Discussion: Balkan Answers for Armenian Question

[Zealot]

In 19th century the longtime dream of Russian Empire had been gaining control of the Straits, and thus reaching the shores of Eastern Mediterranean. Reaching the Dardanelles and taking Constantinople would not only fulfill the Neo-Byzantine ambitions of Saint-Petersburg, but also would give Russia the much desired warm water port which would in turn give her a word in Med affairs. Obviously, the main obstacle for this were the Ottomans, who held control of Dardanelles and large territories around it. But the OE was the Sick Man of Europe, and it was immersed in a process of dismantlement that only took place in a slow and orderly fashion thanks to the efforts of the Powers who were opposed to Russian expansionism. It was mainly the case of British Empire, who was alarmed with the prospect of Russian presence just in the middle of her sea routes to India, but also that of Austria, who considered the Balkans her zone of influence and wanted to keep open the mouth of Danube, and Mad Willy too, who at the end of the Century wanted to consolidate its interests in Ottoman Middle East, etc…

All these reasons made the Balkans the hottest point of opposing geostrategic ambitions over the century (and in some way it had continuity during 20th century in the form of Soviet expansionism) a situation which ultimately would lead to WWI.

Well, that’s something that all we already knew, but I’m interested in some practical aspects of the Eastern Question, and how them could be translated in different conditions, in this case the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia.
The choice of the Balkans by the Russians as the straightest route to Eastern Med was something evident. Opening the Dardanelles to their battleships would open the bottleneck the Straits represented and made the Black Sea Fleet irrelevant, and the shortest distance between the Russian Empire and Constantinople passed across present-day Romania and Bulgaria. Two additional advantages made this route the best option:


1. Apart from the Danube river and the Bulgarian Stara Planina range, which represent the only geographic obstacles, the terrain isn’t too steep, thus suitable for military operations, especially towards the Black Sea coast.

2. These lands were the home of compact Orthodox Christian populations, with low degree of loyalty to the Sultan.


Compared to this, the geostrategic value of the Caucasus, where some warfare happened too, was less relevant, at least from the point of view of the Eastern Question . The Straits were a long way off, the terrain was far more rugged and the local population very mixed: the local Christians, mainly Armenians and Greeks, were scattered across Anatolia, and did not form a majority in almost none of their Vilayets. The other groups dwelling these lands where Muslims, and in the case of a Russo-Ottoman War were obviously less prone to support the Tsar. On the other hand, if Russians considered the option of a land corridor across Eastern Anatolia (then called the Armenian Highlands) to a port in Syria or Cilicia, the problems regarding topography and Muslim majority were almost the same or even worse.

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[Zealot]

But I’m less interested in the Great Powers’ gambling than in the fate of the peoples who were caught in between their ambitions. The Balkan nations achieved their independence during this period, in a more or less traumatic way depending on the case, but always involving some sort of internal armed uprising + strong involvement of the Great Powers. The road to total self -determination was slow but steady, and at the end it can be said that these nations benefitted not only from the progressive collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which allowed them “get rid of the Turkish yoke”, but also from the rivalries between the Great Powers, which actually enabled the Balkan peoples to keep their recently gained freedoms. If the Russian expansionism in the Balkans hadn’t been contested, these peoples would have been just swallowed by the Russian Bear. But the Powers opposing the Russians , when it was impossible to preserve the territorial integrity of OE, often made deals for partial concessions in form of autonomy for the Balkan peoples at first, which would lead to independence at the end. These arrangements always contained additional clauses regarding the share of influence of the Powers in the newborn nations, with the aim of avoiding them to become “too pro-Russian” or too pro-anybody else (for example, the Kingdom of Greece emerged as a tripartite condominium between France, Britain and Russia). This is in certain degree the main reason for the imposition of some foreign monarchs belonging to neutral countries's dinasties (Danes, Catholic Germans...). These new-old Balkan states, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and to a certain degree Romania, although they suffered from interventionism of the foreign powers in their internal affairs, actually enjoyed more independence than, for example, colonies outside the old continent, especially at the beginning of the XXth Century. They were in fact client-states, and often attained greater leeway just playing one Power against another.


