Was there a chance to end the war early that was missed because Ike didn't like Devers?
Devers crosses the rhine in 44
- Thread starter Michael Muzzarelli
- Start date
A few weeks earlier? It may disperse the rebuilding German units for countering this crossing. That may weaken the preparations for the Ardennes offensive.
Ike was looking at the failed Market Garden operation, the bloody battles for the Achen region, Pattons difficulties in Lorraine, and the ongoing transportation problem from the ports to the field armies. He was getting a bit fed up with one shot panacea plans from his field commanders. The situation looked a lot like it did in December 1942 in Tunisia. Badly supplied field armies, winter weather starting, and a enemy stronger than the intelligence people had predicted. A methodical preparation for a general offensive in 90 or 120 days looked like the better plan.
A look at the map shows Devers proposal had 7th Army attacking towards rugged terrain like the Black Forrest, and uplands behind the east bank of the Rhine. Not high speed terrain suitable for the heavily motorized US Army
Ike was looking at the failed Market Garden operation, the bloody battles for the Achen region, Pattons difficulties in Lorraine, and the ongoing transportation problem from the ports to the field armies. He was getting a bit fed up with one shot panacea plans from his field commanders. The situation looked a lot like it did in December 1942 in Tunisia. Badly supplied field armies, winter weather starting, and a enemy stronger than the intelligence people had predicted. A methodical preparation for a general offensive in 90 or 120 days looked like the better plan.
A look at the map shows Devers proposal had 7th Army attacking towards rugged terrain like the Black Forrest, and uplands behind the east bank of the Rhine. Not high speed terrain suitable for the heavily motorized US Army
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Totally agree with what Carl said. Something else to consider is that the historic Rhine crossings were massive, broad and couldn't be effectively contained or repulsed due to the Whermacht lacking the reserves to counter multiple pushes (And the fact that their mobile reserves were just destroyed by the pair of winter offensives).
None of this applies to Devers proposal, meaning that his offensive, already angling towards difficult terrain, would have likely been contained and turned into another slog against concentrated, entrenched, forces.
Now, I am not suggesting that it would turn into a catastrophic defeat or even a market garden level defeat. American formations, when adequately supported by air and mobile assets (as the offensive likely would have been) proved nearly impossible to support by the late war wheremacht. The artillery firepower alone caused catastrophic casualties for German units of all types during both the initial ardennes offensive and the Nordwind follow up. Infantry, even green units, generally fought capably and tenaciously.
The outcome then is likely a bridgehead and little more progress until post whatever form the ardennes offensive takes and then follow up assaults by other commands across the Rhine.
None of this applies to Devers proposal, meaning that his offensive, already angling towards difficult terrain, would have likely been contained and turned into another slog against concentrated, entrenched, forces.
Now, I am not suggesting that it would turn into a catastrophic defeat or even a market garden level defeat. American formations, when adequately supported by air and mobile assets (as the offensive likely would have been) proved nearly impossible to support by the late war wheremacht. The artillery firepower alone caused catastrophic casualties for German units of all types during both the initial ardennes offensive and the Nordwind follow up. Infantry, even green units, generally fought capably and tenaciously.
The outcome then is likely a bridgehead and little more progress until post whatever form the ardennes offensive takes and then follow up assaults by other commands across the Rhine.
The danger that Ike was trying to avoid the dispersal of forces into indecisive actions, while still trying to clear the Germans from the West Bank of the Rhine. If Devers had crossed opposite Strasbourg his forces would be less able to contain the Colmar Pocket. Ike instead ordered Devers to send a few divisions to Patton's 3rd Army, to help him launch his Saarland offensive. Without those divisions Patton wouldn't have been able to shift 3 divisions to attack the south side of the Bulge so quickly.
Of course that was unknowable at the time, but the principle Ike was defending by holding Devers back was concentration of force. Ike's critics accused him of violating this principle with his broad front strategy, but I think they were wrong. Monty's single thrust strategy, or Patton, or Devers grab the opportunity offensives would've over extended the Allied Armies before they were ready to cross the Rhine. The Allies still needed to build their logistical system, while the Germans still held strong forces west of the Rhine.
Of course that was unknowable at the time, but the principle Ike was defending by holding Devers back was concentration of force. Ike's critics accused him of violating this principle with his broad front strategy, but I think they were wrong. Monty's single thrust strategy, or Patton, or Devers grab the opportunity offensives would've over extended the Allied Armies before they were ready to cross the Rhine. The Allies still needed to build their logistical system, while the Germans still held strong forces west of the Rhine.
At this time (late November) Eisenhower's planned date for crossing the Rhine was May (briefing to Brooke on 12 December).
The German losses during the Ardennes probably brought forward the end of the war.
Some would argue Eisenhower caused the dispersal of forced into indecisive action. As you note, his critics would say that it was a consequence of his Broad Front strategy, and it's certainly true that the Allied offensive ground to a halt in the Autumn of 1944 and no one Army Group was strong enough in its individual sector to achieve decisive victory before 1945. The question, really,is how much Omar Bradley's poor handling of his men and resources contributed to that, and how much of it was inevitable.
