Part LXXVI
The Surge
Afghanistan
The King lay dying. After 4 decades on the throne, and a further 3 decades of exile King Mohammad Zahir Shah had returned to Afghanistan. As the tide firmly turned against militant Taleban rule through the dedicated politicking of his long-time cohorts and allies who bargained with dozens of regional leaders, successfully conspired to place him back into authority, as the nation’s interim President.
It was a well-composed compromise, built to assuage the nation's large Pashtun populace that the majority Tajik, Northern Alliance, would not overthrow their way of life. An olive branch to those who had served with the Taleban and an important stipulation of neighbouring Pakistan, to effectively deny the Prime Minister, Ahmed Shah Massoud a complete monopoly of power in Kabul.
But it couldn’t last, the spirit that had filled him upon his return to the homeland was fleeting. 90 years old, his voice became too frail to read declarations, and his advisers and aids quickly filled his in whenever the President became ill or was otherwise unable to make an appearance,
The President was sequestered from even the most important of occasions, including the signing ceremony for the new Afghan Constitution, which was finally adopted after months of filibustering. It officially restructured the country as an ‘Islamic Parliamentary Republic’. Equipped with a bi-cameral legislature, one elected by local constituencies and an upper chamber appointed by regional governors, to hopefully balance the numerous warlords off one another. The first slate of elections was scheduled for October, only a month before the President succumbed to his last hospital stay.
Without a successor in place, it was agreed that the next elected parliament would determine the next president of Afghanistan, and in the meantime, a grand funeral be held for the ancient statesman.
Afghan and foreign dignitaries, lawmakers and relatives flocked to pay their final respects, who each heaped praise on his “success in bringing Afghanistan toward democracy and stability”, statements echoed by representatives of the Anti-Terror Coalition, The United States, Russia and Great Britain, who had helped facilitate his return to executive office.
But now, without even his severely diminished and impaired figure, Afghanistan once again faced uncertainty. Despite leading the proceedings and dubbing Zahir the “true king of Afghanistan” Ahmed Massoud’s relationship with the President had become increasingly at odds, his proposals for an increasingly centralized Afghan state severely opposed by the men in the Presidential palace, and their separate monikers as the ‘father of the nation’ and ‘father of the resistance’ became one of conflict. Even if the divide between the two men never ruptured publicly (and many within the Afghan government dispute its existence at all) nationally there had developed a real divide between those who favoured the King Zahir, and those who favoured the Lion Massoud.
(Left to right) King Zahir, Zahir's funeral, Prime Minister Ahmed Massoud
The country remained geographically split, as a grizzly conflict boiled inside the Taleban-controlled south between the fundamentalists and the opposing Coalition-backed Southern Alliance. The war had become increasingly guerilla, since the failed assault on Kandahar City by the Alliance which resulted in the death of its de-facto leader Mohammed Karzai, and as the Taleban’s veteran soldiers regrouped and rearmed under the commander Dadullah, who adopted hit-and-run tactics, and conducted car and suicide bombings and assassinated and kidnapped local clan and village leaders, successfully repelling the advance despite his lack of air power, sophisticated weapons, or even significant assistance from Taleban leadership.
Dadullah’s victory served its purpose as a major propaganda coup for his movement, as radical Afghans, disturbed by the peace deal accepted by the senior Taleban leadership opted to join his army.
Their scepticism toward Taleban elders especially the clerical council, flared when they announced that though it would not endorse or nominate candidates for the upcoming elections, participation in them would not be considered an offence, allowing independent candidates to take seats in the new national government nationwide, a major goal of Massoud’s premiership. And a decision that drew fire from Afghanistan’s most embittered rebel forces under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Hekmatyar was a quixotic figure, sidelined by Pakistan, the Taleban and Iran following the peace deal, he had been denied any amnesty by the national government for his virulent and mutual hatred of Massoud, and he linked his organization with the most radical elements still present in Afghanistan, appearing alongside its leaders in propaganda videos to conduct attacks on the Afghan government and it’s supporters, shelling the international mission in Kabul, the American operated Bagram airbase and placing bounties on Russian soldiers, and by 2007 he began emulating the tactics of the radicals in Iraq and Chechnya, adopting the suicide bomb as a useful tactic to disturb the supposed peace of Massouds new nation in Afghan cities, as he directly threatened to disrupt the elections leading to the first great test of the new Afghan military, which was deployed at polling stations nationwide, and international forces were once again on the streets in Operation Lasting Chalice.
(Left to right) Taleban commander Dadullah, militant holdout Hekmatyar, U.S. soldiers at Bagram Airbase
Dadullah’s victorious defence of Kandahar and Hekmatyar’s insurgency began to spike fears of a renewed major conflict in Afghanistan, evidenced by the election season’s deployment of troops which similarly brought scrutiny to the international jihadists who continued to trek into the Pakistani badlands to fight Afghan and coalition soldiers. These jihadists were mainly from Arab nations, East Africa, Central Asia and the Caucus’s fusing into a rejuvenated Al-Qaeda.
The group reformed, according to terror watchers, due to the adoption of the internet, deprived of their large training camps, ‘the base’ shifted into a more fluid network of cells that it claimed reached into ‘every nation in the world’. “The martyrs prepare themselves, for the day of days” according to chief spokesman Saif Bin-Laden in an online broadcast relaying the words of Emir Atef and the new head of military operations Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who pledged to bring down the west ‘by a thousand cuts’ as opposed the spectacular Chechen like attacks he once conspired to conduct against the United States. However, these warnings were largely disregarded (despite early arrests like a clique of attempted night club bombers in Edinburgh, Scotland) as other terror movements like Zarqawi in Iraq captured the news cycle with his gruesome displays of violence and the early onset of the Egyptian insurgency.
Since the downfall of the Taleban government, Al-Qaeda had been scattered with prominent figures driven into hiding, captured or killed including key military commanders, but since the Massoud government shifted to a strategy of reconciliation and a crackdown on inter-clan violence and crime, military operations against said groups were drawn down to the chagrin of Massoud’s western backers.
When the parliamentary elections arrived, the major disruptions promised by Hekmatyar failed to materialize, and Massoud praised the proceedings as the “great opportunity to heal the wounds” in Afghanistan, pressing for the whole country to participate. International observers and the news media tagged the election with praise in the northern and western cities, Kabul especially featured competitive elections between political parties, a first in the country including female candidates, advertising and even public debates. “These are the most open and free elections Afghanistan has ever seen” reported the New York Times, and the Chief election officer of the United Nations agreed with “extremely healthy procedures,” in the capital.
