A reverse windy corner. Warspite turned when they wanted her to go straight. Hessen is going straight when they want her to turn!
Jutland Redux - A summer soltice shootout
- Thread starter johnboy
- Start date
And of course Windy Corner in pre-dreadnoughts is going to be much less pleasant.
At least it is happening in daylight. I remember commenting in another thread just how interesting an alt-Jutland could have gone if Jellicoe had chosen the wrong (or right depending on your POV) course during the night and had Grand Fleet run straight into the HSF at say 0030. Think Naval Battle of Guadalcanal with six times as many ships and nobody has radar.
They will also validate their light cruiser and destroyer anti torpedo boat tactics where superior firepower and more robust (relatively speaking) build wins out over the HSF torpedo boat flotillas (at least in daylight)
1737 22 June 1916 - Hannover goes under
1737 22 June 1916, HMS Agincourt, North Sea
6th Division concentrated their fire on the three ships emerging from the mist and smoke, only some 14,000 yards away. It was an unequal action, 15 inch super-dreadnoughts against ships that had long past their prime. Hessen was a prime target, stuck on a straight course, her faulty steering being frantically worked on by her panicked crew. Hannover quickly realised that a mistake had been made and turned away, followed by her division mate, the armoured cruiser Roon. It was the only prudent course. Nothing could be done to make life easier for the stricken Hessen against the onrushing British armada. Whilst it was a prudent choice, it was the turn of the Royal Navy to "get lucky". So far in the battle, the Royal Navy gunnery had been nothing to write home about. The British heavy ships had time for only 4-5 broadsides before Hannover and Roon completed their turn and moved back into the smoke screen. By 1737, Roon had completed her turn and moved back under cover, despite the best efforts of Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign, both newly commissioned ships with green crews. Hessen, battered by Marlborough and Revenge, had taken four hits and was badly damaged.
Aboard Agincourt, the gunnery officer prepared to engage. The enemy had crossed through the smoke and he ordered the ship to open fire on them with the 12” guns, of which she had all of 14, controlled by the Gunnery Commander from a position on the foremast, placing him above the smoke and allowing him to see further. The higher you are the better you are able to spot the fall of shot. He saw three salvos, falling all around the second enemy ship. The fourth got her. It must have been a hit a magazine, for there was a tremendous explosion before she sank. Later in the battle they passed the same ship, bottom up.
SMS Hannover had not been hit in the magazine, instead, a single 12 inch shell had penetrated the deck and plunged through to the torpedo tubes to port, detonating the warheads and causing the ship to rapidly fill and turn turtle. Casualties were horrendous due to the very rapidly of the sinking.
6th Division concentrated their fire on the three ships emerging from the mist and smoke, only some 14,000 yards away. It was an unequal action, 15 inch super-dreadnoughts against ships that had long past their prime. Hessen was a prime target, stuck on a straight course, her faulty steering being frantically worked on by her panicked crew. Hannover quickly realised that a mistake had been made and turned away, followed by her division mate, the armoured cruiser Roon. It was the only prudent course. Nothing could be done to make life easier for the stricken Hessen against the onrushing British armada. Whilst it was a prudent choice, it was the turn of the Royal Navy to "get lucky". So far in the battle, the Royal Navy gunnery had been nothing to write home about. The British heavy ships had time for only 4-5 broadsides before Hannover and Roon completed their turn and moved back into the smoke screen. By 1737, Roon had completed her turn and moved back under cover, despite the best efforts of Royal Oak and Royal Sovereign, both newly commissioned ships with green crews. Hessen, battered by Marlborough and Revenge, had taken four hits and was badly damaged.
Aboard Agincourt, the gunnery officer prepared to engage. The enemy had crossed through the smoke and he ordered the ship to open fire on them with the 12” guns, of which she had all of 14, controlled by the Gunnery Commander from a position on the foremast, placing him above the smoke and allowing him to see further. The higher you are the better you are able to spot the fall of shot. He saw three salvos, falling all around the second enemy ship. The fourth got her. It must have been a hit a magazine, for there was a tremendous explosion before she sank. Later in the battle they passed the same ship, bottom up.
SMS Hannover had not been hit in the magazine, instead, a single 12 inch shell had penetrated the deck and plunged through to the torpedo tubes to port, detonating the warheads and causing the ship to rapidly fill and turn turtle. Casualties were horrendous due to the very rapidly of the sinking.
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Ah it’s back on 
brilliant!
