Robert E. Lee as a General?

[Wolfpaw]

Tactically that's not brilliance, that's Leeroy Jenkinsism.

Stop making me love you, Snake.

 

[Van555]

Stop making me love you, Snake.

You can never not love Snake

 

[Elfwine]

Snake: I was looking at McClellan in regards to the SBR campaign, the Seven Days are . . .

Well, very lavish in blood is actually a tactful way to put it.



Good bit of work by Porter and Longstreet, but an embarrassing week for both their superiors.

Chancellorsville is the Refuge in Audacity trope.

Gettysburg's mistakes are thread on their own, but enough of them are Lee's to make me wonder how Longstreet managed to wait until his memoirs to vent.

And I think that's all that needs to be said to bring down his overall rating. Whether the Second Bull Run campaign was good by him or simply dumb by Pope is just a matter of "how much".

I'm not counting Maryland. Lee did get away with that, even if by all rights it should be a dethroning moment of suck.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Snake: I was looking at McClellan in regards to the SBR campaign, the Seven Days are . . .

Well, very lavish in blood is actually a tactful way to put it.



Good bit of work by Porter and Longstreet, but an embarrassing week for both their superiors.

Chancellorsville is the Refuge in Audacity trope.

Gettysburg's mistakes are thread on their own, but enough of them are Lee's to make me wonder how Longstreet managed to wait until his memoirs to vent.

And I think that's all that needs to be said to bring down his overall rating. Whether the Second Bull Run campaign was good by him or simply dumb by Pope is just a matter of "how much".

I'm not counting Maryland. Lee did get away with that, even if by all rights it should be a dethroning moment of suck.

Well, in the SBR Campaign there's no doubt that McClellan was hoping Pope would crack on his own, but even here Pope was able to withdraw from the field in good order, while it was his mistakes that gave Longstreet the opportunity he exploited. I'll note again that SBR is Lee's best campaign and best battle, and it's perhaps the only instance in the entire war where the mythological view of the ANV holds together, while I would give Chancellorsville to be more JEB Stuart's crowning moment of awesome. Given that the actual CS victory against Hooker there was on the second day and his actions led to it (namely seizing the one area in the Wilderness where artillery could be employed with due effect).

 

[Elfwine]

Well, in the SBR Campaign there's no doubt that McClellan was hoping Pope would crack on his own, but even here Pope was able to withdraw from the field in good order, while it was his mistakes that gave Longstreet the opportunity he exploited. I'll note again that SBR is Lee's best campaign and best battle, and it's perhaps the only instance in the entire war where the mythological view of the ANV holds together, while I would give Chancellorsville to be more JEB Stuart's crowning moment of awesome. Given that the actual CS victory against Hooker there was on the second day and his actions led to it (namely seizing the one area in the Wilderness where artillery could be employed with due effect).

Agreed on Stuart and Chancellorsville. Certainly more kudos to him there than to Jackson, whose flank march sounds awesome but wound up producing a lot less than one would have thought prior to said artillery position being taken.

And at such cost.


I don't know if its all Jackson's fault - part of it is, certainly - but his old division seems to have had terrible luck. Speaking as someone who has spent entirely too much time going over the ANV reorg between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, it is alarming how hard it is to find anyone to take the brigades of Jackson's old division other than the men Lee picked OTL - and even that involved some serious barrel scraping: the senior colonel, one of Early's staff officers and a alcoholic(?), a guy who hasn't seen field command for a year (and another one to command the division!), and a colonel from a regiment in another division.

What the hell. Seriously.



I definitely blame Lee for not making sure Jackson did something about making sure his old division, which never had every unit lead by an officer of full rank until after Gettysburg, had that problem fixed. It's not a huge deal, but it's one of those things that could not have helped its effectiveness as a fighting unit.

 

[dduff442]

Rubbish. A soldiers education doesn't end when he graduates from school. School only gives them the basic knowledge of how armies work, it doesn't give them the experiance, nor does it tell them everything.