(Left to right) Afghan Military on guard, pictures of Afghan candidates, Afghan voter
However, as with all things in Afghanistan, it was a different story outside of the urban north, a country still rife with an undercurrent of warlordism, clans and fiefdoms, the level of political discourse often came down to, whoever the local chief was backing. Notably, Abdul Sayyaf who led the Pashtun Dawah party, was accused of arresting his political opponents he claimed had tried to assassinate him, and was a committed member of the Southern Alliance. Rashid Dostum a warlord who controlled much of Afghanistan’s opium trade revamped his political party the National Islamic Movement, and Ismael Khan the self-styled Emir of Herat who dominated his local province placed his own tariffs on trade with Iran and barred press from the region, and throughout the Taleban controlled south, a swath of independent candidates ran largely unopposed with undeclared but visible Taleban backing “There is only one real candidate” reported a Pashtun farmer, who spoke anonymously, claiming that Taleban warriors had threatened those who might back Abdul Razzaq a local opposition leader.
However, the undisputed winner of the election was Massoud, who controlled the only truly nationwide political party and was able to sway most warlords into backing him anyway, even inside some parts of Taleban territory. Under the banner of The National Movement, he won control over both houses of the parliament, celebrating his victory in Kabul.
“This was a day of self-determination for the Afghan people, decades of war and miser is now behind us, now we have an economy and political institution … this was our day of dignity”.
He spoke in confidence to a large crowd of devoted supporters, unveiling Afghanistan's first ‘democratically elected government’ a mixture of exiled technocrats, his brothers in arms (including many of his direct relatives) and the man who would become Afghanistan’s new president Abdullah Abdullah, a Pashtun Afghan and close confidant and who handily defeated King Zahirs foremost secretary Dr Abdul Sirat.
(Left) Painting of PM Massoud, (Right) President Abdullah Abdullah
His government was fairly inclusive, by now Massoud was adept at managing distrustful allies, even able to garner the votes of the most individualistic warlords, providing cabinet posts and military posts to their friends and relatives, while managing a wider balance between the coalition members who demanded the complete exclusion of Taleban from the government and regional powers like Iran and Pakistan who he hoped to foster close relations with. But still, more Afghans remained anxious about the future of the country, and some foreign observers feared that Massoud was constructing a personality cult.
“If one visits Kabul today, his face is ubiquitous, on calendars, the airport, windows” detailed a report in the Times “'The lion', is everywhere, the difference perhaps unlike Syria or Libya is his popularity is genuine” – Brian Mason
To his credit, much of his major promises had been fulfilled, the war was officially at an end, an insurgency fleeting, a constitution constructed, courts established, rights reconstructed and a democracy in action. Only time could tell if it would last.
Iraq
“We are With You!, ‘We are With You, Praise be to God!, Praise be to Saddam!”
Thrummed the powerful calls of the thousands of Iraqi men and boys, crowding the streets of Baghdad for a government-sponsored ‘Parade of National Celebration’. It wasn’t clear why the parade had been called, there had been no great victories for the regime of late, quite the opposite in fact, the nation had dug into ever deeper pits of hell.
Exposed to crippling sanctions that left much of the population exposed to malnutrition and other hunger born illnesses, while more and more of Iraq’s industry began to rust in the desert, even its oil sector began to dive, as inefficiencies and corruption as well as a crackdown in it’s black market following the United Nations Oil for Food scandal took place, all compiled by a labour shortage, siphoning away the plunder from the purse and barring some of its few reliable sources of income.
Perhaps the government was celebrating a recent triumph in its war? Impossible. Since the February uprisings, The Iraqi government's situation had failed to improve, as fighting expanded, no longer contained to Sadr’s underground army contained to the Sadrist enclave in Karbala, and more and more the administration became directly associated with Zarqawi’s jihadist elements. Adding yet more crimes to the wrap sheet the regime had accumulated over the decades.
The term ‘Insurgency’ no longer sufficed, what was happening in Iraq was war, 'civil war' had become the accepted term for the conflict, especially after the surge in violence as 2007 continued.
The only explanation for the celebration in Iraq was a celebration of the regime's endurance. A show of bullish strength to the world, that they would not go quietly. The soldiers marched, the banners flew and the sirens blared. ‘Iraq is One!’ The parade was even complete with captives, barefoot imprisoned Sadrists to be jeered and spat upon by the crowd.
The country's puppet parliament, officer class, cabinet, and even the devil princeling Uday Hussein received the adulation of the mob, a full deck, bar one.
(Left) Statue of Saddam Hussein, (Right) Iraqi tanks in a parade
The onset of real fighting in Iraq began after the February 20th protests, the attendance was unexpectedly large, spurred on by bloody scenes in the jihadist assault on Karbala, from Baghdad through to Basra young Iraqis, perhaps in the mistaken belief of safety in numbers, or abject exasperation came out, only to be met with gunfire from military, police and republican guard units, leading to an estimated 239 casualties. They came out for different reasons, in one southern town to protest to kidnap and murder of a Shia girl by a Republican guard soldier. And Shia communities, in general, demanded the end to religious persecution and the return of the exiled Ayatollah Sistani.
When the shooting started, the young Iraqis shot back. These militants, occasionally associated with the Sadrist Mahdi army, but more likely inspired by his example, took up small armaments, Kalashnikovs and grenades against the Iraqi forces, and the battles led to gravely differing outcomes.
In the Suburbs of Baghdad, the President's praetorian guard swept the streets with ruthless efficiency, but still, the scenes of unarmed rebels rioting in the streets of the capital city, in the direct shadow of Saddam served a powerful purpose, regardless of the horrific aftermath, leaving bodies strewn across the streets and blood pooling on doorsteps, but only a few miles from the capital the revolts were much stronger.
In Al-Kut, thousands of the protesters were set upon by Republican Guards forces only to form impromptu militias and fight back, exchanging heavy rifle fire. In Nasiriyah, fires burned as Iraqi army forces used artillery and mortars to try and flatten the protesters. In Al Dwiwaniyah, regime helicopters strafed the sky dropping hand grenades into the crowds in a failed attempt to disperse them, In Kufa, the Fedayeen executed nearly 200 detainees, and in Basra armed Sadrists and patrolled the streets in hijacked armoured vehicles chanting “death to the dictator”, vehicles supposedly robbed from an abandoned Ba-athist command post.
