Ideal OoB and Equipment for WWI Combatants

[iddt3]

So I've seen this a ton for WWII nations, but almost never for WWI. Which is interesting, because I feel like there are very dramatic potential PoDs in any WWI nation having some foresight in it's equipment. Like, could Austria Hungry have invested heavily in Tanks in the pre war? Could the French have a Bren Gun Carrier equivalent going into the war?

So two different questions to answer:

• The Plausible: What *plausible* changes could a major combatant that would have a dramatic impact on combat effectiveness going into the war? So bigger investment in machine guns, more motorization, better artillery park, that sort of thing. These should be relatively small changes that don't require extensive justification, the focus is low hanging fruit and their impact.
• The Possible: What are the actual technical limits for what a nation could start WWI with? So is it physically possible for the Germans, given the technology of the time, to equip substantial portions of their army with proto assault rifles? Can you get wider deployment of radios? Can the British start the war with Aircraft carriers and torpedo carrying biplanes?

I'm posting both questions separately in a probably hopeless attempt to keep people from arguing that possible changes aren't plausible, so please indicate which question you're answering!

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Well for anyone rocket artillery and a panzerfaust style rpg. More extensive stokes style mortars are well from 60mm-120mm calibers. If they can figure it out the 210mm breach loading mortar would be extremely useful.

An intermediate caliber carbine is certainly possible, especially if Mannlicher lives longer and is able to get someone to adopt his delayed blowback rifle.
The French should have had a semi-auto rifle pre-war, but spent way too much time focused on developing the perfect magnum rifle round, much like the British and their .276 Enfield.

True LMGs should have been ubiquitous.

 

[McPherson]

Well for anyone rocket artillery and a panzerfaust style rpg. More extensive stokes style mortars are well from 60mm-120mm calibers. If they can figure it out the 210mm breach loading mortar would be extremely useful.

An intermediate caliber carbine is certainly possible, especially if Mannlicher lives longer and is able to get someone to adopt his delayed blowback rifle.
The French should have had a semi-auto rifle pre-war, but spent way too much time focused on developing the perfect magnum rifle round, much like the British and their .276 Enfield.

True LMGs should have been ubiquitous.

a. Jack Parsons is not old enough to figure out perchlorates and asphalt as binders for solid fuels.
b. Ditto for trinary propellants.
c. Stokes mortar is possible.
d. metallurgy for semi-auto and auto-rifles is "iffy". Ditto inventors.
e. No tanks, so why ATRs?
f. LMGs? OS in the heavies still had problems, don't look for a LMG until someone solves the various OS in the heavies aside from the !@# !@#$ed Maxim.
g. delayed blowback is an impulse bad idea in a battle rifle.

 

[Driftless]

Any practical way of preventing the stagnation and carnage of the historic Western Front trench warfare, short of an early appearance of tanks? (Early appearance of infiltration tactics by both sides?) Whenever tanks do appear, can you change the command mindset that their speed is tied to the foot speed of the infantry?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

a. Jack Parsons is not old enough to figure out perchlorates and asphalt as binders for solid fuels.
b. Ditto for trinary propellants.
c. Stokes mortar is possible.
d. metallurgy for semi-auto and auto-rifles is "iffy". Ditto inventors.
e. No tanks, so why ATRs?
f. LMGs? OS in the heavies still had problems, don't look for a LMG until someone solves the various OS in the heavies aside from the !@# !@#$ed Maxim.
g. delayed blowback is an impulse bad idea in a battle rifle.

I don't know why I am even bothering engaging with you again, but here we go.
French semi-autos used in WW1:

Fusil Automatique Modèle 1917 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Meunier rifle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Parsons had no influence on the rocketry programs of most nations, so I have no idea why you even bring him up.
Besides this guy was around:

Robert H. Goddard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

404 Not Found | Spaceline

www.spaceline.org

These theories were refined by Goddard during a year of research and teaching at Princeton University between 1912 and 1913. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Goddard kept detailed records on his research, most of which survive today.

As early as 1914, Goddard received patents for now common rocket components like combustion chambers, exhaust nozzles, propellant feed systems and multi-stage rockets. At about the same period, Goddard began flight tests using gunpowder propelled rockets near Worcester. Some of these rockets reached maximum altitudes of 500 feet.