McClellan learnt during the Mexican War was it was like to conduct military engineering while facing a hostile enemy and he learnt how to scout and perform reconaissance in actual war situation for Scott - the actual experiance of which West Point could never have compensated for - and many of his future ideas were decided in that conflict. He learned the effectiveness of flanking maneuvers and to prefer them over frontal assaults, he learnt the value of seige operations, he saw first hand the difficulties a military commander had to handle when dealing with politicians, learnt the value of maintaining good relations with the local population and the need to enforce discipline to gain it, and he also learnt to distain volunteer forces and militia but particularly political generals who cared nothing for the art of soldiering. These were things his West Point education had not taught him. In the peacetime after the Mexican War he gained experiance in fighting Indian, in engineering work around the country, in European Warfare as an observer during the Crimean War and he made friends with older and more experianced men who added to his education - not least of which was Joe Johnston who, not matter his record in the Civil War, was the most well read soldier of military tactics and strategy in North America during the 1850's.

That's just one example. The idea that education end when you graduate from school is ludicrous. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's fictional detective Sherlock Holmes once said "Education never ends, Watson. It is a series of lessons with the greatest for the last."

An how would a couple of years in staff college have destroyed these learning experiences?

How many things do you think are suitable to be picked up via on the job training? Logistics? Military Geography? Operations Research? The first and third of these could not be absorbed -- they required study, even in the nascent form they possessed then.

It's odd that you should select McClellan for particular praise. He was indeed a highly regarded officer who had been picked out for preparation for senior command. His actual conduct in office was nonetheless as haphazard as it was fitful and irresolute.

For example both he and Lincoln kept agitating for Buell to move his army in to East Tennessee in 1861-62. Strategically, this looked ideal. The sole practical confederate E-W rail link ran through there and the mining- and smallholder-dominated area was strongly pro-union.

But the idea of Buell moving along that axis instead of towards Nashville was a fantasy. As G.H. Thomas later explained when trying to move just 5,000 men through the area "the roads which were represented to me as good are the worst I ever seen". The roads were not only bad and unprepared, cutting up after the first few wagons had passed, they were also sparse so that parallel march routes didn't exist.

The countryside was also desperately poor. When the Confederate force of equal size retreated from Mill Springs towards Nashville it nearly starved en-route. There was no north-south rail connection or even any telegraph. All communications were by river... and that ran to confederate-held Nashville. There wasn't even a bridge over the Tennessee River. Thomas' force, a small fraction of the one McClellan wanted to send through the area, then had nothing in front of it except friendly country but still couldn't advance another mile. He couldn't have advanced unless he could have taught his men to eat coal. The much larger force McClellan wanted to dispatch there would simply have starved for a bit before turning around and marching back to its depot at Lebanon.

Buell knew all these things because he was on the spot. If McClellan possessed a functioning staff, or if he himself were capable of systematically applying even Berthier's methods of a half-century earlier he would have realised these things as well.

And as it turned out, no Western commander ever seriously considered advancing his force through the region against the grain of countryside having some of the poorest communications in the theatre.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Agreed on Stuart and Chancellorsville. Certainly more kudos to him there than to Jackson, whose flank march sounds awesome but wound up producing a lot less than one would have thought prior to said artillery position being taken.

And at such cost.


I don't know if its all Jackson's fault - part of it is, certainly - but his old division seems to have had terrible luck. Speaking as someone who has spent entirely too much time going over the ANV reorg between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, it is alarming how hard it is to find anyone to take the brigades of Jackson's old division other than the men Lee picked OTL - and even that involved some serious barrel scraping: the senior colonel, one of Early's staff officers and a alcoholic(?), a guy who hasn't seen field command for a year (and another one to command the division!), and a colonel from a regiment in another division.

What the hell. Seriously.



I definitely blame Lee for not making sure Jackson did something about making sure his old division, which never had every unit lead by an officer of full rank until after Gettysburg, had that problem fixed. It's not a huge deal, but it's one of those things that could not have helped its effectiveness as a fighting unit.

