How effective would the ‘Advance Firing’ tactic be in 19th century warfare?

[Arnold d.c]

In the Napoleonic Wars most Infantry fought in close order: line, column or mixed order. The Crimea War and the American Civil War was not that much different. While rifle range increased (and thus skirmishers and sharpshooters became increasingly important) in both wars, the armies still thought that the bayonet was the key in taking a position.

An interesting tactic adopted during the ACW was ‘advance firing’. This was August Willich’s solution to advancing over contested ground. Willich found the pre-war theorists’ solution to the extended range of rifles (basically running faster to bayonet the enemy) unsatisfactory and tried to incorporate fire and maneuver while advancing. The result was a line of four ranks with intervals for the rear rank to pass through. The rear rank would run rapidly to the front of the first rank and fire. The next rank would do the same and so on. It was a methodical advance combined with a wall of fire, delivering a volley from one quarter of the attacking force every ten or fifteen seconds while still sustaining a measured forward progress.

Willich claimed to have invented it, though it is possible that he instead adapted it from the German Jaegers in the American Revolution, who apparently had a specialized street-fighting drill that also used four ranks advancing in succession. It was used in Liberty Gap and Chickamauga, and was successful in both cases at a brigade level. The reason it did not catch on was that Rosecrans got sacked and George Thomas took over. In the fall of 1863 Willich was ordered to stop employing or training “Advance Firing” and go back to the standard Casey’s manual. Thomas was a great commander and a superb soldier – but not an innovator, at least in things like tactics.

After the war, when a number of army officers were seeking a new tactical paradigm incorporating the increasing use of breech loading rifles among the infantry, they also went to looser lines and successive ‘waves’ of advance, alternately firing and moving forward – all reminiscent of Willich’s idea, though also, obviously, based on the idea of reinforced skirmish line movement.

So my question is how effective would this have been in other wars? Would it have proved to be a useful tactic in the Napoleonic Wars? Would this have been a useful tactic in storming the earthworks in the Crimea War and ACW? Would this have worked in future wars?

 

[Dave Shoup]

Given that percussion weapons yielded a lower percentage of misfires than flintlocks, this tactic probably would have worked better in the 1850s than in 1815. Fire and maneuver was the right path, but unless the fire is actually going down range, it's not going to have a huge effect on the defenders.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Given that percussion weapons yielded a lower percentage of misfires than flintlocks, this tactic probably would have worked better in the 1850s than in 1815. Fire and maneuver was the right path, but unless the fire is actually going down range, it's not going to have a huge effect on the defenders.

Interesting. I could see that this perhaps would not be very useful in the Napoleonic Wars considering the short range of Infantry combat, but could this solve the British Reverse Slope tactic for the French? Assuming the formation could still function under very heavy fire, could their new firepower punch through Wellington’s lines?

 

[Dave Shoup]

Interesting. I could see that this perhaps would not be very useful in the Napoleonic Wars considering the short range of Infantry combat, but could this solve the British Reverse Slope tactic for the French? Assuming the formation could still function under very heavy fire, could their new firepower punch through Wellington’s lines?

Maybe, but the French infantry would still be trying to make it work with flintlock muskets in northwestern Europe, which is - all in all - fairly damp in the winter and spring.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Maybe, but the French infantry would still be trying to make it work with flintlock muskets in northwestern Europe, which is - all in all - fairly damp in the winter and spring.

Alright. I’d like to know more about the misfire rate of flintlock muskets. IIRC the firing rate between the flintlock muskets and percussion weapons were largely the same. The British Army in the Iberian Peninsula seemed pretty capable in laying down heavy fire before charging. Was misfiring a serious problem during the Napoleonic Wars? Or were percussion rifles that much more reliable?

 

[Dave Shoup]

I'm sure someone tested it at some point, but I'd expect since the transition from flintlocks to percussion caps was pretty much universal by all parties historically, the utility of caps vs. flints seems apparent. Otherwise, why change?

