cowardice. Once it became clear that Châtel had called his bluff and refused his demands, d'Ornano grudgingly resumed the war.
While we have journals from several French officers involved in the Corsican campaign, the Marquis du Châtel is the only general officer who has left us a first-hand account. His description of the kind of warfare waged in the
Dila is an excellent illustration of Corsican guerrilla tactics and the difficulty the French officers faced when dealing with such enemies:
"Description de la guerre en Corse" said:
The measures they have taken are to fortify themselves in all the posts that we might wish to occupy; to inundate the frontiers by their multitude; and to present us everywhere with threats to make us believe that they want to constantly attack us... They force us to make frequent detachments and keep us in a continual and painful movement because of the harshness of the marches in a country so difficult... We do not know who to trust; we find ourselves surrounded by suspicious persons, whose protestations of union and friendship are so many falsehoods, all the counsels of which are betrayals and warnings of snares made to rush you into some rash and fatal enterprise.
On the 12th of July, royalist militiamen trapped a French garrison at Cavru and then ambushed a Franco-Genoese relief column, inflicting heavy casualties and killing a French major. After this encounter, Châtel attempted to consolidate his position, drawing back to a perimeter which roughly speaking enclosed the pieves of Ajaccio, Cinarca, and Mezzana. Even then, however, the French were unable to stop rebel infiltration. Unlike in the loyalist Nebbio, much of this region of the Dila outside of Ajaccio proper was generally sympathetic to the rebels. As the month went on, the rebels were bolstered further by a steady stream of munitions from the north. The royalist withdrawal from the northeast had resulted in a large amount of firearms, powder, and shot being moved to the royalists' new provisional capital of Corti, allowing Count Gaffori to finally fulfill d'Ornano's longstanding requests for aid.
Colonna was not the only guerrilla commander to achieve success during the summer. Theodore's cousin, Lieutenant-General
Johann Friedrich Caspar von Neuhoff zu Rauschenburg, had been badly trounced in open battle in the Balagna but had since rebuilt his forces in the interior. Together with his Westphalian kinsman and fellow general
Matthias von Drost and the Niolesi colonel
Felice Cervoni, Rauschenburg launched a series of raids into occupied Balagna. With the relocation of Rousset and Boissieux to the northeast, the Balagna region was held only by the two under-strength battalions of Brigadier
Jean de Saignard, Sieur de Sasselange and several Genoese infantry companies of mediocre quality.
[1] With a few hundred mountaineers and the help of sympathetic locals, Rauschenburg and his fellow captains endeavored to disrupt the occupation by any means, including acts of vengeance against collaborators, the assassination of Genoese officials, the destruction of supplies and produce that might be of military use to the French, and the occasional skirmish with French and Genoese garrison forces. The occupiers remained too strong for the "maquisards" to take any major settlements, but as in the
Dila they proved capable of infiltrating the under-manned Balagnese frontier and causing substantial damage.
Rauschenburg's raids were of particular concern to Commisioner-General
Giovanni-Battista de Mari. Desperate to defray the heavy costs of the French expeditionary force, the Genoese Senate had placed the highest emphasis on returning the provinces of Balagna and the Nebbio to full productivity and re-establishing the colonial administration to resume the collection of taxes. From the point of view of the Genoese government, Boissieux's conflict in the Castagniccia—always a restive and economically marginal region—was far less important than the restoration of order in the Balagna. The senate had made its priorities abundantly clear to Mari, but the Republic's forces proved inept at stopping the royalist raids. The best they could do was to step up their reprisals against those suspected of helping Rauschenburg, but that only further disrupted and impoverished a province which the Republic needed to rebuild. Mari demanded more men from Boissieux, but the general angrily refused him; he was incensed that after more than a year of complaints about French inactivity, the commissioner was now insisting that he divert troops from the main theater of battle (as Boissieux saw it) in order to garrison farming villages which, believed Boissieux, the Genoese should have been fully capable of protecting against mere bandits.
Despite these difficulties elsewhere, Boissieux's plan continued its seemingly inexorable progress. The second attempt to take Borgo had gone more smoothly than the first, thanks to a larger force accompanied by artillery and the Rattsky hussars. The next objective of Maréchal de Camp
Jean-Charles de Gaultier de Girenton, Seigneur de Rousset was the royalist capital of Vescovato less than five miles south of Borgo. Despite some resistance, Rousset's division captured the village a few days later without much trouble. As an act of retribution, the family home of Lieutenant-General
Andrea Ceccaldi was looted and burned to the ground. The tower of San Pellegrino, which Theodore and Ceccaldi had bravely defended against Brigadier
Jean-Baptiste François, Marquis de Villemur, was captured on August 4th after just a few hours of bombardment by French land and naval artillery. Although portions of the eastern coast remained in rebel hands, the fall of Vescovato and San Pellegrino closed the main arteries of supply and communication from the east into the interior through the valleys of the Golo and Fiumalto. The noose around the rebels' neck which Boissieux had envisioned was nearly complete.
Situation in Corsica in early August 1739
Green: Royalist controlled
Red: Genoese controlled
Blue: French or joint Franco-Genoese occupation
White: Unknown, neutral, or uninhabited
Footnotes
[1] A company of the royal artillery was also under Sasselange's command, but this unit seems to have been stationed permanently in Calvi.