McPherson
Banned
"Clear the Scheldt". That was the instruction. Montgomery tried the best way he knew with the resources available.
Brooke or Mashall as supreme commanders instead of Eisenhower
- Thread starter ivanotter
- Start date
He treated them all as he treated their peers. He had plenty of practice with British, Canadian, Czech, Belgian, Polish etc all as family members of his command. The ‘British’ army was a multinational force so another foreign component was nothing special. One reason why De Gaulle sidled up to the Americans was that he could get away with ignoring their command. Montgomery would stand for no such nonsense.Montgomery was tough to serve alongside, BUT he handled his subordinates well, even if they were a different nationality. There are remarkably few complaints from US generals he commanded during the Ardennes offensive, but Bradley's complaints...
Bradley's complaint of having 1st Army taken away from him was very understandable. The American Corps commanders resented the implication that they had been mismanaging the campaign until Monty showed up to save them from their own folly. As it was said "Monty showed up at 1st Army GHQ like Christ come to cleanse the temple."Montgomery was tough to serve alongside, BUT he handled his subordinates well, even if they were a different nationality. There are remarkably few complaints from US generals he commanded during the Ardennes offensive, but Bradley's complaints...
The French sidled up to the Americans because they needed them for equipment, and supplies. The Americans were also trying to restore the French infrastructure, and get their economy up, and running again. The British could do almost nothing for them. Most Free French forces entered the country though Mediterranean ports, so the obvious place to deploy the French 1st Army was on the Allied right, next to U.S. 7th Army. For their part the Americans were dependent on the French for LOC, and rear area security. The British were only dependent on a few small ports in the NE corner of the country, so they had much less interaction.
The French were fighting on their own soil, and were trying to reassert their national honor, and independence as a great power. They could not be treated like the Czechs, Belgians, Poles, or even Canadians who came to fight as part of a Commonwealth army. De Gaulle wanted to be treated as a coequal leader in the Allied coalition, like Churchill, FDR, and Stalin. Interesting that FDR didn't think the French should have that status until after the war, but he wanted to give Chang a seat at the table, which Churchill thought was ridicules. In the end of course all 5 powers got permanent Security Council Seats.
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That quote is from an unnamed British staff officer; on balance the quotes from the US side (excluding Bradley and his staff
) are positive.That sums up Montgomery arriving at any HQ. A man convinced he is right and thus has the duty to ensure everyone else does too.
All quite so and their North African troops helped tide them over until liberated French could be conscripted and given enough training to join in. The North African troops treatment in the story of liberation and the war is only now being properly addressed. The US kit was scheduled to arrive in France to equip new US units but the numbers of the French army allowed the US to abandon conscription of the troops to man them and have the French man them.
Experience with De GaulLe made the British keep him on a short lead and integrated the Free French into the overall armed forces like the other foreign allied forces. With the US De Gaulle was able to break free.
Garrison
Donor
It was precisely that attitude on the part of De Gaulle that led to the British and the Americans constantly looking for someone else to replace him. France was given a privileged position in the allied ranks out of all proportion to the contribution of the Free French, who only existed as a meaningful force in the first place because Britain gave them support post 1940.
Bradley's complaint about taking the 1st US Army away from him was entirely unreasonable. He had lost control of the battle, was completely isolated from events in the northern sector and was insisting he could sort it out by telephone. Eisenhower was entirely correct to transfer command from him because he had done nothing to get on top the situation and was resisting any suggestion he should move to the north to do so.
Montgomery was perfectly situated to take control of the situation and, unlike Bradley, had actually tried to get first hand knowledge of what was going on by sending his liason officers into the 1st US Army's ranks and to the front to report back to him. As such, Monty had a far clearer overall picture of the battle than even the 1st US Army Command itself did - as Hodges had abandonned his HQ in a panic when he feared he was going to be overrun.
