Comrade Harps Fry of South Africa special (alongeside the previous Tempest II and Starfighter)
Stephen Fry Pt 2: Grumman F11F-3 Tiger
Description
Link:
www.whatifmodellers.com/index.…
Grumman F11F-3 Tiger
a/c 302/S, 2 Squadron, SAAF
Dakhla, Spanish Sahara, 12 August 1958
Personal mount of Captain Stephen Fry
The deck career of Grumman's F11F-1 Tiger was brief. Operated from US Navy flattops as a stop-gap fighter until the introduction of Vought F8U Crusaders, the Tiger served with Navy combat units for just 5 years. Rapidly consigned to advanced training duties by the Navy, the US Marine Corps nethertheless found an ongoing frontline niche for the Tiger. Over 8 years, the USMC used their fighter-bomber F11F-2s in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Cheap, efficient and supersonic in level flight, the Grumman gave every appearance of being an export winner, but several factors worked against it. As a land-based fighter-bomber, the export oriented F11F-3 had the unfortunate position of being available at a time when it was competing against established high-end subsonic types (like the Dassault Canada Mystere IV, Canadair Sabre 6, the CAC CA-27 Sabre and the F-86H Sabre) and the first generation of supersonics (such as the F-100, F-104 and the Super Mystere, all of which were faster). Used to selling their products to naval operators, Grumman's marketing team failed to impress air forces with their F11F-3 sales pitch.
Brigadier Brian Boyle of the SAAF was an ace, with 5 kills credited to him in 1943-44. A highly regarded pilot and officer, in January 1953 he was assigned the duty of leading a team to define the SAAF's fighter requirements over the next ten years. After a tour of briefings, displays and test flights at leading aircraft manufacturers in Canada and the US, Boyle presented his report in July. The Decadal Fighter Evaluation Report, better known as The Boyle Report, recommended a two-stage procurement strategy. The first stage was referred to as The Interim Supersonic Fighter. Detailing how many of the emerging generation of supersonic fighters were immature platforms with questionable reliability, safety and delivery schedules, Boyle recommended the adoption of a low risk interim solution. Although it was yet to have its first flight, the Report noted that the aircraft that best met requirements was the Grumman F11F-3 Tiger. Differing from the Navy and Marine versions in lacking carrier-specific equipment, such as folding wings, the dash 3 was tailored to airfield operations. Although it retained the arrestor hook of the carrier versions, the -3 replaced the retractable tail bumper with a chaff/flare cartridge pack. Thanks to its lighter but stronger wings, it also featured wingtip Sidewinder rails. The Report noted that the Tiger was a "modest iteration" of Grumman's successful F9F series, represented a "conservative" engineering risk and promised to be the most maneuverable of the UN's first generation of supersonic fighters. Significantly, if acquired directly from the Grumman production line, it could be in combat with the SAAF by early 1957. This assessment proved to be accurate; although the F-100 Super Sabre was technically in USAF squadron service before the F11F-3, the dash 3 Tiger beat the North American product into combat service. The second stage was what Boyle labeled The 1960 Mach 2 Fighter. Acknowledging the SAAF staff's preference for single seat, single engine fighters, the Boyle Report eschewed detailed discussion of the F4H Phantom II and recommended in-depth evaluations of the F-104 and Mirage III. Brigadier Boyle would later recommend the Mirage, but the selection of the F-104E to be followed by the F-104G would be a political one assisted by a spectacular measure of corruption. However, with this scandal still in the future, 120 F11F-3 Tigers were duly ordered from Grumman's Bethpage factory.
The F11F-3 Tiger was not Stephen Fry's first jet fighter. That milestone would go to a Koolhoven-built F-86F. After a secondment flying Tempest FB.21s with the Free Spanish Air Force, Fry was assigned to an instructor pilot position. Following a course on the T-33A jet trainer, He converted to the Sabre and taught others how to employ the swept wing fighter as a weapons system. In 1956 he switched to the new F11F-3 Tiger, being a member of the first cadre of SAAF pilots to train on the type. In October 1956 Fry joined 2 Squadron as its Qualified Weapons Officer and deployed to the frontline in March 57. 2 Squadron would fly the Tiger as a fighter-bomber, while 1 Squadron (which had simultaneously converted to the new mount) would fly it purely as a fighter. 7 Squadron and 11 Squadron SAAF would also take the Tiger into combat over North Africa.