Well, there are a couple of mitigating circumstances there. The biggest of which is that due to the Valley Campaign Jackson was *the* CS hero of the actual war, overshadowing even Lee himself and this did not change until later when the Lost Cause overshadowed that older cult of personality. Overriding a victorious hero's decisions on a battlefield is never easy.

 

[Elfwine]

Well, there are a couple of mitigating circumstances there. The biggest of which is that due to the Valley Campaign Jackson was *the* CS hero of the actual war, overshadowing even Lee himself and this did not change until later when the Lost Cause overshadowed that older cult of personality. Overriding a victorious hero's decisions on a battlefield is never easy.

True. But Lee should have at least been able to influence Jackson making sure his corps ran smoothly off the battlefield.

 

[Snake Featherston]

True. But Lee should have at least been able to influence Jackson making sure his corps ran smoothly off the battlefield.

One of Lee's greatest defects as a commander was that he often proved unwilling to accept the responsibility to command. Sometimes a good general does have to say "Do this" and force his subordinates to do it, Lee never had that quality. It's why his subordinates dying in his battles was so damaging to his entire army all out of proportion to their actual numbers.

 

[Anaxagoras]

One of Lee's greatest defects as a commander was that he often proved unwilling to accept the responsibility to command. Sometimes a good general does have to say "Do this" and force his subordinates to do it, Lee never had that quality. It's why his subordinates dying in his battles was so damaging to his entire army all out of proportion to their actual numbers.

It's also why the oft-repeated suggestion that Lee be sent to take command of the Army of Tennessee would have been a disaster of awesome proportions. Can you imagine Lee with subordinates like Polk and Hindman?

 

[dduff442]

This from the person who claimed I said something directly opposite of what I said in regards to Burnside, where I ceded the point his experience pre-war is pretty much nil..

Just like Pope, McClellan, and Hooker, Lee's education ended with West Point. Pope, McClelan, Hooker, Lee all had additional experience of some significance during the Mexican-American War - but no additional education outside experience.

All four were far more than just "top class second lieutenants" based on their pre-ACW experience. Not just Lee.

I find it incredible that you can read exactly what I said to the point of copying it, typos included, and treat it as if they learned nothing between graduation and the ACW. No one seems to be arguing that they were equally good as Lee, but the idea that he was facing people who had learned nothing about soldiering outside WP is just. not. true.

I made no such claim. However the number of people who had *any* preparation for staff work was tiny. The numbers of competent people were so minute it left no room to choose between the Fredendalls and the Pattons. And the dozens of specialised staff officers a Prussian commander would have crewed his HQ with didn't exist.

On officer who might have filled such a role was indeed Meade:

"Meade served in the Mexican-American War, assigned to the staffs of Generals Zachary Taylor, William J. Worth, and Robert Patterson, and was brevetted to first lieutenant for gallant conduct at the Battle of Monterrey. After that war he was chiefly involved in lighthouse and breakwater construction and coastal surveying in Florida and New Jersey. He designed Barnegat Light on Long Beach Island, Absecon Light in Atlantic City, Cape May Light in Cape May, Jupiter Inlet Light in Jupiter, Florida, and Sombrero Key Light in the Florida Keys. He also designed a hydraulic lamp that was adopted by the Lighthouse Board for use in American lighthouses. He was promoted to captain in 1856.

In 1857, Meade relieved Lt. Col. James Kearney on the Lakes Survey mission of the Great Lakes.... Meade stayed with the Lakes Survey until the 1861 outbreak of the Civil War...

Meade was promoted from captain to brigadier general of volunteers on August 31, 1861, a few months after the start of the Civil War..."

Bu instead of undertaking the survey work at which he had extensive experience, the one-time courier on Zachary Taylor's staff found himself in command of the army...

 

[Snake Featherston]

It's also why the oft-repeated suggestion that Lee be sent to take command of the Army of Tennessee would have been a disaster of awesome proportions. Can you imagine Lee with subordinates like Polk and Hindman?