In the early days of the actual civil war, events moved too quickly, and an absence of international reporters made putting together a proper timeline of events too difficult. According to Iraqi reporter Atwar Bahjat who recorded the civil war for Iraqi state-controlled media prior to her defection “The actual death count was unknowable, but the government was in a complete sense of disarray, we would normally be delivered a package stating, what to say, but on these days we got none, effectively don’t cover it no reports, not even to say that Iraq’s military was winning … I think it showed how afraid they were.”,
In most instances, the Iraqi forces defeated the lightly unarmed, underfed teenagers. But in critical instances were effectively beaten back. In Amarah, when a kill order was distributed to the local Iraqi forces, small contingents of the military and police rather than obey and attack, opted to desert their posts, leaving the eastern city abandoned for a complete militia takeover, in a major victory for rebel forces.
But the real blood flowed downriver in Basra, where a depleted and disorganized Iraqi Military and Fedayeen were the ones under attack from a large Sadrist sect equipped with RPGs and mortars, the hundreds of committed rebel fighters, proceeded to overrun the enemy, regiment by regiment.
Allegations have swirled (entirely unconfirmed but not denied) of American assistance in the Basra revolt, as well as wider chaos across Iraq, as the No-Fly Zone which hung over southern Iraq was still enforced on Iraqi bases and large batches of troops outside cities, precluding managed retreats or reinforcements in areas of major revolt, the destruction of Iraqi radio and phone signals and the operation of several Arab language anti-Saddam pampleting groups and pirate stations, but what isn’t up for debate is the aid delivered by the Iranian regime, who admitted that they communicated with the Sadrists to relay Iraq’s manoeuvres and provide other pieces of critical intelligence.
The battle lasted weeks, as the rebels took control of Iraq’s second major city, as Army tanks swivled through the streets becoming trapped in rubble-strewn streets and the commanders dragged out and executed. According to captured Iraqi communication cables, Lieutenant General Ali Ak Majid pleaded with Baghdad for reinforcements only to be refuted after reports that the Americans and British had expanded the No-Fly Zone to explicitly include Helicopters after reports of their use in suppressing the revolt, and President Ghalibaf confirmed to international news for the first time that the uprisings marked a “new chapter in Iraq-Iran relations … the power of Saddam is collapsing”, seemingly confirming his support for the rebels.
Rebels captured the Basra airport, Saddam’s local palace and an Army base leading to powerful images of rebel troops parading through buildings defacing paintings of the President. Scenes captured by one of the few foreign journalists on the scene James Brandon for the British Telegraph who interviewed the Sadrist Mahdi Army Commander Shiekh Al Suwaidi, in April he confirmed that the city had been all but liberated by Sadr and would be incorporated into the Free Islamic Iraqi Republic “This was a very well drawn plan, to deal a complete blow to the Ba-athists, to prove that the resistance is successful …. Either we will win, or we will all be exterminated”.
(Top left clockwise) Sadrists destroy portrait of Saddam, the aftermath of Baghdad February uprising, Civilians flee fighting in Basra, Pro Sadr protests
The spring uprising, fed into a bloody summer when the Iraqi government voted to change Iraq’s military leadership, excoriating long-time Minister of Defence Sultan al-Tai and imprisoning him, instead placing his personal secretary Abid Al-Tikriti into his position. After that, advancing to the position of the Chief of Army forces someone undisputedly loyal to the President, his own son, Uday Hussein who at his swearing-in pledged “To bring down the heavens upon the enemies of Iraq … the Euphrates will be full of the blood of the serpents”.
Uday’s promotion prompted international outrage, his stories of slaughter had become folklore partially encouraged by Uday himself who was now at the head of what on paper was the 5th largest in the world. The decision led the American State Department to extend its first semi-official liaisons with the Free Iraqi forces joined by the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair forcefully endorsed the rebellion in an address to the House of Commons, as the “First step, to a truly free and united Iraq” and held a personal meeting with delegates of Sadr and other supportive Iraqi exiles, including Ayatollah Sistani.
The surge in violence grew as Iraqi regiments trickled from north to south in small contingents to bolster the fight, joined by renewed terroristic zeal by Zarqawi’s Al-Jihad, whose black flag militants, were witnessed on the streets of major Iraqi towns and cities laying down the law with poisonous hate, outmatched even by the Republican Guard or Fedayeen, though unacknowledged by the Iraqi government, the Zarqawi acted as an auxiliary shock force and facilitated the funnelling of more radical fighters from abroad to assist Saddam, suppressing revolts in western Iraq and managing the insurgency against Sadr’s forces in Karbala.
Zarqawi, described the war in Iraq as a wholly religious one, that this was the beginning of the “total war between all Sunni and Shia” describing the battle as an apocalyptic one that would herald the end times, his forces became so established that in the desert Al-Anbar province they set up a local newspaper to describe the victories of the martyred brigades.
The relationship between Zarqawi and the regime was obscure, but most described it as a strategic decision, “right now Saddam needs these men” described Jordanian intelligence officials who held a powerful hatred for the man who boasted about his role in the assassination of their King “he supplies armaments and bombs, and they go out and kill his enemies in the name of Jihad” and the young King Hussein II described his organization in a speech to Jordanian soldiers as a “thugs who want to expand this poison across all the middle east” and pressed for the United States to help Jordan bring full accountability to the crimes against his family, facilitating the first western open aid programme to arm and train Iraqi rebels in Jordan.
In August, firefights became battles between Iraqi forces and Sadrists, especially shocking scenes emerged when Najaf, the holiest city in all of Shia Islam, became a battleground as local forces attempted to crack down on a small insurgency, that exploded after Iraqi regular forces stormed the Imam Ali Holy Shrine to capture suspects, leading the first confirmed usage of rebel suicide bombs against the regional army headquarters. Leading to a tit-for-tat response by the Jihadists turning the peaceful city into another charnel house.
These actions prompted the United States and British to conduct the first series of air-to-ground assaults on Iraqi regular forces outside of major convoys, targeting suspected military compounds, ammo and war industrial facilities and for the first time they classified any suspected military vehicles including 'Single vehicle convoys', greatly restricting any Iraqi military manoeuvres, supplies or reinforcements, leaving Saddam’s forces even more isolated against the rolling tide of descent.