Would the Broad Front have continued to be a successful strategy into 1945 if Bradley had his Armies working together towards common goals instead of advancing on opposited ends of his own sector completely unsupported by each other? Would 12th Army Group have been strong enough to achieve a decisive result if Bradley hadn't permitted Hodges to get bogged down in the fruitless mire of the Hurtgen Forest, or left Patton to his own ineffective divises in front of Metz?
Or was that stalling inevitable as the Allies dispersed their strenght across a 360 mile front while the Germans withdrew and regrouped?
Taking the war deep into German territory would have had a strong effect on the German perception of the war. It would probably force a rethinking of the Ardennes offensive, which was partly an attempt to stabilize the western front away from Germany.
Having built the "stab in the back" narrative on the concept that you can't be militarily defeated while fighting on foreign soil, it was inevitavle that Allied forces entering Germany would be seen as a clear sign of defeat.
Another factor would be that Devers was leading a largely French force, and having French troops play a important role in invading Germany might have significant effects on post war narratives. (This might have been a factor in Ike's decision!
Having built the "stab in the back" narrative on the concept that you can't be militarily defeated while fighting on foreign soil, it was inevitavle that Allied forces entering Germany would be seen as a clear sign of defeat.
Another factor would be that Devers was leading a largely French force, and having French troops play a important role in invading Germany might have significant effects on post war narratives. (This might have been a factor in Ike's decision!
It is worth noting that although nearly every regional commander complained about this, Ike DID shift resources at times to support specific focused offensives. The most notable is Market Garden, and said operation shows us the flaws in narrow offensives and the merit behind broad advances. With the Germans able to shift reinforcements over to block and bog down the narrow front, the operation went nowhere. Defensive forces on a narrow front numerous advantages over over-extended offensive troops.
Compare this to the rapid successive offensives in numerous areas during the breakout from Normandy, the invasion of southern France and the creation of the Falaise pocket. Where could the Germans reinforce without having a flank shattered and said reinforcements cut off? (that's rhetorical
)Possibly. More on this below, I'd like to point out a couple things first.
While the broad offensives are sometimes described as ending after the winter offensives, this is somewhat debatable. The Rhine was attacked WW1 style with multiple prongs over numerous sectors. That defensive line was "fractured" moreso then penetrated, preventing the possibility if containment.
The winter offensive was always going ti signal a pause in allied offensives.
Given the fuel situation, and the slow pace of port reactivation and railroad activation, I'd tend to say yes, though with caveats.
Certainly the Hurtgen Forrest push was a disaster, but in the overall context of the broader offensives is an understandable one. The idea is that putting pressure on each area will prevent the Germans from reinforcing any one place, therefore even non successful attacks can be serviceable to the end goal. Of course, this needs to be balanced by commanders at the front not being morons about where precisely they hit.
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Finally, and with apologies for the length of this, I'll note the success off the broad strategy.
1. It allowed for major armies from ay least 4 countries (UK, Canada, France, USA) to all operate in the same theater without crippling communication and coordination problems.
2. It allowed for continual pressure to be put on the Germans, neutering Herman capacity on the Eastern Front.
3. By its naturally enveloping style, the broad front push smashed German forces at the Falaise pocket/Normandy campaign (Quarter million casualties/captured), the southern France landings and general advance to Paris (about another quarter million German losses), the advance from Paris to the Rhine (about a half million German losses), the drive into the low countries (Unsure on losses here, but significant), the cutting off of several German units in isolated atlantic hold outside, essentially eliminating them from the war for minimal cost.
Finally, it's dispersed nature meant that the winter offensives were doomed to being met with increasing resistance and pressure on the flanks due to every area having troop and armor concentrations.
In short, in about six months the offensive cost the Germand about 1,500,000 troops, took France without major destruction among her cities (the broad front didnt allow for the Germand to fortify at say, Paris, though the Normandy region was flattened), took most of the low countries, threatened the German heartland in the Ruhr valley, destroyed virtually all German mobile reserves, allowed major breakthroughs in Italy and the East AND brought France back into the war as a significant ally.
Driftless
Donor
Which major French ports were better restored and capable of handling a large flow of supplies by the autumn of '44? North or South France?
*edit* Does that even matter if the whole front end of the supply chain is already geared up in a pre-determined path?
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Fro what I have read, the Southern France ports were in better shape but further from where the fighting was.
You raise the counter argument, and add an inept Bradley into the mix. Well let me give you my take on each of these points. After the Allies broke out of Normandy German Army Group West was essentially destroyed in the exploration phase. We all know logistical considerations constrained the Allies for the rest of the year. The British 21 Army Group drew it's supplies mostly through the Channel Ports, from their bases in Eastern Britain, and were less adversely effected. The Americans traced their supply lines from the USA, to Western Britain, then to Normandy, and then by long haul trucks to the front. That system could never fully meet the needs of 12th Army group. The solution was to restore the France Railway System, but this would take time, in fact the rest of 1944. 6th Army Group drew it's supplies from the States, via Southern French Ports.