Well, there's no doubt it would have been a great move....for Abraham Lincoln.

 

[Nytram01]

An how would a couple of years in staff college have destroyed these learning experiences?

How many things do you think are suitable to be picked up via on the job training? Logistics? Military Geography? Operations Research? The first and third of these could not be absorbed -- they required study, even in the nascent form they possessed then.

It's odd that you should select McClellan for particular praise. He was indeed a highly regarded officer who had been picked out for preparation for senior command. His actual conduct in office was nonetheless as haphazard as it was fitful and irresolute.

Seriously, I'm not debating whether McClellan was or was not a good general - I'm sure 67th Tigers will do that soon enough and I couldn't care enough about him to comment one way or the other these days - my point was only that McClellan didn't stop learning things just because he wasn't going to West Point anymore.

Your contention that, essentially, it is impossible that McClellan, Burnside, Pope or Hooker could possibly learn anything after graduating from West Point that could improve their military education is absurd.

The only difference between Lee and McClellan where their education is concerned was age. Lee graduated from 2nd in his class at West Point in 1829, McClellan graduated 2nd in his class in 1846.

Lee did not return to school at any point after his graduation from West Point, he didn't have any further official education, any further education he had was recieved through first hand experiance in the US Army, baring a period spent as a civilian. The only time Lee ever returned to the offical US Military educational system was when he became superintendant of West Point himself, and that was to teach, not to learn.

McClellan likewise did not return to school after graduating from West Point, and any further education he recieved in military art was through first hand experiance baring a period spent as a civilian.

That Lee took different leasons from his experiances than McClellan did is a mark of the different experiences theyt had and the differences between them as people.

And as far as I'm aware there was no US Staff Colllege in the 1850's. The official Staff College at Fort Leavenworth was first opened in 1881, the School of Advanced Military Studies first opened in 1983, the Army War College was first opened in 1901 and the Warrant Officer Career College was first opened in 1993. So, pray tell, where exactly was McClellan supposed to go to learn more about staff work?

 

[dduff442]

@Nytram

You're misrepresenting my point of view. What I said was that their education ended at West Point (fact) and that only a hand full had been given personal attention by the likes of Scott who had experience in these matters, Lee and McClellan among them ("Lee was one of only a handful with staff experience", also fact).

I'm sure they all strived to learn what they could. But there are some things that will be difficult or impossible to learn without an appropriate theoretical grounding. Why don't you list off those officers -- more than a hand full in number -- whom you regard as ideally prepared for the most senior levels of command?

 

[Nytram01]

@Nytram

You're misrepresenting my point of view. What I said was that their education ended at West Point (fact) and that only a hand full had been given personal attention by the likes of Scott who had experience in these matters, Lee and McClellan among them ("Lee was one of only a handful with staff experience", also fact).

I'm sure they all strived to learn what they could. But there are some things that will be difficult or impossible to learn without an appropriate theoretical grounding. Why don't you list off those officers -- more than a hand full in number -- whom you regard as ideally prepared for the most senior levels of command?

There weren't any except Scott. Even the best generals of the Civil War - Grant, Thomas, etc - weren't ideally prepared for senior command when war broke out and had to learn on the job. Everyone made mistakes as they came to grips with the levels of responsibility none had ever handled before with armies bigger than any ever seen in the history of their nation.

 

[dduff442]

There weren't any except Scott. Even the best generals of the Civil War - Grant, Thomas, etc - weren't ideally prepared for senior command when war broke out and had to learn on the job. Everyone made mistakes as they came to grips with the levels of responsibility none had ever handled before with armies bigger than any ever seen in the history of their nation.

Well that's my point exactly.

I did mention West Point's exacting academic standards. But it was still a school for junior officers whose skills might at a stretch scale to brigade level but certainly no higher. Some had benefited from Scott's etc. attention, though not Pope, Burnside, Meade etc. and only a very few. Grant seemed to pick up a surprising amount in between serving customers in his brother's store and drinking himself to death, but he was the exception.