 

[general]

ISTR that with flintlocks, you could expect a misfire 1 out of every 4 shots on average.

 

[NavesFerrata]

I read 2 in 13, from "Great Commanders and their Battles". Don't know where it was sourced.

 

[SwampTiger]

Hardee's Manual of Tactics addressed skirmish tactics, small unit movement and use of cover. The issue to me is the lack of imagination by the most commanders. The technique of 'advance by fire' should have been an early adoption by both sides. Tactical developments did occur throughout the war. Usually despite the advanced thinkers of the antebellum army.

 

[Decatur]

Just to be clear, is this what "advance firing" is?

 

[Arnold d.c]

Just to be clear, is this what "advance firing" is?

Not quite.

This is a reenactment of the tactic.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Column attacks with fire were a attempt in the same direction. Instead of just having the battalion column charge the last hundred meters the first rank would fire and stand fast reloading while the rest of the column passed. The down side was the compact column was still vulnerable to defense fire from a line.

The defense version was in two forms. The front rank fires then retires to reload & the next rank fires. The other would be the rolling volleys by company along the line, which Wellingtons army used to good effect.

 

[SwampTiger]

Note how tightly the officer controls the unit. The 'open' order is much tighter than WW1 open order. Reading Hardee's tactical instructions, this is closer to line or column tactics than skirmish tactics. I understand the difficulties in controlling the minimally trained troops of the ACW limit tactical experimentation. but this is barely better than standard line.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Note how tightly the officer controls the unit. The 'open' order is much tighter than WW1 open order. Reading Hardee's tactical instructions, this is closer to line or column tactics than skirmish tactics. I understand the difficulties in controlling the minimally trained troops of the ACW limit tactical experimentation. but this is barely better than standard line.

No it isn’t. With this formation a regiment can fire a volley every 15 seconds while advancing instead of 30-45 seconds while standing still. The historical data we have showed good results: Willich was able to sweep Maney’s Brigade back 1 mile and seize 5 guns at Chickamauga and Harker’s Brigade routed Robertson’s Texas Brigade with the tactic.

 

[Michael B]

No it isn’t. With this formation a regiment can fire a volley every 15 seconds while advancing instead of 30-45 seconds while standing still. The historical data we have showed good results: Willich was able to sweep Maney’s Brigade back 1 mile and seize 5 guns at Chickamauga and Harker’s Brigade routed Robertson’s Texas Brigade with the tactic.

This reply implies that troops fire faster if moving than if stationary. That seems to be an oxymoron as they have to move through ranks as well as load their musket instead of concentrating on just the latter. In practice to get the higher rate only 1/4 of the battalion is firing at a time.

The real questions to advance firing are:
1) Whether it is more effective as a tactic for a battalion to fire one quarter of its muskets at a time albeit at a faster rate or all of them at the same time?
2) How many times can the advanced firing battalion fire before it reaches charge range?

On 2 (and I am more than happy for people to debate my numbers) assume that the unit first fires at effective smoothbore range of 300m, the battalion moves forward at a speed of 50m a minute and troops charge when they are within 50m. That give 6 shots (300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50) each being 1/4 a battalion. Say one and a half full battalion volleys.

In contrast a station battalion firing at half the rate will get 3 shots (300, 200, 100), ie twice as much full battalion volleys.

We should also consider morale. Troops moving forwards generally have better morale. Also is it worse to getting peppered at twice the rate of receiving full blasts? The the last one I would say comes down to the quality of the enemy. The good will take advantage of you using advance firing and blow your men away. The poor will run quicker.

My analysis assumes using smoothbore muskets. Obviously the numbers change with rifling and I will leave others to present numbers here. At least in the former my view advance firing is not a good tactic and had any army tried it in in the Napoleonic War it would have been quickly dropped.

 

[pjmidd]

Classic mistake of thinking because something works 50 years later it would work with earlier equipment. It would not , Napoleonic muskets don't use minie balls and rifling so effective range is a quarter ie by the time you can do advance firing , you are effectively in charge range. Add in guns more likely to misfire, have wooden ramrods, foul more and its looks not so even worse.