Fry would have a turbulent experience flying the F11F-3. He would be credited with five victories, but would be shot down twice (once after flack damage, once after cannon damage from a Socialist Algerian Fresco), use the tail hook for a wheels-up landing at an emergency airstrip and be forced to eject from another Tiger after running out of fuel. That time he landed in a contested region and shot at several of the Senegalese Tirailleurs (French speaking black Africans serving on behalf of the Free French) that had been dispatched to rescue him. He continued to evade friendlies until an all-white Free French Foreign Legion patrol found him. He did much better when being rescued by white helicopter crews.
A rundown of Fry's credited victories in the F11F-3 Tiger follows:
- 16 April 1957: Socialist Union Fresco A, with AIM-9B
- 5 August 1957: Socialist Moroccan Fluffy D, with AIM-9B and cannon
- 23 August 1957: Hungarian Farmer C with AIM-9B
- 7 June 1958; Basque Fluffy F, cannon kill
- 13 June 1958: Socialist Algerian Farmer C with AIM-9B
Stephen Fry would go on to fly, fight and kill in F-104E Starfighters and F-101E Voodoos. In the latter, he committed what has been described as a war crime.
The model depicts Captain Fry's aircraft, 302/S, as it was photographed on 12 August 1958. Armed with four 20mm cannon, two LAU-3 rocket pods and two AIM-9B Sidewinders, the plane is prepared for a flak suppression sortie. UN documents record that 2 Squadron SAAF took part in Operation Offer 33 that day, an attack mission against Red logistical targets in and around Marrakech, Socialist Morocco. In fierce fighting, the Reds lost 5 planes (but only 1 pilot KIA), while the UN lost 8 planes shot down (7 aircrew POW, 3 KIA and 2 rescued). One of the UN planes lost that day was this aircraft, Captain Fry being forced to eject when his flak-damaged engine lost power south of Angarf. He was gratefully picked up by the all white crew of a Canadian CH-126 rescue chopper.
Fry of Sth Africa Pt.4: McDonnell F-101E Voodoo
Description
Link:
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McDonnell F-101E Voodoo
a/c 604 24 Squadron, South African Air Force (SAAF)
Air Force Base Waterkloof, 13 October 1966
Crew: Kommandant Stephen Fry (pilot) and Luitenant Jan Hendrik de Beer (navigator)
By the mid-1950s, the USAF's all-weather attack aviation aspirations were proving to be problematic. The Century Series aircraft were not designed to meet the ever-growing requirements demanded by the Bomber Mafia within the Pentagon and the next-generation of all-weather attack platforms were still years away. Meanwhile, the existing interdiction bomber force of B-57 Canberras and B-66 Destroyers were rapidly becoming obsolete for the job of penetrating Red airspace. With vision outstripping hardware, the frustrations of Air Force Generals resulted in a bewildering series of programs, many of which were seen as interim solutions pending the availability of the Republic F-105 Thunderchief and the North American B-72 Storm. But with these experiencing prolonged delays and elements in Congress demanding rationalisation by way of the USAF joining the Navy's A-5 and A-6 programs, the USAF went looking for immediate in-house solutions.
Two such interim solutions were the F-101D and E models of McDonnell's Voodoo. These were based on McDonnell proposals intended to compete with the F-105. However, the USAF saw them as low-risk ways of producing all-weather attack combat mass whilst it waited for the Thunderchief and Storm to mature into reliable combat platforms. Both versions leveraged the work done with the NF-101A, a test-bed for the General Electric J-79 turbojet. The modification of the F-101 to accept the J-79 was straightforward and trials indicated that the engine/airframe combination was a successful one. Compared to the J-57s in production Voodoos, the shorter J-79 provided greater power at a lighter weight and reduced fuel consumption. The new engine thus offered the basis for a longer-ranged and more heavily armed generation of Voodoos. For the attack bomber role, the Voodoo's internal missile bay was replaced by a fuel tank or a cannon installation, of which 2 types were produced: a bulged pod containing 4 20mm M39 cannon or, from 1962 (and as seen here), a cannon pack featuring a single 20mm M61A1 Vulcan. The small fuselage strakes originally added to deal with turbulence from the rotary missile platform were retained to eliminate the likelihood of gun gas ingestion by the engines. For avionics, the D and E models used a mix of existing Voodoo gear and off-the-shelf equipment from other programs, including the Autonetics NASARR F15A-41B radar and Liton L-3 INS used in the export-only F-104G. An external bomb load could be carried underwing or beneath the fuselage on multiple or triple ejector racks. Drop tanks were usually fitted under the fuselage, but could also occupy the 2 underwing hardpoints. The F-101D was a single-seat version for the day attack role, while the F-101E was a two-seat model for night attack, including Denied Area Mobile Interdiction Techniques (DAMIT) missions. Promising to be in combat service before any F-105, B-72 or F-106E (itself an interim type), 450 F-101Ds were ordered alongside 350 F-101Es.