Beatty has a new lease of life and Hipper is now stuck behind enemy lines if I understood events right
brilliant!Beatty has a new lease of life and Hipper is now stuck behind enemy lines if I understood events right
I think it is the other way around. Beatty is the orange line sandwiched between Hipper (black line) and Scheer (grey line), although much closer to Hipper. Beatty would be toast, except that Hipper has very few effective ships left.Ah it’s back on
Beatty has a new lease of life and Hipper is now stuck behind enemy lines if I understood events right
Thinking about it, if Beatty and Jellicoe sink Hipper's battlecruisers and Hipper and Scheer sink Beatty's, so Jutland ends with no surviving BCs, do the world's navies look at this massacre of battlecruisers and conclude they were all a tremendous mistake?
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1742, 22 June 1916 - Jellicoe contemplates
1742, 22 June 1916, HMS Iron Duke, North Sea
Vice Admiral Cecil Burney's signal had been quite clear. "Have engaged - sunk one and crippled another Braunschweig class battleship". So, the Germans had brought their pre dreadnought battleships out into the North Sea on the sortie with them. He judged that a mistake, a mistake likely to hold their main line to 17-18 knots, 3-4 knots slower than his own. It was right on the summer solstice. Sunset would not occur until 2205, more than four hours away, although that sunset time would reduce slightly as they travelled further South. In any case, he had a comfortable margin of another 3 1/2 hours of sunlight left.
With a four knot speed margin, he was in a position to force an outcome before the Germans were able to reach the safety of the minefields that covered the Jade. The minefield covered all the way from Esbjerg on the Danish coast South to the Dutch coast. Once within reach of the minefields, the Grand Fleet could proceed no further, indeed, there was an element of danger in going within 30-40 nautical miles of the minefield, where German submarines may well be lurking. He ordered his light cruiser and armoured cruisers, the later at the rear of his line, to move up onto his port and starboard flank. If he was in his opponents shoes, it would only be a matter of time before he committed his light forces to keep his superior opponent's at arms length. Jellicoe was not dismayed by this-he considered his larger and more heavily armed destroyers and light cruisers, with armoured cruiser support, to be superior to his German opponents, a feeling that he was less sure of in regards his capital ships. For all that, from his earlier reports, he felt confident enough in regards numbers, 27 ships to 23, not all of the German strength being in dreadnoughts. It left him in the comfortable position of leaving 5th Battle Squadron and Evan-Thomas to the assistance of Beatty.
Vice Admiral Cecil Burney's signal had been quite clear. "Have engaged - sunk one and crippled another Braunschweig class battleship". So, the Germans had brought their pre dreadnought battleships out into the North Sea on the sortie with them. He judged that a mistake, a mistake likely to hold their main line to 17-18 knots, 3-4 knots slower than his own. It was right on the summer solstice. Sunset would not occur until 2205, more than four hours away, although that sunset time would reduce slightly as they travelled further South. In any case, he had a comfortable margin of another 3 1/2 hours of sunlight left.
With a four knot speed margin, he was in a position to force an outcome before the Germans were able to reach the safety of the minefields that covered the Jade. The minefield covered all the way from Esbjerg on the Danish coast South to the Dutch coast. Once within reach of the minefields, the Grand Fleet could proceed no further, indeed, there was an element of danger in going within 30-40 nautical miles of the minefield, where German submarines may well be lurking. He ordered his light cruiser and armoured cruisers, the later at the rear of his line, to move up onto his port and starboard flank. If he was in his opponents shoes, it would only be a matter of time before he committed his light forces to keep his superior opponent's at arms length. Jellicoe was not dismayed by this-he considered his larger and more heavily armed destroyers and light cruisers, with armoured cruiser support, to be superior to his German opponents, a feeling that he was less sure of in regards his capital ships. For all that, from his earlier reports, he felt confident enough in regards numbers, 27 ships to 23, not all of the German strength being in dreadnoughts. It left him in the comfortable position of leaving 5th Battle Squadron and Evan-Thomas to the assistance of Beatty.
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This is correct. Beatty would indeed be in an almost impossible position if the High Seas Fleet had not had to turn away due to Jellicoe. I think that, given the circumstances, battlecruisers will be seen as a bad deal. Of course, the British have Renown and Repluse very near completetion and Glorious and Courageous well and truely launched. Germans have Hindenburg close to completion as well.