This decision was classified by U.S. Central Commander John Abizaid as the NDZ a ‘No Drive Zone’ a military option presented and signed off by President Edwards as, “necessary to protect the innocent lives being destroyed by the monstrous actions of the Hussein family”. And when asked by reporters what he hoped would come from the military response in terms of Saddam, he responded that “the only good thing that Saddam could do for Iraq, would be to depart immediately”. Furthermore reiterating declared U.S. policy to be the overthrow of the Hussein regime.
(Left to right) Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Uday Hussein, Zarqawi fighter, Shia rebels, U.S. General John Abizaid
The spring and summer warfare left Iraq as a whole in tatters, the rebels were seeing increasing success in the south and east becoming far better armed, assisted by the coalition NDZ by unsubtle Iranian resources, evidenced by batches of uniforms that unfurled from unmarked trucks in the truly liberated southeast.
Sadr himself praised the achievement of the rebels and the Mahdi army in a consistent stream of daily public announcements and mustered support through supportive religious groups, mufti and mullahs, who celebrated the Free Iraqi Fighters as they signed up to fight the regime, “The victory is our’s brothers, the infidel Ba-athist retreat in the face of our defiance”.
The regime looked to be floundering, totally devoid of allies, on the defensive on all fronts, its military weighed down by decades of corruption, incompetence and extremism. Though soldiers were often willing to die, according to retired General Ricardo Sanchez interviewed by CNN to present a military perspective on the war. “These men are committed to the fight, there are a rare few prepared to defect so far, but rather than leading to victories, this dedication is getting hundreds of their own men killed, rather pointlessly” He pointed to an outpost north of Basra. “This serves no military purpose, it was a tank depot, but it has been destroyed it is functionally worthless, but [The Iraqi army] lost a lot of blood trying to hold it, why? Because the President decreed it, no retreat.”
And where was the President? Despite constant evocations of his will, Iraqi generals, mosques, newsreaders and politicians, continued to evoke his image, his voice and his words. But the man himself was nowhere to be seen, from the onset of the major fighting in February for four months, Saddam Hussein was invisible, theories swirled, ranging from him being in hiding to avoid an assassination attempt, some debilitating illness, a favoured theory of Iraqi exiles (these groups often presented the most humiliating deceases they could ponder, such as syphilis or bowel cancer, which tabloids were happy to run with) and German intelligence reportedly told the Americans they suspected Saddam to be in an induced coma, and that his son and cabinet were in effective command of the country.
These rumours were tempered given Saddam’s first live appearance shaking hands and observing a ceremony for Iraqi veterans, though given allegations of his use of body doubles and the absence of any foreign media, heaped layers of scrutiny onto these supposed outings.
All this finally culminated in the October day of National Celebration, which Iraq watchers, viewed with close eyes, to see if they could learn who was currently sitting in the captain's seat in Iraq. Noting the absence of older Baathists, in favour of Uday’s clique of younger devotees, Tariq Azis the country's longtime mouthpiece and deputy PM was gone, replaced with Uday’s chief ally in the Republican Guard, Younis Al-Ahmed, a Hussein family sock puppet, and promotions rained upon his favoured officers including Samilr Al-Khlifawi a particularly brutal army commander accused of beheading rebel soldiers personally. This all told a story of perhaps the beginning of a transition of the Hussein rule, from father to son, especially as the President's absence at the proceedings was becoming the greater spectacle for foreign observers until, to the roar of the crowd and a multi-battery salute, the President himself finally emerged to the balcony.
Beset with a full beard, which many suspected was to further boost his Islamic credentials. His speech was short but it hit on all the points he needed to “I am the President of Iraq, The President of yesterday, today and tomorrow!” He gloated over his many enemies “The Americans, Iranians, Zionists, Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, British, French, Russians. All have tried to subdue Iraq. None will Succeed! … They will all burn in Hell!”
(Top) President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein
Hamas Disputes Palestinian Election Loss
The Islamic militant group Hamas has contested the results of last week's Palestinian parliamentary elections, following defeat.
Finalized results had given the ruling Fatah party an 81-seat majority, while the much more radical Hamas has come up short of expectations with only 42 seats.
Hamas officials have reportedly been disappointed by the result, as the group expected that Israel’s military withdrawals from both the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank territory would give the organization a leg up in the campaign, as well as a focus on Palestinian corruption.
“Our main objective is to end the occupation, and in our short period of struggle we achieved more than Fatah has in 40 years, our success will carry us to a truly independent redeemed Palestinian state,” said Hamas leader, Ismaail Haniyeh
But following the tabulation of the final results, several Hamas candidates and organizers have blamed the loss on political corruption, deliberate voter suppression and outright ballot fraud. The Islamist faction has pointed to the arrest of its campaigners by Israel who were attempting to cross through still-occupied sections of the West Bank, the supposed misuse of Palestinian Authority funds for electioneering, and a confusing electoral system it claims benefited the incumbent Fatah and led to a disproportionate defeat despite a narrow popular vote.
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Fatah’s long-time head Yasser Arafat and who leaned hard on his predecessor's image in the campaign, has refuted the allegations. “The international observers have praised these results, the Palestinian people have rejected their message and have entrusted us, their will should be respected”.
However members of Hamas have not been willing to concede defeat, the militant group which refuses to renounce violence against Israel and is responsible for conducting nearly 60 suicide bombings and rocket attacks recently have demanded an investigation into the election. Mushar al-Masri, who lost a seat for Hamas in the northern Gaza strip has blamed the interference of Israel and the United States for his loss, and now supports the creation of a Hamas security taskforce to scrutinize new elections on top of cabinet seats in the government. “Their hands are still dirty from this theft, the people demand an end to corruption”.
But a Fatah cabinet minister Saeb Erakat has denied any plans to hold a re-election “There is no reason or possibility for an early poll, the government has been chosen”., just as Abbas is hesitant to bring any Hamas representation into his government fearing it could harm his position with any future Israeli negotiations.
The animosity between the groups has grown, recently there were clashes between supporters in Ramallah, after Hamas supporters tried to forcibly seat one of their candidates in office, requiring Palestinian security to disperse the assembly with gunfire.
(Top left clockwise) Fatah Leader Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas leader Ismaail Haniyeh, Hamas Fighters, PLO Security
The Surge
Afghanistan
The King lay dying. After 4 decades on the throne, and a further 3 decades of exile King Mohammad Zahir Shah had returned to Afghanistan. As the tide firmly turned against militant Taleban rule through the dedicated politicking of his long-time cohorts and allies who bargained with dozens of regional leaders, successfully conspired to place him back into authority, as the nation’s interim President.