None of these factors can be extrapolated neither to the Armenians nor the Georgians: They were far less relevant from the geostrategic point of view and, most important, they were far away from any Great Power opposing Russia other than the Ottomans(or the Persians before being screwed up). In the case of Armenian people, they had to resign themselves to choose between the Turkish oppression or, for many Armenians the lesser evil, the Russian boot.


But, in spite of this…..

 

[Zealot]

….in spite of this, some efforts were made to forestall Russian advance in the Caucasus to a certain degree. It must be noted that Russian expansion in Georgia and Eastern Armenia took place in successive victorious wars in the first third of the century, conflicts not involving any other Great Power, so the victories of the Russians weren’t checked at first by their opponents. But it is also true that, despite being a secondary battlefront, Russia had frequently to retreat some miles back from the furthest point of its advance. For instance, Erzurum (a strategic crossroad) was taken in the course of 1828–29 and 1877–78 wars, but never became a Russian city. After the last Russo-Turkish War in 1878, though the main game was being played in the Balkans, the British became aware of the Russian growing presence in Eastern Anatolia: they pressed for the removal of the Treaty of Berlin article which designated the Russians as protectors of the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia, requiring the evacuation of Russian troops (Russian Empire would annex Kars province as consolation prize after the signing of the Treaty). Finally, it was the Kaiser’s threat, in the form of growing German penetration in OE (Baghdad railway, military assistance), what drew closer the British and the Russians: Suddenly the forgotten Armenian Question came to the forefront (because of the intervention of a third party) and both powers pressed the Sultan for granting autonomy to the Armenian provinces, a scheme that failed to come to existence due to the outbreak of WWI…

 

[Zealot]

Well, after taking in consideration all these precedents, I want to put this question: Was some sort of Balkan-like arrangement possible for the Armenians, that is, an autonomous principality placed between Ottoman, Russian and Persian Empires, created from the territories of these empires thanks to the intervention of the Concert of Europe?. I was thinking about this idea, and I’d like to know if it’s ASB or something plausible; The territories assigned to this Autonomous Principality would be these ones:




In other words, the former Russian provinces of Erivan and Kars minus some portions. My original idea about TTL is some POD delaying the Russo-Persian and Russo-Turkish wars of 1826–28 and 1828-29 where the Russians annexed Erivan from the Persians and took Kars temporarily . These campaigns took place without “disturbing” the Great Powers (only Britain displayed some timid support for the Persians), who weren’t alarmed at the victories of the Tsar is such distant scenario. But IMHO, if this expansion had happened just before a great Russian defeat, the Russians would have to accept some territorial adjustments and give up conquered land (in OTL it happened with some lands in the mouth of Danube). Instead of giving back these territories to their former rulers (Persians and Turks), the Great Powers would in TTL decide to restore some form of Armenian statehood (the “protection” of the Christian subjects were a constant in diplomacy at this time), with the purpose of placing a buffer between warring contenders. So the best moment for these AT territorial changes is the Crimean War, where the Russians had to face the combined opposition of France, Britain, and the OE, and were severely defeated.


But for this to have been accomplished, I see two main obstacles:

 

[Zealot]

1. Demography:

Unlike in the Balkans, Armenians didn’t form a majority in the lands of “Historical Armenia”, the region that encompassed most of Eastern Anatolia. In fact, they constituted only large pluralities in some of the Eastern Vilayets. The same happened in Yerevan and Kars: The only record I’ve found (well, I have to admit that my research has been very poor) indicates that during the Persian rule, Erivan had only a 20% of Armenians. I don’t know the figures for Kars, but in the map for my proposed Armenian Principality, the territory of Alexandropol, already holding a large Armenian population, is ceded by the Russians, increasing Armenian demographics. According to wiki-sources, OTL the Russians favored the settlement of Armenians from Persia and Anatolia soon after the annexation. In the late 1890s censuses the Armenian population for the combined Kars-Erivan territory was a little below the 50%, and increased slow but steadily to the outbreak of WWI.