He requested financial support for rocket tests from the Smithsonian Institution in 1916, and received a $5,000 grant from the organization in January, 1917. High-altitude rocket research was put on hold, however, when the United States entered World War I later that year.

Considered a staunch patriot until his death, Goddard went to work for the Army in 1917 with the goal of designing rockets that would aid in the war effort. The work was conducted in California, and yielded the development of a small, hand-held rocket launcher similar to what was later called the bazooka.

By September, 1918 Goddard had presented the Army Signal Corps with several options for rockets and launchers, the most simple of which could be fired from trenches. The largest version could carry an eight-pound payload a distance of about one mile.

Black powder rocket launchers worked too long before WW1:

Congreve rocket - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

New York Rocket Battalion - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

William Hale (British inventor) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And the Panzerfaust used that:

The basic concept was that of a recoilless gun; in the Faustpatrone and the Panzerfaust a propellent charge pushed the warhead out the front of the tube while the blast also exited the rear of the tube balancing forces and therefore there was no recoil force for the operator.
The propellant was of 54 g (1.9 oz, 830 grains) of black powder, the metal launch tube had a length of 80 cm (31½ in) and a diameter of 3.3 cm (1.3 in) (early models reportedly 2.8 cm (1.1 in)). Fitted to the warhead was a wooden shaft with folded stabilizing fins (made of 0.25 mm (0.01 in) thick spring metal). These bent blades straightened into position by themselves as soon as they left the launch tube. The warhead was accelerated to a speed of 28 m/s (92 ft/s), had a range of about 30 m (100 ft) and an armor penetration of up to 140 mm (5½ in) of plain steel.

No one said anything about ATRs.

As to LMGs:

Lewis gun - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Lewis gun was invented by U.S. Army colonel Isaac Newton Lewis in 1911, based on initial work by Samuel Maclean.[3] Despite its origins, the Lewis gun was not initially adopted by the U.S. military, most likely because of political differences between Lewis and General William Crozier, the chief of the Ordnance Department.[4] Lewis became frustrated with trying to persuade the U.S. Army to adopt his design, "slapped by rejections from ignorant hacks", in his words,[5] and retired from the army. He left the United States in 1913 and went to Belgium, where he established the Armes Automatique Lewis company in Liège to facilitate commercial production of the gun.[6] Lewis had been working closely with British arms manufacturer the Birmingham Small Arms Company Limited (BSA) in an effort to overcome some of the production difficulties of the weapon.[3] The Belgians bought a small number of Lewises in 1913, using the .303 British round and, in 1914, BSA purchased a licence to manufacture the Lewis machine gun in England, which resulted in Lewis receiving significant royalty payments and becoming very wealthy.[5] Lewis and his factory moved to England before 1914, away from possible seizure in the event of a German invasion.[7]

AKA around pre-WW1.

Delayed blowback in a rifle is a bad idea? Except for all the successful ones:

Heckler & Koch G3 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Or this:

Gun automatics: delayed blowback action - Modern Firearms

In our previous article we discussed the simplest form of automatic gun action, known as “blowback”, or technically speaking, unlocked breech action. In this article we will discuss a slightly more complex form of the unlocked breech principle, known as “delayed” (or, in some sources...

modernfirearms.net

Probably the most successful early design of a delayed (retarded) blowback weapon appeared in 1905-1907. It was a machine gun, designed by the German engineer Andreas Schwarzlose, and adopted by Austro-Hungarian, Swedish and some other European armies. Widely used during WW1, it remained in service until WW2 in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Netherlands. To ensure reliable extraction with a prematurely opening breech, Schwarzlose employed a built-in oiler that applies a small amount of lubricating oil to each cartridge during the chambering process. This helps to avoid cases sticking in the dirty or overheated chamber, which otherwise would result in stoppages or catastrophic gun failures due to torn case rims or separated cartridge heads. Retardation of the breechblock opening was ensured by the knee-shaped arrangement of two levers, supporting the breechblock.

Any practical way of preventing the stagnation and carnage of the historic Western Front trench warfare, short of an early appearance of tanks? (Early appearance of infiltration tactics by both sides?) Whenever tanks do appear, can you change the command mindset that their speed is tied to the foot speed of the infantry?