It was a well-composed compromise, built to assuage the nation's large Pashtun populace that the majority Tajik, Northern Alliance, would not overthrow their way of life. An olive branch to those who had served with the Taleban and an important stipulation of neighbouring Pakistan, to effectively deny the Prime Minister, Ahmed Shah Massoud a complete monopoly of power in Kabul.
But it couldn’t last, the spirit that had filled him upon his return to the homeland was fleeting. 90 years old, his voice became too frail to read declarations, and his advisers and aids quickly filled his in whenever the President became ill or was otherwise unable to make an appearance,
The President was sequestered from even the most important of occasions, including the signing ceremony for the new Afghan Constitution, which was finally adopted after months of filibustering. It officially restructured the country as an ‘Islamic Parliamentary Republic’. Equipped with a bi-cameral legislature, one elected by local constituencies and an upper chamber appointed by regional governors, to hopefully balance the numerous warlords off one another. The first slate of elections was scheduled for October, only a month before the President succumbed to his last hospital stay.
Without a successor in place, it was agreed that the next elected parliament would determine the next president of Afghanistan, and in the meantime, a grand funeral be held for the ancient statesman.
Afghan and foreign dignitaries, lawmakers and relatives flocked to pay their final respects, who each heaped praise on his “success in bringing Afghanistan toward democracy and stability”, statements echoed by representatives of the Anti-Terror Coalition, The United States, Russia and Great Britain, who had helped facilitate his return to executive office.
But now, without even his severely diminished and impaired figure, Afghanistan once again faced uncertainty. Despite leading the proceedings and dubbing Zahir the “true king of Afghanistan” Ahmed Massoud’s relationship with the President had become increasingly at odds, his proposals for an increasingly centralized Afghan state severely opposed by the men in the Presidential palace, and their separate monikers as the ‘father of the nation’ and ‘father of the resistance’ became one of conflict. Even if the divide between the two men never ruptured publicly (and many within the Afghan government dispute its existence at all) nationally there had developed a real divide between those who favoured the King Zahir, and those who favoured the Lion Massoud.
(Left to right) King Zahir, Zahir's funeral, Prime Minister Ahmed Massoud
The country remained geographically split, as a grizzly conflict boiled inside the Taleban-controlled south between the fundamentalists and the opposing Coalition-backed Southern Alliance. The war had become increasingly guerilla, since the failed assault on Kandahar City by the Alliance which resulted in the death of its de-facto leader Mohammed Karzai, and as the Taleban’s veteran soldiers regrouped and rearmed under the commander Dadullah, who adopted hit-and-run tactics, and conducted car and suicide bombings and assassinated and kidnapped local clan and village leaders, successfully repelling the advance despite his lack of air power, sophisticated weapons, or even significant assistance from Taleban leadership.
Dadullah’s victory served its purpose as a major propaganda coup for his movement, as radical Afghans, disturbed by the peace deal accepted by the senior Taleban leadership opted to join his army.
Their scepticism toward Taleban elders especially the clerical council, flared when they announced that though it would not endorse or nominate candidates for the upcoming elections, participation in them would not be considered an offence, allowing independent candidates to take seats in the new national government nationwide, a major goal of Massoud’s premiership. And a decision that drew fire from Afghanistan’s most embittered rebel forces under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Hekmatyar was a quixotic figure, sidelined by Pakistan, the Taleban and Iran following the peace deal, he had been denied any amnesty by the national government for his virulent and mutual hatred of Massoud, and he linked his organization with the most radical elements still present in Afghanistan, appearing alongside its leaders in propaganda videos to conduct attacks on the Afghan government and it’s supporters, shelling the international mission in Kabul, the American operated Bagram airbase and placing bounties on Russian soldiers, and by 2007 he began emulating the tactics of the radicals in Iraq and Chechnya, adopting the suicide bomb as a useful tactic to disturb the supposed peace of Massouds new nation in Afghan cities, as he directly threatened to disrupt the elections leading to the first great test of the new Afghan military, which was deployed at polling stations nationwide, and international forces were once again on the streets in Operation Lasting Chalice.
(Left to right) Taleban commander Dadullah, militant holdout Hekmatyar, U.S. soldiers at Bagram Airbase
Dadullah’s victorious defence of Kandahar and Hekmatyar’s insurgency began to spike fears of a renewed major conflict in Afghanistan, evidenced by the election season’s deployment of troops which similarly brought scrutiny to the international jihadists who continued to trek into the Pakistani badlands to fight Afghan and coalition soldiers. These jihadists were mainly from Arab nations, East Africa, Central Asia and the Caucus’s fusing into a rejuvenated Al-Qaeda.
The group reformed, according to terror watchers, due to the adoption of the internet, deprived of their large training camps, ‘the base’ shifted into a more fluid network of cells that it claimed reached into ‘every nation in the world’. “The martyrs prepare themselves, for the day of days” according to chief spokesman Saif Bin-Laden in an online broadcast relaying the words of Emir Atef and the new head of military operations Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who pledged to bring down the west ‘by a thousand cuts’ as opposed the spectacular Chechen like attacks he once conspired to conduct against the United States. However, these warnings were largely disregarded (despite early arrests like a clique of attempted night club bombers in Edinburgh, Scotland) as other terror movements like Zarqawi in Iraq captured the news cycle with his gruesome displays of violence and the early onset of the Egyptian insurgency.
Since the downfall of the Taleban government, Al-Qaeda had been scattered with prominent figures driven into hiding, captured or killed including key military commanders, but since the Massoud government shifted to a strategy of reconciliation and a crackdown on inter-clan violence and crime, military operations against said groups were drawn down to the chagrin of Massoud’s western backers.
When the parliamentary elections arrived, the major disruptions promised by Hekmatyar failed to materialize, and Massoud praised the proceedings as the “great opportunity to heal the wounds” in Afghanistan, pressing for the whole country to participate. International observers and the news media tagged the election with praise in the northern and western cities, Kabul especially featured competitive elections between political parties, a first in the country including female candidates, advertising and even public debates. “These are the most open and free elections Afghanistan has ever seen” reported the New York Times, and the Chief election officer of the United Nations agreed with “extremely healthy procedures,” in the capital.