Then we have the elephant in the room , no offense but American Civil War soldiers were considered poor milita by European standards. They tended to break easier than "professional" troops so tactics that worked in America , may not work in Europe.

 

[Arnold d.c]

This reply implies that troops fire faster if moving than if stationary. That seems to be an oxymoron as they have to move through ranks as well as load their musket instead of concentrating on just the latter. In practice to get the higher rate only 1/4 of the battalion is firing at a time.

It’s not an oxymoron at all. The first rank fires a volley, the rear rank runs through the gap to the first rank and fires their own volley and so on. Assuming it took 15 seconds to complete each movement, each rank fires a volley at least once. Secondly, a regiment in four ranks is not too bad. While it is true that most ACW regiments fought in lines of 2 ranks, most Napoleonic armies used lines 3 ranks deep (except the British).

The real questions to advance firing are:
1) Whether it is more effective as a tactic for a battalion to fire one quarter of its muskets at a time albeit at a faster rate or all of them at the same time?
2) How many times can the advanced firing battalion fire before it reaches charge range?

1. The advantage is to close in to threaten a bayonet charge while constantly punishing the defenders with fire. There were only three applications of the tactic but in all cases the defender’s ability to reload their weapons was disrupted by the volleys and their morale was shaken.

2. But a compact formation such as that was superior in driving a bayonet charge than a line of battle.

On 2 (and I am more than happy for people to debate my numbers) assume that the unit first fires at effective smoothbore range of 300m, the battalion moves forward at a speed of 50m a minute and troops charge when they are within 50m. That give 6 shots (300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50) each being 1/4 a battalion. Say one and a half full battalion volleys.

In contrast a station battalion firing at half the rate will get 3 shots (300, 200, 100), ie twice as much full battalion volleys.

We should also consider morale. Troops moving forwards generally have better morale. Also is it worse to getting peppered at twice the rate of receiving full blasts? The the last one I would say comes down to the quality of the enemy. The good will take advantage of you using advance firing and blow your men away. The poor will run quicker.

300 meters? Engagement ranges in the Napoleonic wars was typically less than 100 meters. At best the defenders could get off one or two volleys before distance is closed for a bayonet charge. My idea is that this is a firepower column, shaking the defenders with several volleys before charging. Napoleonic columns if stopped were in danger of destruction and were generally incapable of advancing again. If they could keep advancing with this new tactic it could prove to be a tactical improvement in my opinion.

 

[Michael B]

It’s not an oxymoron at all. The first rank fires a volley, the rear rank runs through the gap to the first rank and fires their own volley and so on. Assuming it took 15 seconds to complete each movement, each rank fires a volley at least once. Secondly, a regiment in four ranks is not too bad. While it is true that most ACW regiments fought in lines of 2 ranks, most Napoleonic armies used lines 3 ranks deep (except the British). .

So the regiment fires 1/3 full battalion volley every 15 seconds instead a full one every 30 seconds. An improvement but not exactly a great one.

1. The advantage is to close in to threaten a bayonet charge while constantly punishing the defenders with fire. There were only three applications of the tactic but in all cases the defender’s ability to reload their weapons was disrupted by the volleys and their morale was shaken. .

And so is the attackers and they are receiving more volleys overall.

300 meters? Engagement ranges in the Napoleonic wars was typically less than 100 meters. At best the defenders could get off one or two volleys before distance is closed for a bayonet charge. My idea is that this is a firepower column, shaking the defenders with several volleys before charging. Napoleonic columns if stopped were in danger of destruction and were generally incapable of advancing again. If they could keep advancing with this new tactic it could prove to be a tactical improvement in my opinion.

If the defenders get 2 volleys in that is going to be twice as much as the advance firers are going to deliver.

The advantage of the tactic is that the regiment is firing on the move and thus better morale. If that offsets the greater punishment that it is likely to receive then the tactic works. If not then it is back to the thin red line.