Sure, don't have the Germans mess up their western front operations. The BEF and French armies could have been crushed in 1914, which would have likely prevented the OTL trenches and WW1 in the west ends up being a rerun of the Franco-Prussian war.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Austria-Hungary couldn't invest heavily into anything. Franz Josef kept the purse strings too tight for even Conrad's most modest budget proposals.

If a large enough budget was approved:

First thing on the list would be replacing all the bronze barrelled guns with steel barrelled ones with modern recoil mitigation devices (some of the guns in AH service didn't even have spades!).

Second on the list would be expanding the officer corps, AH had a pretty good cadre of multilingual pre-war officers, but then they were all culled in the Winter Carpathian Offensives*. Developing a redundancy of officers would greatly improve AH's ability to sustain casualties.

After that increasing the number of machine guns per battalion is a must. IIRC Conrad wanted to at least match the Russians.

In terms of fancy new technologies, the Austro-Daimler Panzerautomobil seemed like a really decent armoured car, and Mannlicher's pistol calibre carbines would have been useful in infantry assaults.

*some better winterized uniforms would also be a good idea.

 

[iddt3]

I don't know why I am even bothering engaging with you again, but here we go.
French semi-autos used in WW1:

Fusil Automatique Modèle 1917 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Meunier rifle - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Parsons had no influence on the rocketry programs of most nations, so I have no idea why you even bring him up.
Besides this guy was around:

Robert H. Goddard - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

404 Not Found | Spaceline

www.spaceline.org

Black powder rocket launchers worked too long before WW1:

Congreve rocket - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

New York Rocket Battalion - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

William Hale (British inventor) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And the Panzerfaust used that:


No one said anything about ATRs.

As to LMGs:

Lewis gun - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

AKA around pre-WW1.

Delayed blowback in a rifle is a bad idea? Except for all the successful ones:

Heckler & Koch G3 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Or this:

Gun automatics: delayed blowback action - Modern Firearms

In our previous article we discussed the simplest form of automatic gun action, known as “blowback”, or technically speaking, unlocked breech action. In this article we will discuss a slightly more complex form of the unlocked breech principle, known as “delayed” (or, in some sources...

modernfirearms.net

Sure, don't have the Germans mess up their western front operations. The BEF and French armies could have been crushed in 1914, which would have likely prevented the OTL trenches and WW1 in the west ends up being a rerun of the Franco-Prussian war.

What about on the Allied side? Is it possible to get a WWI that isn't defined by trench warfare in the west, but also isn't over in six months?

Also, it sounds like Katyusha's are vaguely plausible. Does that make a meaningful difference, or does it just contribute to the soldier's misery?

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

For Canada:

First of all, higher a mercenary to kill Sam Hughes.

Second on the list is to run the Ross Rifle through some extensive tests, and actually act on the feed back this time. So many of the problems Canada had with the guns could have been found and solved pre-war (in fact, quite a few of the problems were discovered in training prior to being shipped overseas) and by just improving quality control standards at the factory. Here's a pretty good video on the numerous screw ups involved in the Ross' production.

While unruining the Ross, some enterprising factory worker starts experimenting with converting it into an automatic rifle. OTL Mr. Huot was able to successfully manage that in two years, working alone, without pay. So actually give this guy a salary, and a staff to speed up the process and hopefully the CEF can go over with some decent auto rifles.

And buy a better armoured car than the Armoured Autocar, and start experimenting with a motorized battalion before 1914.

 

[Blue cat]

So I've seen this a ton for WWII nations, but almost never for WWI. Which is interesting, because I feel like there are very dramatic potential PoDs in any WWI nation having some foresight in it's equipment. Like, could Austria Hungry have invested heavily in Tanks in the pre war? Could the French have a Bren Gun Carrier equivalent going into the war?

So two different questions to answer:

• The Plausible: What *plausible* changes could a major combatant that would have a dramatic impact on combat effectiveness going into the war? So bigger investment in machine guns, more motorization, better artillery park, that sort of thing. These should be relatively small changes that don't require extensive justification, the focus is low hanging fruit and their impact.
• The Possible: What are the actual technical limits for what a nation could start WWI with? So is it physically possible for the Germans, given the technology of the time, to equip substantial portions of their army with proto assault rifles? Can you get wider deployment of radios? Can the British start the war with Aircraft carriers and torpedo carrying biplanes?