So it is no insult to the collection of Captains and Majors of the recent past whom Lee faced to suggest they were grossly under prepared. McClellan was the outstanding candidate by miles but if you look at poorer countries around the world and how abysmally many have fared under "Harvard educated economist" X or "ENA trained" Y you'll see the problems that arise when the pool of qualified candidates is too small. And that's without even going into the qualities of the staff McClellan had working for him, many of whom would have needed skills comparable with McClellan himself for his team to be effective.

McClellan was the only qualified candidate and it proved he was like a clone of Fredendall: someone whose practical abilities bore no relationship to his skill in selling those abilities to others.

Lee wasn't responsible for his adversaries' incompetence, but this cannot be discounted when assessing the challenges he faced or his merits as a commander.

 

[dduff442]

Seeing as the point about scale doesn't seem to be coming across, consider:

A battalion on the march with a couple of cannon under tow. The rifles' range is around 4-600m and the cannon's effective range is ~1200m. The whole column is around 400m if they march 4 abreast and will pass a given spot in around 5 mins. All elements are within a couple of minutes of the commander's position and most are within earshot. Moreover, the entire column is shorter than the range of the infantryman's weapon and only a small fraction of the range of the cannon.

Consider instead a corps of 30,000. The rifles and cannon still have the same range. But now the column will take a day to march past. Recon info and orders may take hours to be relayed. If the body is split into separate march columns, altering the axis of advance may be difficult or impossible. Will a given order, for instance, reach column X before the head of the column has passed the crossroads at Y? Who knows? What can be said that if it does arrive, it won't be possible for column X to turn around without being thrown into confusion. Most importantly, the length of the column now bears no relationship to the ranges of the weapons employed.

These are problems of totally different sorts and West Point was not designed to give officers any training whatsoever in the latter.

 

[dduff442]

"What can be said that if it does arrive..." -> "What can be said that if the order does arrive late..."

 

[Snake Featherston]

Well that's my point exactly.

I did mention West Point's exacting academic standards. But it was still a school for junior officers whose skills might at a stretch scale to brigade level but certainly no higher. Some had benefited from Scott's etc. attention, though not Pope, Burnside, Meade etc. and only a very few. Grant seemed to pick up a surprising amount in between serving customers in his brother's store and drinking himself to death, but he was the exception.

So it is no insult to the collection of Captains and Majors of the recent past whom Lee faced to suggest they were grossly under prepared. McClellan was the outstanding candidate by miles but if you look at poorer countries around the world and how abysmally many have fared under "Harvard educated economist" X or "ENA trained" Y you'll see the problems that arise when the pool of qualified candidates is too small. And that's without even going into the qualities of the staff McClellan had working for him, many of whom would have needed skills comparable with McClellan himself for his team to be effective.

McClellan was the only qualified candidate and it proved he was like a clone of Fredendall: someone whose practical abilities bore no relationship to his skill in selling those abilities to others.

Lee wasn't responsible for his adversaries' incompetence, but this cannot be discounted when assessing the challenges he faced or his merits as a commander.

At the same time there is the risk of over-emphasizing the point. Lee faced incompetent opponents, but proved able to repeatedly transform that incompetence into victories. That still requires a skill set that can be hard to match until he meets someone that doesn't make those mistakes. And George Meade was that someone.

 

[Elfwine]

I made no such claim. However the number of people who had *any* preparation for staff work was tiny. The numbers of competent people were so minute it left no room to choose between the Fredendalls and the Pattons. And the dozens of specialised staff officers a Prussian commander would have crewed his HQ with didn't exist.

Your claim is that their education stopped with West Point. So did Lee's. Except by the definition of education Nytram is using (and I'll let you work that out with him). All of them had to learn how to do this without special education and the kind of training that actual staff academies or West Point preparing anyone to handle over company command would have involved. Some showed such understanding, at least to a point, in the Mexican-War, some early in the ACW, some both.