​

But, what amount of Armenian population would be needed to “justify” the establishment of an Armenian entity? Well, in some contemporary precedents, the “titular nationalities” populations weren’t far above the half of the total figures; for instance, the A-H Kingdom of Hungary had a Hungarian-speaking population of around 40-45% in mid-nineteenth century, which increased to 50%at the end of the century (thanks to aggressive assimilation policies), but this didn’t represent an obstacle for Magyar absolute political dominance throughout that period. The same happened in Austrian Galicia, where the Poles were less than 50% of the inhabitants of the territory, but the Polish aristocracy enjoyed the monopoly of power until the dissolution of the Empire
.

IMHO, an acceptable starting point would be a figure close to 50 %, taking into account also that the rest of the population would not conform a homogeneous bloc (it would be divided between Sunni Turks and Kurds and Shia Azeris), and that the political system wouldn't be too democratic. This figure can be reached if a protecting power enforces Armenian resettlement from neighboring territories and “encourages” Muslim emigration during the first stages of Armenian autonomy. The model for this scheme is what happened in Bulgaria just after the Russo-Ottoman War in 1878: During and after the conflict, the Russian troops, who were held responsible for the provisional administration of the liberated lands, did thorough efforts to “simplify” the demographics of Bulgaria. The process of ethnic cleansing affected a large percentage of the pre-war Turkic population, thus strengthening the Slavic predominance. In TTL Armenian entity Russians would be interested during the war in cleansing the land of untrustworthy Muslims, and after the war, in keeping unrest of as long as possible, by the easy method of stirring up Muslim uprisings for justify Russian intervention… which in turn would entail Ottoman retaliation on Armenians outside the Principality borders and further immigration….. Also it must be noted that the new state apparatus would be exclusively Armenian, hence an additional influx of educated bureaucrats would take place.


After the first years of recovered self-rule, the Armenians would consolidate their position in their new statelet by a variety of means, from the most “liberal” ones (monopolization of bureaucracy posts, unfair land distribution, discriminatory schooling policies…) to the most “direct” methods (violence exerted on Muslim minorities by Armenian civilians with the tacit consent of authorities, or even by the same security forces….)


(NOTE FOR SENSITIVE MEMBERS: Despite the often euphemistic language, my intention isn’t making apology of any side of the conflict… the events occurred in OTL, and those which would have happened in ATL, were terrible regarding human rights violations. The fact of making such detailed account doesn’t aim at being sadistic or making fun of the issue, but to discuss the matter in the most realistic terms. Again, I do apologize if someone feels offended.)


Anyways, it must be noted that TTL wouldn’t be much different than OTL in terms of population transfers; large deportations actually were pursued by the Russians in Caucasus, just around these years , and the resettlement of Armenians and Christians in Erivan an Kars happened in a similar way OTL, perhaps not at the same pace, but with similar results.

Under these circumstances, the situation of the Armenians towards the end of 1800s would be rather similar to that of contemporary Romanians or Serbs: a small ethnic stronghold enjoying at least nominal independence squeezed between two mighty neighbors with large (in this case the majority) populations of the same ethnicity living outside their borders. (In fact, towards the end of the century an opposite trend of migration would be very likely: the Armenian statelet, mainly agrarian would be soon overcrowded and the oil industry of Baku and Batumi would attract Armenian migrant workers. The consequence would be some sort of irredentism, which would be fueled by one empire against the other.

 

[Zealot]

2. Feasibility of the new entity:

The question is, is it possible for this kind of invention to last? Apart for the Powers involved in its inception (Britain, France…), far away to effectively enforce its independence, what would be the position of Ottomans and Russians?