The D and E model Voodoos entered service in early 1959, several months after the F-105B, but the latter was plagued with problems. Replacing a variety of types, the first squadrons equipped with the new Voodoos went into combat in December. At the time, F-105Bs were being held in reserve in the US due to limited capabilities, excessive maintenance demands and a high attrition rate. Only 2 squadrons would take the F-105B into action and their combat record was poor compared to the J-79 powered Voodoos. In late 1961 the F-105D was finally cleared for combat, but only after several incidents had led to grounding orders. By comparison, the McDonnell bombers had been produced on budget, delivered on time and progressed through their test and training programs on schedule. By undertaking a focused, low risk upgrade of a mature platform, the USAF had (unusually) achieved its stated goals. After being replaced in frontline units by F-105Ds, F-106Es B-72Ds, 46 Ds were converted into RC-101D reconnaissance aircraft and 60 Es were modified into EF-101E electronic warfare platforms. Equipped with radar homing gear, the latter saw action in the Wild Weasel role, using jamming technology, CBUs and AGM-45A Shrikes to engage Red radars. The last RF-101D last retired in by the USAF in 1969 and the final EF-101Es lingered on with the USAF Reserve as EW aggressors until 1980.
South Africa was the only export customer for the F-101E. 45 were delivered to equip 21 and 24 Squadrons for use against Red targets in the Maghreb, with a further 37 delivered as attrition replacements between 1962 and 64. From 1962, all were equipped with the Buttermilk One radar warning system and associated Amasi One internal ECM, both made by the Johannesburg-based electronics company, Airborn. The forward antenna and associated black boxes for these displaced the nose-mounted refueling probe, which was replaced with a retractable unit attached to the port side of the forward fuselage. Armed with M117 and Mk.82 bombs and a variety of cluster munitions, they saw action against the Reds in North Africa during 1961, 62 and 63. By the end of 1963, the growing number of newly independent black majority governments in Africa had made it politically difficult for the armed forces of South Africa's Apartheid regime to operate under UN authority throughout much of the continent. From 1964, the SAAF was confined to deployments in support of white minority governments like those in Rhodesia and the Free Portuguese and Free Spanish colonies. The SAAF Voodoos continued to see action against black independence forces
through the auspices of the Salisbury Alliance until the Azanian Revolution of 1967. Signed in 1962, the Salisbury Alliance provided a framework for cooperation in the fields of defence, economics and diplomacy by the governments of the Free Portuguese Empire, the Free Spanish Empire, Rhodesia and South Africa.
In June 1966, the Free Portuguese Empire launched Operation Gordian Knot. A 7 month campaign against the Mozambique Liberation Army (MLA), it targeted bases and training camps in the liberated zones of northern Mozambique and attempted to close the Tanzanian border crossings used by the insurgents. As the Free Portuguese forces were too few in number to execute the Operation themselves, Rhodesian and South African air and ground assets fought alongside the colonial troops. Using guerrilla tactics, the MLA drew their enemies into a quagmire of hit-and-run ambushes, minefields, sporadic mortar attacks, sniper fire and IEDs. Choosing when to fight and when to withdraw, the MLA opened new fronts further south and often retreated across the border into Tanzanian sanctuaries. The latter tactic brought pressure to conduct attacks against the MLA's Tanzanian bases. This brought to the fore a major rift within the UN. The UN Secretary General was calling for a peaceful decolonisation process in Mozambique and many of its African members supported the conservative MIM and MLA as counters to the growing Mozambican Marxist threat. By contrast, the signatories to the Salisbury Alliance (also members of the UN) had no intention of giving up their power. A major miscalculation was in the offing.