If the American Commanders resented the change from an Army Group Commander who had neglected them to one intent on getting to grips with the situation then it would say more about their pride and insecurities than any fault of Monty's, and certainly reflects badly on Bradley.
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Just because Market Garden was the best option at the time to end the war in one grand swoop does not mean it was a good idea…. If someone suggests you jump out of an airplane without a parachute, jump off a cliff or jump off the roof of your home, the roof may be the best option but that does not mean it is a good idea. M.G. Was NOT a good idea. It was a gamble. And it was one that Ike was either dumb enough to take or one that he figured wouldn’t harm him. But I personally think it was not likely enough to work to justify risking the lives of the men involved. I also personally believe that from Ike’s point of view it had little downside if it work he and Monty looked like hero’s if it failed Monty was the scape goat, And either way it would tend to shut Monty up for a while. So if you ignore the needless deaths that would happen from it failing… it is mostly positives from Ike’s point of view,
As for the single thrust idea that is perhaps the absolute worst idea the wallies could have. In WW2 the single largest advantage the wallies had was more men and equipment, thus outnumbering and out equipping Germany But you can’t take advantage of that by limiting the area. Germany would be able to concentrate forces while the wallies radically limited its forces. This is a horrible idea when you have more forces then your enemy. If you don’t think so look at how well that worked for the Union in the ACW… If the Union had attacked consistently and everywhere at the same time from the start the war probably is over much sooner. But the played games attacking here and there at different time allowing the South to shift around to handle it as best it could. Germany could have pulled that trick…
And Ike’s biggest failure was not better managing the overall picture, he and his HQ were the folks in a position to control the overall battle but for much of the time they just sat back and chose from the options Patton, Bradley and Monty and co. put forward rather then come up with there own ideas. Very much like the chairman and not like a true general.
And the US is not letting a non US general take overall command for multiple reasons ranging from ego, to legal arguments. By having IKe in charge then ultimately it could be argued that even while under Mounties command they were still under US command as Ike was a US officer and Monty worked for Ike so ultimately authority cam from a US officer.
As for the single thrust idea that is perhaps the absolute worst idea the wallies could have. In WW2 the single largest advantage the wallies had was more men and equipment, thus outnumbering and out equipping Germany But you can’t take advantage of that by limiting the area. Germany would be able to concentrate forces while the wallies radically limited its forces. This is a horrible idea when you have more forces then your enemy. If you don’t think so look at how well that worked for the Union in the ACW… If the Union had attacked consistently and everywhere at the same time from the start the war probably is over much sooner. But the played games attacking here and there at different time allowing the South to shift around to handle it as best it could. Germany could have pulled that trick…
And Ike’s biggest failure was not better managing the overall picture, he and his HQ were the folks in a position to control the overall battle but for much of the time they just sat back and chose from the options Patton, Bradley and Monty and co. put forward rather then come up with there own ideas. Very much like the chairman and not like a true general.
And the US is not letting a non US general take overall command for multiple reasons ranging from ego, to legal arguments. By having IKe in charge then ultimately it could be argued that even while under Mounties command they were still under US command as Ike was a US officer and Monty worked for Ike so ultimately authority cam from a US officer.
The key advantage the Allies had was in the mobility of their forces; all their units were motorised while the Germans still relied on horses. A single thrust to cross the Rhine in September 1944 would have caused the Germans major problems. If they try to hold the WestWall their forces will be quickly cutoff; even if they withdraw quickly they will still lose heavily, and lose the Rhine as a transport corridor. In any case they will not be able to eliminate any Allied bridgehead across the Rhine.
Unfortunately the US had not updated their thinking for WW1 lessons about firepower on the battlefield.
The conclusion in Supplying War by van Creveld is that there were sufficient logistical resources for British 2nd Army and US First Army to encircle the Ruhr in September 1944.
McPherson
Banned
In England. Not in France where there was a transportation bottleneck. Please remember that he is most meticulous in his research and he says this.