2.1 IMO the Porte wouldn’t be too displeased by the scheme… well, it is true that the best outcome for them would just have been taking the lost territory back, but at least in the Balkans it didn’t happened like this: Even when the Turks where the victors, they were subjected to a series of conditions regarding the protection or autonomy of their Christian subjects. Also outside the Balkans, in the French sphere of influence, Mount Lebanon was granted autonomy after major inter-confessional strife at the mid-nineteenth century…. so the matter is that if retaking the lost territory (in case of the Porte, only Kars Province) is very difficult, the lesser evil for the Ottomans would be moving the Russians away from their border. The Armenians would indeed play the role of buffer between both enemies, because they probably would be strictly neutral, at least during the first years of existence: The Armenian leadership would probably be under pressure both from the Armenians in Russian Empire and the Armenians of Constantinople. The Sultan could exert almost as much influence as the Tsar in Erevan internal affairs with a two-track policy: firstly, thanks to the financial support for Erivan from the Armenian Ottoman nobility (yes, the relations between Christian Armenians and the Sultan were more complex than most people imagine), and secondly, simple saying something like "if you, Armenians form Erivan, dare to make anything against the Sultan, your Ottoman brethren will suffer the consequences". Ultimately, once the Armeno-Ottoman relations became strained, the Porte would have the chance of suggesting the Powers the forced transfer of ALL Ottoman Armenians to Erivan as the best solution for the "Armenian Question".


2.2 Regarding Russia, things would be still more complex... It is clear that Russians wouldn’t willingly accept giving up any conquered territory, since best case for them is simply annexing it and moving closer to the Med... that is why Armenian independence could only be achieved after a great loss, as it has been mentioned before. But it must be also considered that this would generate an uneasy situation in Russian Caucasus: would the act of granting independence to the Armenians incite the Georgians, whose kingdoms had been recently occupied by the Tsar, to revolt again against the foreign rule?. Would it spark unrest throughout the Caucasus?.

Well, I'm not sure, but the matter is more complex than it seems: Apart from being a backward, lanldlocked country, totally dependent on foreign aid, unable to pose a serious threat against anybody, under TTL circumstances, the living conditions during first stages of the Armenian entity would be very harsh for the civilian population, facing deportations, retaliation, constant unrest, and interethnic violence.... to the point that it could even give a lesson to the Georgians about what could happen to them without Russian direct "protection". In addition, Eastern Armenian population would be divided between the citizens of the new small state and those Armenians under direct Tsarist rule (in Tiflis, Elisabetpol, Baku…), a situation far from idyllic. It must be also noted that, given the animosity already existent between Georgians and Armenians in Tiflis, it would be hard to both peoples to forge an alliance against the Russians. Armenians, on the other hand, remained by far the most Russophile Caucasus people till the downfall of the Empire, in spite of some short-sighted Russification attempts, and the Tsar always could play the card of Turkish threat.

In addition, the existence of this Armenian entity could somehow give the opportunity to Russia, who was at that time embarked in a process of ethnic cleansing in Caucasus, of outsourcing part of the job, or even justifying it because of the unavoidable clash between Christians and Muslims.

 

[Zealot]

SPOILER ALERT:


For those worried about the possibility of this thread becoming an Armenia-wank, or a vindication of Greater Armenia, I’m afraid that it won’t happen, at least if it just depends on me…. I’m sorry for those waiting for this kind of AH…

​

 

[telynk]

I'm not enough of a history expert to give an authoritative opinion on the plausibility of this idea, but it sounds good to me. It seems well researched and well thought out which is the biggest thing I look for in a good AH idea. I look forward to reading about the future of the Caucausus.

I know I may be asking for spoilers here, but is Armenia going to set a trend? Will your TL eventually lead to an independent Georgia? Azerbaijan? Kurdistan? Chechnya? I'm interested to see where this leads...

 

[katchen]