(Left to right) Afghan Military on guard, pictures of Afghan candidates, Afghan voter
However, as with all things in Afghanistan, it was a different story outside of the urban north, a country still rife with an undercurrent of warlordism, clans and fiefdoms, the level of political discourse often came down to, whoever the local chief was backing. Notably, Abdul Sayyaf who led the Pashtun Dawah party, was accused of arresting his political opponents he claimed had tried to assassinate him, and was a committed member of the Southern Alliance. Rashid Dostum a warlord who controlled much of Afghanistan’s opium trade revamped his political party the National Islamic Movement, and Ismael Khan the self-styled Emir of Herat who dominated his local province placed his own tariffs on trade with Iran and barred press from the region, and throughout the Taleban controlled south, a swath of independent candidates ran largely unopposed with undeclared but visible Taleban backing “There is only one real candidate” reported a Pashtun farmer, who spoke anonymously, claiming that Taleban warriors had threatened those who might back Abdul Razzaq a local opposition leader.
However, the undisputed winner of the election was Massoud, who controlled the only truly nationwide political party and was able to sway most warlords into backing him anyway, even inside some parts of Taleban territory. Under the banner of The National Movement, he won control over both houses of the parliament, celebrating his victory in Kabul.
“This was a day of self-determination for the Afghan people, decades of war and miser is now behind us, now we have an economy and political institution … this was our day of dignity”.
He spoke in confidence to a large crowd of devoted supporters, unveiling Afghanistan's first ‘democratically elected government’ a mixture of exiled technocrats, his brothers in arms (including many of his direct relatives) and the man who would become Afghanistan’s new president Abdullah Abdullah, a Pashtun Afghan and close confidant and who handily defeated King Zahirs foremost secretary Dr Abdul Sirat.
(Left) Painting of PM Massoud, (Right) President Abdullah Abdullah
His government was fairly inclusive, by now Massoud was adept at managing distrustful allies, even able to garner the votes of the most individualistic warlords, providing cabinet posts and military posts to their friends and relatives, while managing a wider balance between the coalition members who demanded the complete exclusion of Taleban from the government and regional powers like Iran and Pakistan who he hoped to foster close relations with. But still, more Afghans remained anxious about the future of the country, and some foreign observers feared that Massoud was constructing a personality cult.
“If one visits Kabul today, his face is ubiquitous, on calendars, the airport, windows” detailed a report in the Times “'The lion', is everywhere, the difference perhaps unlike Syria or Libya is his popularity is genuine” – Brian Mason
To his credit, much of his major promises had been fulfilled, the war was officially at an end, an insurgency fleeting, a constitution constructed, courts established, rights reconstructed and a democracy in action. Only time could tell if it would last.
Iraq
“We are With You!, ‘We are With You, Praise be to God!, Praise be to Saddam!”
Thrummed the powerful calls of the thousands of Iraqi men and boys, crowding the streets of Baghdad for a government-sponsored ‘Parade of National Celebration’. It wasn’t clear why the parade had been called, there had been no great victories for the regime of late, quite the opposite in fact, the nation had dug into ever deeper pits of hell.
Exposed to crippling sanctions that left much of the population exposed to malnutrition and other hunger born illnesses, while more and more of Iraq’s industry began to rust in the desert, even its oil sector began to dive, as inefficiencies and corruption as well as a crackdown in it’s black market following the United Nations Oil for Food scandal took place, all compiled by a labour shortage, siphoning away the plunder from the purse and barring some of its few reliable sources of income.
Perhaps the government was celebrating a recent triumph in its war? Impossible. Since the February uprisings, The Iraqi government's situation had failed to improve, as fighting expanded, no longer contained to Sadr’s underground army contained to the Sadrist enclave in Karbala, and more and more the administration became directly associated with Zarqawi’s jihadist elements. Adding yet more crimes to the wrap sheet the regime had accumulated over the decades.
- Religious persecution, bordering on ethnic cleansing, for the subjugation and massacres of the southern Shia.
- The suicide bombing of Iraqi worshipers left nearly 300 dead in central Karbala.
- The brutal crackdown on protesters led to a dozen instances where marchers were fired upon by Iraqi military and security forces.
The term ‘Insurgency’ no longer sufficed, what was happening in Iraq was war, 'civil war' had become the accepted term for the conflict, especially after the surge in violence as 2007 continued.
The only explanation for the celebration in Iraq was a celebration of the regime's endurance. A show of bullish strength to the world, that they would not go quietly. The soldiers marched, the banners flew and the sirens blared. ‘Iraq is One!’ The parade was even complete with captives, barefoot imprisoned Sadrists to be jeered and spat upon by the crowd.
The country's puppet parliament, officer class, cabinet, and even the devil princeling Uday Hussein received the adulation of the mob, a full deck, bar one.
(Left) Statue of Saddam Hussein, (Right) Iraqi tanks in a parade
The onset of real fighting in Iraq began after the February 20th protests, the attendance was unexpectedly large, spurred on by bloody scenes in the jihadist assault on Karbala, from Baghdad through to Basra young Iraqis, perhaps in the mistaken belief of safety in numbers, or abject exasperation came out, only to be met with gunfire from military, police and republican guard units, leading to an estimated 239 casualties. They came out for different reasons, in one southern town to protest to kidnap and murder of a Shia girl by a Republican guard soldier. And Shia communities, in general, demanded the end to religious persecution and the return of the exiled Ayatollah Sistani.
When the shooting started, the young Iraqis shot back. These militants, occasionally associated with the Sadrist Mahdi army, but more likely inspired by his example, took up small armaments, Kalashnikovs and grenades against the Iraqi forces, and the battles led to gravely differing outcomes.
In the Suburbs of Baghdad, the President's praetorian guard swept the streets with ruthless efficiency, but still, the scenes of unarmed rebels rioting in the streets of the capital city, in the direct shadow of Saddam served a powerful purpose, regardless of the horrific aftermath, leaving bodies strewn across the streets and blood pooling on doorsteps, but only a few miles from the capital the revolts were much stronger.
In Al-Kut, thousands of the protesters were set upon by Republican Guards forces only to form impromptu militias and fight back, exchanging heavy rifle fire. In Nasiriyah, fires burned as Iraqi army forces used artillery and mortars to try and flatten the protesters. In Al Dwiwaniyah, regime helicopters strafed the sky dropping hand grenades into the crowds in a failed attempt to disperse them, In Kufa, the Fedayeen executed nearly 200 detainees, and in Basra armed Sadrists and patrolled the streets in hijacked armoured vehicles chanting “death to the dictator”, vehicles supposedly robbed from an abandoned Ba-athist command post.