I'm posting both questions separately in a probably hopeless attempt to keep people from arguing that possible changes aren't plausible, so please indicate which question you're answering!

Plausible:
Maybe issue steel helmets and hand grenades on a large scale from day one.
Better boots, uniforms etc are probably also possible.


Possible:
Maybe foresee chemical warfare and at least have protective gear on hand (or at least designed and ready to go into mass production.)
Maybe issue radios on a somewhat wider basis
Maybe have simple SMG style weapons either available or ready for mass production (I have some nagging doubts that mass producing significant numbers of fully interchangeable and reliable magazines for SMG style weapons was a simple thing to do in the WW1 era.)
I expect there is some low hanging fruit re medical care
Maybe have basic body armor ready to go into mass production if needed (ie. steel shields for use by more or less stationary personnel in Trenches..)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

What about on the Allied side? Is it possible to get a WWI that isn't defined by trench warfare in the west, but also isn't over in six months?

Also, it sounds like Katyusha's are vaguely plausible. Does that make a meaningful difference, or does it just contribute to the soldier's misery?

Probably not without major pre-WW1 PODs for France that would include changing their entire strategy, infantry doctrine, and artillery park as well as their political scene.

Rocket artillery would be quite helpful, but given the technological limits of the day mortars might be more effective and accurate.

 

[Intosh]

Probably not without major pre-WW1 PODs for France that would include changing their entire strategy, infantry doctrine, and artillery park as well as their political scene.

Rocket artillery would be quite helpful, but given the technological limits of the day mortars might be more effective and accurate.

The French was actually doing it. Severals military reforms were in adoption in 1914, others could have been adopted, for exemple the end of blue/red uniform.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The French was actually doing it. Severals military reforms were in adoption in 1914, others could have been adopted, for exemple the end of blue/red uniform.

Right, but far too late and only because they were countering German military reforms. So either war is delayed, which probably butterflies WW1 or there has to be a mess of PODs to get France moving sooner that won't necessarily advantage them. The French just had a serious problem with military preparations for political reasons (going back to Napoleon) and population disparity. The BEF just isn't big or prepared enough to deal with the German numerical advantage that existed in 1914.

 

[Hammerbolt]

Maybe we should split this into 3 eras? After all, the war did change it's basic nature.

So, we'd have most of-1914: manouver war, armies trying to rush-outflank each other
15-17: trench war
18: manouver again.

Each would require diferent equipment.

 

[McPherson]

Any practical way of preventing the stagnation and carnage of the historic Western Front trench warfare, short of an early appearance of tanks? (Early appearance of infiltration tactics by both sides?) Whenever tanks do appear, can you change the command mindset that their speed is tied to the foot speed of the infantry?

Look at @Blue cat and see my comments. He has some good ideas about what was plausible

Plausible:
Maybe issue steel helmets and hand grenades on a large scale from day one.
Better boots, uniforms etc are probably also possible.

a. I would add camouflage, weatherization, better load carrying webbing. Don't forget the wire cutters and a good pig sticker.

Possible:
Maybe foresee chemical warfare and at least have protective gear on hand (or at least designed and ready to go into mass production.)
Maybe issue radios on a somewhat wider basis
Maybe have simple SMG style weapons either available or ready for mass production (I have some nagging doubts that mass producing significant numbers of fully interchangeable and reliable magazines for SMG style weapons was a simple thing to do in the WW1 era.)
I expect there is some low hanging fruit re medical care
Maybe have basic body armor ready to go into mass production if needed (ie. steel shields for use by more or less stationary personnel in Trenches..)

b. With Germans, chemical warfare was almost certain. I am surprised that offensive smoke screens and tear gas was not employed from day 1.
c. Radios in WWI are big fragile and awkward. War at sea, sure. Issue to everything that floats. Land warfare is "iffy" below corps. Motorcycle is a better development.
d. Blowback machine pistol is possible by 1910. I think this is the light firepower that is possible in auto weapons of the era. Machine pistols, grenades and infiltration might prevent some stalemate and one might see a WWI version of WWII infantry brawling with patrol, ambush and outposts/pickets separating the line of contact being the norm along a more fluid battlefield.
e. useful for snipers. Others? YMMV. I just don't know enough.