McPherson
Banned
When he discusses the Normandy campaign and why Patton ran out of gas and bullets in that book. The port tonnage was not there and the length of the LLOCs and torn up road net also contributed to the supply crisis. It is the same exact reason Rommel failed in North Africa. From ports to front was a nightmare the Germans never solved as they burned up more gas to get fuel forward than they could get to the front. In Patton's case, the Red Ballers were just about 50/50 at Metz. First Army's problem was WORSE as it was about 65/35 ratio. So where do you get this "enough supplies nonsense?"
Well the US position in the staff discussions of the time was that there should be a single unified commander for the ETO and MTO and CBO which the British reject on the grounds that its just a stupid Idea ( although they expresssed it more elegantly - As the source of Strategic direction is the CCS having another layer of command to give strategic direction is pointless and below him you need a level of command to deal with the war anyway. Also he system in use in the MTO works.
This is different from the Pacific theatres where the main issue is between the USA and USN. And remember that the USA at this point includes the Air Force.
He is supposed to be in charge of Logistics. ( dig and you will find the actual instruction to Eisenhower) but its not that simple. The Army Groups are responsible for their logistics from roughly corps on down and for most stuff ( and the bulky stuff is Artillery ammunition, Food, and POL but POL only if you are moving ( when you don't use so much ammo btw) they are drawing on national supply sources for ammo and food. And that's a defined distance back from the Front. The delivery route is factory - warehouse - Theatre - various depot with the AG responsibility being at a distance they can pick up and deliver to the front line units and cycle back and forth fast enough.
This gives a different situation for 21 and 12 AG. Montgomery who has done this before is operating from Normandy then from channel ports, which means almost as soon as it hits theatre its AG trains moving stuff and back from there its an overnight trip to the factories or stocks in the UK. 12 AG is inland and stuff from the US has a week or more transatlantic voyage with much more dependence on ADSEC and FECOMZ to move stuff forward from Cherbourg. And both of those are clearly under SHAEF. Where there is commonality is with POL which is universal. But the POL goes either to Cherbourg Normandy or Ambleteuse/Rouen from Mid September which is again much closer to 21 AG than 12AG.
And coordination of all of this is typewritten carbon copy memos , hand tabulation and sending the info by courier around the place or the occasional teletype which has to be encoded decoded. Noone gets a universal end of turn report unless someone sends it to them. So neither Bradley or Montgomery will be aware of the overall situation developing unless someone makes a point of telling them and telling them that its important.
And ofc Bradley and the US organisation has never really done this at the intensity of ETO operations. And SHAEF also has to deal with supplying France which neither AG have to bother about.
Market Garden and the Scheldt.
The Key decision point is 20 August which sets the general theme of the advance from Normandy which gives orders to 21 AG to '“The quickest way to win this war is for the great mass of the Allied armies to advance northwards, clear the coast as far as Antwerp, establish a powerful air force in Belgium, and advance into the Ruhr.”
So the plan at that point is for 12 AG to fight house to house through the Ruhr, so its surprising that Montgomery offers a sensible alternative like not fighting housing to house through the Ruhr. So the argument is not between take Antwerp and charge across Germany its between house to house fighting in the Ruhr and using firepower and mobility on the North German Plain.
Montgomery is right, Eisenhower horribly wrong and it takes Brest, Aachen and particularly the Hurtgen to show him that conclusively. Its an understandable decision but its actually wrong. Montgomery is also probably wrong on timing but remember this is actually the plan for 45.
The order coming out of that are to advance to Antwerp and take the docks, not to clear both sides of the Estuary. Why would they be. On that date noone knows the German position will collapse over the next fortnight and the Port facilities will captured intact. And this has been the Allied problem to date, destruction of the port facilities. So 11 Amd is given clear instructions to capture Antwerp and the Port which it does on 4 September. It is further ordered to then rest and refit as its just done a massive advance and has about half its armour in need of maintenance. They actually do try to cross the Albert Canal on 4th Sept on general principles but they have no positive orders to do so.