1755 22 June 1916 - Steer directly towards the enemy
1745, 22 June 1916, SMS Lutzow, North Sea
The five large battleships had reacquired his battered ships some ten minutes ago. Only four of his ships could reply in kind. He supposed he should be thankful. His flagship's rear armament was still operational, as opposed to the wreckage that composed Anton and Bruno turrets. Seydlitz and Von der Tann lagged at the rear of his formation, which was held to a little over 14 knots by the crippled ships. His own flagship had no communications beyond searchlights. Communication with Seydlitz indicated that even maintaining a speed of 14 knots was causing her to ship more water into her already flooded hull, slowing the ship still further. In quick succession, at 1745, Lützow was struck by two 15-inch shells fired from Barham, both striking below the waterline. Both shells shattered on impact with the armour, and while not piercing it, the plate was unseated, allowing the two outer compartments to fill with water. They represented the 16th and 17th hits on the ship. They were quickly followed by more.
Hits 18, 19 and 20 followed at 1746. These shells all struck aft beneath the armoured deck and the damage allowed huge quantities of water to flood inwards rapidly below the deck. The waters put an increasing amount of strain on the bulkhead at frame 239, adjacent to the port boiler room. By 1750, the ship's speed had to be reduced to 12 knots. The pressure diminished only slightly. The bulkhead was not completely watertight and sea water seeped into compartment XI, the boiler room, through the damaged joints. By 1755, Hipper had made his decision, in what he thought was the best traditions of the Kaiser's Navy. He signalled the rest of his command their orders. Derfflinger and Moltke, the only two ships capable of making over 14 knots, would continue on with their screen at best available speed, both ships still capable of at least 22 knots. His damaged flagship, Von der Tann and Seydlitz all settled on course 0035, directly towards Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron.
The five large battleships had reacquired his battered ships some ten minutes ago. Only four of his ships could reply in kind. He supposed he should be thankful. His flagship's rear armament was still operational, as opposed to the wreckage that composed Anton and Bruno turrets. Seydlitz and Von der Tann lagged at the rear of his formation, which was held to a little over 14 knots by the crippled ships. His own flagship had no communications beyond searchlights. Communication with Seydlitz indicated that even maintaining a speed of 14 knots was causing her to ship more water into her already flooded hull, slowing the ship still further. In quick succession, at 1745, Lützow was struck by two 15-inch shells fired from Barham, both striking below the waterline. Both shells shattered on impact with the armour, and while not piercing it, the plate was unseated, allowing the two outer compartments to fill with water. They represented the 16th and 17th hits on the ship. They were quickly followed by more.
Hits 18, 19 and 20 followed at 1746. These shells all struck aft beneath the armoured deck and the damage allowed huge quantities of water to flood inwards rapidly below the deck. The waters put an increasing amount of strain on the bulkhead at frame 239, adjacent to the port boiler room. By 1750, the ship's speed had to be reduced to 12 knots. The pressure diminished only slightly. The bulkhead was not completely watertight and sea water seeped into compartment XI, the boiler room, through the damaged joints. By 1755, Hipper had made his decision, in what he thought was the best traditions of the Kaiser's Navy. He signalled the rest of his command their orders. Derfflinger and Moltke, the only two ships capable of making over 14 knots, would continue on with their screen at best available speed, both ships still capable of at least 22 knots. His damaged flagship, Von der Tann and Seydlitz all settled on course 0035, directly towards Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron.
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Cue 'Ride of the Valkyries' at very high volume.
With the three German battle cruisers so badly damaged, the 5th Battle Squadron should be able to simply steam through them and continue their pursuit of Derfflinger and Moltke. Turning his flagship towards the 5th Battle Squadron is a mistake with both Anto and Bruno turrets destroyed, it really is a 'death ride', even at 12knots steaming away with both aft turrets firing is more likely to inflict delay and Damage on the 5th and hopefully disrupt their pursuit just a bit longer.
With the three German battle cruisers so badly damaged, the 5th Battle Squadron should be able to simply steam through them and continue their pursuit of Derfflinger and Moltke. Turning his flagship towards the 5th Battle Squadron is a mistake with both Anto and Bruno turrets destroyed, it really is a 'death ride', even at 12knots steaming away with both aft turrets firing is more likely to inflict delay and Damage on the 5th and hopefully disrupt their pursuit just a bit longer.
I think the three closing ships will be sunk before the 5th can steam through them, and they need to be because otherwise the last shots from Hipper's battlecruisers will be at point-blank range where even 11" guns will penetrate the armor of a Queen Elizabeth.
For an 11" gun to penetrate the belt of a QE battleship the Germans ships have to be still afloat with a working turret, Under the circumstances ITTL my money would be firmly on the QE's coming through without having a single shot through the belt.