 

[Ramontxo]

Minimum plausible POD what about giving ASAP a automatic pistol to each private? Trenchs and closae cuartel brawls and a fast firing 1911 or any of the available models would be better than a rifle. Later some enterprising blokes would surely play about transforming them to full automatic fire. From that to a smg...

 

[Merrick]

For a first shot
- Send everyone involved in the July Crisis a care package of tea, cocoa, aspirin, antacids and possibly morphine.
- Remind the Diplomatic Service that a Europe-wide war on one week's notice is the policy outcome they're paid to prevent.
- Round up every copy of the set-in-stone cannot-be-changed Grand National Mobilisation Plan, place them carefully in a bomb-proof vault and then lose the key.

If that doesn't work, we're on to Plan B:
- Hand grenades, steel helmets and low-observable uniforms are a given (I'm looking at you, France).
- Support weapons and lots of them. Ideally, you'd have every infantry section with a mortar or LMG - that's not going to happen in 1914, but the more support firepower you can put in the front line the better.
- Increasing the number of MGs is probably a better bet than messing around with self-loading rifles. WW1 was not a rifleman's war.
- Get some smart people onto developing a reliable man-portable radio. The biggest problem for WW1 offensive operations - even more than barbed wire and machine guns - was that attacking troops were basically out of contact from the moment they went over the top.
- Get ready to produce HE shells on an industrial scale, and then some. I think that during the Battle of the Marne, the German army was firing off more shells than it had used in the whole Franco-Prussian War, per day.
- Do some research work on shell fuses to find out which ones work, and which ones bury themselves in the mud.

- Realise that the size of armies plus the speed of communications makes it impossible for a general to control the whole battle from HQ.
- Train your mid-level officers to react to the unexpected on their own initiative, rather than mindlessly following the Plan or (worse) halting to wait for orders.
- Work on improving communications, especially lateral communications between peer units. Try to cut down on the delay loop at HQ.

- The problem with trying to develop pre-1914 tanks is that pre-1914 engines just aren't up to it. Probably best to start with something like tracklaying artillery tractors and once you get an engine/transmission/suspension that can move multi-ton loads cross country at better than 3mph, start working on putting armour on it.
- Aeroplanes are a thing. Work on integrating them into the rest of the army, with emphasis on turning round reconnaissance reports rapidly enough for them to be useful. Ignore "visionary" lunatics babbling about strategic bombing.

 

[PMN1]

As has been said, the engines used in the tank were not really up to it until Ricardo was asked to do something about them but was the original Daimler engine that was used in the first tanks any more reliable when used to power the Foster--Daimler tractor?

As I understand it, Tritton knew Ricardo so could you have Tritton ask Ricardo to design him a better engine sooner...i.e.before the outbreak of war?

 

[Driftless]

Weren't there some marine engines of appropriate size (somewhat more HP than car/truck engines of the '10's), but not so heavy as to be too much? A "Goldilocks-just-right" size engine? First, use it in track-laying prime movers, and then in armored vehicles?

 

[McPherson]

For a first shot
- Send everyone involved in the July Crisis a care package of tea, cocoa, aspirin, antacids and possibly morphine.
- Remind the Diplomatic Service that a Europe-wide war on one week's notice is the policy outcome they're paid to prevent.
- Round up every copy of the set-in-stone cannot-be-changed Grand National Mobilisation Plan, place them carefully in a bomb-proof vault and then lose the key.

a. Could we have trained psychiatrists or whatever they used in those days, put Woodrow Wilson, Kaiser Bill and Czar Nicky under immediate medical care or have them declared incompetent and removed from decision making capacity?