That's the question I was asking in the 1853 TL. In that case, Austria-Hungary's position on the Black Sea would open up the Caucasus to a double Great Power rivalry. And leave us not forget that the Armenians are not the only Christians in the neighborhood. Besides the Georgians (who would like very much to be independent of the Russians) and the Ossetians (who feel very much put upon by the Georgians and while they would like nothing more than independence, find the Russians a protector. Then, even further away but still under Ottoman rule and still being persecuted (but now within reach of European powers ) are the Assyrian Christians of Northeast Iraq.
Balanced against them are Muslims who want out of Turkish rule. Specifically the Kurds in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, who actually broke away and established short lived kingdoms in the 1830s. From there, balkanization can extend to the Arab Middle East. Lebanese Maronite Christians want independence. So do Ismaili Druse. So do Latakia Alawites. Jews and Anglo- Christian Zionists wanting a Jewish Palestine. And Shiites from Iraq down through Bahrain want to be ruled by people of the same Muslim persuasion as themselves. So this could be a very interesting TL indeed, with many of the same sorts of things happening in the mid 19th Century that are happening now. The reason that they didn't is because the Great Powers after World War I clamped down on the Middle East the equivalent of the Concert of Europe (codified in the Treaty of San Remo in `1920) in which Great Britain and France with the assent of the others of the League of Nations drew the boundaries that the peoples of the Middle East were to live under
That they didn't happen

 

[Zealot]

That's the question I was asking in the 1853 TL. In that case, Austria-Hungary's position on the Black Sea would open up the Caucasus to a double Great Power rivalry. And leave us not forget that the Armenians are not the only Christians in the neighborhood. Besides the Georgians (who would like very much to be independent of the Russians) and the Ossetians (who feel very much put upon by the Georgians and while they would like nothing more than independence, find the Russians a protector. Then, even further away but still under Ottoman rule and still being persecuted (but now within reach of European powers ) are the Assyrian Christians of Northeast Iraq.
Balanced against them are Muslims who want out of Turkish rule. Specifically the Kurds in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, who actually broke away and established short lived kingdoms in the 1830s. From there, balkanization can extend to the Arab Middle East. Lebanese Maronite Christians want independence. So do Ismaili Druse. So do Latakia Alawites. Jews and Anglo- Christian Zionists wanting a Jewish Palestine. And Shiites from Iraq down through Bahrain want to be ruled by people of the same Muslim persuasion as themselves. So this could be a very interesting TL indeed, with many of the same sorts of things happening in the mid 19th Century that are happening now. The reason that they didn't is because the Great Powers after World War I clamped down on the Middle East the equivalent of the Concert of Europe (codified in the Treaty of San Remo in `1920) in which Great Britain and France with the assent of the others of the League of Nations drew the boundaries that the peoples of the Middle East were to live under
That they didn't happen

Thanks for your comments.... Luckily, this format of debate gives the chance of sharing knowledge and enriching projects with fresh ideas.... In this case, this feedback makes me think about some matters which I didn't consider form the beginning.

Unfortunately, Lord didn't favor me with the gift of imagination when I was born , therefore when I suggest a POD I find it difficult to predict how many butterflies it may generate... in fact, I think I am more specialized in minor PODs about secondary historical issues, with lesser impact in global affairs: A big number of butterflies and their consequences overwhelm me, but I know that AH Forum members love just the opposite, completely different universes

Hence your comments about the lasting overall consequences of this POD in the whole OE are very interesting.. It can be summarized like this: once the Powers decided to sponsor the first Balkan small nation independence, they set a precedent which led to an endless process of dismemberment in Ottoman Europe...consequently the Armenian affair would inevitably balkanize all the Near East, with big consequences in TTL.

Let's analyze the possible consequences, comparing TTL situation with what happened OTL. First of all I must stress the fact that the prevailing opinion in European Powers at the time was biased towards the Christian subjects of the Sultan, but the sufferings of the Muslims, sometimes at the hands of Christians, went unnoticed for the general domain. In addition, when a new small state was carved out the OE, it didn't happen only because of the desire of fulfilling the will of the struggling nation, but almost always because it was deemed useful to the Great Powers interests.

IOTL some minor territories adjustments happened in the Near East the expense of the Ottomans. For example, European Powers intervened in Mount Lebanon on behalf of the local Christian population, forcing the Porte to grant wide autonomy to the region, under protection of Europeans, mainly France. This process didn't entail the disintegration of Turkish rule in Syria, although it was a bad precedent. Also Cyprus was leased to the British, but London didn't push for more aggressive penetration in form of territorial acquisition. It is true that British established a virtual protectorate over Egypt, but the Egyptians were by the time almost independent of the Porte. At this time, the traditional British policy was supporting the Turks as a bulwark against the Tsarist expansionism.