Believing that the Tanzanian government would not intervene, on 13 October 1966, the Salisbury Alliance mounted Operation About Time against MLA sanctuaries in Tanzania. Planned so as to inflict maximum casualties, About Time sought to engage major MLA bases in Tanzania through a combined arms operation planned to last 5 days. It involved an intensive bombing campaign supported by ground troops whose job it was to seal off escape routes and call in artillery and air strikes. The conduct of the F-101E equipped 7 and 24 Squadrons SAAF were critical to the plan, providing a heavy day and night strike capability against enemy bases and troop concentrations. To execute their targets, the Voodoo crews strafed and delivered bombs, napalm and cluster munitions against MLA positions. Other aircraft involved in About Time included Free Portuguese and Rhodesian GAF-built Canberra bombers, Free Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African F-104G Starfighters (built by Koolhoven in SouthAfrica), SAAF Sparrowhawks (the combat version of the Atlas Hawk jet trainer), plus an assortment of airborne FACs, helicopters and transports.
About Time was launched to coincide with anniversary celebrations that commemorated the foundation of the MLA. Throughout the day on 13 October, the MLA held a series of parades, speeches, meetings and live fire drills at their bases in Tanzania. That night, at its 3 main Tanzanian bases, music concerts were held and these were targeted by the Voodoo crews of 24 Sqn SAAF to open the offensive. Coming in low and fast, the F-101Es each dropped 8 CBU-49s and strafed with their 20mm Vulcan cannon. No resistance was met and the casualties were over 1,000, including Tanzanian civilians, politicians and military personnel.
Not surprisingly, the remainder of About Time was characterised by vigorous Tanzanian resistance. Tanzanian Air Force (TAF) F-86F Sabres and Mirage 5Ts contested the foreign incursions, resulting in several dog fights. A TAF Sabre was shot down by a Portuguese Koolhoven made F-104G Starfighter, and a Free Portuguese Canberra and a SAAF F-104G were shot down by Tanzanian Mirage pilots. Notably, the Tanzanian air defenders had the advantage of being assisted in their operations by Royal Australian Navy (RAN) airpower from HMAS Brisbane, which was off the east African coast at the time. RAN fighter controllers in E-2A Hawkeyes (escorted by F-8E Crusaders) tracked adversary aircraft and directed TAF fighters into intercept positions. Ironically, the RAN was in the area following exercises with the Salisbury Alliance and were thus able to use their knowledge of adversary tactics to help the Tanzanians. Forced to fight the UN-backed Tanzanian armed forces, About Time's schedule was derailed, its scope contracted, most of its objectives unmet and the Salisbury Alliance experienced higher casualty numbers than anticipated.
The aftermath of Operation About Time was devastating for the Salisbury Alliance. Appalled by the severity of the attacks, the UN imposed sanctions on the Free Portuguese Empire, Rhodesia and South Africa, the latter government falling to the Anzanian Revolution in 1967. White control over Rhodesia would last until 1974, out of which the Zimbabwe would form, but only after a 2 year armed struggle between UN-backed and Anzanian-backed guerillas saw the latter victorious. The Free Portuguese Empire officially lost control over Mozambique in 1975, but by then authority in the colony was fragmented between the UN, the MLA or Anzanian-backed Reds. The latter would take over the country in 1978, overseas UN forces having withdrawn in 1977.
This F-101E Voodoo of 24 Squadron SAAF is modeled as photographed on 13 October 1966, the opening night of Operation About Time. It is armed with 8 SUU-30 cluster bomb dispensers, plus 2 AIM-9B Sidewinders for self defence. It wears the camouflage of dark brown and tan adopted by the SAAF Voodoos in 1964. This scheme reflected the change from exclusively night combat missions against the Reds in the Maghreb to both night and day COIN missions in southern Africa. However, in October 1966, many of their MERs, TERs and Sidewinder launch shoes were still painted black, as per the previous camouflage. The yellow low-voltage formation lights were a recent addition to the aircraft. Pooling their aircraft, 21 Sqn specialised in daylight missions (and OCU duties), with 24 Sqn focused on nocturnal flying. The Voodoo force was grounded following the Anzanian Revolution and the aircraft scrapped in the early 1970s.
Kommandant Stephen Fry (pilot) and Luitenant Jan Hendrik de Beer (navigator) were the crew of 604 on the night of 13 October 1966. Attacking an area target and not expecting any surface-to-air resistance, 604 was armed with 8 CBU-49s (SUU-30 dispensers with BLU-59 bomblets). A pair of AIM-9Bs were carried for self-defence, but the TAF was caught napping and no contacts were made with Tanzanian fighters. Both Fry and de Beer would leave South Africa as the Apartheid government fell, de Beer ultimately moving to Australia. Fry joined the Free Spanish Empire Air Force as a civilian advisor.
But yeah, looking again now they don't bother using numbers in the name, it's more a build version number.