In the early days of the actual civil war, events moved too quickly, and an absence of international reporters made putting together a proper timeline of events too difficult. According to Iraqi reporter Atwar Bahjat who recorded the civil war for Iraqi state-controlled media prior to her defection “The actual death count was unknowable, but the government was in a complete sense of disarray, we would normally be delivered a package stating, what to say, but on these days we got none, effectively don’t cover it no reports, not even to say that Iraq’s military was winning … I think it showed how afraid they were.”,
In most instances, the Iraqi forces defeated the lightly unarmed, underfed teenagers. But in critical instances were effectively beaten back. In Amarah, when a kill order was distributed to the local Iraqi forces, small contingents of the military and police rather than obey and attack, opted to desert their posts, leaving the eastern city abandoned for a complete militia takeover, in a major victory for rebel forces.
But the real blood flowed downriver in Basra, where a depleted and disorganized Iraqi Military and Fedayeen were the ones under attack from a large Sadrist sect equipped with RPGs and mortars, the hundreds of committed rebel fighters, proceeded to overrun the enemy, regiment by regiment.
Allegations have swirled (entirely unconfirmed but not denied) of American assistance in the Basra revolt, as well as wider chaos across Iraq, as the No-Fly Zone which hung over southern Iraq was still enforced on Iraqi bases and large batches of troops outside cities, precluding managed retreats or reinforcements in areas of major revolt, the destruction of Iraqi radio and phone signals and the operation of several Arab language anti-Saddam pampleting groups and pirate stations, but what isn’t up for debate is the aid delivered by the Iranian regime, who admitted that they communicated with the Sadrists to relay Iraq’s manoeuvres and provide other pieces of critical intelligence.
The battle lasted weeks, as the rebels took control of Iraq’s second major city, as Army tanks swivled through the streets becoming trapped in rubble-strewn streets and the commanders dragged out and executed. According to captured Iraqi communication cables, Lieutenant General Ali Ak Majid pleaded with Baghdad for reinforcements only to be refuted after reports that the Americans and British had expanded the No-Fly Zone to explicitly include Helicopters after reports of their use in suppressing the revolt, and President Ghalibaf confirmed to international news for the first time that the uprisings marked a “new chapter in Iraq-Iran relations … the power of Saddam is collapsing”, seemingly confirming his support for the rebels.
Rebels captured the Basra airport, Saddam’s local palace and an Army base leading to powerful images of rebel troops parading through buildings defacing paintings of the President. Scenes captured by one of the few foreign journalists on the scene James Brandon for the British Telegraph who interviewed the Sadrist Mahdi Army Commander Shiekh Al Suwaidi, in April he confirmed that the city had been all but liberated by Sadr and would be incorporated into the Free Islamic Iraqi Republic “This was a very well drawn plan, to deal a complete blow to the Ba-athists, to prove that the resistance is successful …. Either we will win, or we will all be exterminated”.
(Top left clockwise) Sadrists destroy portrait of Saddam, the aftermath of Baghdad February uprising, Civilians flee fighting in Basra, Pro Sadr protests
The spring uprising, fed into a bloody summer when the Iraqi government voted to change Iraq’s military leadership, excoriating long-time Minister of Defence Sultan al-Tai and imprisoning him, instead placing his personal secretary Abid Al-Tikriti into his position. After that, advancing to the position of the Chief of Army forces someone undisputedly loyal to the President, his own son, Uday Hussein who at his swearing-in pledged “To bring down the heavens upon the enemies of Iraq … the Euphrates will be full of the blood of the serpents”.
Uday’s promotion prompted international outrage, his stories of slaughter had become folklore partially encouraged by Uday himself who was now at the head of what on paper was the 5th largest in the world. The decision led the American State Department to extend its first semi-official liaisons with the Free Iraqi forces joined by the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Tony Blair forcefully endorsed the rebellion in an address to the House of Commons, as the “First step, to a truly free and united Iraq” and held a personal meeting with delegates of Sadr and other supportive Iraqi exiles, including Ayatollah Sistani.
The surge in violence grew as Iraqi regiments trickled from north to south in small contingents to bolster the fight, joined by renewed terroristic zeal by Zarqawi’s Al-Jihad, whose black flag militants, were witnessed on the streets of major Iraqi towns and cities laying down the law with poisonous hate, outmatched even by the Republican Guard or Fedayeen, though unacknowledged by the Iraqi government, the Zarqawi acted as an auxiliary shock force and facilitated the funnelling of more radical fighters from abroad to assist Saddam, suppressing revolts in western Iraq and managing the insurgency against Sadr’s forces in Karbala.
Zarqawi, described the war in Iraq as a wholly religious one, that this was the beginning of the “total war between all Sunni and Shia” describing the battle as an apocalyptic one that would herald the end times, his forces became so established that in the desert Al-Anbar province they set up a local newspaper to describe the victories of the martyred brigades.
The relationship between Zarqawi and the regime was obscure, but most described it as a strategic decision, “right now Saddam needs these men” described Jordanian intelligence officials who held a powerful hatred for the man who boasted about his role in the assassination of their King “he supplies armaments and bombs, and they go out and kill his enemies in the name of Jihad” and the young King Hussein II described his organization in a speech to Jordanian soldiers as a “thugs who want to expand this poison across all the middle east” and pressed for the United States to help Jordan bring full accountability to the crimes against his family, facilitating the first western open aid programme to arm and train Iraqi rebels in Jordan.
In August, firefights became battles between Iraqi forces and Sadrists, especially shocking scenes emerged when Najaf, the holiest city in all of Shia Islam, became a battleground as local forces attempted to crack down on a small insurgency, that exploded after Iraqi regular forces stormed the Imam Ali Holy Shrine to capture suspects, leading the first confirmed usage of rebel suicide bombs against the regional army headquarters. Leading to a tit-for-tat response by the Jihadists turning the peaceful city into another charnel house.
These actions prompted the United States and British to conduct the first series of air-to-ground assaults on Iraqi regular forces outside of major convoys, targeting suspected military compounds, ammo and war industrial facilities and for the first time they classified any suspected military vehicles including 'Single vehicle convoys', greatly restricting any Iraqi military manoeuvres, supplies or reinforcements, leaving Saddam’s forces even more isolated against the rolling tide of descent.