Things began to change however towards the end of the century, when German Empire replaced Russia as the main threat to the BE interests in the area, and London began speculating with different options: in Kuwait, for instance, they established a protectorate aiming at blocking foreign presence in Persian Gulf, at a moment when German aspirations in Near East became more apparent. And this didn’t balkanize the area either. For the following years up to the outbreak of WWI, alliances will shift, placing Russia and Britain in the same camp for the first time in years, hence the position of London regarding the preservation of OE changed dramatically. But again, regarding my proposed TL, this period would take place many years after the establishment of Armenian self-rule, hence IMHO this event would have limited influence in a scenario generated 50 years later.

 

[Zealot]

But two names from your posts have caught specially my interest: Georgia and Kurdistan.

Firstly, you suggest TTL course of events would butterfly some kind of Georgian struggle for independence… There had been some revolts IOTL against Russian rule in 1830s and 1840s, but they had been successfully suppressed, and the Georgian nobility was at that time undergoing a process of co-optation by Moscow. But, would TTL Armenian partial self-rule incite new Georgian uprisings?. First of all, I dismiss the possibility of Russia being forced to withdraw from the whole Transcaucasia in the aftermath of Crimean War; Note that ITTL, Erivan and Kars are granted autonomy because they have been taken during the course of that war, while Georgia and Azerbaijan were conquered some decades before. Besides that, Russia was forced to make painful concessions in other areas, deemed more relevant for the Great Powers (demilitarization Black Sea, Romania…), therefore I think the Diktat shouldn’t be too harsh regarding Caucasus .

Hence, if we rule out an Treaty of Paris-sponsored independent Georgia, the other possibility is a Polish-like uprising in the country after Crimean War against Russian troops. Since the Treaty of Paris, which settled the Crimean War, stated the prohibition of Russian naval build up, thus preventing the reconstruction of the destroyed Black Sea Fleet, an armed revolt in Russian-controlled Georgia would be disastrous for Russian interests in Transcaucasia, given that Georgian Black Sea coast was the gate to foreign powers to land troops in the area. Therefore the Russians would never tolerate it and would crush the rebels without mercy. By the way, Georgians couldn’t expect any support by the side of TTL Armenians: Besides that they would need the Russian aid against Muslim revolts, they would never stage an armed conflict against one of their protecting powers. In addition, Armeno-Georgian relations weren’t the best ones during that period: Armenians merchants dominated economic life in Tiflis, and were regarded with suspicion by the Georgians, which considered them Russian agents in their own homeland.

 

[Zealot]

SIGH, nobody else interested in this stuff?

Not even in the possibility of establishing a contemporary Armenian monarchy….?

 

[ingemann]

SPOILER ALERT:


For those worried about the possibility of this thread becoming an Armenia-wank, or a vindication of Greater Armenia, I’m afraid that it won’t happen, at least if it just depends on me…. I’m sorry for those waiting for this kind of AH…

View attachment 204035​

I'm somewhat sad, the existance of a greater Armenia would be historical interesting and it would change the entire dynamic of the Middle East and the Balkans. In fact I could see the Ottoman Middle East being split between Egypt (Syria) and Persia (Mesopotania), while we would see some expulsion of Muslim from greater Armenia and they would likely be resettled in the Turkish Balkan and as result both develop the area and push Muslims into the majority in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Northern Greece (through Slavic speaker would likely stay in majority).
The lack of fighting over influence over the Balkans between Russia and Austria would also make the Dreikaiserbund more likely to survive, butterflying WWI away.

 

[Fearless Leader]

One interesting thing to consider in such a scenario, is how the establishment of an Armenian state would affect the millet reform of the latter 19th century.

In OTL the Armenian Millet pioneered Millet reforms due to the presence of American educated Armenians who thought that importing more democratic methods and protestant ideas would gain the Armenians more friends in the west. The reforms to the Armenian millet were soon copied by the other millets which led to the traditional religious elite which favoured working within the Ottoman system being slowly crowded out by the emergence of new nationalist figures who sought to use the religio-political structure of the Millet for nationalist ends.