There's logistical limits would prevent a full scale invasion of Germany no matter how the tactical battles on the West Wall turned out. Eisenhower's only reasonable strategy was to keep the pressure on the Germans, by attacking with all the divisions he had that could be supplied. He wanted to reach the Rhine, to use the whole West Bank as a springboard for an invasion of Germany. In the process he wanted to inflict the maximum attritional losses on the German Army. If he couldn't destroy the Germans, he wanted to ware them down. That strategy worked in that German losses were heavy, and the high command so on the defensive that their counter offensive was delayed a month, from it's original start date. Some forces earmarked for the Ardennes were unable to join the offensive, being tied down elsewhere.
History has shown it is easier to defend against one axis of advance then multiple ones. Ike had 3 Army Groups, controlling by the fall 7 Armies. Each of them could form it's own axis of attack, to keep the Germans off balance, and prevent them from concentrating against any one thrust. In the case of 12th Army Group the front was bifurcated by the Ardennes Forest. The Ardennes was lightly defended by the Americans not because the Americans didn't think the Germans could attack from there, but because the terrain, and road net on the other side made it a poor route into Germany. 12th AG's situation was further complicated by 9th Army being nominally under 21st AG control.
Bradley had to deal with the same political, logistical, and geographic problems Ike was dealing with, all inside his own AG. He also had to deal with the other 2 AG's on his flanks. Keeping a tight reign on Patton could be a fulltime job, so he kept his GHQ south of the Ardennes. Hodges did make a hash of his Fall offensive, and fought the unnecessary Battle of the Hurtgen Forest. The battle seemed to make sense on a grand scale map, so what Hodges was doing seemed to make sense to those above him. It was Hodges failure to listen to his Corps, and division commanders who could see on the ground that the strategy was wrong that was the problem. An AG commander has to have confidence in his army commanders, and that both Ike, and Bradley didn't see the problem with the rigidity of Hodges personality was a failing on their part. Hodges was the worst American army commander in Europe, in WWII.
Bradley is rightly criticized for not moving his forward HQ to Namur, to better supervise his AG during the Battle of the bulge. He judged he could do the job from Luxembourg using modern communications. He believed moving his GHQ would seem to the civilian population like his army was about to abandon them. He allowed a political consideration to override military logic. After the Bulge with the supply situation more stable, and all 3 of his armies under his full control there was little to criticize about his generalship. The crossing of the Rhine, encirclement of the Ruhr, and the pursuit across Germany were all well done.
To judge Bradley based on the Fall of 1944 because all the armies were stalled is unfair. By that measure every Allied general was a failure. If for no other reason then logistical limitations the idea that the Allies could win the war in 1944 is a fantasy. It was always a mirage, that rose up, because of the German collapse in the late Summer. It was never real.
What did you want him to do, overrule his boss? Resign? Go over his head to Bradley? Everyone was in a bad situation.
IIRC Collins had much more to do with Huertgen than Hodges. If as a commander you don't like a plan you complain to your boss.
However as Collins made Chief of Staff he seems to have got away with his reputation mostly intact.
And until 45 the French force was actually weak, Its not until the troops from metropolitan France become available in very late 44 and really 45 that it becomes an offensive force.
In general after Mid September the German armies are rebuilding, they are occupying good defensive positions and without time to resupply the allied armies will be stuck for a while, Even if the initial attack is successful they do not have fuel to exploit at any depth, and south of Aachen even doing that will take you nowhere important in a hurry.
On Hurtgen there are several issues, but mostly its attacking on a single corps, maybe divisional frontage for a couple of months. Even within 1st US army there were options to shift the axis and not reinforce failure for month on end. Which itself takes resources from other formations.
This was balanced in the railways extending north from the southern port group were in far better condition. Even at the end of September the railways from Cherbourg & the Channel ports were carrying less than 25% of the actually supply requirements. Bradly was fighting the battles of October & November short 50% to 25% of the supplies required. Particularly artillery ammunition. Devers had a much better situation, receiving close to 100% of requirement. 800 to 900 tons daily per division slice.
Addressing the autumn battles more broadly, air support is notable by its absence. To many days of 10/10 cloud cover. The ground forces lacked the sort of air support they'd had in Normandy June through August. Had this border battle somehow been fought in the summer months the firepower on the Germans would have been larger and more accurate.
So, the 12th AG was fighting with perhaps half the aggregate raw combat power it had the previous summer. Less artillery, less air support, less fuel, even shortages of dry clothing and slow provision of winter equipment cut the combat power of each corps.
In game terms the Allied pieces have their combat factors halved from the 15 September turn.
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1st French Army had 250000 men in the fall of 1944. It was a sizeable force that provided the bulk of Devers infantry.
Also a lot were Algerian, pieds noir or arab who have been in combat since 42 and have limits on replacement levels. Put them into heavy fighting and the infantry will melt away fast. They really do need the 100k+ from the metropole coming in the new year, which has a decent number of trained men, from the 1940 army.