But the German position does collapse and both Dempsey and Patton enter pursuit mode. At this point there are two points of view. Either the German Army is permanently irrevocably routed ( and Bagration is happening so hmm maybe) or its not and at some point they will be able to stand. For Dempsey and Patton that does not matter their job is to keep advancing and get as much favourable ground as possible before the stand, because eventually the attack will resume in full force the only question being whats in front of it.
For Patton its the Moselle ( which he tries to bounce and fails about this time) then the Vosges then the Maginot Line, then the Westwall then the Rhone then the Harz with the next strategic objective being Munich. For Dempsey its the river lines, no mountains no fortification and if over the Rhine flat ground to Russia. 1st US army is not in Luxemburg until 9 September, and 9th army still around Brest until 19 September. And parts of both are immobile to keep Patton moving.
On 2 September, two days before Antwerp is taken. Dempsey/Montgomery propose Operation Comet which is a coup de main operation to seize the river crossings at Nijmegen Arnhem and Grave. This would use the British and British Trained Polish airborne who are trained for coup de main operations and its really there to prevent the germans blowing the bridges as the Armour advances. It does not happen mainly due to weather and when the order comes back Dempsey is dubious he has lost a week and is conscious that german 15 army is falling back into Holland in front of him, and they now have time to prep the Bridges so he starts arguing for a right turn through the Reichswald.
At which point Eisenhower has come back with an OK and London is pressuring Montgomery to take the V2 launch sites around the Hague. From Dempseys or Montgomery's point of view Market Garden working is great if it works and if it does not its better to attack now when the Germans have had a fortnight to prepare defences than in a month or 6 when they have had that much longer. Following the operative plan they will still have to cross that groudn the only question is when.
They have the fuel to do this. Horrocks says he had about 100 miles worth in his fuel tanks on 6th and more to hand so XXX corps at least could advance to about Arnhem. And half the additional tonnage eventually delivered for Market Garden was to support the US airborne divisions not originally needed ( so plus 250t per day to support XXX corps is the requirement.) MG starts on 17 September ends on 25 September with subsequent fighting being German counterattacks which fail.
Meanwhile in Antwerp. On 6 September the Germans start pulling 15 army out of the Pas de Calais this puts about 90,000 troops in front of 21 AG around Antwerp btw. The British are about 12 miles short of cutting off Walcheren Island with the Albert Canal in the way and German occupied on the South bank as well 13 September 4th CDN amd tries to take the Leopold Canal. and fails. This is the part south of the Scheldt which the Germans are retreating over. Simonds prioritises the Channel ports until Switchback on 21 September to clear the south bank of the river, 2nd of October the Canadians start attacking North of Antwerp against a numerically superior german force and succeed slowly sort of. They actually cut off Walcheren by 10 October.
9 October Eisenhower gives irrational and ill informed orders to prioritise the attack around - over holding the Arnhem pocket - on the basis that the Canadians will not be able to attack until 1 November because of lack of supplies, this is wrong its lack of infantry and the god awful terrain with canals and inundations everywhere requiring infantry. the battle actually ends on 3 November
Given the number people dying every day of that horrendous war - to not have attempted to shorten it with an MG type op in Sept is IMO morally reprehensible - and they were correct to have attempted it.
Success would have cut off the 15th Army - which was obliged to retreat into the remaining parts of the Netherlands anyway abandoning all of its heavy equipment but here might have been completely cut off and large parts of it trapped - and forced the 1st Parachute 'army' under Gen Student back into Germany, liberated more of the Netherlands and greatly extending the Western front -further stretching the German forces in the West and placing the Allies closer to the Ruhr and outflanking the Westwall.
McPherson
Banned
September-November 1944: The Battle of the Scheldt ...
Americans can read maps. So can Montgomery and I presume most British army officers. Antwerp is a setback port and the docks are worthless as long as the channel is blocked by enemy forces.