If that doesn't work, we're on to Plan B:
- Hand grenades, steel helmets and low-observable uniforms are a given (I'm looking at you, France).
- Support weapons and lots of them. Ideally, you'd have every infantry section with a mortar or LMG - that's not going to happen in 1914, but the more support firepower you can put in the front line the better.
- Increasing the number of MGs is probably a better bet than messing around with self-loading rifles. WW1 was not a rifleman's war.
- Get some smart people onto developing a reliable man-portable radio. The biggest problem for WW1 offensive operations - even more than barbed wire and machine guns - was that attacking troops were basically out of contact from the moment they went over the top.
- Get ready to produce HE shells on an industrial scale, and then some. I think that during the Battle of the Marne, the German army was firing off more shells than it had used in the whole Franco-Prussian War, per day.
- Do some research work on shell fuses to find out which ones work, and which ones bury themselves in the mud.

b. If we are going to diss anyone about personal gear how about the Americans? They NEVER get a decent helmet, rucksack or boots.

THAT was proposed in 1917.
c. Nothing wrong with the potato masher. A LOT wrong with the grapefruit. Stokes mortar or Brandt is doable. Portable machine gun is relative. Some of the garbage they tried was … well garbage. Lewis gun and maybe a QCB Hotchkiss on a three man carry is doable.
d. At some scale one is dealing in millions of shells and BILLIONS of bullets. 100,000 machine guns in the line spitting 10,000 bullets per day = 1 billion bullets. 4 year war = ~1.3 trillion bullets. Go 2 magnitudes less for Arty. 1 BILLION shells. Something is wrong there, Rupert. Both logistically and ethically, that is just not right.

- Realise that the size of armies plus the speed of communications makes it impossible for a general to control the whole battle from HQ.
- Train your mid-level officers to react to the unexpected on their own initiative, rather than mindlessly following the Plan or (worse) halting to wait for orders.
- Work on improving communications, especially lateral communications between peer units. Try to cut down on the delay loop at HQ.

e. Nice to have but until one gets reliable crystals and or spark transmitters and multiple channel capability, one is stuck with flare rockets, signal flags, messenger runners, and motor cyclists who cannot memorize a simple twenty word verbal frag order,
f. and Henry Haphazard, frontier indigenous people fighter (read colonial imperialist goon), promoted from captain to brigadier general; trying to read and understand his part of the plan off a hastily grease penciled map (Yes; they had cellophane overlays and grease pencils back then. Hope he knows French!) is trying to remember 57 years into the past how they did it in granddad's day at Lookout Mountain. (If you get the reference, you receive the order of the golden turkey, with the gilded beak cluster.)

- The problem with trying to develop pre-1914 tanks is that pre-1914 engines just aren't up to it. Probably best to start with something like tracklaying artillery tractors and once you get an engine/transmission/suspension that can move multi-ton loads cross country at better than 3mph, start working on putting armour on it.
- Aeroplanes are a thing. Work on integrating them into the rest of the army, with emphasis on turning round reconnaissance reports rapidly enough for them to be useful. Ignore "visionary" lunatics babbling about strategic bombing.

There is nothing WRONG with Strategic Bombing as long as it is the NAVY that does it. Asking the army to figure it out is begging to be Mitchelled.

 

[AJE]

- Get some smart people onto developing a reliable man-portable radio. The biggest problem for WW1 offensive operations - even more than barbed wire and machine guns - was that attacking troops were basically out of contact from the moment they went over the top.

Using radios for all communication is one option, and this works well in a fight against enemies with less radio use. Against an army that uses radios everywhere, there is another option which works very well and renders the first option useless. This consists of making radios, but training troops to maintain EMCON and minimize their use wherever possible. At the same time, set up a large organization of radio intelligence units in the army with listening and direction-finding equipment. All recorded communications would pass to decryption, and locations from direction-finding would pass to artillery units (which units would probably be located with, as passing data to them by radio would be dangerous and passing data by messenger would be slow). Artillery would immediately fire on any major radio source in enemy territory. Frequency-hopping can defeat interception and jamming, but not direction-finding. War against a radio-dependent enemy could be summed up with this:

Communications were shattered and it seemed that any headquarters that used the radio was quickly attacked by bombs and artillery fire.

Most likely the enemy army would lose all of its radio operators and most of its command staff within 1-2 weeks, and would be completely neutralized without an alternative to radio.

The ideal method to use depends on how much the enemy force uses radios, and most importantly if they can function without using them.