Now given a vastly different situation in TTL, would the same reforms happen? To begin with the whole issue of the Armenian church is going to be very different. I'd imagine that in TTL it would be similar to Greece with an independent Armenian church in Yerevan somewhat opposed to the leaders in Constantinople. Mind you, Armenia in TTL will be much poorer than Greece with less access to credit, so the Armenian church is going to have a tougher time aiding Armenian nationalism.

Anyways, I'd wager that the independent Yerevan is going to attract most of the nationalists, leaving the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire to their own devices. This may significantly retard the implementation of any reform of the millet system (no other millet felt sufficiently threatened to adopt such radical measures) when millet reform does happen it could look very different. So what does this mean? Well potentially it means more support for the Ottoman Empire from it's Christian subjects for a longer period of time which might alter events like the Macedonian Question and influence the Greco-Turkish Wars.

 

[katchen]

As long as it's basically the Russians and the Turks in the Black Sea with no other power having access to the Black Sea, Armenians and others in the Caucasus have a choice between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. That's why it was Austria gaining frontage on the Black Sea by getting Wallachia that got me thinking about the Caucasus as another Balkans when I read the "Sweden enters the Crimean War" TL and saw the settlement that was reached.
Basically, you need Austria in the Black Sea even if that presence initially is only the port city of Galatz (Galatai) on the Danube. Galatai was and is a seaport (a factoid I ran across in Bram Stoker's novel Dracula of all places. Ocean going ships depart from Galatai on the Danube for the Black and Mediteranean Seas. So if Austria-Hungary gets Galatai (to rename Galatz), even if they do not get Tulcea and the Danube Delta, the Black Sea suddenly gets a lot more interesting. Because now it's not just Britain and France who have potential interests in the area; it's Austria-Hungary, a Central Power that is a player as well.
And the fact of the matter is that especially now (1850s and 1860s) with railroads getting built and the Afghans having just handed the British's head to them in the Retreat from Kabul, Persia and India, and a railroad to at least Persia gives the people of Armenia, Kurdestan and Assyria, Persia and Shiite Iraq more wiggle room ITTL than they would have OTTL. But that third ppwer in the Black Sea may be essential for this.

 

[Zealot]

About the Kurds, I’m not sure about the existence of some Kurdish proto-nationalism in 1850s…. Remember that Christian subjects of OE were somehow autonomous thanx to the millet system, the same that allowed the existence of separate communal leadership and a sense of shared identity. It was among this leadership where the nationalist intelligentsia emerged, once the western notions of “nation” and “sovereignty of the people” reached Constantinople. I think it would be more difficult to extrapolate to the Kurds, who had no Ethnarch of their own. Besides this, IMHO the sort of Kurdish autonomy that happened OTL was more “tribal” than “national”… that is, more related to the desires of some single tribal chief for collecting their own taxes than the existence of a common Kurdish identity shared by large populations from different strata and with a large territorial base. Hence if the troublesome chieftain was “dismissed” and his successors consequently coopted, the problem disappeared, at least in nineteenth century.


It also must be noted that OTL the reaction of some Kurds against Christian aggression was siding with their Sultan against the Infidel (remember de Hamidiyye), and since the treatment the Christian Powers gave then to their Muslim subjects (Egypt, Algeria, Tunis, Caucasus….) was of colonialist nature, the Kurdish leadership would hardly expect improving their status revolting against the Sultan with the help of foreign powers.