This decision was classified by U.S. Central Commander John Abizaid as the NDZ a ‘No Drive Zone’ a military option presented and signed off by President Edwards as, “necessary to protect the innocent lives being destroyed by the monstrous actions of the Hussein family”. And when asked by reporters what he hoped would come from the military response in terms of Saddam, he responded that “the only good thing that Saddam could do for Iraq, would be to depart immediately”. Furthermore reiterating declared U.S. policy to be the overthrow of the Hussein regime.
(Left to right) Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Uday Hussein, Zarqawi fighter, Shia rebels, U.S. General John Abizaid
The spring and summer warfare left Iraq as a whole in tatters, the rebels were seeing increasing success in the south and east becoming far better armed, assisted by the coalition NDZ by unsubtle Iranian resources, evidenced by batches of uniforms that unfurled from unmarked trucks in the truly liberated southeast.
Sadr himself praised the achievement of the rebels and the Mahdi army in a consistent stream of daily public announcements and mustered support through supportive religious groups, mufti and mullahs, who celebrated the Free Iraqi Fighters as they signed up to fight the regime, “The victory is our’s brothers, the infidel Ba-athist retreat in the face of our defiance”.
The regime looked to be floundering, totally devoid of allies, on the defensive on all fronts, its military weighed down by decades of corruption, incompetence and extremism. Though soldiers were often willing to die, according to retired General Ricardo Sanchez interviewed by CNN to present a military perspective on the war. “These men are committed to the fight, there are a rare few prepared to defect so far, but rather than leading to victories, this dedication is getting hundreds of their own men killed, rather pointlessly” He pointed to an outpost north of Basra. “This serves no military purpose, it was a tank depot, but it has been destroyed it is functionally worthless, but [The Iraqi army] lost a lot of blood trying to hold it, why? Because the President decreed it, no retreat.”
And where was the President? Despite constant evocations of his will, Iraqi generals, mosques, newsreaders and politicians, continued to evoke his image, his voice and his words. But the man himself was nowhere to be seen, from the onset of the major fighting in February for four months, Saddam Hussein was invisible, theories swirled, ranging from him being in hiding to avoid an assassination attempt, some debilitating illness, a favoured theory of Iraqi exiles (these groups often presented the most humiliating deceases they could ponder, such as syphilis or bowel cancer, which tabloids were happy to run with) and German intelligence reportedly told the Americans they suspected Saddam to be in an induced coma, and that his son and cabinet were in effective command of the country.
These rumours were tempered given Saddam’s first live appearance shaking hands and observing a ceremony for Iraqi veterans, though given allegations of his use of body doubles and the absence of any foreign media, heaped layers of scrutiny onto these supposed outings.
All this finally culminated in the October day of National Celebration, which Iraq watchers, viewed with close eyes, to see if they could learn who was currently sitting in the captain's seat in Iraq. Noting the absence of older Baathists, in favour of Uday’s clique of younger devotees, Tariq Azis the country's longtime mouthpiece and deputy PM was gone, replaced with Uday’s chief ally in the Republican Guard, Younis Al-Ahmed, a Hussein family sock puppet, and promotions rained upon his favoured officers including Samilr Al-Khlifawi a particularly brutal army commander accused of beheading rebel soldiers personally. This all told a story of perhaps the beginning of a transition of the Hussein rule, from father to son, especially as the President's absence at the proceedings was becoming the greater spectacle for foreign observers until, to the roar of the crowd and a multi-battery salute, the President himself finally emerged to the balcony.
Beset with a full beard, which many suspected was to further boost his Islamic credentials. His speech was short but it hit on all the points he needed to “I am the President of Iraq, The President of yesterday, today and tomorrow!” He gloated over his many enemies “The Americans, Iranians, Zionists, Syrians, Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, British, French, Russians. All have tried to subdue Iraq. None will Succeed! … They will all burn in Hell!”
(Top) President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein
(Bottom) Map of Iraqi Civil War Red: Baathist, Green: Sadrist, Yellow: Kurdish
Hamas Disputes Palestinian Election Loss
The Islamic militant group Hamas has contested the results of last week's Palestinian parliamentary elections, following defeat.
Finalized results had given the ruling Fatah party an 81-seat majority, while the much more radical Hamas has come up short of expectations with only 42 seats.
Hamas officials have reportedly been disappointed by the result, as the group expected that Israel’s military withdrawals from both the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank territory would give the organization a leg up in the campaign, as well as a focus on Palestinian corruption.
“Our main objective is to end the occupation, and in our short period of struggle we achieved more than Fatah has in 40 years, our success will carry us to a truly independent redeemed Palestinian state,” said Hamas leader, Ismaail Haniyeh
But following the tabulation of the final results, several Hamas candidates and organizers have blamed the loss on political corruption, deliberate voter suppression and outright ballot fraud. The Islamist faction has pointed to the arrest of its campaigners by Israel who were attempting to cross through still-occupied sections of the West Bank, the supposed misuse of Palestinian Authority funds for electioneering, and a confusing electoral system it claims benefited the incumbent Fatah and led to a disproportionate defeat despite a narrow popular vote.
Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Fatah’s long-time head Yasser Arafat and who leaned hard on his predecessor's image in the campaign, has refuted the allegations. “The international observers have praised these results, the Palestinian people have rejected their message and have entrusted us, their will should be respected”.
However members of Hamas have not been willing to concede defeat, the militant group which refuses to renounce violence against Israel and is responsible for conducting nearly 60 suicide bombings and rocket attacks recently have demanded an investigation into the election. Mushar al-Masri, who lost a seat for Hamas in the northern Gaza strip has blamed the interference of Israel and the United States for his loss, and now supports the creation of a Hamas security taskforce to scrutinize new elections on top of cabinet seats in the government. “Their hands are still dirty from this theft, the people demand an end to corruption”.
But a Fatah cabinet minister Saeb Erakat has denied any plans to hold a re-election “There is no reason or possibility for an early poll, the government has been chosen”., just as Abbas is hesitant to bring any Hamas representation into his government fearing it could harm his position with any future Israeli negotiations.
The animosity between the groups has grown, recently there were clashes between supporters in Ramallah, after Hamas supporters tried to forcibly seat one of their candidates in office, requiring Palestinian security to disperse the assembly with gunfire.
(Top left clockwise) Fatah Leader Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas leader Ismaail Haniyeh, Hamas Fighters, PLO Security