​

 

[Zealot]

As long as it's basically the Russians and the Turks in the Black Sea with no other power having access to the Black Sea, Armenians and others in the Caucasus have a choice between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. That's why it was Austria gaining frontage on the Black Sea by getting Wallachia that got me thinking about the Caucasus as another Balkans when I read the "Sweden enters the Crimean War" TL and saw the settlement that was reached.
Basically, you need Austria in the Black Sea even if that presence initially is only the port city of Galatz (Galatai) on the Danube. Galatai was and is a seaport (a factoid I ran across in Bram Stoker's novel Dracula of all places. Ocean going ships depart from Galatai on the Danube for the Black and Mediteranean Seas. So if Austria-Hungary gets Galatai (to rename Galatz), even if they do not get Tulcea and the Danube Delta, the Black Sea suddenly gets a lot more interesting. Because now it's not just Britain and France who have potential interests in the area; it's Austria-Hungary, a Central Power that is a player as well.
And the fact of the matter is that especially now (1850s and 1860s) with railroads getting built and the Afghans having just handed the British's head to them in the Retreat from Kabul, Persia and India, and a railroad to at least Persia gives the people of Armenia, Kurdestan and Assyria, Persia and Shiite Iraq more wiggle room ITTL than they would have OTTL. But that third ppwer in the Black Sea may be essential for this.

Wow. This idea would completely shake up the course of history since 1850s …. I have just begun to read this thread and it find it amazing, plenty of possibilities to butterfly away many issues which nowadays everybody take from granted…. Regarding the Caucasus Question, TTL would evolve to a much more Balkan-like scenario, since Armenians and other peoples would be caught between three powers, namely Austria, Russian and the Porte…. With the Ottoman Empire declining, the Eastern shore of the Black Sea would turn into a chessboard where Russian and Austrian interests would probably clash…. And to make things even more interesting, Caucasus would actually replace Balkans as the scenario where major conflicts would ignite, given the fact that an Austrian-dominated Romania would effectively block the Russians the passage to the Straits, therefore making it necessary to redesign the whole stuff…..

 

[Zealot]

Anyways, I would like to pose another question: Would the existence of TTL Principality of Erivan somehow butterfly the European dealing of the Armenian Question in next decades?. I mean…,once Erivan becomes more stable, Balkan-like country, and ceases to be considered a mere Armenian Bantustan… would it make some Powers consider the advantage of concentrating Armenians in smaller territory with demographic majority…?. OTL the proposed Armenian Reform Package just involved appointing foreign inspectors to foresee reforms aiming at improve living conditions for Armenians in Eastern Provinces, including provisions for guaranteeing the fair allocation of administrative posts according to demographics….all this for vast territory where Armenians were far from making up the majority.

Since the aim of the Great Powers was actually obstructing German penetration in Middle East, wouldn’t it be preferable to concentrate the largest possible Ottoman Armenian population somewhere, for example the Van-Bitlis area, enabling them to get a single Armenian-dominated province?. It would only be necessary to designate the proposed area as the only one deserving the right of autonomy, Armenians would then move there in large numbers . This would give them the effective control of most of their own affairs, under some sort of Ottoman suzerainty….(something like Mount Lebanon, but with Ottoman garrisons). This could have considerable consequences on the impact of massacres before and during WWI.

To summarize: Two entities holding Armenian majorities: the semi-independent Erivan + some sort of autonomous Vilayet around lake Van, instead of this:

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[Zealot]

I want to put also some questions about the 1914 Armenian Reform Package: Its implementation would have just implied putting the Six Eastern Vilayets under foreign overall supervision by two General Inspectors from two neutral countries, with broad powers to implement reforms in benefit of the Armenian minority. But, to what extent?. I mean, if Eastern Anatolia rested under Muslim military and police control (unlike of Mount Lebanon or Eastern Rumelia, for example), and the reforms just intended to fairly distribute administrative posts in such large areas, where the Armenian only made up a large minority, did it really represent a threat for Ottoman interests? Was it actually a big success for Armenian lobby, or a consolation prize? What real gains could be expected once had it come into effect for the Armenians? Would the (Christian) General Inspectosr dare to discriminate against the Muslim Turco-Kurdish majority? . Since the Ottoman Army and Gendarmerie remained in place, would the reforms had been carried on easily or somewhat resisted had the plan been put into work?


And could the Armenians expect to gain something else from a slightly more advantageous starting point?

 

[Strategos' Risk]

SIGH, nobody else interested in this stuff?

Not even in the possibility of establishing a contemporary Armenian monarchy….?

There are, but they've all been banned in the internecine ethnic flame wars of yesteryear AH.com